This essay is on the Singapore of my dreams. My dreams have obviously changed over the years. I will begin with my school boy's dreams.

A School Boy's Dreams

I grew up in colonial Singapore. After the Second World War, my parents sent me to a Chinese primary school. After a few years, because of my unsatisfactory progress, my parents decided to switch me to the English stream. I spent a bridging year in a Catholic school and then joined the Outram School, which was then a government primary school. I completed my secondary education at Raffles Institution (RI).

What were my school boy's dreams for Singapore?

First, I dreamt that one day Singapore would be independent and we would be able to rule ourselves. I was greatly influenced by the anti-colonial struggles and nationalist movements then taking place in Asia and Africa. I remember debating the merits and demerits of colonialism with one of my expatriate teachers in RI.

Second, I dreamt that one day Singapore would be without slums and all Singaporeans would have access to good housing, clean water and modern sanitation. I had relatives living in Bukit Ho Swee and they lacked all three. I used to accompany my mother and aunt to visit them. I am very glad that this dream of mine has come true.

Third, I dreamt that all families would earn enough income to enable them to live decently. After the war, there were a lot of poor people in Singapore. Today, the situation is vastly different. If we use the internationally accepted criteria of US$1 per day or US$2 per day, there are no poor people in Singapore. However, the reality is that for the bottom 30 per cent of our population, life is very tough. We should do more to help our poor and disadvantaged families without undermining our work ethic and our culture of self-reliance.

The Southeast Asian region is more peaceful than it has been in the past six decades. Interstate conflict is a distant memory, and many — though not all — of the internal conflicts that erupted in the process of nation building after the colonial era have either subsided or have been resolved. ASEAN is proud of the fact that compared with neighbouring regions, relations among member states are relatively harmonious and security is for the most part assured.

There are glaring exceptions, however. In several parts of the region stubborn irredentist conflict sustains low intensity armed violence. In recent years, internal conflicts in the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand and parts of Indonesia have flared up. In Southern Thailand, more than 3,500 lives have been lost since 2004. In 2008 a flare up of violence in the Southern Philippines resulted in the loss of 300 lives and the displacement of almost half a million people.

The fact that most of these conflicts pit Muslim against non-Muslim communities (in Indonesia's Maluku province, Mindanao in the Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand) has meant they attracted wider attention because of the dangers of wider international terrorist involvement.

Management of these conflicts has been partially successful. Over the years, governments have forged temporary ceasefire agreements, implemented some special local political arrangements, or placated communal feelings sufficiently enough to keep violence at a manageable level. But resolution in terms of reaching effective agreements to permanently end hostilities and address grievances through far reaching political and legal arrangements has been rare.

One notable exception appears to be Aceh. The long running conflict between the Indonesian authorities and the Free Aceh Movement was settled after the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in Helsinki in August 2005. The settlement, which allowed the former rebel groups to set up their own political parties, came after more than six years of efforts by private mediators from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and latterly the Conflict Management Initiative, to bring the two sides together.

The near-fatal shooting of East Timor's president, Jose Ramos-Horta, on 11 February 2008, by members of renegade Major Alfredo Reinado's gang, and the death of Reinado himself, broke a deadlock in East Timorese politics that had threatened to keep the country in a state of perpetual crisis. Prior to this incident, most observers had noted that the recently elected Parliamentary Majority Alliance government of Xanana Gusmao needed to address two critical issues. The first issue was returning the remaining tens of thousands of internally displaced persons to their homes. The second, which allowed the first to happen, was resolving the issue of the “petitioners”, soldiers who had deserted the army in 2006, sparking an internal conflict that almost led to state collapse. Without having the “petitioners” problem resolved, the country's internally displaced persons (IDPs) claimed they felt too insecure to return to their homes.

Resolving Inherited Problems

At the beginning of 2008, East Timor remained unsettled, by Reinado's gang and the petitioners still on the loose, by the IDPs who were largely Fretilin supporters, and by Fretilin itself refusing to accept the legitimacy of the outcome of the 2007 elections, which saw its vote cut in half to just under 30 per cent and a coalition of parties led by Xanana Gusmao's Timorese Council for National Reconstruction (CNRT) form government. Fretilin embarked on a campaign of protest that continued well into 2008 which, set against the still fragile backdrop of IDPs and military mutineers, could have pushed the country back into chaos at any time. The presence of the Internal Stabilization Force and UN police helped ensure the country did not again divide, as it had two years previously.

All of this changed just after dawn on Monday 11 February 2008. As the sun was rising out of the Banda Sea behind the Indonesian-built Christo Rei statue on Fatucama Hill at the eastern point of Dili's sweeping harbour, East Timor's President Jose Ramos-Horta was out in the morning coolness for his daily walk along the Areia Branca with two members of the F-FDTL, not far from his home at Meti-hau.

Indonesia's political and socio-economic developments in 2008 were marked by two contradictory trends. On the one hand, the process of democratic consolidation continued, with Indonesia further strengthening its political institutions, making progress in its anti-corruption drive and generally maintaining healthy economic growth. Indeed, with very low levels of political and communal violence, Indonesia in 2008 appeared like a bulwark of stability in the Southeast Asian region, as Thailand was crippled by incessant mass demonstrations and the Philippines saw the Mindanao insurgency escalating once again. However, Indonesia's democratic consolidation was also challenged by a very divergent phenomenon: that is, the increasing proliferation of some form of nostalgia for the effectiveness of Soeharto's New Order, which had ruled the country with an iron fist between 1966 and 1998. Significantly, the year 2008 not only witnessed Soeharto's death after a long struggle with illness and the post-authoritarian judiciary, but also the tenth anniversary of the democratic regime change. Using both occasions to reflect on Soeharto's achievements, many Indonesians concluded that his regime had been superior to the existing polity in several important aspects, particularly health services, prices of basic goods and security. This sentiment was also reflected in the names that emerged as contenders for the 2009 presidential elections: several of Soeharto's former generals threw their hat into the ring, trying to profit from the growing sympathy for New Order policies.

This chapter aims to take account of both developments: the remarkable stabilization of Indonesian democracy and the latent support in society for Soeharto's authoritative and tough leadership. Accordingly, it will discuss events, trends and patterns that dominated Indonesia in 2008 by looking at five different areas: first, the progress that Indonesia has made in advancing key democratic institutions and procedures, including elections and the fight against corruption. Second, the public reaction to Soeharto's death in January 2008, which highlighted the attitudes of Indonesians toward the New Order and the current polity.

The Philippine economy started 2008 on a high note — it had just registered its highest real GDP growth rate in three decades of 7.2 per cent in 2007, which was significantly higher than the 6.1–6.7 per cent target set by the government. This was attributed to spending related to the May elections, which typically bolsters consumption expenditure; government expenditure on infrastructure projects; and personal consumption expenditure, supported by overseas Filipinos’ remittances. This despite a weakening external environment, particularly as a result of instability in U.S. and global financial markets.

As in previous years of inordinately strong economic performance, the question was whether it could be sustained in 2008 and beyond. But given the domestic factors that drove growth in 2007, and the real fallout from the U.S. and eventual global financial crises, some economic slowdown was to be expected in 2008. The question was how well the Philippine economy would cope with the impending U.S. and global recession.

In contrast, political controversies and disturbances that began in 2007 were carried over into 2008, in addition to those that began in earlier years. The continued strong performance of the economy despite continuing political instability has raised the question of whether economic performance has decoupled from political developments in the Philippines.

The article first discusses economic performance and trends in the Philippines in 2008, followed by a discussion of key political developments that could have had the most negative impact on the economy.

The Philippine Economy in 2008

Economic Growth and Sectoral Performance

Table 1 shows real GDP growth rate by type of expenditure for 2005–08. The period from 2002 was a period of steady, moderate growth, ranging from 4.4 per cent in 2002 to a high of 7.2 per cent in 2007 for real GDP, and from 4.2 per cent to 8 per cent for real GNP. Real GDP growth slowed down significantly to 4.6 per cent in the first three quarters of 2008, compared to 7.5 per cent during the same period in 2007.

Introduction

Of the many myths and legends in Indonesia, the notion of the “Great Majapahit” has been the most attractive to many Indonesians. Mohamad Yamin, regarded as Sukarno's ideologist, was the main proponent of this legend. He believed that the Majapahit Hindu Kingdom in the fourteenth to sixteenth century was a vast and strong Kingdom, covering the entire archipelago and extended its influence as far as Madagascar in the West and Taiwan in the North.

In reality, however, Indonesia came into being only in the twentieth century, when nationalism began to grow in certain parts of the archipelago, and more specifically since the Youth Oath or Pledge in 1928 that recognized “one country, one nation and one language, namely Bahasa Indonesia”, as the national movement was taking shape. In 1945 this modern state was established by the Nationalist Movement. Thus, the Indonesian state and nation were only established some 63 years ago. It is quite a young nation.

The Legacies of Sukarno and Soeharto

The first era of this young nation was led by President Sukarno. This period began after World War II and the four years of the revolution. The economy was in shambles and political development highly unstable. Following the Dutch model, we had many political parties, and in 1947 developed a liberal parliamentary democracy which deviated from the presidential system under the 1945 Constitution. Unstable coalitions came and went during this phase with the government on average lasting only 11 months.

The general election in 1955, the first of its kind, and an honest one, produced four main parties, but there was no stability. Bung Karno (or Brother Karno, as Sukarno was affectionately called) tried hard to have the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) included in the government but he did not succeed. Some of the regions, especially Sumatra and Sulawesi, rebelled and martial law was proclaimed in early 1958.

The year 2008 was yet another eventful year for Thai democracy. With yet another new constitution and more new institutions, to go along with a deeply divided society, it was certain to prove a challenging time. Red shirt and yellow shirt demonstrators came into confrontation on several occasions, culminating in a takeover of both of Bangkok's airports by the yellow shirts, leaving hundreds of thousands of tourists stranded. While the protestors eventually left peacefully, there can be no doubt that the year saw a weakening of all major institutions. Thailand also faces a difficult period for the economy, and some challenges in foreign relations. We begin by outlining the divisions in society, with a brief look backward, to clarify the origins and the depth of the divide in Thai society.

The Escape

Singapore began 2008 in high drama. On the early evening of 27 February, Singaporeans were told of a breakout from the Whitley Road Detention Centre (WRDC). Mas Selamat bin Kastari, an Indonesian-born Singaporean, held under the Internal Security Act, sparked the largest manhunt ever launched in Singapore. He was allegedly the head of the Singapore branch of militant group Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and, according to the Singapore government, was suspected of plotting to attack Singapore Changi Airport in 2002 by crashing a plane into it. Arrested in January 2006 by Indonesian anti-terror squads in Java, Mas Selamat was then deported to Singapore. He was never formally charged with any terrorism-related offences but was held by the state under the Internal Security Act. A nation-wide search involving the Singapore Police Force, the Gurkha Contingent, the Police Tactical Unit and the Police National Service Key Installation Protection Unit was conducted. They were later joined by the Singapore Guards and the Singapore Armed Forces Military Police Command.

Response from the public ranged from mild alarm to anger, the latter of which was manifested largely on Internet blogs and forums. Public criticism was directed at several levels. Many were critical of the way a supposedly dangerous terrorist suspect could have so easily slipped out of a high security detention centre and at the misinformation given out to the public by the police. Initial news alerts informed the public that Mas Selamat walked with a limp; later alerts noted that the limp was only visible when he ran. Critics also accused the pro-government media of trying to play down the incident and skirting key issues. One political commentator, observed “The mainstream media did its job of trying to play down the most shameful part of the incident”, while a media academic wrote about the mainstream media not asking the most immediate question of “how” Mas Selamat escaped: “The question is so natural and so obvious that you'd think anyone barely paying attention would ask it. Unless, apparently, one worked for the national news media.”

INTRODUCTION

Papua's biologically diverse forests serve a multiplicity of roles and functions for its people. Historically, they have provided Papuans with household needs for food and shelter, a resource base for gardening and products to trade, while also fulfilling a fundamentally important cultural role. Although products from Papua's forests have been exploited commercially and exported regionally for at least a thousand years, it is only in the past 25 years that forest degradation and loss associated with large-scale commercial timber harvesting, an expansion of agricultural cash crops and the growth of population centres have begun to threaten the survival of the forests and the communities that depend on them. This chapter presents a case study of a particular forest and community, exemplifying issues of forest management and conflict in Papua more widely.

Indonesia's New Order government asserted state ownership over the country's forests in 1967, denying customary (adat) ownership and rights. It began to exploit the forests by issuing large-scale timber harvesting concessions (HPHs). Other pressures on Indonesia's forests have included those associated with the expansion of forest and palm oil plantations and agricultural crops, and with transmigration. In Papua, as elsewhere in Indonesia, forests were zoned into those intended for conservation and protection, those to be retained for wood production and those to be converted to plantations or agriculture. The respective proportions of Papua's 33 million hectares of forests in these three broad categories are 46 per cent (conservation), 31 per cent (wood production) and 23 per cent (conversion).

With minor exceptions, during the Dutch colonial period and for some time afterwards, Papua's forests remained under indigenous forest management. The first HPH over Papuan forests was issued in 1984. By 2000, there were 54 HPHs covering a total area of 13 million hectares, a further 10 industrial forest plantation concessions (HTIs) covering 1.6 million hectares and many small-scale concessions.