Multilateralism, both as an approach and policy position, falls within the liberal tradition in international relations. It emphasizes the utility of states acting in concert to achieve a common purpose. Alternatively, individual issues or areas may be isolated for transnational cooperation. International norms and regimes that are classic expressions of multilateralism are meant to support and augment national interests in the creation of what Hedley Bull would call international society. While multilateralism may function alongside a realism that typically construes international relations in statist terms, liberal variants of multilateralism are intended to broaden transnational cooperation and in the process, weaken realist-styled state interests. Accordingly, regime theory and neo-liberal institutionalism fall well within the multilateral enterprise.

The liberal approach to international relations was played down after World War II in favour of realism. The Cold War that defined international relations from 1950 onwards was premised on arch-realist principles that emphasized the centrality of states. Additionally, state interests were defined and articulated in terms of the retention and acquisition of state power in a variety of forms. Hence, over time, the liberal tradition came to be called “idealist”, with all the attendant negative connotations. However, the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, long regarded as the fountainhead of communism and as being antithetical to liberal-democracy and capitalism, altered the bipolar structure of international relations. The decompression effect associated with this structural transformation turned convergent conceptions of international norms and society into a real possibility, and was aided and abetted by the increasing popularity of constructivism in international relations inspired by the liberal tradition.

Constructivists, unlike realists, argued that norms and practices associated with collective identity formation could serve as a catalyst in international relations just as well as the realist state-centric model that had acquired paradigmatic status after 1950. The fundamental assumption, made well within the liberal tradition, was that mutual gains rather than mutual fear could equally well underpin state motivations in international relations. The dissipation of bipolarity afforded constructivists the structural possibilities for making their case. Greater transnational cooperation and the strengthening of international regimes throughout the 1990s did indeed give cause for such optimism. Although the United States has recently elevated its own national interests or conceptions thereof as overriding considerations in international relations, this position was not always the case.

INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

The East Asian region as a whole (both Northeast and Southeast Asia) has evidenced a remarkable growth pattern since the late 1980s and early 1990s — a trend that was somewhat deflected by the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. Economic recovery and growth appear to have come back on track after the turn of the century. However, this most recent period of growth has being punctuated by the SARS epidemic (2003), and most recently, by the outbreak of bird flu in East Asia. Will these negative developments in the health sector affect overall economic growth and political stability as well as regional security? There is no doubt that the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States did and continues to have an impact on external and regional perceptions and policies regarding Asia-Pacific security. In any case, the more interesting feature of the post-9/11 scenario lies along two dimensions: First, the nature of initiatives and responses by East Asian (especially ASEAN) governments to the terrorist threat, and second, the glaring inability of international terrorism to overthrow or significantly alter the political, social, and territorial status quo in the region.

Globalization understood in terms of its totalizing economic, political, social and cultural impact on human civilization is a fairly recent phenomenon that commenced with the advance of Western imperialism and territorial conquest in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The non-Western world was arguably globalized by the imperial activities of Western powers and also Japan, whose emergence as a military-industrial power under the Meiji restoration gave the “Land of the Rising Sun” the same imperial energy and drive that had characterized the Europeans. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the two world wars, the world community essentially accepted the nation-state process of globalization, and symbolized the post- World War II status quo by establishing the United Nations in 1945. Henceforth, unilateral ambitions were to be moderated by multi-lateral impulses through the machinery of international organization, and pacific settlements of disputes achieved through the medium of international law. Multi-lateralism in trade and economic matters was also endorsed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, whilst the 1944 Bretton-Woods agreement attempted to stabilize the international monetary system.

THE CHARACTER OF EUROPE

Europe is the cradle of Western civilization. Ancient Greece is normally considered to have laid the foundations of European civilization. Later on, the Roman Empire and its Christianized civil society exercised a strong influence on all European peoples. Despite experiencing the thousand-year long Dark Ages, Europe still emerged by the time of the Renaissance as the most advanced civilization in the world. With the Enlightenment, Neo-Platonism and industrialization, the West took shape. European cultures grew in confidence and came to display unprecedented hegemonic power throughout the world.

However, in the aftermath of World War I, European societies entered a negative trend, as its citizens became more and more distrustful of inherited values and beliefs. Oswald Spengler labelled this the “Decline of the West”. Nevertheless, after 1945, Western Europe gradually rebuilt itself into a highly integrated and cohesive grouping of economies and peoples.

PEACE AND EUROPEAN UNION

For centuries, Europe was the scene of frequent and bloody wars. Between 1870 and 1945, France and Germany went to war against each other three times, with terrible loss of life. After World War II, some visionary European leaders became convinced that the only way to secure lasting peace between their countries was to unite them economically and politically. The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed integrating the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. As a result, in 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up with six members: Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The power to make decisions about the coal and steel industry in these countries was placed in the hands of an independent, supranational body called the “High Authority”. Jean Monnet was its first president.

The ECSC was such a success that, within a few years, these same six countries decided to integrate other sectors of their economies. In 1957 they signed the Treaty of Rome, creating the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) in the process. The member states set about removing trade barriers between themselves and forming a “common market”. In 1967 the three European communities were merged into one. From that point on, there was one single Commission and one single Council of Ministers with a directly elected European Parliament. From then on, it was called the “European Community” or “European Communities” (EC).

AN OVERVIEW OF PARADIGMS

East Asian economic studies have been based on three alternative paradigms: one mainstream and two rival paradigms. The mainstream paradigm involves basic economic thoughts derived from free-market theory, modernization theory and development economics. It argues, among other things, that economic development in East Asia and other regions can be achieved only through the implementation of a market economy along with free trade and free enterprise systems. Inputs from the West, such as capital, technology, institutions and cultural values, are essential, while traditional cultures and institutions of the Orient are considered to be obstacles to progress. High economic growth in East Asia is credited to the free market system, with the state playing a small role. Proponents of this paradigm include such well-known economists as Milton Friedman, Gustav Ranis, John C.H. Fei and Edward K.Y. Chen.

As early as in the 1970s, the mainstream paradigm was challenged by a neo-Marxist school of thought known as “dependency theory”. It asserts in general terms that “periphery capitalism” (that is, the capitalist system in the Third World) will inevitably result in dominance by “core” economies that will deprive the “peripheral” economies of any chance of “autonomous development”. Samir Amin and other dependency theorists applied this theory to Asia in the mid-1970s, arguing that none of the Asian economies had come close to “the stage of independent and autonomous development”, but on the contrary, “unequal development” and the dependency-dominance relationships in these economies had become a more serious problem than ever before. Some neo-Marxist theorists even went so far as to lump Asian economies together with other Third World regions under the vague category of “under-development”, which was said to be the consequence of “overdevelopment” in the core economies of the West. As the economic success of the Four Tigers became increasingly evident, however, this rival paradigm sank into oblivion.

The second rival paradigm came on the scene toward the end of the 1970s when the “economic miracle” of East Asia attracted the attention of the world's academic communities. Many prominent social scientists, including sociologist Peter Berger and political scientist Ezra Vogel, argued that the East Asian model of economic development was different from the free-market model, and undertook to develop an alternative “Asian type of modernization”, with emphasis placed on the contribution state interventions and traditional Confucian values make to economic success.

HISTORICAL CONDITIONS OF REGIONALISM IN EASTERN ASIA

Research on East and Southeast Asia generally follows the common practice of focusing on nation states. Where this proves unsatisfactory (and this happens increasingly often), scholars resort to frameworks such as regional studies or “area studies” as alternatives, or phrase issues that are relevant to geographic regions beyond national boundaries. Where East Asia is concerned, national borders have remained more useful as boundaries for academic disciplines than they have been where Southeast Asia is concerned.

The geo-political “leftover” that is Southeast Asia consists of a political and cultural plethora beyond what one would expect, given its relatively small land surface. The predominantly maritime nature of human contacts in the region, especially in the south, is the main reason for this. Southeast Asian studies, therefore, is a regional discipline by nature, where the region's national policies must necessarily consider inter-cultural dynamics throughout maritime Asia from India to Japan. In fact, “culture” as understood in Southeast Asia assumes inter-cultural dynamics and hybridity to a larger extent than in continental regions such as East Asia.

Historical traditions in East Asia, influenced as strongly as they were by the bureaucratic class, have generally been about domestic order and barbarian invasions. This prolonged prejudice has allowed the history and reality of inter-state trade and communication through the ages to be overshadowed by central perspectives. However, wide-ranging extra-political factors were always significant, and exerted an influence that cannot be denied. In the case of China, the centre of its culture and its economy had been moving steadily southwards throughout the centuries under pressure from northern peoples pushing across porous boundaries. The inter-cultural exchanges involved and how they have in fact impacted on Chinese civilization and politics are not widely known. This southward movement was to an extent slowed in the fourteenth century by the usurping third monarch of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), the Yongle Emperor (reign period 1403–24), when he moved the imperial capital, which had shown a tendency to shift eastwards and southwards since the Tang Dynasty (618–907), if not already during the Later Han (25–220), to his own power base in Beijing, one of the traditional capitals of non-Chinese dynasties in the north, including the Yuan Mongols.

INTRODUCTION

It should be mentioned from the outset that the discussion here is slanted more towards a Southeast Asian perception than an East Asian one. Understandably, if the discussion were to be led by someone from East Asia, it would probably be the other way round. But that is putting it very generally. Neither Southeast Asia nor East Asia is a homogeneous entity. The need to generalize in intellectual discussions, while unavoidable, is also full of pitfalls. Scholarship is quite often, for one reason or another, coloured by sentimentalism that can result in more being seen than there is to see. On the other hand, if the distant past is almost faded from memory or is clouded by contemporary prejudices, its significance may be underplayed. It is difficult at any rate to deny that even the remote past is never really obliterated. Bali, for example, one of Indonesia's over 17,000 islands, has retained its Hindu culture and religion within a country with an overwhelmingly Muslim population. Inversely, in contemporary Javanese culture, a thick layer of Hinduism is still recognizable. Historical and cultural links have greater lasting impact if they are authentic rather than mythical, and if each succeeding generation is able to consciously cherish them.

The discipline of history is concerned with the total past — from as far back as it is possible to imagine up to the recent moment. However, no single historian can hope to cope with the total past. To help simplify matters, a broad distinction is often made between “proto-history” and “pre-history” on the one hand, and “history” on the other. The historical period begins when scholars can rely on sound documentary evidence. The period prior to that is by and large the domain of archaeologists who primarily conduct studies based on artefacts, relics, buildings and monuments. It is also common when discussing history to use categories such as the distant/remote past and the recent past, or ancient and contemporary/current history.

Neither Southeast Asia nor East Asia (especially China) lacks ancient artefacts and sites. However, documents are not easily available for the pre-fifteenth century period with regard to relations between the two regions. Based on what is available and what is still perceivable of the cultural scenario today, one cannot but surmise that there was, in the distant past, profound cultural links between South Asia and Southeast Asia.

INTRODUCTION

East Asia has always been a region that has exerted a strong influence on international history. In ancient times, it was the site of the Chinese civilization and the great Chinese empires. In modern times, it was the place where great powers such as Britain, France, Holland, Portugal, Spain, the United States, Japan and Russia competed for political influence and colonial domination. This struggle led to the Pacific War that left many bitter memories behind. During the succeeding Cold War, it became the arena for ideological conflicts between the East and the West, led by the USSR and the United States respectively. Civil wars dragged on in the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese mainland and in Southeast Asia. With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict in 1993, the region became stable and started to experience impressive economic growth. Japan rose like a phoenix from the ashes of war to become an economic giant, second only to the United States. Soon, the four little dragons — Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore — followed Japan's growth, later to be tailed by Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Indonesia.

In the meantime, the region also became home to newly established multilateral organizations such as the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN+3 (Japan, South Korea and China). There was even a proposal for an East Asian Economic Grouping that would have excluded Western powers, but which failed because of U.S. opposition. Taken as a whole, the region was an economic powerhouse until it was hit by the 1997 financial crisis. Since then, it has been recuperating and most signs show that it is re-emerging as an area of high growth. Although the security scenario has changed since the collapse of the USSR, some Cold War remnants still remain. U.S.-Japan relations are still central to regional security, and U.S. bilateral security frameworks in the region still remain intact. The United States retains its military presence in Okinawa and South Korea, and overall U.S.-China bilateral relations still remain cordial despite hiccups over human rights, and fears of a power struggle between the two.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1949, the American Congress passed the Mutual Defence Assistance Act that led to a programme commonly known as “security assistance”. In accordance with this act (and later revisions), the United States came to export almost US$500 billion in arms and related military services from 1950 to 2001. The transfer of military equipment to allies and friendly states has remained a consistent feature of U.S. foreign policy, although there was a significant change in how arms were supplied. The United States provided arms free of charge in the beginning, but gradually began to demand payment. In other words, there was a shift from military aid to military sales (the aid/sale transformation). The transition was remarkable: in 1950, for example, only 4 per cent of the total agreements on weapons exports were sales; but in 1984, military sales accounted for more than 90 per cent of all U.S. arms exports. Even after the Cold War, this percentage was never lower than 63 per cent. The purpose of this study is to develop a consistent explanation of this increase in the percentage of arms sales, after which the data is tested on the case of U.S. arms exports to East Asia.

This involves two important features. First, arms transfer is an “international” activity between at least two states or international actors. In other words, arms transfer involves cooperation between states, and requires a supplier to export arms and a recipient to import them. If either the supplier or the recipient is not capable or not willing to cooperate, no arms transfer can occur.

This chapter contends that U.S. arms transfers cannot be adequately studied by examining the supplier side alone. The supplier and the recipient are equally important in understanding the pattern of U.S. arms transfer.

PART I

Japan's diplomacy of international conciliation can be traced back to the latter years of the Shogunate. Japanese cooperation with Western Powers began in 1853 when, under the threat of Commodore Perry's “Black Ships”, Japan concluded unequal treaties with the United States. The Treaty of Kanawa was signed in 1854, to be followed by the U.S.-Japanese Commercial Treaty in 1858. It also concluded unequal treaties with Holland, Britain, Russia, France, Portugal, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Italy and Denmark.

Although these treaties were qualified by terms such as “good-will” or “commercial”, their actual contents concerned: (1) opening ports for trade; (2) extra-territorial jurisdiction; (3) negotiating a customs-tax rate; and (4) granting of most favoured nation status, etc. These very treaties marked the beginning of the so-called “humiliation diplomacy”. The Meiji restoration was carried out under the concept of “Sonno Joyi” (Reverence for the emperor and expulsion of the barbarians). Nevertheless, the Meiji government was wont to take over the unequal treaties, signed by the Bakufu in submission to the foreigners.

It is said that the representatives of Britain and France were very active in pursuing economic interests in Japan behind the scenes of the Meiji restoration. British envoy Harry Smith Parkes supported Satsuma-Choshu in overthrowing the Bakufu, while French envoy Leon Roches stood by the Tokugawa Shogunate. Thus, it may be said, the outcome of the Meiji restoration was Britain's diplomatic victory over France. Accordingly, Japan was in a position to appease Britain after the Meiji restoration. In 1871, Iwakura Tomomi was selected to head a special mission composed of more than one hundred powerful Meiji government officials including Kido Koin, Okubo Toshimichi, and Ito Hirobumi, to mention but a few. Their aim was to have negotiations with the Western powers concerning the revision of the unequal treaties.

However, Iwakura's group was disappointed by the cold reaction of the Western powers to their treaty revision proposals. They had no choice but to alter the purpose of their mission and embark upon a tour of America and Europe to study Western civilization. Iwakura and his companions came to realize that Japan had lots to learn about bunmei kaika (civilization enlightenment) and fukoku kyohei (rich country, strong army) before she could rank among the Western powers.

Introduction

In 2000, the Southeast Asian population was 37 per cent urban but it has been estimated that by the year 2017, the urban population in Southeast Asia will be 50 per cent. In Malaysia, the rate of urbanization has been even more rapid, from 34 per cent of its population being urban in 1970, to 50 per cent in 1990 moving towards 58 per cent in 2000. This is expected to reach 64 per cent by the year 2010 (Jones 1997, p. 238). In the Malaysian state of Sarawak, only 16 per cent of the state's total population lived in urban centres in 1970 and this increased marginally to 18 per cent in 1980. Then it jumped to 22 per cent in 1991 and 48 per cent in 2000 (Ishak Shari et al. 1997, Yearbook of Statistics Sarawak, 2000 and 2003). The Iban and the Bidayuh make up the two largest group of rural migrants. The majority of rural migrants are single with 45 per cent being females. More than half are between fifteen and thirty-four years of age. The major receiving centres are Kuching, Miri, Bintulu and Sibu in descending order of number of migrants. Kuching as the capital and administrative centre of the state has a population of about half a million. It has a large service sector that attracts the highest number of rural female migrants in Sarawak. In the main, manufacturing in Kuching is small to medium size and light industry rather than heavy. In contrast, male migrants are attracted to the petrochemical industries in Miri and Bintulu and to the wood-based industries around Sibu.

Jones (1997) argues that there are several observable trends which have led to an under-estimation of the levels of urbanization in Asia. First, urbanization has led to a blurring of what is considered urban and rural. Increasing penetration of infrastructural and economic development beyond city boundaries has resulted in what McGee (1991) calls the emergence of desakota, which literally translates into “village-town” in Asia. Globalization and the integration of village economies with the urban has meant that there is a reconfiguration of large zones around major cities which are known as extended metropolitan regions (EMRs).

Introduction

Accelerated urbanization in Sarawak in the last four decades has far reaching ramifications on the lives of people. The consequences of rural-urban migration such as changes in family structure, the breakdown of traditional support networks, advancement of technology, changes in communication networks and opportunities for employment have all been well documented. On the other hand, it needs to be noted that urbanization is not a uniform process, but a highly differentiated one. Firstly, state policies in Sarawak have seen a concentration of development in the urban centres, mainly in the major towns of Kuching, Sibu, Miri and later Bintulu. Secondly, the impact of urbanization is differently experienced by people in Sarawak not only as a result of this urban bias, but also because the impact of urbanization is mediated by class, ethnicity, gender and age.

How has urbanization impacted on women? What are the changes and adjustments that they have to make in their encounters with urbanization? Are they active agents or passive recipients? This chapter focuses on the lived experiences of elderly women in the urbanization process of Sarawak and examines how it has had an impact on them. Quantitative data presented aims to show key demographic characteristics of these women and whenever relevant, comparisons will be made to elderly men. Qualitative data based on in-depth interviews with several selected women were presented in the form of vignettes which sought to privilege their personal accounts of their journeys through the urbanization process. Drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data, emerging themes and issues are highlighted in the concluding section of this chapter.

Brief Background to the Study

Primary data in this chapter are drawn from a larger study, “Ageing in Sarawak: Needs, Impact and Emerging Issues”, commissioned by the Ministry of Social Development and Urbanization, Sarawak. The main aim of this study was to examine demographic trends and assess the needs and emerging issues of the older population. The findings of the study would assist the state government in formulating policies and programmes for the elderly. The research team decided to use the government retirement age of 55 as the starting age for the definition of elderly persons. Such a starting age is also justified on the grounds that life expectancy in Malaysia, as in other developing countries, is shorter than in developed nations.

In each chapter we have examined the multi-faceted consequences of urbanization on a specific group of women, the price paid and the rewards earned. However, three main themes have emerged from our research. The first is that gender is embedded in social transformative processes such as urbanization, but how women and men participate and experience such forces is often uneven across class, ethnicity, age, marital status and location. One thing is clear, it is more difficult for the poor, lowly educated rural migrant women who are mainly the subjects of this book, to negotiate this terrain of change than their better educated middle-class, urban sisters. The second theme is that although new opportunities for women arise, pre-existing gender inequality such as poverty, economic exploitation and discrimination is often exacerbated by rapid social change. The third theme is that elderly village mothers and city daughters who face insurmountable obstacles often must turn to their poverty-stricken families for support. The inadequacy of state intervention to ensure the survival of these fragile families is pivotal to women's experiences of the disempowering aspects of macro-structural changes.

Single women enjoy greater mobility and therefore expanded employment opportunities in the cities than their married sisters who remain in the village. However, in a gender-segmented labour market, women with low education and limited marketable skills find themselves at a disadvantaged position in comparison to their brothers in the same strata. Women earn less, have lower occupational mobility and experience more discrimination. In addition, they suffer greater sexual vulnerability in the urban courtship game. When they marry and have children, new dependencies are created when they have to withdraw from the labour market and become family caretakers. If their marriage or relationship fails, unemployment and low wages translate into poverty for single mothers. It is pertinent to add here that the vulnerability of women in marriages or liaisons in recent times is also a consequence of urbanization and men's greater labour mobility.