Introduction

This chapter examines Indonesia’s policy towards China under Suharto. It explains why it took so long for Jakarta to normalize relations with Beijing and what obstacles arose in the process. What were the factors that contributed to the diplomatic breakthrough in 1989? What were the roles of the military and the President in this normalization process? Are there any issues which may affect the relations?

Sino-Indonesian Relations under Sukarno

It is a well-known fact that, during Sukarno’s time, Indonesia was on good terms with the PRC, especially in the mid-1960s when Indonesia, together with the PRC, attempted to set up the Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) headquartered in Jakarta. CONEFO was supposed to be a United Nations of poor countries because at the time, the PRC had not yet been admitted to the UN, and Indonesia had just left the organization. This did not mean, however, that all socio-political forces in Indonesia were in support of close Beijing-Jakarta relations. On the contrary, the army was worried about a Beijing-Jakarta axis but was not able to move Indonesia away from the PRC anti-colonialist coalition.

In the 1960s, prior to the emergence of the New Order, there were three political forces competing for influence in domestic politics. Communist influence continued to grow after the 1957 by-elections and the Army also gained in strength after crushing the 1958 regional rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The President, who was becoming more left-wing in his political orientation, initially attempted to balance the PKI against the Army and vice-versa, but gradually he moved closer to the PKI. Fearing the rise of the military, the PKI wanted to establish a Fifth Army under its control made up of peasants and workers. Sukarno lent his support to the idea and sent Omar Dhani, the chief of the Air Force, to negotiate with the PRC in the hopes of getting small weapons for the Fifth Force. Apparently, the President wanted to balance the army’s strength by aligning himself with the PKI and the Air Force.

This balance of power game came to a sudden end on 30 September 1965 when an alleged communist coup took place. Six generals were kidnapped and slain, but General Nasution escaped. General Suharto, who was the commander of the Strategic Unit in Jakarta, was not on the list.

Introduction

This chapter sets out to answer the following questions. Is the present pandemic an out-of-the-ordinary event or something that could have been expected, given past history, but for which we were not prepared? What are the basic causes of pandemics? How are these causes related to the way humans interact with nature and environment? These are addressed in Section 1. Section 2 of the chapter asks: what are the different ways societies have responded to the pandemic crisis? What factors explain why some are doing better than others? What lessons can be learned to prepare for the next pandemic?

With hindsight, a global pandemic was inevitable. History is peppered with pandemics including in recent times, and today’s globally connected world could hardly be better optimized to breed new outbreaks and allow them to spread. High population densities, intensive farming and deforestation all make the emergence of novel viruses and pathogens more likely; trade and modern travel make their transmission inevitable. What was not inevitable though was our collective response to the threat.

We begin with a brief tour of the history of pandemics from ancient to modern times, focusing on the latter and in particular on the present pandemic—the COVID-19 pandemic. We will look at influenza and coronavirus pandemics in turn, but we will also include a few pandemics that do not neatly fall under these headings and attempt to balance this loose categorization with a historical chronology.

Section 1: A Brief History Of Pandemics Historical Background: Plague Pandemics

There have been three major bacterial pandemics since the sixth century AD: the Justinian plague, the bubonic plague (or Black Death), and the third plague pandemic (we will also briefly look at the Manchurian plague). All are noteworthy for the devastation that ensued both in terms of loss of life and in the far-reaching socio-economic impacts they made.

Throughout the course of the first two pandemics, spanning both the Dark Ages and the Renaissance, a poor understanding of the cause of plague led to a persistent curtailment of control. In these periods the pathogenic agents or bacteria had yet to be discovered. People were unaware that rats were transmitting agents. The belief at that time was that miasmic bad air was to be blamed, sometimes associated with malevolent astrological signs (Watts 1997, pp. 8–15).

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

Appendix 1: List of Interviewees

Due to the Movement Control Order (MCO) implemented in Malaysia, the interviews since March 2020 were conducted through online platforms

If 2020 was a year dominated by COVID-19 worldwide, it is difficult to label 2021 any differently, especially in Laos. While much of the Global North enters a stage of pandemic recovery, and talk of life in the post-pandemic world, this is just beginning in Laos; one of the early success stories of COVID-19, with only a small number of infections in 2020. From 19 September 2021, Vientiane entered its strictest ever period of lockdown, with cases of the delta variant soaring and concerns about the pandemic spreading throughout the capital causing strict restrictions on movement, including large numbers of roadblocks. The extended lockdown was only showing signs of easing at the time of writing in November 2021. Different parts of the country have been under various degrees of lockdown, but it is clearly unlikely that the country will return to a widespread state of pre-pandemic normality at the end of 2021.

While it is easy to view 2020 and 2021 in Laos as solely about COVID-19, and the initial sections of this chapter focus on that, there have been other significant developments in Laos. These can be split into three main themes. The first relates to infrastructural developments, particularly the completion of the Laos–China Railway, set to open on 2 December 2021—it also marks the rising presence of China in Laos. The second involves political developments aiming to strengthen the rule of law and the government campaign against drugs. This is pertinent as 2021 saw Southeast Asia’s largest ever drugs bust in Laos. Other political developments include attempts to combat corruption and the rise of repression against freedom of expression, especially around internet freedoms. The third theme is about economic developments, including concerns about rising levels of debt and inflation, attempts to stabilize the Lao kip, and the reform of state enterprises. The chapter finishes with some suggestions as to what 2022 may offer and some tentative predictions as to what is worth watching closely.

COVID-19 Arrives in Laos, Again

Laos escaped 2020 relatively unscathed by COVID, with only forty-one cases and zero deaths by the end of the year. Even in a region that experienced fewer COVID-19 cases than elsewhere in the world, this low level seemed positive. All went seemingly well until the Lao New Year in April 2021.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I felt extremely honoured to be here today to share with you my thoughts on the prospects of the Peranakan community at the age of globalization. Being a Baba and Nyonya yourself, I am sure you are very concerned about the future of the Peranakan community. The word “Peranakan” is more commonly used in Bahasa Indonesia than in Bahasa Melayu. In the past, the terms “Baba and Nyonya” were commonly used to refer to the localized Chinese. However, Peranakan in fact includes all localized foreigners or their descendants. Thus, we have the Chinese Peranakans (Baba and Nyonya), Indian Peranakans (Chitty or Mamak-Indian Muslim), Portuguese Peranakans, and European Peranakans (Eurasian or Serani). Melaka is the home of the Peranakans in both Malaysia and Singapore and so it is not only appropriate and relevant but also historically significant for me to deal with this topic here. Although I am a Singaporean, and not a Baba myself, in the past decades I have business concerns in Melaka and frequently visited Melaka. Thus, I am virtually a local Melakan, living at the centre of the old town and have witnessed the change that has taken place in the past two decades.

I would like to begin by giving you a few significant glimpses into the history of the Chinese diaspora as well as the eventual development of the Peranakan community in Melaka so as to set the tone of proper historical perspective. The Chinese have been migrating southward from China to Southeast Asia for centuries, driven from their homeland by economic necessity, political disturbance, flood and drought. Chinese diaspora outside China are generally addressed as Tang Ren (Teng Lang, 唐人) because since the seventh century in the Tang dynasty, Chinese mariners and traders were engaging in considerable international maritime trade, travelling as far afield as East Africa through the Straits of Melaka. They actually went to mainland Southeast Asia as early as the Qin dynasty and were addressed as Qin Ren (秦人). However, they were merely sojourners before the fourteenth century.

Cheng Ho’s (Zheng He, 郑和) historic seven voyages to the western ocean in the early fifteenth century marked the first wave of Chinese migration to Southeast Asia. Cheng Ho discovered the presence of Chinese settlements in Island Southeast Asia.

Executive Summary

• • Organized propaganda and public opinion manipulation are increasing in Indonesia’s cybersphere. Specifically, since 2019, there has been a marked rise of cyber troop campaigns that serve to mobilize public consensus for controversial government policies.

• • Cyber troop operations played a crucial role in three controversial events in which public opinion had been initially critical of the government policy at issue. These were, first, the revision of the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission in September 2019; second, the launch of the New Normal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic in May 2020; and third, the passing of the Omnibus Law for Job Creation in October 2020. In all three cases, there is clear evidence of cyber troops manipulating public opinion in support of government policy.

• • In all three cases, the cyber troops manufactured consent by flooding social media with narratives that promoted the governing elite’s agenda, often using deceptive messages and disinformation that were amplified by numerous “buzzer” and “bot” accounts. Thereby they effectively drowned out oppositional discourses on social media and neutralized dissent, especially as mainstream media simultaneously echoed the cyber troops’ narratives.

• • The ever more systematic use of cyber troops—and the considerable resources spent on such operations—indicates increasing co-optation of Indonesia’s cybersphere for elite interests. This threatens to undermine the quality of public debate and democracy in Indonesia because cyber troop operations not only feed public opinion with disinformation but also prevent citizens from scrutinizing and evaluating the governing elite’s behaviour and policy-making processes, which further exacerbates Indonesia’s ongoing democratic regression.

Overview

Jokowi’s initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic was driven by a firm resolve to avoid lockdowns in the hope that Indonesia could evade a large wave of infections until vaccines became available. The arrival of the highly transmissible Delta variant in 2021 shattered this optimism. According to official estimates, 144,000 people in Indonesia have died from COVID-19. More than half of these deaths occurred during the intense wave of infections that engulfed the country between June and September 2021. The Delta wave caused a health system collapse and widespread economic disruptions. It also damaged President Jokowi’s personal credibility, as public trust in his ability to manage the crisis sank to the lowest levels since the pandemic began.

Amid the raging health crisis, the Indonesian Parliament (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR) took up two legislative priorities. The 2021 Law on Special Autonomy (Otsus) for Papua was passed in July despite sustained protests by Papuans and a challenge in the Constitutional Court. Touted by the government as means for accelerating development, the new law effectively ends Papua’s ability to govern itself by transferring key fiscal and political powers back to Jakarta. In contrast to the speedy passage of the Otsus law, the sexual violence bill that has languished in the DPR since 2016 was shelved once again. Lawmakers accommodated objections by Muslim organizations to the consent-based definition of sexual violence in the bill and dropped key provisions for victims’ rights. But even this watered-down version could not be passed when Islamist parties insisted on revising the law to ban sex outside of marriage, including LGBTQ relations.

Two regional developments tested Indonesia’s reliance on ASEAN for managing its foreign policy objectives. Following the coup in Myanmar, Indonesia’s foreign minister skilfully navigated a myriad of interests to prevent recognition of Myanmar’s military government, but the bloc’s five-point consensus had little success in curbing the regime’s atrocities against civilians. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS deal upset Indonesia’s longstanding efforts to prevent intensification of great power rivalry in Southeast Asia. Support for the deal from the Philippines and Singapore also exposed deep divisions within ASEAN, once again raising questions about ASEAN’s ability to serve as a buffer against geopolitical competition in the region.

Everywhere I spoke about ASEAN, I have always been asked about its importance, and even its relevance, in the face of its perceived failure to address at least three major issues—the South China Sea, the Northern Rakhine (Rohingya) problem and human rights. One of the quickest ways to counter arguments against the charges of the irrelevance of ASEAN is the fact that it has formal partnerships with all the major powers in the world—the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the European Union (EU) and many more are waiting in the queue. This is despite the long and arduous process of applying to become an External Partner. Even the seemingly simple act of signing the Instrument of Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) follows the same long and sometimes cumbersome process that takes several months to complete. If ASEAN were irrelevant, I would say, why would these external parties go through all this? Obviously, the answer lies in their perception that indeed, ASEAN matters and that, of course, they would want to benefit from ASEAN’s growing economic and political/security importance as well as push their own agenda into that of ASEAN. The dynamics of how this happens will be the subject of this section, using the autoethnographic framework I described earlier.

ASEAN has not indicated any ranking or category of hierarchy for its external partners but it is generally understood that such a hierarchy exists. Among the Dialogue Partners (DPs), nine are sub-classified as Strategic Dialogue Partners (SDPs) while Canada has also indicated its desire to become one. This de facto categorization is reflected in Table 6.1.

The growing interest by other countries in ASEAN is also reflected in the number of applicants waiting to be accepted as external partners of ASEAN. These are: Bangladesh, the UK, Morocco, Fiji (Observer Status), Ecuador, Egypt, and Mongolia.

The TAC issued in 1976 is a fundamental peace treaty that all members, external partners and observers of ASEAN must accede to. Thus, countries and regional organizations desiring to apply for formal relationships with ASEAN regard it as their first step towards their acceptance for any category of external partnership.

The hope that the COVID-19 pandemic would be contained in 2021 did not materialize as the coronavirus continued to ravage the economies around the world, including Southeast Asia. Although there were important lessons learned from 2020, the pandemic was far from over in 2021 for most Southeast Asian economies. Uncertainty continued to prevail as the region once again struggled with managing the pandemic and juggling between health and economic needs. Living with COVID, rather than a “zero COVID” strategy, soon emerged as the new norm for some of the economies in Southeast Asia,

This chapter assesses the key factors affecting economic growth and recovery in 2021 as well as the prospects for sustaining the recovery in 2022. There are four main sections in this chapter. The second year of the COVID-19 pandemic in Southeast Asia is reviewed in the first section. The second section examines the impact of COVID-19 on regional growth in 2021 and 2022. The third section discusses the main factors that can affect the prospects of achieving or deterring the achievement of the forecasted growth. The conclusion is given in the last section.

Continued COVID-19 Disruptions

Containing the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Race to Vaccinate in Southeast Asia

One year of hard-earned lessons from managing the pandemic and the rollout of COVID-19 vaccines at the start of 2021 provided hope for global recovery. But the subsequent emergence and rapid transmission of the Delta variant, which became the dominant form of COVID-19, soon disrupted the fragile global recovery. Once again, countries all over the world continued to wage battle against the coronavirus through vaccinations as well as a transition towards managing COVID-19 as an endemic disease.

In Southeast Asia, the number of COVID-19 cases started to surge upwards in the first quarter of 2021 (Figure 1). Daily COVID-19 cases per million shot up towards the second half of the year. This was due in part to the spread of the highly contagious Delta variant and the slow rates of vaccination as well as the easing of restrictions in the early part of the year. The number of new cases per million peaked in the third quarter for some economies, but the average daily caseload in Southeast Asia started to decline towards the end of October 2021.