1. Umno, Money Politics, And The Malay Agenda

In January 2005, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi began his fifteenth month in office as leader of this multi-ethnic nation of 26 million people, with a raft of issues that remained unsettled since assuming office on 1 November 2003. Abdullah was faced with pressing problems such as money politics, cronyism, budget deficits, glaring failures of several government-linked companies (GLCs), and religious intolerance. On a personal level, 2005 was a particularly difficult year for Abdullah, as his ailing wife Endon Mahmood succumbed to breast cancer in October after battling it for two years.

The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) General Assembly (19–23 July 2005) furnished the testing ground for Abdullah's leadership style and ability to emerge as a conciliator and problem solver for intra-UMNO politics and the general management of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN). The BN is a 14-member coalition government in which two ethnic-based parties — the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) are senior partners representing numerically significant minorities in the country. The Prime Minister was conscious of the fact that he was not only UMNO President — the political party with 3.4 million Malay members — but was also the Prime Minister of a multiracial country. Abdullah squarely addressed the issue of money politics, which figured largely in the month-long run-up to the General Assembly. In his keynote speech, he remarked: “there can be no pride in winning an election through corrupt means and subsequently accepting money to bribe others”. Adding that it would be a tragedy for the Malays if wealth was used to barter power and power was used to sell out the race, Abdullah stressed that efforts to enhance integrity and eradicate corruption would cover both the public and private sectors, including statutory agencies and GLCs.

The premier was evidently referring, in his speech, to the recent suspension of Isa Ahmad, the UMNO Vice-President and Federal Territories Minister, who secured the largest number of votes for the three vice-presidential posts in the September 2004 party elections.

This article analyses Japan's policy towards East Asia in general and East Asian community-building in particular. Japan, as a global nation, has huge stakes in strengthening global governance institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To respond to transnational and global issues such as economic globalization, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and international terrorism, Japan needs to enhance global mechanisms and make a substantial contribution to such global governance institutions. Japan's bid for a permanent membership at the UN Security Council and the amendment of the Japanese Constitution that is on the domestic political agenda must be understood in this context.

At the same time, ‘regions’ or regionalisms are becoming a more salient concept for managing politico-security and economic affairs in today's world. We are entering an era of ‘A World of Regions’. 1 East Asia is becoming a more important region for Japan's peace and prosperity. The great transformation of East Asia is posing great challenges and opportunities for Japan, demanding its strong commitment to East Asian community-building.

Growing trade which is linked with foreign direct investments (FDI) and foreign production is integrating the Japanese economy closely with East Asia. Japanese multinational firms have shifted to international production and reorganized their business activities accordingly. Their production networks are spread over a large number of countries. This trend has created a strong Japanese interest in liberalization, guarantees for Japanese investment, and institution-building in order to manage these economic relations.

Essentially two region-wide production and distribution networks have been established by Japanese firms in East Asia since the middle of 1980s, one with Southeast Asia and the other with China. The pressing task for Japan is to connect these two production networks more closely, thereby constructing ‘seamless’ networks of production and distribution in East Asia.

Lee Hsien Loong's succession of Goh Chok Tong as Prime Minister (PM) in August 2004 was long anticipated. It was thus unsurprising that political analysts spent 2005 dissecting the new PM's every public utterance for clues as to the character of his new administration. These analysts have endeavoured to describe and define the new Lee administration perhaps not just to distinguish it from the long shadow of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew and the highly popular Senior Minister Goh, but also to decipher the People's Action Party (PAP) government's visions for Singapore at the dawn of the 21 st century. In a one-party state with only three prime ministers since independence, it is tempting to see each transition as epochal even if the PAP government takes pains to spread the message of ideological continuity and political stability. It was thus inevitable that Lee's widely publicized inaugural “open and inclusive society” slogan would be contrasted with Goh's own “kinder, gentler society” tagline as though a national paradigm shift had quietly occurred between administrations. Given the growing demands of an increasingly cosmopolitan citizenry, Lee's slogan was interpreted by some to be a hint at further political liberalization, even prompting the Straits Times to herald in a “brave new Singapore”; one that was moving away from a “one-size-fits-all paradigm” in terms of government policies.

Initial expectations of greater political liberalization have, however, at the close of 2005, been replaced by a more sober appreciation of the fact that the proposed “open and inclusive society” was never intended to signal democratic openness but, rather, societal acceptance of different personal and social achievements. By celebrating individuals who have wandered off the beaten track and achieved success in non-academic fields and non-mainstream careers, the message of the new Lee administration was that society no longer recognized just one peak of excellence but an entire mountain range, even as the traditional out-of-bounds markers continue to remain firmly installed.

The year 2005 marked the 35 th anniversary of the People's Revolutionary Party's takeover of the Laotian government. Throughout this period, journalists and scholars have used various labels to describe the Laotian state. Some referred to it as a communist or socialist authoritarian state while others have described it as a weak state that could not even pay the salaries of many of its employees regularly. It is true that Laos is one of the five remaining communist countries in the world. It is also true that the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) does not tolerate any form of political opposition that directly or indirectly challenges its rule. Laos remains one of the most underdeveloped and poorest countries in the world. Even in 2005, about 38 per cent of the population reportedly lived below the poverty line and the salary of senior government officials was not enough for a family of four to live decently. Furthermore, a large majority of the working people, especially those from minority areas, do not have any formal education.

In spite of these factors, this article attempts to demonstrate that the Laotian state is not static. Since the collapse of the communist bloc, the Laotian state has undertaken several reforms. Consequently, the nature of the state has changed over time. The government has also loosened control over the population. In the early 1990s, foreigner could not travel around the country freely. A Laotian businessman noted that he would not dare to talk to any foreigner as it could earn him a prison term. In 2005, however, many foreigners moved around the country and interacted with people quite freely. One can see at coffee houses, restaurants and bars in Vientiane that most Laotian people are not afraid of dealing with foreigners any more. Since early 2000, the infrastructure has improved significantly.

This article examines the state of the state in Laos in 2005. In so doing, the article will highlight how the nature of the Laotian state changed in the last 15 years and assess its capacity to deal with social and economic reforms.

The main events that characterized Myanmar's political scene in 2005 were the military government's highlighting of its National Convention (NC) as a showcase for political progress and the crackdown on political activists from the Shan ethnic group. The legitimacy of the NC established by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, the junta from 1988 to 1997) and endorsed by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) was still not accepted by the political opposition and the US-led Western governments while the crackdown attracted a fresh round of condemnations by the advocates of human rights, political opposition from within and without the country and Western governments. In fact, the issue of the apparent lack of progress in instituting political reforms towards democratic rule had become the bone of contention in ASEAN's relations with its dialogue partners and even within ASEAN itself and the year saw a significant increase in attempts by the international community to press for changes in the regime's conduct to conform with Western norms of human rights and democracy.

The issues of democratic reforms and the continued detention of opposition icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as well as allegations of forced labour, ill-treatment of political prisoners, internal displacement, and religious persecution that dogged the regime since it came to power were highlighted time and again by the regime's critics and detractors who unleashed a torrent of complaints, condemnations and warnings throughout the year, culminating in calls for a move to refer Myanmar to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as threat to peace and security in the region.

Meanwhile, on the economic front, the government continued its claim of double-digit GDP (gross domestic product) growth as in the previous few years, despite cost-push inflationary pressures and further deterioration in the free market exchange rate of the local currency (kyat, or K) to the US dollar. The government's claim of a high economic growth rate was disputed by outside observers such as the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Asian Development Bank.

The year 2005 is likely to be remembered as extraordinary, even peculiar, in the history of Thailand's evolving democracy since 1932. Within the year Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra soared to unprecedented political heights and then descended steeply into a political abyss. His Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party secured a thumping victory in the February 2005 General Election. Yet less than a year later, he faced a virulent Bangkok-based insurrection that called for no less than his resignation and permanent banishment from Thai politics. How did Thailand's most popularly elected prime minister who had risen so meteorically decline so precipitously?

This article sheds some light on key episodes following Thaksin's re- election triumph in February 2005. It begins with the significance of the re-election and the factors that led to the TRT's overwhelming victory. In the immediate aftermath of his re-election, Thaksin exhibited uncharacteristic signs of magnanimity and benevolent statesmanship, which lasted just several weeks. By mid-2005, his authoritarian streaks returned in full force, fanning the flames of discontent over his governance. By September an anti-Thaksin movement broke out into the open, spearheaded by a disgruntled media tycoon who had been an erstwhile ally of the Prime Minister. While this movement was initially confined to the Bangkok-based intelligentsia, middle classes, and civil society groups, it expanded into a mass movement to topple Thaksin when his family- owned Shin Corporation (Shin Corp) was sold to the Singapore government's Temasek Holdings in January 2006. The Prime Minister's political standing appeared untenable as long as he remained unable to convincingly explain the controversial sale of Shin Corp. The article concludes with the implications of these developments for the post-Thaksin era, including Thailand's near-term prospects.

Overwhelming Election Victory

In line with widespread expectations, Thaksin and the TRT scored a crushing victory in Thailand's general election on 6 February 2005. Despite claims of vote-buying and fraud, the election was relatively clean by Thai standards. The TRT garnered more than 75 per cent of the 500 seats for members of parliament (MPs), including 67 party-list seats.

For a country known for both its strong commitment to democracy and its weak political institutions, the year 2005 was full of intrigues and challenges for the Philippines. In July the Arroyo administration almost collapsed amidst rumours of coups, political controversies, and another People Power movement, sidelining efforts towards economic reform. Yet, despite this crisis and the ensuing policy setbacks, the economy displayed unexpected resilience.

The analysis of the events of 2005 will be divided into three sections. The first deals with the country's main political events, the second with the state of the economy. The final section concludes by reflecting on the country's economic and political prospects in the short term.

Political Developments

Crisis and controversies

The year 2005 saw the Filipino President almost toppled by street protests — yet again. Despite being impeached and facing considerable public opprobrium, the Arroyo administration narrowly survived. However, at the end of the year, the controversies surrounding the President's mandate were far from settled. These issues threaten to resurface in 2006 as her administration endeavours to push for changes in the Constitution as a way of solving the gridlock that besets the Philippine political system.

Mrs Arroyo won the 2004 elections by a margin of about 1 million votes over her closest rival, actor Fernando Poe. This entailed a six-year term for Arroyo, who rose to the presidency in January 2001. The new presidential term evoked promise, as questions of Arroyo's mandate and legitimacy seemed to be resolved by her electoral victory. Yet, the optimism was short-lived as economists from the University of the Philippines warned of an impending fiscal crisis. In her July 2004 State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Arroyo declared that the country's “most urgent problem” was solving the government's worsening fiscal and debt condition. Eight new revenue measures were announced as a legislative priority but Congress took its time legislating them. Because of this, credit rating agencies downgraded their ratings of the Philippines.

The year 2005 was another crucial year for Brunei Darussalam, setting in motion its policy directions for the next decade or so. In fact, it was a strengthening of the strategies introduced the previous year. Consolidation and reform were the key targets of the government as it gained confidence and momentum in forging ahead with political and economic development. The society, in the mean time, took the opportunity to participate in public affairs as signs of openness and transparency increased.

Politics and Governance

The major event of the previous year had been the reconvening of the Legislative Council after an absence of over 20 years as it had been suspended since independence in 1984. One of the main tasks of that assembly, composed of 21 appointed members, was to discuss and pass various amendments to the 1959 Constitution. A high-level committee had been established a few years earlier to review the constitution and related legal matters. His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah as Head of State, signed the Proclamation of Brunei's Constitution (Amendments) on 29 September 2004 during the sitting of the legislature. While the constitution reinforced Brunei as a Malay Islamic Monarchy, the legislative process was given prominence as a means for the people to take part in the development of the state, even though the numbers of those participating were limited. It was projected as an official forum to voice opinions and raise issues. Some of the discussions in the Assembly supported that notion. It was also announced that the legislature would be enlarged to 45 members, with provisions for a maximum of 15 representatives to be elected from the four districts of Brunei-Muara, Tutong, Belait, and Temburong.

Contrary to the announcement made the previous year, the legislature did not convene in 2005. By decree, the previous Legislative Council was dissolved as of 1 September and a new one was constituted to take effect as of 2 September.

BACKGROUND

For the past decade, Australia has been the overseas study destination of first choice for Indonesians. Its major competitive advantages are its proximity to Indonesia, the quality of its education and the range of courses available to international students. Indonesians are also attracted to Australia because it is an English-speaking country and has a reasonable cost of living compared with other Western countries.

Australia currently enjoys approximately 37 per cent of the overseas-bound Indonesian student market. The United States attracts another 22 per cent of the market, Singapore 15 per cent and Malaysia 7 per cent. At the end of August 2005, 15,158 Indonesians were enrolled in study programs in Australia. Education was Australia's fourth-largest export commodity in 2003–04, worth A$5.9 billion (DFAT 2005a). The export of education to Indonesia alone yields approximately A$500 million per annum for Australia. This amount is derived predominantly from living costs and tuition fees from on-shore programs.

Australian education and training services, delivered through the Australian Development Scholarship (ADS) scheme, the Australian Partnership Scholarship (APS) scheme, the Indonesia–Australia Specialised Training Project and so on, account for a total of 50 per cent of Australia's aid to Indonesia. Through the ADS and APS schemes, 600 Indonesians are awarded scholarships annually for postgraduate study in Australia.

Indonesia, as a developing nation, is under great pressure in the area of education. With a population of approximately 220 million people, more than 44 million of whom are in the 19–24-year age bracket, Indonesia's ability to provide its citizens with access to all levels of education has become a critical issue. With development emerge aspirations for a good education and equal employment opportunities. Both are crucial to social and political stability.

Unfortunately, Indonesia is still unable to provide its people with the standard of education they need for their nation to progress in the world, nor is it able to cater adequately for the growing demand for more university placements. Remaining competitive regionally is also proving to be a challenge for Indonesia owing to its lack of skilled labour. Compared to neighbouring Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Indonesia currently ranks among the lowest in relation to access to and quality of education and overall quality of human resources.