INTRODUCTION

A study of religion in adolescence is important because today's youths are the adults of tomorrow — their behaviour, attitudes and beliefs affect the political, economic and social future of a nation. Adolescence is characterized by many biological, cognitive and social changes which constitute a transition into adult life. Growth can spur changes in how adolescents are viewed and treated by their parents and peers as well as changes in how adolescents view themselves and are viewed and treated by their parents, peers and others. It is a period when they not only encounter society's expectations of them, but also have a strong need to find intimacy and friends. Religion or more generally, religiosity begins to play a large part upon how these potential adults view the world. Important questions pertaining to identity and meaning begin to surface. However, research on religious development in adolescence is a much neglected area, as can be observed by the lack of research and surveys available until recently.

Tong (2002) has documented anthropological and sociological studies on Hinduism, Christianity, Hinduism and Chinese religion in Singapore written in English in the last 150 years. These studies have mostly focused on more apparent aspects such as rituals or festivals. Although Christianity is practised by only 14.6 per cent (Leow 2001) of the population, more research has been undertaken on it than on other religions. However, these studies have been more of religious sociology rather than the sociology of religion. In all these, very few systematic surveys or studies were undertaken and as far as this writer is aware, no research on religious switching among the adolescent school-going population has been documented. There has been however, some research of religious conversion among students in tertiary institutions, but mostly on Christianity and Buddhism (for example, Tamney and Hassan 1987). Hence, this study appears to be the first such study and is thus important although preliminary and exploratory in nature. A reason for the scarcity of research on this area is because studies of switching or conversion have received little respect from scholars since they are often assumed to be a supernatural phenomenon.

INTRODUCTION

Singapore has enjoyed racial and religious harmony since its independence in 1965. What is not so evident is the tremendous care, effort, and pre-emptive prudence invested in nurturing multi-religiosity as an integral part of Singapore's multi-racialism framework. Buttressed by the state's professed commitment to secularism, racial and religious harmony is one of Singapore's five Shared Values. This stability is jealously guarded by the state especially since rapid modernization has neither resulted in the decline of religious belief nor the downgrading of importance of religious institutions among Singaporeans. Religious faith is a “major part of Singapore's cultural ballast” and exerts a tremendous pull on Singaporeans (Shared Values 1991, p. 8; Tong 2002). Singapore's rich religious heritage is also celebrated as a source of strength, with places of worship attended in large numbers by locals and promoted as tourist sites of interest. Singapore's architectural landscape, with many prominent religious buildings, is a legacy of religious developments in early modern Singapore history (Lee Geok Boi 2002). Yet, consider the paradox: religion has been selectively co-opted in secular Singapore's nationbuilding process. Can a strong religious identity co-exist with a strong Singaporean identity?

This chapter begins with a description of the multi-religious landscape of Singapore and notes some aspects of the religious state of play. It then examines the institutional and legal framework in the management of religion within the context of an evolving, putative Singapore model of secularism. The policy impulses behind the state's co-option of religion to reinforce the teaching of moral values, to sustain economic vitality, and to urge the practice of one's religion in keeping with the secular and multi-racial mores of Singaporean society are examined. It shows that the state engages in a tightrope walk between secularism and control and influence over religion, and religious expression for the purposes of state- and nation-building.

INTRODUCTION

The Buddhist temple is now considered an important provider of welfare services. The cultural politics of religion is such that while the temple sees its welfare roles as strictly belonging to the moral dictum of its teachings, the state sees the temple as a legitimate space where the group of temple-goers can be convinced to take on welfare roles. Through a series of Land Law and planning policies, the state has indirectly transformed the role of the temple into an important welfare provider. In this sense, a religious space is partially turned into a secular space for the less privileged groups of people within Singapore society. The temple can thus been seen as a champion of the underclass, assuming moral authority over the citizenry albeit under the directive of the Singapore state.

This chapter explores the relationship between Buddhism and state in the delivery of welfare services in contemporary Singapore. It examines the intersection between the Singapore state's ideology and Buddhist ideology to produce a philanthropic Buddhist landscape that encourages Buddhist organizations and individuals to become actively involved in charity works. In particular, they undertake to provide social and welfare services to the socially disadvantaged groups.

The development of the temple as a provider of welfare coincides with the varying strategies implemented by the Chinese community to cope with economic and social changes within Singapore society. The strategies taken by both the temple and the Sangha (Buddhist order of monks and nuns) have therefore to be seen within this wider context.

The relationship between religion and charity has always been an intimate one. The Buddhist Sangha has, since its formation, taken on the role of a provider of charity and welfare for the less fortunate public. Much of its work in this area, because of its small scale, has generally gone unnoticed and unacknowledged by the general public, except for those who have been at the recipient end. In recent years, the Sangha and temples have formalized their work on charity works, and their work in this area is now increasingly recognized by the general public and the state.

INTRODUCTION

A fundamental observation in the sociological study of religion has been the rise of new religious movements and cults. Many scholars have attributed this phenomenon to the decline or the gradual secularization of traditional religions like Christianity (Nelson 1987; Johnstone 1997). History may have envisaged that religion has relentlessly come into focus as a struggle between the good old forces of institutionalized churches and disorder-seeking sects and cults. However, an intermediate ground-seeking innovation has been casting its shadow whilst the writings of the dominant discourses inspired by religious fervour continue. Carrying the popularly coined brand name of New Religious Movements (NRMs), they have continued to exist for long despite minimal writings on them. Beckford (1986) writes that “the idea of a religious movement implies an organized attempt to introduce changes in religion” (p. x). Often reformist in orientation, the term “movement” can be said to denote shifts in people's religious beliefs, ideas and conceptions which they were so used to in the older organized religious orientations.

What necessarily sparks the interest in these spiritual movements? Marshall (1994) points out that NRMs often tend to be syncretistic in nature, borrowing elements from many different religious and philosophical traditions. Sociologists in addition have made claims that such movements satisfy the psychological and social needs of young and modern people seeking a meaning in life, something they often fail to find easily within the mainstream religious traditions.

The religious economy thesis has dominated the discursive field of religion in the field of sociology with much success in the study and analysis of religious and cult movements both in the United States and Canada (Stark and Bainbridge 1985). However, it has been unable to account for the spread of other spiritual movements such as the Sathya Sai Baba movement and its global outreach. The religious economy thesis primarily lends itself to Christian and Western discourses. What is implicitly evident here is the operation of a Eurocentric bias with regards to Western exclusivist and religious conversion (Pereira 2005, p. 1).

In a nutshell, the concept of the religious marketplace implies that the conversion of an adherent requires the rejection of the parent religion, as is evident in sects, or the radical departure from established religions as is often characteristic of cults (Stark and Bainbridge 1985).

INTRODUCTION

There are at least 2,000 adherents of the Baha'i Faith in Singapore today. The Baha'i Faith is the youngest of the world's independent religions and the Baha'is are followers of Baha'u'llah (meaning “Glory of God”), the Prophet- Founder of the Baha'i Faith. This religious community has been registered in Singapore as an independent religious entity since 1952 (Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Singapore, 1998), yet little is known about this nascent community.

The Baha'i Faith in Singapore had its beginnings in 1950 with the arrival of Dr and Mrs Shirin Fozdar from India (Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Singapore, 2000). By 1952, there were a total of twelve declared believers, which was sufficient for the Baha'i community to form the first Local Spiritual Assembly. The election of the first governing body for Baha'i affairs took place in April 1952 and the Local Spiritual Assembly was duly incorporated in July of that year (Inter-Religious Organization, Singapore 2001).

There is neither priesthood nor clergy in the Baha'i Faith (Effendi 1974). The administration of the Baha'i world community is based on the unique system of Houses of Justice (or Spiritual Assemblies), which extends from the local to the international level. These elected bodies are responsible for ministering to the needs of the individual as well as the community at large. There have been very few studies carried out on the Baha'i community of Singapore. An academic exercise (Yeo 1980) focused on the phenomenon of witnessing from the angle of boundary maintenance, by looking primarily at the structure of the Baha'i community through a predetermined framework of a sectarian movement. Chew (1997) is a descriptive and research-oriented study focusing mainly on a comparison of Taoism and the Baha'i Faith and the former's impact on the latter. Chew (1996) has also written on the emergence of the Baha'i Faith in Singapore but more from a historical rather than cross-sectional perspective. The Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of Singapore has also published a brochure on the Baha'is in Singapore but the information is largely general and historical in nature.

INTRODUCTION

Processions have traditionally been an integral part of religious life. They are often among the most visible of religious activities in public spaces and, to that extent, have the greatest opportunity for contact with secular activities and religious practices of other faiths. Because they tend towards the “spectacular” and symbolic, the potential for conflict is heightened. As events which attract crowds, the possibility of violence and aggression is real, as the experience in many countries reminds us. The politics of such events must be understood to avoid the troubles apparent in different parts of the world. At the same time, to understand the politics of processions, it is imperative to understand the meanings and values invested in such events — in short, the poetics — not least because it enables policy-makers and enforcement agencies to become aware of what sacred meanings are negotiable and what should remain fixed values.

Much of the geographical literature on processions addresses secular processions, including national parades (Kong and Yeoh 1997), and community parades such as the Carnival in London (Jackson 1988; Lewis and Pile 1996), the Rose Parade and the Doo Dah Parade in Pasadena, California (Lawrence 1982). The literature which is closest to the subject matter on religious processions deals with pilgrimages (see Kong 1990, 2001). Indeed, there are many similarities between the nature and experience of processions and pilgrimages, though the latter is at a larger scale, often traversing greater distances, involving greater commitment of time and possibly enduring more privations. Insights drawn from existing literatures therefore, are from the literature on both secular processions and religious pilgrimages.

How has modern society and its many secular influences impacted on the practice of processions? Campo (1998, p. 42) forcefully argues that

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Muslim Religious Elite

It is generally understood that there is no clergy in Islam. What exists is a body of religious elite called the ulama that provides leadership in matters pertaining to religious belief and practices in the Muslim community. It is maintained that their emergence is the result of social necessity as there is hardly any system of belief that does not comprise a group of individuals forming a class of the selected few whose task is to provide leadership in that aspect.

The ulama exercise considerable influence in Muslims’ religious and cultural life. By virtue of their training in the religious sciences, they believe that they are the spiritual and intellectual custodians of Islam. Hence they define problems affecting the community which they regard as falling within the ambit of the religion. They also attempt to provide solutions based on what they consider as the divine law. Generally the Muslim community perceives the ulama as pious and the authority on everything connected with Islam. Many are revered for their devotion, concern for Muslim solidarity and propagation of the virtues of Islamic teachings and values.

The ulama propagate their ideas and teachings through established religious institutions such as the madrasah. They also conduct organized religious classes, either in mosques or within the confines of private homes. Their thoughts are also disseminated via the mass media by way of regular contributions to television and radio programmes and the Internet. Pages or columns in the Malay daily also publish their writings at least twice a week. Their sermons and writings on Islam are sold commercially in the form of tapes and printed materials. Furthermore, they are often invited to speak at religious forums and seminars organized for the Muslim public by various Malay-Muslim organizations. Amongst them are leaders of tarikat (Arabic meaning “way”) or religious orders. Individuals and groups including Malay leaders and professionals encourage their participation in the Malay-Muslim community's affairs over issues ranging from education to the problems of the Knowledge Based Economy (KBE). Moreover, they are consulted and their advice sought by members of the community on numerous matters, including family life and marital conflicts; parenting, various social problems like delinquency, drug addiction, teenage pregnancies and marriage and illnesses of sorts, to name a few.

INTRODUCTION

Since the early stages of Christian missionary activity in Singapore, Western missionaries had already merged the provision of social services with their evangelistic endeavours, a pattern which they had mastered in several Asian societies (Chi 2005; Kim 2001). The prominence accorded to social service provision followed the increasingly popular discourse within Western theological circles in the late nineteenth century which emphasized that the missiological enterprise had to first demonstrate the love of Christ through Christian charity before it broached the preaching of the “wrath of God” (Magnusson 1977; Ferre 1988).

As ministers from the developed world, Western missionaries were acutely aware of various gaps in social service provision among the populations that they sought to serve. This led them to embark on various initiatives. Methodist and Anglican missionaries who arrived in Singapore recognized the numbers of orphaned children and the many girls who did not receive an education, and set up orphanages and boarding schools catering to these disadvantaged populations (Ow 2005). The lack of healthcare for women and children led medical doctor Dr Charlotte Ferguson (the wife of the then Anglican bishop) to initiate the setting up of the St Andrew's Mission Hospital in 1913 (St Andrew's Community Hospital 1998–2005), while the lack of educational opportunities for handicapped persons led the American Baptist missionary Alice Shae to set up Christian Outreach to the Handicapped (Christian Outreach to the Handicapped, 2006). Similarly, theological educators at Trinity Theological College, recognizing the social upheavals caused by modernization in the 1960s, initiated the Churches Counselling Centre to provide counselling help (Yeo 1993). In these efforts the missionaries recognized that moving the hearts of a people foreign to the Christian gospel required various “sweeteners”. Thus much of the social service endeavours worked to “soften hearts” to the Christian faith.

The success of many of these and other social service endeavours were partly related to the ability of Western missionaries to identify pertinent needs in the community and to mobilize resources both in terms of finances and expertise from their international mission agencies in the establishment and upkeep of these social services.

INTRODUCTION

It has been over four years since I visited Israel and the refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The faces of the people and the experience have remained with me. It has led me to reach out and befriend Muslims, and to volunteer to support the needs of their community in Singapore. It has also led me to make the decision to leave Singapore, sell my apartment to fund my education, and embark on a master's degree programme in Islamic Studies and Christian-Muslim relations at Hartford Seminary, USA.

I have had to deal with my ignorance of the history of Christianity and Islam, its often-turbulent relationship and the issues that face the Muslim world today. In this process, I examined my own beliefs, the sources of my misconceptions and have come to understand myself on a much deeper level. I started as a Christian with an exclusive view; I am now a Christian with a pluralistic view. I no longer insist that only I have “the truth”. I am learning to not just tolerate the “Other” but also “accept and embrace” them.1 It has been an ongoing process of self-discovery and pushing my own boundaries.

THE BURDEN FOR INTERFAITH RELATIONS

In January 2001, I visited the Holy Land as a tourist with a group of Christians and then extended my stay with my friend Grace as volunteers in an old folks’ daycare centre for the elderly. The Intifada had begun several months earlier, and we witnessed the sadness and tears of the very old, who watched the television footage of the carnage of suicide bombing incidents. It was the first time we had come close to violence of any nature. We were bewildered at what was happening in this beautiful land. In a conversation with the Jewish manager of this centre, he suggested that we visit the West Bank and Gaza Strip to understand the situation better.

We took his advice seriously. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, we undertook food distribution to needy Palestinian families, and began to see the human faces of those suffering.

INTRODUCTION: MANAGING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

It is a fact that many contemporary societies are diverse in many respects, including matters of religion. A central issue of politics is therefore how to manage such diversity. But there are many who are still not prepared to accept this starting point, and to acknowledge the existence of diversity as a more or less permanent feature. Some believe that the current diversity, although it is real and deep, is not lasting and that our social life will eventually converge on a comprehensive set of fundamental values and perspectives. The idea that reasonable people would agree, when the distorting features of social life are removed, remains the perennial, and sometimes dangerous, dream of some social reformers. It can be dangerous if sustained attempts to secure rational agreement fail, and continued disagreement is then attributed to perversity and a stubborn refusal to acknowledge what one must know to be the single truth. The suppression of those who know that they are in error may then be seen as justified.

Rejecting Exclusivism

There are others who think that while religious diversity exists, it is merely superficial and conceals a fundamental agreement deep down about important matters. Among some cosmopolitan religious thinkers, there is a strong conviction that any form of exclusion is undesirable. They seek a central core of shared convictions by ignoring the details of doctrinal differences, focusing instead on the highest and most abstract common denominator — the belief in God. But even when reduced to this bare minimum, not all religions are in agreement because not all religions believe in God. Replacing God with something more nebulous, some ultimate, transcendent reality, will not solve the problem, for there is disagreement about the nature of this reality, for example, with respect to whether human beings survive death or the form of such survival. Again, some specific matters of detail, such as the divinity of Christ, are central to one religion, but rejected by others. In any case, even if all the traditional religions can be shown to share a fundamental set of doctrines, the programme of rejecting exclusivism remains unattainable because it leaves out agnostics and atheists.

INTRODUCTION

A secular public sphere is neither in practice nor in theory a straightforward arrangement. For one, the distinction between the religious and the secular is a false one. Secularism has religion-like qualities, even dogmas, rituals, cults of personality and leaps of faith; just as religions can be, and have been in history, tolerant, inclusive, self-reflective, self-critical, adaptable, philosophically rigorous and even radical. Instituting strict formal secularism can have the effect of distorting free and open communication in the public sphere, by excluding legitimate religious reasons and thereby eliciting a defensive and even fundamentalist reaction from religious communities. A conceptually false dichotomy in this way turns into a battle line, preventing real discussion and debate. An insistence on formal secularism is therefore at least partly responsible for a distorted public sphere that is defensive, dogmatic and disengaged.

The formal secular public sphere in Singapore cannot be understood without considering the mass media. With its long-standing role as a key nation-building tool of the government, the media has the power to shape what can be said in the public sphere, determine how and when it is said, and decide who gets to say what, all according to the parameters laid out by the state. This chapter examines the role of the national media in admitting religious reasons and arguments into the secular public sphere, looking closely at the way that it stage-managed public debate in 2003 over the question of non-discriminatory hiring policies in the Singapore civil service with respect to homosexuals. This was an issue that the then prime minister (PM) had raised in the international Time magazine in an interview probably meant more for the attention of prospective foreign talent hesitant about working in sterile Singapore, but turned into an issue that sparked some heated reactions from Singaporeans.

This sympathetic acknowledgement (though by no means the decriminalization) of homosexuals by the government in 2003 signalled increased levels of openness perceived by some religious communities as moral degeneration and even a betrayal of the government's moral basis of authority.

INTRODUCTION

The post 9/11 rise of global terrorism has raised the awareness and the potential social threat of religious extremism. Battling such terrorism headon results in a tragic scenario of “violence begets violence”. Conflicts like terrorism require bottom-up approaches and solutions. Interfaith youth engagement is one such approach. It potentially educates youths from different faiths on their commonality. Only by such gradual education can interfaith understanding advance beyond mere tolerance into true respect from understanding. Mere tolerance can be quite fragile in the face of social mistrust resulting from terrorism.

On the social cohesion front, Singapore's forty years of nation-building has been based on a contract of mutual tolerance between the different faiths and racial communities, with the government as a paternal moderator. However, in the face of rapid globalization, the rapid spread of diverse ideas through info-communication technology and changing global politicosocial dynamics have made it necessary to re-examine the current social contract of interfaith engagements, particularly those amongst youths. Preparations must be made for youths to inherit the responsibility of upholding multiracial and multi-religious respect, and to continue and advance effective interfaith engagement. This chapter examines the ground realities of interfaith youth engagement and suggests policy recommendations, including social actions that will equip all stakeholders to move from mutual tolerance to a coherent and in-depth interfaith engagement, thereby strengthening social cohesion.

What is Interfaith?

Due to its sensitivity and tendency for misunderstandings, it is worthwhile to define the intended scope and role of “interfaith” in Singapore. Interfaith is not about uniting faiths to form a universal religion. Rather, as the prefix “inter” implies, it involves an understanding amongst different religions of their common social purposes. In Singapore, faith and ethnicity can be highly intertwined. By induction therefore, multiracial and interfaith harmony enjoy a parallel relationship with each other. In context, they are thus vital elements of Singapore's nation-building. In this study, the terms “faith” and “religion” are understood as synonymous and will be used interchangeably.

Currently, the consensual and official direction of interfaith harmony, as spelt out under the Declaration on Religious Harmony (2003), lies in achieving religious harmony through “mutual tolerance, confidence, respect and understanding”.

INTRODUCTION

This paper briefly traces the historical role and development of mission schools in Singapore, to ascertain the means by which they achieved a reputation for excellence and maintained that reputation even after Singapore's independence and the creation of a national school system. Although mission schools have had to negotiate their distinctive character in the light of national educational imperatives and currents — including the Religious Knowledge curriculum in the 1980s and the racial-religious climate which surrounded it — the quality of a distinctive school “spirit” and its “moral” benefits have persisted throughout the history of mission schools. This, to judge from the large body of responses on the role of mission schools (ranging from ministerial comments to the responses of teachers and alumni of the schools themselves), has largely been effected through non-curricular or structural means which permit such non-curricular influences to be communicated. The result is a distinctive character of mission schools which has been broadly acknowledged to play a significant part in the Singapore educational landscape, not only or primarily in academic terms, but more in terms of the “moral” training for which mission schools are held in high regard. The superior efficacy of moral influence (which arises from the inherently Christian nature of the mission schools), over a Religious Knowledge curricular approach (in which this Christian nature has to give way to a multi-religious, pluralistic curriculum inculcated through abstract classroom dictates), argues for an enhancement of the structural leeway given to mission schools to carry out their project of Christian moral influence. Clearly, a number of safeguards have to be set in place to protect the religious sensibilities of non-Christian students. With these safeguards in place, however, the implications of the socio-historical development of mission schools in Singapore would appear to argue for a policy allowing such schools to structure an enhanced Christian influence into their modus operandi, even as schools from other religious traditions (such as the Buddhist schools) be similarly allowed to enhance their religious aspects, with an eye to the moral development of students.

NAMING A ‘NEW’ PHENOMENON: A QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY

In the course of research for this chapter, I discovered an interesting collection of theoretical works on the subject of “new religious movements” (NRMs), four of which were especially eye-catching: The Historical Dictionary of New Religious Movements (2001), edited by George D. Chryssides; The Oxford Handbook of New Religious Movements (2004), edited by James R. Lewis; Encyclopedia of New Religious Movements (2005), edited by Peter B. Clarke and Encyclopedia of New Religions, New Religious Movements, Sects and Alternative Spiritualities (2004), edited by Christopher Partridge. It is significant that in the year 2006, a student of the field of “new religions” has access to an accumulated body of resources such as historical dictionaries, encyclopedias, handbooks and guidebooks in addition to an astonishing array of empirical data about NRMs across the globe and sophisticated theorizing about a subject that, only a short fifty years ago, was still in its infancy. This suggests three important points: (1) the phenomenal global growth of “new religious movements”, especially in the second half of the twentieth century, (2) the huge scholarly interest in the phenomenon as well as creative attempts to make sense of it, and (3) the institutionalization of this sub-field of study in the social sciences. Expectedly, the emergent field is not defined by consensus; instead, the vibrant debates within have raised fundamental questions about definitions, concepts and modes of theorizing this new phenomenon. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to enter these discussions in detail; only one strand of the conversation is relevant to the present purpose: the question of definitions.

Scholars agree that something “new” is happening in religious domains globally, and that novel and innovative expressions of religiosity are not only asserted by participants but also that different kinds of evidence for this are pervasive. A primary challenge is to figure out how this “new” religious style is to be discoursed and theorized, and this entails addressing the following questions: How are these individuals (with a new religious style) who have organized themselves into collectivities and their religious ideas to be denoted? Do they constitute a new religion?