INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that Islamic thought is very complex. The complexity of Islamic thought is even greater in philosophical, dogmatic, theoretical, and conceptual aspects especially if one puts it in the context of recent international developments such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack in the United States. The complexity is also great in the context of Southeast Asian Islam which, in addition to having a great deal of affinities with Middle Eastern Islam, possesses a number of distinctive characteristics due to its different historical, social, cultural and political realities.

There has been a lot of discussion whether Islam is one or many and, by extension, also if Islamic thought is monolithic or pluralistic. There are many among Muslims who maintain that Islam is only one; they refuse the perception that Islam is many. Responding to this matter, I would argue that at the level of the Qur'an — the original and primary source of Islam — Islam is one. There is no disagreement among Muslims that the Qur'an is God's revelation sent down to the Prophet Muhammad. But, Muslims from the time of post- Prophet Muhammad have been in disagreement about the Prophetic tradition (hadith, the second source of Islam), a portion of which is considered false and fabricated by Muslim religious scholars (ulama).

However, it is important to make it clear that the Qur'an and valid hadith need interpretation (ijtihad) from the ulama in order to formulate workable and implementable doctrines. The formulation of the ulama especially in the field of aqidah (beliefs) and fiqh (detailed interpretation of general principles of shari‘a contained in the Qur'an) are generally very detailed. Influenced by certain sociological, cultural, historical and political factors, differing if not conflicting interpretation of certain verses of the Qur'an and hadith among Muslim ulama have been existing not long after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. As a result, at the sociological level, there are many “Islams” or, to put it in a more precise way, there are many expressions of Islam throughout Islamic history.

SUNNISM AND SHI‘ISM

It is important to point out that much of the differences among Muslims had its origins not in the religious discourse, but in the political disputes and conflicts between the followers of Uthman ibn Affan, the third caliph, and of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth caliph of the four rightly-guided caliphs (al-khulafa’ al-rashidun).

INTRODUCTION

Islam probably reached Southeast Asia in the very first century of the Islamic era. Although this early period may be considered as the starting point of the Islamization process, the most recent events have shown that its end has yet to come. Many theories have been offered on the origin and development of Islam in this region. Any approach that fails to consider a diversity of factors and a variety of successive stages in its history will also misunderstand contemporary Southeast Asian Islam. This chapter will present a few details to substantiate this thesis. It will also analyze some debates on the history of Islam in the region and highlight the inter-related scholarly and political dimensions of these discussions.

The chapter will pay particular attention to the role of international networks in the development of Southeast Asian Islam and the existence of various international, regional, and local intellectual references. As cases in point, it will offer some details on the development of Islamic educational institutions and the circulation and translation of books produced in various parts of the world. It will also examine the position of the Southeast Asian Muslim community in past and present globalization, Islamic “counterglobalization”, and localization processes.

To complete this historical survey, this chapter will explain some contemporary dissimilarities of the situation and characteristics of Islam in the various countries of the region by referring to differing styles of colonization and decolonization. Although much research has been done on the history of Islam in Southeast Asia, many questions remain unanswered and various debates undecided. This condition is not only of an academic or scholarly nature, but has ideological and political dimensions too.

THE PROBLEM OF ORIGIN

The very starting point of Islamic history in the region is matter of controversy. Estimations vary from the first century of the Islamic era, that is, approximately the latter half of the seventh and the first half of the eighth century of the Christian or “common” era, to somewhere around the twelfth century of this common era. The question of the time in which Islam was introduced into Southeast Asia is closely related to questions of the region it came from, and of the people who brought it. This relationship is both of a technical and of an ideological nature.

INTRODUCTION

On 11 September 2001, a tragedy occurred in the United States. Three jetliners hijacked by terrorists struck the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the principal symbols of American hegemony. Another hijacked jetliner tried to crash into the White House but failed, and plummeted into an open field in Pennsylvania. Within the space of twenty minutes, the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and part of the Pentagon collapsed, with the loss of more than three thousand lives. Mass hysteria and sorrow immediately afflicted not only American society, but also all civilized nations throughout the world. They strongly condemned the attacks and sent their sympathies to the victims. As an immediate response to the attacks, President George W. Bush proclaimed a “global crusade” against “terrorism”. He asked the entire world to join an anti-terrorist coalition, in order to defeat Osama bin Laden and his internationally operating terrorist network, Al Qaeda, which was accused of being responsible for the attacks. He even took a vow to retaliate by bombing Afghanistan, a country ruled by the Taliban regime and considered to have provided a haven for Osama bin Laden and his organization. From this tragedy, the world has apparently entered a new phase of global war, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war.

Various effects have been produced by the September 11 tragedy and its aftermath. Direct reactions to the tragedy appeared in different parts of the world. In the West there emerged sporadic attacks against Muslim immigrants and their symbols of existence, indicating the increase of anti-Islam sentiment. Such a sentiment was intertwined with the fear of the threat of terrorism associated with Islam, exacerbated by the anti-terrorist campaigns by the United States. Similarly, in the Muslim world, reactions to September 11 arose in many places, but with different concerns, where protests against George W. Bush's proclamation of a global war were voiced. These reactions significantly correlated with the increase of anti-American sentiment in particular and the rise of Islamic radicalism in general. Witnessing these events, it is difficult to deny that the clash between the Western world and the Muslim world is somehow really legitimizing Huntington's thesis about the clash of civilizations.

INTRODUCTION

In 1991, an Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI), was founded in Indonesia. In a way, this was a historical landmark considering the fact that the long-overdue project had finally materialized. Muslims in Indonesia had been aspiring to the creation of such an important financial institution since the 1970s. For many of them, the existence of an Islamic bank is a necessity to enable them to perform their religious obligation in the economic field. As widely understood Islam prohibits riba (usury). What constitutes riba, however, is still a debatable subject. Among the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) scholars themselves, there has not been a final word regarding the issue. Different opinions and interpretations of riba are still very much in existence. In fact, discussions over the issue tend to develop into a more detailed, complex, and sophisticated manner, covering both the economic as well as religious dimensions. Yet, the likelihood is that Muslims will not come to a single understanding of it in the near future.

Many Indonesian Muslims, like their counterparts throughout the Islamic world, believe that interest is one kind of riba. Thus, in their view, the existence of interest-based financial institutions does not seem to conform to Islamic teachings. A larger part of the Muslims, however, perceive otherwise. As such, they do not consider interest as a form of riba. Therefore, they do not seem to have any theological inconveniences in conducting economic and/or financial transactions with any existing conventional or non-Islamic banks. To make the question of interest more difficult to settle is the presence of the sizeable bulk of Muslims who take a middle stance. They argue that, given the strengths and weaknesses of each differing positions, interest can be identified as mutasyabihat, a legal issue that is not yet clear and therefore must be avoided. At best, they are of the opinion that until the foundation of an Islamically operated financial infrastructure is secured, the existence of a conventional banking system can be accepted as an emergency institution.

The fact that perceptions as to what constitutes riba are by no means unified does not appear to prevent Muslims from establishing Islamic financial institutions.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will explore the issue of whether Islam — especially the agendas of political Islam — is antithetical to the democracy that defines a Civil Society. Among the many vital aspects one could explore in terms of civil society and Islam, I am choosing to address a core element of concern in Southeast Asia: are civil society and Islam antithetical to each other? This concern is about relatively new states and democracies — especially those with Muslim majorities — which are either appropriating, struggling against or juggling Islamists, political Islam and a fidelity to being Muslim countries, together with being configured as democratic, modern nation-states with heterogeneous populations. Among the questions raised by those who live with Islam and modernity, especially the nation-state, are: how can the universalism of Islam be reconciled with the reality of the nation-state, the embodiment of difference and pluralism beyond Islam encapsulated within national boundaries? Are the defining elements of a nation, premised on fundamental freedoms and an individual's rights, resonant with a theocracy and/or the objectives of political Islam which are often to establish an Islamic legal and social order defined by the shari'a? This chapter deals with aspects of these questions, exploring whether the democracy inherent in the notion of civil society is cohesive with Islam, especially political Islam. These questions are especially acute in the context of the calls for and declarations about an Islamic state in Malaysia and to a lesser extent, Indonesia; as well as the plan by Jemaah Islamiyya militants to forge a dawla islamiyya or Islamic nation in nusantara or Southeast Asia. The chapter explores what has been articulated theoretically about Islam and civil Society in both the Middle East and in Southeast Asia, while offering some reflections on a specific example, Malaysia.

I am using the term “political Islam” to indicate a defining element of groups who proclaim an Islamic agenda — such as the primacy of the shari'a or the implementation of an Islamic state — to achieve power through political participation and democratically-constituted elections. As such, the coherence of “political Islam” is with groups that are essentially fundamentalistoriented, applying text and historical tradition literally to evolve a polity for the present.

INTRODUCTION

The need for development programmes after political independence and the perceived failures of both the capitalist and socialist models provided a fresh opportunity for Muslim nations to seek “indigenous solutions” to their socioeconomic problems. The main focus is on events in the last twenty-five years where actual policy documents are available and institutions established. This chapter* argues that the development of Islamic economic institutions has been due to both external and internal factors and that both Islamic legacy and modern economics have contributed to these institutions. The chapter will also argue that the developments of these institutions and related reforms in Malaysia have by and large been accommodating, flexible and relatively pluralist in nature. In this context, “Islamization” of modern economics has been the basis of the efforts in Malaysia rather than mere rejection of modern economics or attempts to impose traditional models and views that may not necessarily be relevant in the Southeast Asian context. The chapter also attempts to evaluate the impact of Islamic economic institutions on economic development in Malaysia. Financial statistics and figures may show that the impact has thus far been marginal. However, the chapter will also argue that Islam was actually mobilized by the Mahathir administration to try and provide a counter-balance to the increasing pace of economic/material development in the last two decades, especially among the Malays. Unfortunately, not much attention has been given to this important dimension in development studies in Malaysia.

THE MODERNIZATION THESIS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A ROLE FOR RELIGION?

In his 1968 article in the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Lerner (1968) characterized modernization as a process in which less developed countries acquired the characteristics of developed countries. Among these characteristics was the diffusion of secular norms2 including personality transformation. The secular mind was seen as an important “attitudinal” ingredient in modernization, being rational and progressive as opposed to the irrationality of religious (and mythical/magical) predispositions.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyzes Muslim responses to the various challenges and opportunities associated with modernization, and processes of globalization. These two processes have aroused anxiety, suspicion, and opposition, especially in the Muslim world. Muslims regard modernity and globalism as a Western, particularly American, project for world domination. They believe that America's attempt to homogenize the world would degrade all other countries into servants. When members believe their core faith is being corrupted, many are angered and some organize to rectify matters. The Western media, barring few exceptions, have mainly taken note of “Islamic fundamentalism” in its most violent manifestations — blowing up apartment blocks, kidnapping geologists and razing the WTC towers in New York to the ground. The West deploys “Islamic fundamentalism” as a pejorative term to disparage and discredit Muslims “as irrational, irresponsible and extremist forces, dedicated, actually or potentially, to the goal of international terrorism.” It is unfortunate that Muslim concerns about the global system and the globalization process have been sorely neglected by the dominant forces in the West. Is modernization and globalization compatible with Islam? How do Muslims perceive this process of globalization? What is the nature of their response and what alternatives do they provide to the ongoing process of modernization and globalization?

MODERNIZATION, GLOBALIZATION AND ISLAM

Modernization refers to the processes whereby society becomes modern. It implies industrialization, economic growth, increasing social mobility, and political participation. At the level of values, the process of change has sometimes been described as one of cultural “secularization” — a decline in the influence of religion and of traditional ideas as to the “naturalness” of social inequality, and correspondingly the spread of materialistic, this-worldly values and the ideals of universal equality and liberty. At the ideological level, this found expression, firstly, in nationalism and then in various formulations of democracy, whether the liberal parliamentary democracy of Western states or the more radical communist version.

In the past two decades, modernization has been accelerated and accentuated by globalization. Modern institutions like the nation-state and liberal economics, with its emphasis on the creation of markets, have become the means through which the world is being made one.

INTRODUCTION

Modernity refers to the end result of the process of modernization. It is the condition that a society attains after having gone through specific patterns of social and economic change which began in Western Europe in the eighteenth century and which has been spreading throughout the rest of the world. The process of modernization refers to the introduction of modern scientific knowledge to increasing aspects of human life, first of all in Western civilization, then to non-Western societies, by different means and groups, with the final aim of achieving a better life as defined by the society concerned (Alatas, S.H. 1972, p. 22). The traits of modernization include the rationalization of economic and political life, rapid urbanization, industrialization, differentiation in the social structure, and greater popular involvement in public affairs. If we understand these traits as constituting the modern condition, then modernism would refer to the ideology, attitude or mentality that subordinates the traditional to the modern.

This chapter begins with a brief introduction to development studies as a modernist discourse. This is followed by a concise overview of the Islamic ideal of development which is juxtaposed to the economic realities of Muslim societies. It then proceeds to theoretically assess attempts in Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia to create an alternative discourse on development that draws on Islamic law and an Islamic philosophical anthropology. The next sections move on to a consideration of the role of the state in development and the questions of democracy and civil society. The concluding section makes some remarks on the problematic state of discourse in the Muslim world on modernization.

DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AS MODERNIST DISCOURSE

The vast majority of Muslims around the world live in economically underdeveloped countries, with high rates of inflation, low rates of economic growth, low life expectancy, and a high level of adult illiteracy. There are also severe problems in the health and nutritional status of Muslims worldwide, which have serious implications for the quality of human resources. Muslim countries also lag behind industrialized nations in educational attainment, especially where access to tertiary education is concerned (Hassan 1992).

Political Islam as an issue affecting our present and future, will remain a matter of great concern to Muslims as well as non-Muslims in this region, and the world as well. Parts I and II have highlighted the complexity involved, and the problematique associated with translating theory and doctrine to reality. Indeed, this is the biggest challenge facing all Muslims: to adapt, modernize, reform, and reinvent their social systems in as much as the non- Muslims too are doing the same — to develop relevant models of economic, political, social, cultural and religious life — that can empower us without undermining our freedom to choose, while at the same time enabling us to positively address the multi-faceted challenges confronting humanity in the twenty-first century. In this conclusion, the focus is not on “doctrinal Islam” but on “applied Islam”, that is, the political and strategic dimensions of Islamic activity as it affects Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

A question naturally arises whether Islam is inherently political or whether politicization of Islam is a historical phase and a circumstantial development brought into sharp relief in the latter part of the twentieth century. Political Islam emerged partly as a reaction to European colonialism and partly as an aspect of the nationalist movement that struggled for independence in the former colonies. For Islam is basically a faith and a state of mind founded on its renowned five pillars, namely, prayer, fasting, the hajj, the zakat obligation to help the poor, belief in God and the hereafter. These are not inherently political and Muslims can practise their religion without any political engagement in a party or government, or even in the absence of a government. Islam admittedly does not preclude government from the scope of its teachings, yet it remains to be said that state and government are not essential to the religion.

The question whether Islam is a religion (din) only, or both religion and state (din wa dawla) was addressed in the early decades of the twentieth century by Shaykh ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, a former judge and professor of the famous Al-Azhar Universityin Cairo, and at one time also Minister of Awqaf (religious endowments) of Egypt, who published a book bearing the title al- Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Principles of Government) in 1926.

INTRODUCTION

Malaysia has a record of racial, cultural and religious tolerance that should be the envy of all plural societies. Mosques, temples, churches and gurdwaras dot the landscape. Citizens celebrate each others’ religious festivals. Unlike in some other democracies where religious/communal riots erupt with painful regularity and where holy places of minority religions are often razed to the ground, in Malaysia there is much inter-religious friendship and tolerance. Cultural and religious pluralism are not only tolerated, they are celebrated. Religious extremism and attempts to disrupt religious harmony are severely dealt with. Unlike in England where blasphemy is an offence only against the Church of England, the Malaysian Penal Code in sections 295–298A punishes offences against all religions.

Legislation has been introduced to provide for Muslim and non-Muslim religious institutions. Among the laws existing are: Islamic Banking Act 1983, Islamic Development Bank Act 1975, Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984, Syariah Court Evidence (Federal Territories) Act 1997, Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965, Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997, Syariah Criminal Procedure (Federal Territories) Act 1997 and 122 State Enactments and Ordinances on Islamic matters in the thirteen states of the Federation. In relation to non-Muslim religious affairs the prominent laws are: Daughters of Charity of the Canossian Institute (Incorporation) Ordinance 1957; Synod of the Diocese of West Malaysia (Incorporation) Act 1971 (Act 36); Muslim and Hindu Endowments Ordinance (Cap. 175); Cheng Hoong Teng Temple (Incorporation) Act 1949 (Act 519); Pure Life Society (Suddha Samajam) (Incorporation) Ordinance 1957; Superior of the Institute of the Congregation of the Brothers of Mercy (Incorporation) Act 1972 and Superior of the Institute of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary (Incorporation) Ordinance 1957.

Financial allocations and tax exemptions are granted to all religions. Foreign priests and missionaries are allowed permits to enter and work in the country. Christian and Hindu festivals are marked by national holidays. Missionary hospitals, schools, bookshops and hostels abound. Christian missionary teachers are often retained till age sixty-five, a privilege not enjoyed by other religious teachers. Hotel rooms throughout the nation carry the King James Version of the Bible. At the same time the direction of the Muslim qiblat (direction of prayer towards the Ka'ba) is required to be indicated in every hotel room. Liquor shops are allowed.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROCESS OF ISLAMIZATION

The National Geographic Magazine in its September 1980 issue published a map which showed the different countries with significant Muslim populations. A glance at this map reveals that Muslim communities pioneered by the Islamic expansion that began in the seventh century have largely remained and in many cases have grown in spite of political changes inimical to Islam.

The process of Islamization that took place in these countries may vary in detail but certain general patterns can be detected, especially in areas where similar historical circumstances prevailed. In this sense, the Islamization of Southern Philippines cannot be treated as an isolated incident but belongs in its proper context to the Islamic expansion that occurred after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632.

This general expansion can be classified into two types of movements. The first was characterized by the military conquests that expanded the Islamic empire out of Arabia to the Middle East, North Africa, Spain, Central Asia and later to Eastern Europe. The second was the expansion of Islam towards Southeast Asia and to Sub-Saharan Africa. This was characterized by the movement of dedicated Muslim individuals either as merchants or as missionaries.

The Islamization of the Malayo-Indonesia archipelago and Southern Philippines belongs to this second movement. Islamization in this phase involved the interplay of many different factors. The first and foremost was the acceleration of trade and the existence of trade routes. One of the oldest trade routes was the Silk Route, an overland connection that linked China to Sumatra and the Middle East over mountains and deserts. Another was an overland caravan route that linked West and North Africa to the Middle East, while still another led to the Volga lands.

The sea routes, which developed later on account of the spice trade started from Malacca on the Malay archipelago across the Indian Ocean and into the Persian Gulf, to Basrah in Iraq and up the Tigris River to Baghdad; or up the mountains of Asia Minor and Armenia to Trebizond on the Black Sea thence to Europe via Constantinople. The Arab market thus extended overland through Central Asia and overseas to Africa, India, China, and Southeast Asia. These routes made possible the tremendous exchange not only of goods but also of people and ideas.

INTRODUCTION

As noted in the previous chapter, the economic crisis of 1997 became a watershed for ASEAN, particularly in the way it had to respond to regional problems brought on by the crisis. There is however a paradox to the crisis. While the attendant challenges stemming from the crisis should have resulted in a less cohesive association, as members were expected to turn inward to attend to domestic problems, the crisis however became a rallying point for ASEAN to become more responsive and bolder in instituting mechanisms to handle regional problems. We noted that it was in December 1997, just a few months after the onset of the financial crisis, when ASEAN leaders unveiled the ASEAN Vision 2020 at the ASEAN Second Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur. The ASEAN Vision 2020 articulated the leaders' vision of an “ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies”.

A closer look at the preamble of the ASEAN Vision 2020 would reveal that the Vision had essentially set out the three-part agenda of ASEAN in the new millennium. These were: political and security cooperation, economic co-operation, and building a community of caring society. This agenda was reaffirmed and rearticulated at the Ninth ASEAN Summit in October 2003 when the ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN Concord II (also referred to as Bali Concord II) that declared the establishment of an ASEAN Community comprising three pillars, which are essentially the same as three areas of co-operation identified in the Vision 2020.