From the fourteenth century, there was already some interaction within the polity of the Lao kingdoms between ethnic Lao lowlanders and the highland peoples of various ethnic origins. The latter were the “others”, however, geographically, culturally, politically and symbolically located at the edge of the kingdom. Here, I will discuss the relationship between lowland and highland peoples in historical perspective, from the Lan Xang era to the period of French Indochina (1887–1945). My aim is to show the changing patterns of interactions between these two populations and, more significantly, the disruptive impact of French colonial administration, of which the most intriguing symptom was arguably the emergence of a modern identity among some highland groups in colonial Laos. French policy, especially towards the upland peoples, played a significant part in the rise of rebellions that occurred from the late nineteenth century in Indochina. It also, albeit indirectly and involuntarily, led to the transformation of some of these revolts into modern political claims. In the last section, I will focus on Ong Kommandam' armed resistance in southern Laos as a remarkable example of the emergence of ethnic consciousness in colonial Laos and as an early expression of identity politics before the advent of an independent Laos.

The divinities, the ethnic Lao and the upland people

Geographical and ecological frontiers

The polity of the traditional Lao kingdom, like other pre-modern Southeast Asian states, was based on an ecological and geographical core which was immutable, constituting as it did the “heartland of irrigated rice cultivation” (Leach 1960–61, p. 56). Beyond this heartland, the state could expand or retract since it had no irrevocably fixed boundaries, nor a permanent administrative apparatus. The core of the kingdom, the rice-lands, would remain despite the unstable mode of governance. Consequently, there was a real distinction between the peoples who lived on the plain and the populations who inhabited the mountains. Thus, Edmund Leach contrasted the “Hill peoples” to the “Valley peoples”, while Georges Condominas used variations on the term “civilization” to differentiate between the “civilization of mountains and the civilization of the plains” (Condominas 1980, p. 185).

About Writing an Autonomous History (of Laos)

Post-colonial historiographers share an obsession with origins. As Paul Connerton points out, the politics of tabula rasa paradoxically engender even greater reference to the past (Connerton 1995, p. 61). Nations need a foundation, a mythical past so as to enforce a longue durée — an essential component for consolidating a collective memory and identity. Horizontal homogeneity must be accomplished along an uninterrupted span of time: “we are what you were, we will be what you are” famously wrote once Ernest Renan (Renan 1997 [1982], p. 32). Patricia Pelley remarks likewise with respect to post-1945 Vietnamese historiography that “[o]nly by determining when it began, they [Vietnamese historiographers] reckoned, could they narrate it in a meaningful way. Only after they had a clear sense of origins could they clarify the trajectory of the past and divide it into meaningful segments” (Pelley 2002, p. 8). History textbooks, as is well known, are the main vehicle for disseminating such a history, particularly in countries where dissonant voices are repressed and alternative perspectives discouraged. In that context, school textbooks merely tend to be “ideological, repetitive and mantra-like” (Talib and Tan 2003, p. xiii). The narrative of origins in modern Lao-language history books and textbooks, instead of depicting a master version of a pacified history representing “idealized images of a harmonious, pre-colonial social order imbued of nostalgia” (Alonso 1994, p. 388), is, on the contrary, divided between three interpretations of the origins of the Lao, each situated in divergent geopolitical, political and ideological perspectives. The first and most popular reading is the “Ai-Lao” version that is dominated by the trope of migration and is an implicit response to the Thai nationalist historiography. The second historiography, with a Marxist-Leninist orientation, bears by contrast a resemblance to the Vietnamese communist narration. I suggest below that the (re)writing of the origins of the Lao nation epitomizes the fragmentary state of Lao historiography and, more precisely, its struggle to deal with competing ideologies.

Brunei Darussalam

As one of the most oil-dependant economies of Southeast Asia, the sultanate of Brunei's economic prospects hinge largely on the oil and gas sector. Crude oil and liquefied natural gas accounts for half of Brunei's GDP, as well as 90 per cent of its exports and 88 per cent of government revenue. As crude oil prices continue to spiral upwards to about US$70 a barrel (as of September 2005) in the wake of a myriad of factors including stronger demands from China, continuous oil supply disruption in the Middle East and disruptions in global oil production due to the adverse impacts of hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the Gulf of Mexico in the United States, the sultanate exchequer is likely to get a boost.

According to the Brunei Economic Bulletin (BEB), the non-oil sector expanded by 6.0 per cent in the first quarter (Q1) of 2005 compared with the same period last year owing to the strong performance in forestry, construction, wholesale and retail, restaurant and hotels, and transport and communication sectors. The wholesale and retail trade, construction, and transport and communication sectors are likely to maintain steady growth in 2006.

Brunei recorded a steadily improving budgetary position in 2005 due to the skyrocketing oil prices. In Q1 2005, the economy witnessed a budget surplus of B$99.11 million (US$58.68 million). The state of government finance is expected to remain in surplus in 2006, benefiting from the high global oil prices. The Brunei government expects this surplus to be instrumental in accelerating the implementation of country's 8th National Development Plan.

The BEB reported that Brunei recorded a trade surplus of B$1,860.5 million (US$1,101.60 million) during Q1 2005 owing to the persistent oil price hike and a plunge in import demand. However, a stronger consumer demand and construction growth may push the import demand in 2006 substantially. In Q1 2005, Japan remained the dominant export market of Brunei, followed by ASEAN, Korea, Australia, United States, India, and China.

More of the Same

As Asia grapples with a growing list of new security threats, old issues continue to affect the broad security environment in Southeast Asia. The threats of terrorism were raised a few notches higher with the suicide bombings in Bali on 1 October 2005. The Bali attacks — which came a few days before the third anniversary of the Bali 2002 bombings — were a grim reminder of the potent threat of terrorist activities, despite tightened security measures instituted by governments and strengthened regional and international cooperation to combat terrorism. What is significant, however, with the 2005 terrorist attacks are the emergence of new disparate groups, some of which are reportedly factions of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) who, while adopting similar tactics of suicide bombings, act independently of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Terrorist targets also appeared to have shifted away from Western-linked establishments to local ones (see the article “Terrorism in the Region: Changing Alliances, New Directions” on page 8).

The mutations of other terrorist networks have put a new face to the festering problem of terrorism in the region, and highlights the extent to which little is still known about the chimerical nature and extent of terrorist networks operating here. The problems have also been compounded by the elusive peace in the troubled regions of southern Philippines and southern Thailand. Against the spectre of spawning networks, it becomes all the more crucial for states in the region to intensify cooperation not only in combating terrorism but also in helping to seek peaceful settlements to sectarian and ethnic conflicts that continue to beleaguer some states in Southeast Asia.

In East Asia, beyond the persistent threats of terrorism, the concerns about North Korean nuclear proliferation got a much needed respite after the successful conclusion of the six-party talks in Beijing in September 2005. The September talks ended a three-year stand-off and a hardening of positions taken by both the United States and North Korea on the issue of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.

Regional Outlook offers a succinct analysis of political and economic trends in Southeast Asian countries and their prospects for the forthcoming two years. Scholarly, yet written in an accessible style, it is designed for the busy executive, professional, diplomat, journalist, and interested observer. This annual publication, which the Institute launched in 1992, has built up a loyal following of readers in Singapore and beyond.

Last year's Regional Outlook warned that terrorism in the region would not recede any time soon. The attacks on Bali on 1 October 2005 underlined the continuing deadliness of this threat. Southern Thailand is another site of the destabilizing effects of terrorism. The terrorist attacks there not only eroded Thailand's sense of domestic security but also affected bilateral relations between Thailand and Malaysia. Apart from terrorism, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have had to contend with various natural disasters. The Boxing Day tsunami of 2004 is etched deeply into regional memory. The looming possibility of the avian influenza turning into a pandemic is an issue that calls for the closest regional and global cooperation. On the bright side, an East Asian Summit spearheaded by ASEAN and scheduled for December 2005 is the first step towards an integrated Asian community. However, any realistic appraisal needs to acknowledge hurdles ahead. Just five years into the new millennium, Asia's many challenges are clear.

On the economic front, a moderate economic slowdown is expected in Southeast Asia over the next two years. The main risks that could affect the region's economic outlook in 2006–2007 are high oil prices, China's overheating economy, the possibility of an avian flu pandemic, and rising global imbalances because of the financing of the US current account deficits by excess savings in East Asia. Sustained high oil prices, in particular, are a major risk to regional economic growth. If oil prices continue to rise, inflationary pressure will persist, eroding business and consumer confidence in the region.

As is the long-standing pattern in the ASEAN region, politics in some of its member countries are rambunctious and unpredictable while in others, nobody is expecting any significant change. This picture emerges in the ten country reports on politics.

In the Philippines, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is fending off calls to impeach her. In Thailand, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, having won an impressive election victory in early 2005, is fast losing his hallmark lustre as an effective leader by the end of the year because of his failure to come to grips with the violent religious/ethnic problems in the country's deep south. Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, one year into his term, gets a mixed report card, which is perhaps what any Indonesian president can realistically expect given the complexities of the country's problems. That is to say this President is not doing too badly. The new prime ministers of Malaysia and Singapore, two places where politics are rather more placid, are busy reinventing their respective country. Nobody expects the unexpected here. The even quieter sultanate of Brunei is actually experimenting with some rather bold political initiatives. These are exciting times for the country; however, very few seem to be curious about the Bruneians.

Among the new ASEAN members, Vietnam is having its Communist Party Congress in 2006 and so is Laos. But the opacity of their politics perhaps hides no more than intra-elite squabbles over how to share power and the perks that come with power. Despite pundits pointing to reformists versus conservatives rifts, the leaders of these countries probably enjoy a stronger consensus than given credit for. That consensus is for the country and themselves to get rich quick.

Given this mindset, development-friendly policies and politics are safely guaranteed for quite a while in these places. Cambodia continues to muddle through and the military regime in Myanmar remains in its political bunker while sorting out how to retain power, give some space to the opposition, and get round international pressure.

Southeast Asia will grow slower in 2005 — at 5 per cent compared with 6.3 per cent observed in the previous year (ADB 2005). The slowdown in the major industrial countries has been a drag on the global economy and high oil prices will continue to be a matter of concern over the coming year.

Global economic growth will decelerate to 4.3 per cent in 2005 compared with a historical high of 5.1 per cent in 2004 (IMF 2005) (Figure 1). World trade volume (goods and services) growth will soften from 10.3 to 7 per cent over the same period. It is evident that high oil prices and the downturn in the information technology (IT) sector have clearly taken their toll on industrial production and world trade in 2005.

Most countries in Southeast Asia will register lower growth rates in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 (Figures 2 and 3). The IT slump has affected the export performance of Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. On the supply side, bad weather conditions during the year have badly affected agricultural output in the Philippines and Thailand.

Continued high oil prices have clearly dampened economic growth in the region. Oil-dependent countries such as Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines were particularly vulnerable. Indonesia also fared badly as its huge fuel subsidies were causing a severe downward pressure on the rupiah. Nevertheless, the country's currency has begun to stabilize, with significant hikes in domestic gasoline and diesel prices imposed by the Indonesian government.

Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to China rose from US$53.5 billion in 2003 to US$60.6 billion in 2004, making it the world's third largest destination for FDI after the United States and the United Kingdom (UNCTAD 2005). Meanwhile, Southeast Asia saw a significant rise in FDI inflows, from US$17.4 billion in 2003 to US$25.7 billion in 2004 (Figure 4). The main beneficiaries of the higher inflows were Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Philippines.

Brunei Darussalam

In May 2005 the Sultan of Brunei announced a long-awaited cabinet reshuffle, which incorporated a number of innovations. The first innovation is the institution of two new cabinet positions: senior minister and minister for energy in the Prime Minister's Office. Crown Prince Al Mutadee Billah was given the senior minister position, which marked his formal induction into the cabinet structure. This can be looked at as training the heir to the throne for the job of governing within a monarchical framework. It would also help to ensure a smooth and effective succession in the near future.

The additional appointments of the Crown Prince as a General in the Royal Armed Force and Deputy Inspector General of Police, as well as his frequent visits, as senior minister, to various ministries further highlighted the preparation for political succession. The sudden marriage of the Sultan to a young Malaysian, which has dented his popularity especially among Bruneian women, also fuelled speculations about the Crown Prince ascending the throne sooner rather than later.

Another innovation in the cabinet structure is the introduction of the position of second minister in the ministries taking charge of finance and foreign affairs. The Sultan and his brother, Prince Mohammed, hold the ministerial position in both ministries respectively. Having second ministers to help with these portfolios will alleviate the workload of the Sultan, who is also Prime Minister, and of Prince Mohamed, who is also Head of the Brunei aristocracy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also been enlarged to become the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade by absorbing the Division of International Relations and Trade (previously under the Ministry of Industries and Primary Resources).

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

Land area: 5,765 sq. km.

Population: 332,884

Capital: Bandar Seri Begawan

Type of government: Monarchy

Head of State and Prime Minister: Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Muizzaddin Waddaulah

Currency used: Brunei dollar (on par with the Singapore dollar)

US$ exchange rate on 1 December 2005: US$1 = B$1.69