This chapter explores how the ASEAN Charter has changed or will change ASEAN in four areas: (1) democracy; (2) human rights cooperation; (3) becoming a more rules-based organization; and (4) organizational structure. It will not attempt to examine how the Charter is going to change the member states of ASEAN. That important but highly sensitive question will have to be addressed by each member state concerned.

DEMOCRACY IN ASEAN

As an inter-governmental organization, ASEAN is actually very democratic. Just look at the following evidence: sovereign equality as one of the principles (Article 2, Paragraph 2a of the Charter); every member state is equal in representation and participation in ASEAN; annual rotation of the ASEAN chairmanship; no weighted voting right or veto power; decision-making by consultation and consensus; and equal contribution to the annual operational budget of the ASEAN Secretariat, etc.

Sovereign equality begets non-interference. But non-interference cannot be absolute when a state joins a regional grouping like ASEAN and takes part in its community-building endeavour. Hence the Charter includes two new principles: “shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity” (Article 2, Paragraph 2b) and “enhanced consultations on matters seriously affecting the common interest of ASEAN” (Article 2, Paragraph 2g). All the principles in Article 2 must be accepted and upheld as a whole set. No member state can pick and choose to highlight some principles and ignore the rest.

Unlike the EU, ASEAN has never prescribed any political criteria of its membership. The Charter's Article 6 on Admission of New Members merely lists the following: (a) geographical location in Southeast Asia; (b) recognition by all ASEAN member states; (c) agreement to be bound and to abide by the Charter; and (d) ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of membership.

Consequently, ASEAN may be the only inter-governmental organization in the world with such amazing political diversity.

Yala Province:

1. Asasuddin, Muang.

2. Alawiyah, Bannangsta.

3. Thamma Wittaya Mullanithi, Muang.

4. Phatana Wittaya, Muang.

5. Phatana Islam Wittaya, Muang.

6. Suksawad Wittaya, Yaha.

7. Islahiyah, Muang.

Pattani Province:

1. Bamrung Islam, Muang.

2. Triam Sueksa, Muang.

3. Mahad Darul-Maarif, Muang.

4. Azizsathan, Khokpho.

5. Sasanupatham, Muang.

6. Wattanatham Islam Phoming, Panareh.

7. Al-Islamiyah Wittaya, Yarang.

8. Sasana Samakki, Nongchik.

9. Ratprachanukroh, Thung yang Daeng.

Narathiwat Province:

1. Darussalam, Rangeh.

2. Attarkiyah Islamiyah, Muang.

3. Buranah Islam Tokno, Muang.

4. Sengtham Wittaya, Sungaipadi.

5. Suksan Sasana, Muang.

6. Samanmit Wittaya, Yingo.

Name of Schools in Yala (and foundation):

1. Darul Ulum Nibong Baru (Yayasan Darul Ulum Nibong Baru), Muang, Yala.

2. Tarbiartul Watan Mulniti (Yayasan Al-amin), Muang, Yala.

3. Thama Wittaya Mulniti (Islam Wittaya Foundation), Muang, Yala.

4. Prathib Wittaya (Yayasan Misbahhulmunir), Muang, Yala.

5. Pattana Wittaya (Yayasan Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Yala), Muang, Yala.

6. Pattana Islam Wittaya (Yayasan Lutfi), Muang, Yala.

7. Sateri Islam Wittaya Mulniti (Yayasan Islam Wittaya), Muang, Yala.

8. Asasuddin Wittaya (Yayasan Muhamadi), Muang, Yala.

9. Darulhuda Wittaya (Yayasan Darulhuda), Raman, Yala.

10. Ma'had Islamiah (Yayasan Islam Suksa Bala), Raman, Yala.

11. Ma'had Dakwah Islamiah (Yayasan Islam Taklokhala), Raman, Yala.

12. Srifarida Baru Wittaya (Yayasan al-Ansar), Raman, Yala.

13. Suksawat Wittaya (Yayasan Suksawat Islam Wittaya), Yaha, Yala.

14. Islam Bachok Wittaya (Yayasan Islam Bachok Wittaya), Bannansetar, Yala.

15. Alawiyah Wittaya (Yayasan Abukar), Bannansetar, Yala.

16. Khairiah Wittaya Mulniti (Yayasan Muslim Thai-Muslim Betong), Betong, Yala.

Name of Schools in Narathiwat (and foundation):

1. Sukkan Sart Wittaya (Yayasan Sekolah Sukkan Sart Wittaya), Muang, Narathiwat.

2. Attarkiah Islamiah (Yayasan Islam Untuk Pendidikan), Muang, Narathiwat.

3. Islam Burana Toknor (Yayasan Islam Burana Toknor), Muang, Narathiwat.

4. Pattana Sart Wittaya (Yayasasan Kebajikan Dan pendididkan), Muang, Narathiwat.

5. Prathip Wittaya (Yayasan Aukaf al-Misbah), Ranget, Narathiwat.

6. Darussalam (Yayasan Darussalam), Ranget, Narathiwat.

7. Nahdhatulsubban (Yayasan Islam Untuk Pendidikan dan Kebajikan), Rusok, Narathiwat.

8. Siritham Wittaya (Yayasan Siritham Wittaya), Bachok, Narathiwat.

9. Darul Qurannulkarim (Yayasan Al-iman), Yingo, Narathiwat.

10. Jariatam Wittaya (Yayasan Jariatam Wittaya), Weang, Narathiwat.

11. Rahmaniah (Yayasan Sekolah Rahmaniah), Weang, Narathiwat.

12. Seangtham Wittaya Mulniti (Yayasan Seangtham Wittaya), Sungai Golok, Narathiwat.

13. Nuruddin (Yayasan Nuruddin), Takbai, Narathiwat.

Name of Schools in Pattani (and foundation):

1. Bamrung Islam (Yayasan Sokongan Pendidikan Seklah Bamrung Islam), Muang, Pattani. (This school is run by Dr.Ismail Lutfi).

2. Triam Suksa Wittya (Yayasan Untuk Pendidikan Sekolah Triam Suksa Wittya), Muang, Pattani.

3. Wattana Tham Islam (Yayasan Sekolah Wattana Tham Islam Pombing), Panaret, Pattani.

4. Anjamiah Al-Islamiah (Yayasan Sokongan Kebajikan Kampung Maruat), Panaret, Pattani.

5. Sart Sukksa (Yayasan Sekolah Sart Untuk Pendidikan), Saiburi, Pattani.

6. Samartdi Wittaya (Yayasan Sekolah Samartdi Wittaya Untuk Pendidikan), Saiburi, Pattani.

7. Saiburi Islam Wittaya (Yayasan Sekolah Saiburi Islam Wittya Untuk Pendidikan), Saiburi, Pattani.

8. Darunsat Wittaya (Masjid Darul Nasi-iin), Saiburi, Pattani.

9. Arunsart Wittaya (Yayasan Untuk Pendidikan Sekolah Arunsart Wittaya), Saiburi, Pattani.

10. Mulniti Aziztan (Yayasan Aziztanusorn), Khok Po, Pattani.

11. Songsermsart (Yayasan Abdulkadir Al-Qadi Littarbawi), Yaring, Pattani.

Islamic education in southern Thailand has not been the subject of much scholarly attention and analysis as few have gone to print on it — whether in the English, Malay, or Thai languages. Currently, Hasan Madmarn's work on Islamic schools in Pattani, The Pondok and Madrasah in Pattani, stands out as the only book-length investigation of this phenomenon published in the English language. For that reason alone it remains a path-breaking study and a valuable contribution to our understanding of a very dynamic, yet reclusive, social-religious institution. The value of Madmarn's contribution is undoubtedly augmented by the fact that he himself was a product of the traditional pondok (Islamic school), an institution that remains the heartbeat of Thai Malay-Muslim culture and identity, even in this age of globalization. Madmarn's book provides important historical information about the development of the pondok in southern Thailand, as well as its gradual ascent to a position of eminence as a bastion of Islamic scholarship in Muslim Southeast Asia.

While it provides insight into the traditional curriculum in Islamic schools, Madmarn's laudable effort is by and large descriptive in nature. Little attempt is made to analyse and interrogate the much-vaunted legacy of traditional Islamic education in southern Thailand against the political context in which it is located, or to uncover the tensions and antinomies inherent in southern Thailand's dynamic Muslim society, which I suggest have both framed and been framed by Islamic education. By skirting these more complex issues, Muslim society is inadvertently portrayed as a somewhat monolithic entity when in fact it is deeply divided between forces of tradition, reform, and modernity. To be fair, Madmarn does hint at these cleavages when he introduces the madrasah as an alternative to the traditional pondok, but ultimately, the implications of its emergence on the overall landscape of Islamic education in the South is skirted.

Aside from Madmarn's work, broader studies on Muslim society, particularly of the Malay-Muslim southern provinces have touched on various aspects of Islamic education. The work of Michel Gilquin, Wan Kadir Che Man, Surin Pitsuwan, Uthai Dulyakasem, and Raymond Scupin come immediately to mind, as does a Ph.D. dissertation written in English by Ibrahim Narongraksakhet, available in the libraries of Universiti Malaya and Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus.

ATIGA AND ACIA — IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS FOR BUSINESS

The ATIGA and ACIA are important developments in ASEAN for the business community:

1. • They consolidate many existing agreements thereby providing more coherence and transparency for business;

2. • They have been improved and modernized to address the complex linkages needed for doing business in an integrated market; and

3. • They provide more policy certainty for business by fleshing out how ASEAN intends to build its single market.

THE INFORMATION CHALLENGE

Even though they are not entirely new, the agreements contain a huge amount of information of policy significance to business and it will not be easy for business to absorb this information and assess the new opportunities that can emerge.

It is vital that ASEAN governments, the ASEAN Secretariat and the business community address the information gap very quickly. The gap needs to be filled through better access to information, information that can be understood by business, and socialization of that information.

Some ASEAN countries have built websites specifically for business and they are very helpful. However, not all developing countries in ASEAN have the capacity to duplicate these types of websites and that may not be an effective use of resources for much of the information about ASEAN. Rather, the ASEAN Secretariat should be the information hub of the emerging economic community. It should be provided with sufficient funds and resources to build a single business Web portal that can be supplemented by government and business in individual countries.

ASEAN documents must be translated into a language and format that is useful and practical for business, especially for smaller and medium sized firms who may not be as familiar with analysing formal international agreements.

At present, it is difficult to design socialization programmes for business with information in the current format. And with only six years to go before the AEC is to go into full effect, there is an urgent need for more socialization for business in ASEAN on a significant scale.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Islamic education in Southeast Asia was not a topic of great scholarly or policy urgency. Although a few anthropologists recognized that Islamic boarding schools in Java, Malaysia, and southern Thailand played an important role in religious learning and the sustenance of local religious identities, the general assumption was that Islamic schooling was so incapable of keeping up with the demands of the modern age that it was just a matter of time before it was pushed from the national scene. In an otherwise thoughtful essay, one of today's most perceptive observers of Islamic affairs in Southeast Asia reached just such a pessimistic conclusion about the future of the Javanese variant of the Islamic boarding school known as the pesantren, writing, “The pesantren has enjoyed an unusually long life for a traditional school, but it may finally be threatened with disappearance.”

As it turns out, like its southern Thai counterpart, the Javanese pesantren did not disappear. Rather, like Islamic education across most of Muslim Southeast Asia, it has flourished and diversified since the great resurgence in Islamic piety of the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, however, Muslim educational institutions are no longer seen as quaintly irrelevant institutions. Since the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. and the October 2002 Bali bombings in Indonesia in particular, the sense of wistful obsolescence that used to characterize discussions of Southeast Asia's Islamic schools has been replaced by an anxious and often unhelpful media frenzy.

The reasons for the change of perception are understandable enough. The teachers of the young men responsible for the October 2002 attack in Bali had educational ties to the al-Mukmin boarding school in Central Java, an institution alleged to have links to the terrorist Jemaah Islamiyah. The link led to widespread fears that some of Indonesia's 47,000 Islamic schools were being used to open a “second front” in the al-Qa`ida conflict with the West. In the Philippines, the Intelligence Chief of the Philippine Armed Forces blamed an upsurge in terror bombings in that country in the early 2000s on the southern Philippines’ network of madrasas.: “[T]hey are teaching the children, while still young, to wage a jihad. They will become the future suicide bombers.”

BACKGROUND

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the ASEAN Declaration. ASEAN had only five members at the time of its establishment: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The ASEAN Declaration spelt out the aspirations of the five nations and indicated a simple informal structure to carry them out.

Over the years, ASEAN expanded into a ten-member body with the following additional members: Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. Forty years on, it also finds itself in a very different globalized world of intense economic competition.

In adapting ASEAN to the changed environment, ASEAN leaders decided that ASEAN needed a meaningful instrument to spell out the aims, aspirations, vision, powers and structure of ASEAN. Hence, the ASEAN Charter was signed by the ASEAN states on 20 November 2007 at the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore. It entered into force on 15 December 2008, this date being the thirtieth day after all ten ASEAN member states had deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of ASEAN.

What does the Charter do for ASEAN? In the words of the current ASEAN Secretary-General, Dr Surin Pitsuwan, the Charter:

The ASEAN Charter, which entered into force on 15 December 2008, asserts in Article 3 that ASEAN “as an inter-governmental organisation, is hereby conferred legal personality”. This chapter examines the legal status of the Association, as well as the political question of whether the whole is greater than (or perhaps less than) the sum of its parts. The argument presented is that legal personality at the international level is less a status than it is a capacity: the fact that ASEAN now claims international legal personality in the Charter does not mean it lacked it previously, nor that it now possesses it in any meaningful way. Rather, the key question is what specific powers have been granted to ASEAN and how those powers are used. On these questions, the Charter is largely silent.

* * *

In January 1991, less than two weeks before the commencement of hostilities to drive Iraq from occupied Kuwait, the French poststructuralist philosopher Jean Baudrillard published an article in Libération entitled, “The Gulf War Will Not Take Place”. He argued that this war would never happen in a meaningful sense of the word, because technology had transformed perceptions of conflict to the point where all that was left was the simulacrum of war. As the bombs were falling and troops were moving, he produced a follow-up piece: “The Gulf War Is Not Taking Place”. After Iraq had been driven from Kuwait and tens of thousands had died, he returned to the opinion pages with “The Gulf War Did Not Take Place”. The three essays are now conveniently published together in a volume by Polity Press entitled The Gulf War Never Happened.

Is it not a similar conceit to question the existence of ASEAN? Without doubt, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represents an important slice of the world. It encompasses a population of around half a billion, with a combined GDP in the order of a trillion U.S. dollars. From the five countries that signed the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, it has added Brunei in 1984, and Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia between 1995 and 1999.

The ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) are both worldclass agreements. They are comprehensive and include key principles in international trade, such as the free transfer of capital; full protection and security for investments; fair and equitable treatment for investors; dispute resolution; and others. However, the agreements will only realize their great potential for ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) if their implementation is just as comprehensive.

The timely and consistent implementation of both agreements will bring huge benefits for ASEAN as it will make the region a more attractive investment destination. The implementation of the ATIGA, ACIA as well as the realization of the AEC by 2015 would lead to significantly increased investment into the ASEAN region.

At the moment however, most senior business executives with knowledge of the region will tell you that they do not perceive ASEAN as an integrated and cohesive market. They still tend to see ASEAN as ten different markets with ten different rules and regulations. They see ASEAN as ten smaller economies instead of one market of 600 million people, with a US$1 trillion GDP and total trade of about US$1.4 trillion. So although they would like to develop an “ASEAN strategy” to take advantage of economies of scale, in reality, they can only adopt strategies for individual member countries.

The challenge for ASEAN is to convince the private sector that ASEAN is serious about realizing the AEC by 2015 and that it will implement the various agreements and roadmaps it has put in place without further delay and without backtracking on commitments it has made.

It is recommended that the ASEAN Secretariat be more proactive in informing the private sector about initiatives under the AEC, the ASEAN Charter, ATIGA/ACIA and other agreements that would benefit businesses with operations in ASEAN. The ASEAN Secretariat Website should be fully utilized to inform the private sector of what ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat are doing to push for greater integration.

HOW THE CRISIS AFFECTED ADVANCED ASIA

Although individual circumstances differed, the Advanced Asian economies of the Asia-Pacific region were all hit hard by the global financial crisis when it spread to the real sector and caused the volume of world trade to collapse in the latter part of 2008. These economies immediately responded to the sharp deceleration of economic activity by easing monetary and fiscal policies substantially, which acted relatively quickly to help stabilize the economies. In fact, signs of economic recovery were already evident in the region in the first part of 2009, with some economies returning to positive growth in the early months. The biggest policy challenge most economies faced at the end of 2009 was to decide when to reverse the extraordinary stance of monetary and fiscal policies, which cannot be sustainable for a long time, in view of potential inflationary and debt sustainability concerns.

How to manage the exit will not be easy, however, inasmuch as the prospect for the recovery of world trade remains uncertain. Over the short term, there is a danger that pulling the stimulus prematurely may cause the nascent recovery to stall. Over the medium term, there is going to be an inevitable rebalancing of global demand that will have major implications for Advanced Asia. It will take time to restore balance sheets in advanced Western countries, notably the United States, so that the region's net exports to these markets must decline. This means that Advanced Asia, especially those economies that had relied on high-tech exports to the West to propel growth, must find alternative engines of growth if it is to make the economic recovery firm and sustainable.

The initial impact of the U.S. sub-prime crisis was relatively small on the Advanced Asian economies. For the most part, these economies had only limited exposure to sub-prime-related assets and their banking systems were relatively sound and well capitalized. In fact, the biggest challenge facing these economies in the summer of 2008 was high energy and other commodity prices.