Came to prominence during and immediately after World War I, partly as a reaction against the perceived failings of the balance of power system. The concept's best-known early advocate was Woodrow Wilson. Appalled by the outbreak of war in Europe, Wilson decided by the end of 1914 that nations must be “bound together for the protection of the integrity of each, so that any one nation breaking from this bond will bring upon herself war; that is to say punishment, automatically”. He called for a League to Enforce Peace, and publicly committed himself to “an association of nations”. In his famous 1917 “peace without victory” speech to the U.S. Senate calling for war against Germany, Wilson lashed out at the “crude machinations” of the balance of power and its failure to keep the peace in Europe. He pledged that once the war was over, he would work to replace the balance of power with a “community of power.” It was this idea which would eventually grow into the modern notion of collective security and lead to the creation of the ill-fated League of Nations.

While the United States turned its back on collective security when it rejected participation in the League, the idea resurfaced under President Roosevelt. In 1943, Cordell Hull, one of the architects of the successor to the League, the United Nations, declared that the creation of an international collective security organization meant there would be “no need for spheres of influence, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security.” Speaking to the Senate following the 1945 San Francisco conference, Senator Arthur Vandenberg declared that he would support ratification of the United Nations Charter, saying “peace must not be cheated of its collective chance … We must have collective security to stop the next war, if possible before it starts; and we must have collective security to crush it swiftly if it starts; and we must have collective action to crush it swiftly if it starts in spite of our organized precautions.”

Describes the use of limited force or the threat of force to achieve a specified diplomatic outcome. According to Sumit Ganguly and Michael Kraig, “the essential distinguishing feature of [coercive diplomacy] (and possibly its only consistent feature) is that it involves the threat of the use of force or the limited use of force. In essence, the coercing state uses this method to induce an adversary to desist from ongoing hostile actions and reverse any gains it has made.”

According to Alexander George, there are three possible goals for coercive diplomacy: to get an adversary to stop an action already underway short of its goal; to persuade the adversary to reverse an action already carried out, and to attain “cessation of the opponent's hostile behaviour through a change in the composition of the adversary's government or in the nature of the regime”. Coercive diplomacy differs from deterrence, in that deterrence uses the threat of force only to dissuade an opponent from doing something that has not yet begun. It is also different from traditional military strategies. The target state's military “stays largely intact, and its overall ability to fight is not severely degraded”. Or in George's rather more colourful expression, the goal is to “persuade an opponent to cease his aggression, rather than bludgeon him into stopping”. Any use of force is designed to be exemplary, “to create a dramatically heightened sense of risk — an urgent fear by the elites of the targeted state that if they do not reverse course, disaster will surely ensue”. According to Barry Blechman and Stephan Kaplan, “with coercive diplomacy, military units themselves do not attain the objective; goals are achieved through the effect of the force on the perceptions of the [targeted] actor”.

For its proponents, coercive diplomacy has advantages over diplomacy or the resort to war. “It is more compelling than diplomacy alone, for it carries with it the explicit threat of resorting to war if compliance is not forthcoming within a specified time span.

There is no single definition of what constitutes a middle power. Adam Chapnik argues that “for all its importance, [the term] ‘middle power’ is rarely defined and limited explanations are never specific.” According to a major work on the subject, there are at least four distinct approaches to defining a middle power. In practice, the term most commonly refers to a state on the basis of its position in an informal international hierarchy. In this view, middle powers occupy the “middle” point on one of several gauges of national power. These include size, geostrategic location, population, gross national product (GNP), military capability, and so on. While measuring precisely what is the “middle” and what is not can be highly problematic; the concept satisfies “the intuitive desire to differentiate between those states which clearly are not great powers but are not minor powers either”.

A second definition is based on conceptual position. In this view, middle powers are just that — in the middle between major powers. This approach has two variants: one, with obvious Cold War baggage, suggests middle powers are in the middle, between ideologically polarized great powers. An alternative geographic definition argues that middle powers are states that are powerful within their own particular geographic region. A third definition is a normative one. This asserts that middle powers are “potentially wiser or more virtuous” than either great powers or small states. Middle powers are viewed as somehow more trustworthy members of the international community because they can exert diplomatic influence without resorting to the use of force.

Recognizing the limitations of all these approaches, an alternative behavioural formulation was put forward by Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Nossal in their work, Relocating Middle Powers. Rather than focus on the traditional criteria, they identify middle powers on the basis of the diplomatic behaviour they display in common.

Terrorism is now one of the most frequently used terms in the contemporary Asia-Pacific security discourse. It is also strongly contested, with little international consensus on what constitutes either an act of terrorism or a terrorist group. It is clear that terrorism involves some sort of violent activity, but what kind of violence is to be labelled terrorism is a key question. Unhelpfully, interpretations range from “any violent threat to existing order” to the assertion that the term “terrorism” is merely a pejorative label with no substantive meaning.

The origins of the word “terrorism” are usually traced to the French Revolution. In 1792 the Jacobins came to power and launched a bloody purge of counter-revolutionaries that came to be known simply as “the terror”. Led by Robespierre, the terror was described as “nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible” and thousands were executed at the guillotine. Edmund Burke's 1795 condemnation of the revolutionaries as “those hellhounds called terrorists [who] are let loose on the people” is the first recorded use of the term.

Attempts to define terrorism for legal purposes go back at least as far as the League of Nations. An international convention debated by the League in 1937 described “terrorism” as “all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public”. However, the convention never came into force because of a lack of ratification by member states.

Despite ongoing disagreement, there have been a number of attempts to define terrorism by international bodies such as the United Nations. Most of these modern definitions have a common core, namely that terrorism involves the use of violence, usually against civilians or non-combatants, for the purpose of provoking a state of terror in order to advance a specific political, religious or ideological cause. A small sample of national and international definitions is offered below.

A group of states that cooperate in an ad hoc or informal fashion, outside of more formal multilateral institutions and alliances. The term has been used recently to describe the group of countries supporting the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but its origins predate the George W. Bush administration. While the term usually refers to cooperation for military purposes, it has also been used in relation to other economic and human security issues in the Asia- Pacific region. A key component of any coalition of the willing seems to be its essentially pragmatic, ad hoc nature. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a “coalition” as “a union, combination or fusion”, noting that in politics the term often refers to “an alliance for combined action of distinct parties, persons, or states, without permanent incorporation into one body”. Webster's describes a “coalition” as a “combination, for temporary purposes, of persons, or parties, or states, having different interests”.

The precise origins of the term “coalition of the willing” are unclear, but a controversial 1992 Pentagon planning document captured the essence of the concept, arguing that coalitions “hold considerable promise for promoting collective action”. It said the United States “should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished”.

Recent usage continues to stress this flexible, impermanent character. Less than a month after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld said,

Conceived in its contemporary usage in Cold War Europe, it was first formulated in the 1982 report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, chaired by the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. Egon Bahr, a West German member of the Commission and a former adviser to Willy Brandt, has claimed credit for inventing the term. According to Geoffrey Wiseman, “common security is designed to be a long-term and pragmatic process that will eventually lead to peace and disarmament by changing thinking that has created the superpower arms race, prevented arms control and disarmament, and which has seen continued high levels of conventional conflict.”

The Palme Commission's report, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival, described common security as underpinned by the assumption that security is best assured through cooperation rather than competitive power politics. The report set out six principles of common security: all nations have a legitimate right to security; military force is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes between nations; restraint is necessary in expressions of national policy; security cannot be attained through military superiority; reductions and qualitative limitations of armaments are necessary for common security; and “linkages” between arms negotiations and political events should be avoided.

The commission's report dismissed notions of security as a zero-sum phenomenon that can be attained unilaterally. It recognized that “inadvertent” war could arise from the dynamics of a reciprocal security dilemma, in which the defensive preparations of one state are seen as offensively intended by rival states. To avoid such a scenario, common security emphasizes the importance of reassuring potential adversaries. According to Palme, “states cannot achieve security at each other's expense”; security must be achieved “not against the adversary but with him”. Common security, the report went on, “must replace the present expedient of deterrence.” The Palme Commission also called for arms control, multilateral cooperation and the enhancement of the collective security functions of the United Nations.

This chapter examines the first phase of Malaysian telecommunications reform. Three main arguments are presented. First, Prime Minister Mahathir played a central role in the adoption of privatisation in Malaysia. Second, while the Malaysian state is strong and determinedly adopted privatisation as an economic policy, its implementation was greatly influenced by the active lobbying of Malay businessmen. This points to the fact that, a strong state that is able to formulate policies independently is not necessarily insulated from lobbying that shapes implementation. Third, the implementation of telecommunications privatisation mainly benefited politicians, their political allies, and those within the Barisan Nasional patronage network.

The discussion is divided into three parts. The first looks into how and why privatisation was adopted as a state policy. The second focuses on the privatisation of the telecommunications sector by analysing its stages, its implementation, and the roles of major actors. A final section synthesises the chapter's evidence and main arguments.

PRIVATISATION IN MALAYSIA

Malaysia was one of the first among developing countries to adopt privatisation as part of its economic reform program. In the early 1980s, the total or partial sale of state enterprises to the private sector was viewed as the solution to numerous problems confronting the state including inefficient state enterprises, high levels of public debt, and poor economic performance. In March 1983, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed spoke of privatisation as a cornerstone of his economic policy. He said:

Likened to a security management system “by committee”. In the words of Benjamin Miller, a concert is

Concerts bring together a small group of major powers in order to regulate relations among themselves, to promote norms of cooperation, and to prevent conflicts between smaller states from provoking a larger war. Rosecrance and Schott describe a concert as a “club or group of powers that agree collectively to lower security costs for a given geographic (regional or worldwide) area”. They should be clearly distinguished from ad hoc singleissue diplomacy, “less institutionalized forms of great power diplomatic cooperation such as détente and entente”, and alliances of several major powers balancing against another power or powers.

An essential requirement for a functioning concert system is an agreement among concert members not to act unilaterally. Instead, decisions are made by consensus after consultation, and action to implement decisions is taken collectively. The central objective of a concert is to maintain stability, in effect the status quo of an international order. Because of this, the second important prerequisite for the establishment of a concert of powers is the acceptance of a set of common norms of behaviour by its members. Concert members must share compatible views of a stable international order. They must acknowledge one another's security interests and respect one another's domestic affairs. Members must agree not to act unilaterally against one another with force, or without consultation. Because concert systems can be informal, they have the additional advantage of not requiring complex institutional or bureaucratic mechanisms.

The idea that in certain circumstances it is permissible under international law for a state or states to use military force to intervene in another state's territory, in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster from taking place, even without the permission of the government of that state. While the idea has developed an extensive literature, it is strongly disputed by some governments. Legal scholars also differ over its scope and substance.

According to Peter Malanczuk, “there are numerous and often conflicting definitions of ‘humanitarian intervention’, some of which appear to be mere de facto ‘working definitions’, and others which are meant to be normative in the sense that the definition itself purports to establish criteria of legality or illegality.” Legal scholar Wil Verwey attempts to find what he calls an “authentic definition” of humanitarian intervention as a legal concept, but concludes “one is immediately confronted with a major analytical obstacle: it soon appears from a comparative analysis of relevant instruments and literature that there may be few concepts in international law today which are as conceptually obscure and legally controversial as ‘humanitarian intervention’.” He attributes this to the lack of consensus on the legal meaning of both the terms intervention and humanitarian.

Sean Murphy uses a working definition which assumes that humanitarian intervention “is the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights”. Baxter emphasizes that the force used must be “short term”. Verwey argues that to be considered as “humanitarian”, forcible action must be “for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to serious violations of fundamental human rights, in particular threats to the life of persons, regardless of their nationality”. His stipulation that it be solely for preventing these violations is so strict that he does not think there have been any genuine examples so far.

This chapter describes the condition of the telecommunications industry in Malaysia and the Philippines before market reform by examining the condition of the telecommunications sector and the roles played by the state and private actors. The patterns of political patronage, the types of rents, the way they were obtained, who acquired them, and how they were used will also be analysed. Finally, the question why the Malaysian telecommunications sector was more efficient than that of the Philippines will be addressed.

Immediately after independence, Malaysia was left with a fairly efficient communications infrastructure. Telecommunications were originally the responsibility of a state department that had monopoly control of service delivery. The private sector's role was limited to equipment supply. With the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP), the state's monopoly over the telecommunications sector was used to allocate patronage to Malays through the award of licenses for some services and equipment supply contracts. The NEP goal of rapid economic development led to massive state investment for the expansion of the communications sector in the 1980s. The modernisation of the communications infrastructure, however, was also used to create business opportunities for Malays. State patronage of these businessmen resulted in increased costs and inefficiencies in the infrastructure expansion programme. Yet, the economic impact was generally expansionary and growth-enhancing.

Under American occupation, foreign-owned companies under state regulation provided telecommunications services in the Philippines. In 1967, a group of Filipino businessmen close to then President Ferdinand Marcos took over ownership of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). PLDT had sole authority to operate a national communications network. During the 1970s, PLDT consolidated its monopoly status, and was under very little state pressure to expand its network and improve its services. A few other businessmen were granted exclusive privileges by the Marcos regime to operate various communications services, and small provincial telephone companies proliferated due to unmet demand. Yet, the state protected the monopoly profit of PLDT, whose services were inefficient. Monopoly rent was captured for private profit, and was growth-hindering.

Sometimes called “collective self-defence”. Historically one of the most important elements of states' national security policies, second only to “self-help”. The concept refers to the practice where states agree to collaborate to ward off a threat from an identified enemy (whether actual or potential). This collaboration is usually in the form of alliance relationships, coalitions, or pacts of mutual assistance, which aim to deter the would-be aggressor. The bestknown collective defence arrangements during the Cold War were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. The “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” is recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

While collective defence is a very simple idea, in practice it is often confused with collective security. This is not surprising, for as well as having similar names they overlap in content. In the case of both collective security and collective defence, states commit themselves to assist others in the event of an attack. In both instances, the victim of aggression expects its defensive strength to be supplemented by the strength and support of other states. However, the essential difference between the two concepts is the way the states conceive of the enemy. According to Arnold Wolfers, nations enter collective defence arrangements to ward off threats to their national security emanating from some “specific country or group of countries regarded as the chief national enemy, actual or potential”. In contrast, collective security arrangements are directed against “any and every country anywhere that commits an act of aggression, allies and friends included”. In other words, while collective defence arrangements are focused against a particular (albeit often unnamed) external enemy, collective security targets aggression itself, from wherever it might come, including from within the group, with the threat of all against one.

The development of the modern series of collective defence agreements in the Asia-Pacific began with the end of World War II.

A la carte suggests the idea of picking and choosing. The term a la carte multilateralism was coined by Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning in the U.S. State Department from 2001 to 2003. In a speech in July 2001, Haass told a Washington think-tank that “what you're going to get from [the George W. Bush] administration is a la carte multilateralism… we'll look at each agreement and make a decision, rather than come out with a broad-based approach.”

Haass' use of the term came against a backdrop of debate about the Bush administration's supposed preference for unilateral action, signalled by its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. According to one analyst the formulation was intended to suggest that “multilateralism was not rejected out of hand, but would be engaged only as and when the United States chooses to participate”. Treaties will “be judged one issue at a time, one negotiation at a time, one summit meeting at a time”. As such, the term clearly shares much with ideas like “ad hoc multilateralism” or “coalitions of the willing” in which one leading state creates a multilateral group by “picking and choosing its allies and mechanisms as circumstances dictate”.

Advocates of an a la carte approach argue that it is realistic and pragmatic. Rather than accepting multilateralism as an end in itself, a la carte multilateralism puts emphasis on achieving outcomes. Satu Limaye has said the Bush administration's approach more closely resembles “accountable multilateralism” in which “a premium is placed on making institutions achieve concrete ends”. Robert Kagan agrees, arguing that, “contrary to fashionable wisdom, the debate today is not between multilateralism and unilateralism. It's between effective multilateralism and paralytic multilateralism”. John Bolton, then U.S. Under-Secretary of State for international security affairs, explicitly links the efficacy of a la carte multilateralism to its ability to serve the national interest.