In the latest era of Indonesian history, from the mid-1960's to 1998, known as the New Order Era, leaders from the army, key technocrats, and agents of other nationalist-oriented groups control the Indonesian government. These leaders have not challenged the basis of the state that was inherited from the preceding Sukarno era (1945–1965); it rests on the 1945 Constitution, the philosophic slogan of the Five Principles (Pancasila), and the personality of President Suharto (b. 1921) as national guide and leader. This elite has provided political stability – welcome after a lengthy period of turmoil (1942–1966) – and it has constructed a national consensus for a policy of economic development. All other considerations are subordinate to the twin policies of political order and economic development; the place and role of Islam is no exception. (Hooker, Virginia M. 1993, 1–19; Vatikiotis 1993, 1–6, 191–205)

Prior to and throughout this era Muslims leaders, spokesmen and activists have spoken of the importance of Islamic values in the life of the Muslim community and in the operation of the Indonesian state. It is not surprising that such a call should be made, since it is a historical Muslim contention that Islamic values should be paramount wherever Muslims live; the modern call emphasizes that in Islam there is no separation between religion and state. Within this context it is possible to identify a large number of general and specific values. Most important for our purposes are syariah, the immutable and transcendent law of God, which all Muslims are enjoined to obey, and tauhid, the concept of God's unity, which is to be honored and, whenever possible, applied in belief and behavior – both private and communal. Most other values are subsidiary to these two paramount concepts and they serve as a central reference point for the Muslim community of Indonesia. (Voll 1991, 23–33; Faruqi 1980, 76–89, 264–79)

A. ISLAMIC STANDARDS AND THE GOVERNMENT

With these statements about elite concerns and Islamic values in mind, the relationship among contending and coexisting groups can be explored to ascertain an understanding of the position of Muslims and Islam in the Indonesian state and its society. One way of doing this is to compare the world views of four sets of government agencies and ministries.

Introduction

The shift from colonial to sovereign status did not bring any direct or pervasive changes to bear on the stature of law in the young Republic of Indonesia. By the time the proclamation of independence was issued on August 17, 1945, law in Indonesia had essentially changed little since the Japanese occupation of Java. As most of the nation's elite was, in the early days of independence, people who had dominated Indonesian politics during the colonial era, the revolutionary ideas of grass-roots movements had not yet penetrated common legal parlance. This elite did not constitute a radical, social element interested in the reformulation of the former colonial state apparatus. On the contrary, they were quite content to fall back on the familiar. Strategies for social revolution, or even social change were hardly mentioned formally within the legal sector at this time. Symptomatic of this situation was the Transitional Provision in Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution which stipulates that “All existing institutions and regulations of the state shall continue to function so long as new ones have not been set up in conformity with this Constitution.” Hence, to avoid creating a legal vacuum, the new government was forced to reintroduce many laws inherited from the colonial era. An example of this is the Wetboek van Strafrecht measures, enacted in 1915, which continued to regulate criminal law in Indonesia, except in those regions outside of Java where native courts remained operative. In the latter, only a few articles of laws inherited from the Dutch were applied through the provisions of Law No. 80 of 1932.

This paper will address the development of Indonesian law in the post-independence era. In the following pages, I aim to demonstrate that changes in the country's political climate affected both the Islamic and adat (customary) courts, in spite of the inflexibility with which both legal traditions had weathered the political upheavals of the first half of the century. To this end, the place of both adat and religious courts in post-independence Indonesia will be analyzed in light of this political change.

BY THE GRACE OF GOD ALMIGHTY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Considering:

Whereas in accordance with the philosophy of Pancasila and the aspirations to promote national law, it is deemed essential that there shall be a Law concerning Marriage to be in force for all Indonesian nationals.

Pursuant to:

1 Article 5 paragraph (1), Article 20 paragraph (1), Article 27 paragraph (1) and Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution; 2. Decision of the People's Consultative Assembly Number

IV/MPR/1973.

With the concurrence of the House of People's Representatives.

Article 1.

Marriage is a relationship of body and soul between a man and a woman as husband and wife with the purpose of establishing a happy and lasting family (household) founded on belief in God Almighty.

Article 2.

(1) A marriage is legitimate, if it has been performed according to the laws of the respective religions and beliefs of the parties concerned.

(2) Every marriage shall be registered according to the regulations of the legislation in force.

Article 3.

(1) In principle in a marriage a male person shall be allowed to have one wife only. A female person shall be allowed to have one husband only.

(2) A court of law shall be capable of granting permission to a husband to have more than one wife, if all parties concerned so wish.

Article 4.

(1) If a husband desires to have more than one wife, as referred to in Article 3 paragraph (2) of this Law, he shall be required to submit a request to the Court of Law in the region in which he resides.

(2) The Court of Law referred to in paragraph (1) of this article shall grant permission to a husband wishing to have more than one wife if:

a. his wife is unable to perform her duties as wife;

b. his wife suffers from physical defects or an incurable disease;

c. his wife is incapable of having descendants.

REGULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA NUMBER 28 OF THE YEAR 1977 CONCERNING WAQF OF LANDS WITH THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Considering:

a. that waqf is a religious institution which can be used as one of the means for developing religious life, particularly to people professing Islam, within the framework of the national effort to attain spiritual and material welfare toward a just and prosperous society based on Pancasila;

b. that the current statutory regulation, regulating the waqf of lands with the right of ownership, beside not yet meeting the need for waqf procedures, also give opportunities for undesired matters to arise due to the absence of factual complete data on waqf lands;

c. that in line with the provision in Article 14 paragraph (1) under b and Article 49 paragraph (3) of Act Number 5 of the year 1960, it is deemed necessary to provide for the procedures and registration of waqf of lands with the right of ownership by means of a Government Regulation;

With a View to:

1. Article 5 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution;

2. Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly Number IV/MPR/1973 on the Basic Outlines of the State's Policies;

3. Act number 5 of the year 1960 on Basic Regulations on Agrarian Principles (State Gazette of the year 1960 number 104; Supplement to the State Gazette number 2043);

4. Government Regulation number 10 of the year 1961 concerning the Registration of Land (State Gazette of the year 1961 number 28; Supplement to the State Gazette number 2171);

HAS DECIDED :

To lay down : REGULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA CONCERNING WAQF OF LANDS WITH THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP.

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1.

In this Government Regulation:

(1) “WAQF” means the permanent dedication by any person or corporate body of part of his/its assets in the form of lands with the right of ownership recognized by Muslem Law as serving the interests of Islam or for other public interests in line with the teachings of Islam;

Introduction

Kompilasi Hukum Islam di Indonesia (KHI), literally translated as the Compilation of Islamic Laws in Indonesia, is one of many vehicles used by the Indonesian Government to unify and codify Islamic law. This codification, utilized by judges in the religious courts, was meant to serve as a reference guide in deciding cases. Before the enactment of the KHI, other efforts to unify and codify Islamic law had been tried out. A government regulation suggesting the use of only thirteen fiqh books as judicial references and the enactment of Marriage Law No. 1/1974 and Religious Judicature Act No. 7/1989 are among those efforts.

With respect to the historical perspective, efforts to unify and codify Islamic law in Indonesia may be regarded as an extension and perpetuation of Islamic legal thought expressed throughout the development of Islamic law. Notions of unification, compilation, and codification have occupied jurists from the early days of Islamic history. Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. 139/756), for example, suggested to al–Mansur (754–775), an Abbasid Caliph, that “the caliph should review the different doctrines, codify and enact his own decisions in the interest of uniformity, and make this code binding on the kadis”. For this reason, Ibn al-Muqaffa' proposed to al-Mansur to make the al-Muwatta' of Imam Malik ibn Anas, the Medinan jurist, the standard juridical work to be used throughout the empire. During his first pilgrimage, al-Mansur met with Imam Malik and repeated al-Muqaffa's proposal to make the al-Muwatta' the standardized reference for all juristic questions, and that it be given a prominent place in the Ka'bah, with copies circulating in all parts of the empire.3 However, Imam Malik declined the suggestion, insisting that people should not be forced to adhere to the opinions of a single jurist – opinions, which might possibly be wrong and imperfect.

From the medieval era on, efforts to codify Islamic law, or in the words of Muhammad Hashim Kamali “the introduction of statutory legislation”, have been made in most Muslim countries. In the Ottoman Empire, particularly during the Tanzimat period (1839–1879), the government was successful in codifying the provisions of Islamic law and compiling them in the so-called Majallah al-Ahkam al-'Adliyah.

Introduction

Indonesia is the largest Muslim nation in the world. According to estimation, Muslims make up more than 87 per cent out of the total Indonesian population. The rest of the populations are Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and smaller groups of adherents of local mystical cults and primal religions. Despite its large Muslim population, Indonesian Islam is still a neglected area of scholarly studies. Furthermore, when Indonesian Islam is studied, much attention have been paid by scholars mainly to the political and cultural aspects; while Islamic law has not yet received an equal treatment.

It has been recognized that the rapid spread of Islam in this archipelago, beginning in the twelfth century, takes a form of “penetration pacifique”. Thus by and large, as Arnold points out, no gun was fired, nor was any sword drawn for the propagation of Islam in Indonesian soil. Arnold concludes that, “the history of Malay Archipelago during the last six hundred years furnishes us with one of the most interesting chapters in the story of the spread of Islam by missionary efforts… In every instance, in the beginning, their works had to be carried on without any patronage or assistance from the rulers of the country, but solely by the force of persuasion, and in many cases in the face of severe opposition, especially on the part of the Spaniards”.

It is important to note that Islam arrived in Indonesia when the centers of Islamic political power in the Middle East were in the decline. In the middle of the thirteenth century when Islam gained a foothold in Sumatra, the Muslim all over Islamdom had fallen on evil days. The Abbasid were already torn apart; the Fatimids who ruled over the Arab countries, and North Africa were in the process of disintegration; Persia was the vantage ground for self-interested upstarts; while Spain, once the pride of Muslim culture and philosophy, had forgotten its traditions and was in the throes of death, surrounded as it was by the Christian hordes who were bent upon giving it short shrift.

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA NUMBER 7 OF THE YEAR 1989 RE RELIGIOUS JUDICATURE

BY THE GRACE OF GOD THE ALMIGHTY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,

Considering: a. whereas the Country of the Republic of Indonesia, as a legislated state which is based on the Philosophy of Pancasila and the Constitution of the 1945, aiming at realizing a life of a nation which is prosperous, secure, peaceful and order;

b. whereas in order to realize the aforementioned life order and to guarantee the equilibrium of each citizen before the law, measures to uphold justice, truth, order and the law enforcement which are able to protect the people of Indonesia are in need;

c. whereas one of the efforts to uphold the aforementioned justice, truth, order, and law enforcement is by means of Religious Judicature as it is stated in the Law number 14 of the year 1974 re the Basic Regulations of the Judicial Authorization;

d. whereas the regulation on the structure, authority, and lawsuit procedure within the Religious Jurisprudence in which so far is still in vary due to the references of:

1. The regulation on the Religious Judicature in Jawa and Madura (Staatsblad of the year 1882 Number 152 related to the Staatsblad of the year 1937 Number 116 and 610):

2. The regulation on the Qadi's deliberation and Great Qadi's deliberation (religious leaders) for some parts of South and East Kalimantan Regencies (Staatsblad of the year 1937 Number 638 and 639);

3. Government Regulation Number 45 of the year 1957, re the Establishment of Religious Court/Syari’ at Court outside Jawa and Madura. (State Declaration of the year 1957 Number 99), That all needs to be ended anule for the sake of the establishment of the unity in law which regulates the Religious Judicature in the framework of the national system and law order based on the Pancasila and The Constitution of 1945;

I had just sat down in the waiting room of the newly formed Union of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), awaiting the arrival of one of the organization's leaders, and I was startled by the unexpected appearance and questioning of this gentleman, a low-ranking officer in ICMI. It was July 22, 1992, my first day in Jakarta. I had traveled to this office among the modern buildings on Jalan Thamrin to interview a high-ranking ICMI officer about his role in the recent establishment of the Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI), Indonesia's first official Islamic bank. The officer hadn't arrived yet, so, hot, jet-lagged from my travel, and anxious about the upcoming interview, I sat down, hoping to use the minutes before his arrival to collect my thoughts. Having heard I was an anthropologist, however, this other gentleman, who had entered the waiting room and abruptly sat down beside me, seemed determined to get an answer.

My interrogator cocked his head to the side with a skeptical smile, obviously unconvinced by my feigned ignorance. He challenged me again:

Introduction

In 1989 the Indonesian legislature passed and President Suharto signed a new law governing the country's Islamic courts. The statute, known as the Religious Judicature Act2 (the Act), significantly enhanced the legal and institutional standing of the Islamic courts by providing formal legal guarantees of their security and increasing the level of state support. The Act also expanded and equalized the courts' powers. Prior to the passage of the Act the substantive competence of Islamic courts on the populous islands of Java and Madura extended only to matters of marriage and divorce. The 1989 Act expanded the Islamic courts' jurisdiction to include inheritance throughout the country. The Act also strengthened the standing of the Islamic courts in relation to the civil courts by eliminating a rule dating from the nineteenth century which had required that decisions of Islamic courts must be ratified by a civil court to be enforceable.

The enactment of the Religious Judicature Act seemed to signal a reversal in New Order policy on the role of religion in public life and the enforcement of Islamic Law. Although Islamic interests provided critical support in President Suharto's rise to power in the mid-1960s, the regime's actions over the ensuing two decades did not support Islamic involvement in the exercise of state power. Once in control, the New Order set about systematically to neutralize Islam as a basis for political and legal mobilization. Most observers in the 1970s would have found it unthinkable that in the 1990s the Suharto government would be actively promoting state enforcement of Islamic doctrine.

This article seeks to place these recent developments in Islamic law in a broader context, and qualifies the initial assessment of their importance. Though significant, the Religious Judicature Act does not mark the dramatic shift in policy that at first blush it seems to indicate. Rather, it is to a large extent the culmination of events set in motion twenty years earlier. Moreover, while the Suharto government is clearly presenting a more Islamic demeanor, it has not abandoned its historic policy of controlling Islamic law and politics.

The collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998 has ushered in some new hopes for the application of shari'a (Islamic law) in Indonesia. Numerous Muslim groups and Indonesian figures consider this a golden opportunity to struggle for a fuller incorporation of shari'a into Indonesian legal systems. These aspirations are actually gaining in significance because, with the political liberalization in the wake of Soeharto's fall, each individual or group is free to express their goals and interests. In addition, the political shift from an authoritarian to a more democratic order, including some amendments to the 1945 Constitution (Undang-undang Dasar, or UUD 1945), has given the Indonesian people a fresh beginning for rebuilding the nation and consolidating upon existing legal systems. Triggered by demands for legal reform, the place of Islamic law and its institutional presence in Indonesia constitute an important issue. Now that Indonesia is undergoing a transition, there have been numerous interesting developments in the application of Islamic law in Indonesia.

Since most of the preceding chapters in this book were written during the New Order period, there is no analysis of the latest developments regarding shari'a in Indonesia, particularly during the terms of both President Habibie (May 1998– October 1999) and President Abdurrahman Wahid (October 1999–July 2001). Thus, this closing chapter will attempt to bring the book up to date. A number of remarks will also be made concerning some points made in previous chapters. It will be argued that political change in the post-New Order period has offered an opportunity for incorporating more shari'a elements into Indonesian legislation and has opened the gate for increasing demands for the local application of shari'a in certain regions in the country.

This chapter begins with a discussion of Indonesia's political transition, during which the political and social make-up of religious institutions has been realigned structurally. As the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung, or MA), the House of Representatives (DPR), and the Indonesian Bank (BI) have become more independent bodies, certain Islamic institutions such as the Islamic court and the Islamic Bank have also gained a more advantageous position and an increased capacity.

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how Indonesian fatawa (plural for fatwa) gave response to politics and government policies from 1926 up to 1998. It also shows how political situations influenced the issuance of fatawa and, at the same time, how fatawa influenced the Indonesian political atmosphere. Until the beginning of the twentieth century,ijtihad in Indonesia was performed by individual ulama. In the second quarter of the twentieth century, the practice of ijtihad as performed by the ulama in groups began. In 1926, traditionalist ulama founded the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization, and it began issuing fatawa as early as during its first congress. The modernist Muhammadiyah organization, which was founded in 1912, did not concern itself with fatwa until 1927 when it created a special committee called Majelis Tarjih to deal with religious issues in general and Islamic law in particular.

Although fatawa issued by certain individual ulama could still be observed, the tendency was for more and more ulama to identify themselves with one of those two poles: the NU or Muhammadiyah. A new development emerged when the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, or MUI) was established in 1975. Both the traditionalist and the modernist ulama are represented in the MUI through which they issue joint fatawa.

Unlike in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Indonesia does not have a grand mufti. Fatawa are issued collectively by Islamic organizations. The characteristics of Indonesian collective ijtihad (ijtihad jama'i are as follows: firstly, before issuing fatawa, each organization holds a meeting attended by their ulama and – if necessary – other scholars. They discuss the subject, and the conclusion of the meeting is issued as a fatwa from that particular organization. Secondly, the characteristics of pluralism, which makes Indonesian fatwa unique, can be seen. Indonesia has many Islamic organizations such as the NU, Muhammadiyah, and the MUI, each of which consists of separate branches in more than twenty provinces. It is possible that a fatwa from one organization may differ from those of other organizations. It can also happen that a fatwa issued from the national organization is different from one given by the provincial organization

The political atmosphere in the post-New Order era is evidently marked with the euphoria of democracy or political liberalization. One of its manifestations, as William R. Liddle ever predicted, is that in a more open political climate the expression of more formalistic Islam (the scripturalists) would appear, since “they would have many more political resources, in mass acceptance of their ideas, organization, allies, media, and access to politicians”.

There are at least four features of such appearance in the current scene. First is the establishment of numerous Islamic political parties that mostly adopt Islam as their basis replacing Pancasila, which the Soeharto regime forcefully implemented to be the sole basis of any organization. Two parties, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB), insist that Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution be amended to reinsert the famous “seven words” (dengan kewajiban melaksanakan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya [with the obligation to carry out shari'a for its adherents]). With these words, it will officially provide shari'a with the constitutional status within the Indonesian national legal system. This proposal to reintroduce the clause, which will require Indonesian Muslims to apply shari'a, has been unsuccessful in three consecutive annual sessions of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) in 2000, 2001, and 2002. In the 2002 annual session, the MPR has decided not to amend Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution. However, Islamic parties continue to advocate the formal application of shari'a.

Second is the growing demand from certain regions of Indonesia for the formal implementation of shari'a. Aceh is the first province that demanded for the application of shari'a. In fact the application of shari'a in this region was sporadically undertaken when in November 1999, a young man accused of committing adultery was punished by being whipped one hundred times in public. Similarly in South Sulawesi, there is an increasing aspiration to implement shari'a for its Muslim adherents. Abdul Aziz Qahhar Muzakkar, chief of the preparation committee for the application of shari'a in South Sulawesi, said that the special autonomy status granted to Aceh, including the implementation of shari'a, has paved the way for other provinces to secure the same status

Introduction

It has been argued in the literature on Islam and politics in Indonesian New Order that the early phase of the regime was marked by antagonism towards Islam, while the last phase was characterized by a more accommodative approach. Abdul Aziz Thaba has further subdivided the New Order regime into three phases. He refers to the first phase (1967–82) as the antagonistic period. During this time, the regime systematically frustrated Muslim aspirations to power. The second phase (1982–85) is described as having been marked by reciprocal criticism. During this time, the regime imposed Pancasila as the sole basis for the Muslim political party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or PPP) and almost all Muslim organizations, a move that was initially met with some resistance. The third phase (1985–94) on the other hand was a period of active accommodation. Realizing that political Islam was no longer a threat, the state began to build a Muslim base of support through a number of policies thought to agree with Islamic socio-cultural and political interests, for example, the passing of the Religious Judicature Law (1989), the founding of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, or Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) (1990), the compilation of Islamic law (1991), the issuance of the Joint Ministerial Decree on guiding zakat administration or BAZIS (1991), the holding of an Islamic cultural festival (1991), the establishment of the Islamic Bank (1992), and the annulment of the national lottery (1993).

It must be remembered, however, that these divisions are simply heuristic devices that should not be interpreted literally. During the antagonistic period, for example, there was a policy on zakat that accommodated Muslim religious concerns. When President Soeharto delivered his official speech on the occasion of the Isra' Mi'raj celebration on 26 October 1968, he declared that he, as “a private citizen”, was willing to take charge of the massive national effort of zakat collection and to submit annual reports on its collection and distribution. Following that declaration, he then officially instructed three high-ranking military officers, one of them being General Alamsyah, who was a Minister of the State Secretariat at that time, to make all necessary preparations for a nation-wide zakat collection drive.

For Muslims, the authority of Islam is an alternative to the authority of the state, regardless of that state's particular ideological persuasion. This is as true now as it was for the Abbasids, the Ottomans, the former Soviet Union and the Imperial European powers of the 19th and 20th centuries. The issue has not subsided with the demise of imperialism. The successor states must still face and accommodate it. In the past 50 years, the relationship between the Indonesian state and Islam has changed constantly depending on the political circumstances of the time, ranging from oppression, conflict and control to an uneasy accommodation. It is a relationship that is difficult to characterise with any precision. It would be overfacile, for example, to describe any period of the relationship only in terms of conflict. Equally, accommodation, or attempts at accommodation, have not been overwhelmingly successful. Recently, however, the Indonesian state appears to have struck a more positive balance with Islam. The government has provided for the integration of syariah into the rapidly developing state.

Essentially, the issue is authority. Islamic purists claim authority from

Revelation; secular nationalists claim authority from the Constitution of the state. The ideal for some Muslim activists is the Islamic state. However, this in itself is a contradiction. Authority can have only one locus. The issue is always who has the power to exercise authority, and how this power is to be divided, controlled and transferred. As Pakistan shows, Islamic jurisprudence provides no sufficient answer for the contemporary nation state. Indeed the arguments about the nature of the Islamic state in the contemporary Muslim world usually reduce themselves to little more than vague generalities supposedly founded in seventh century Muslim practice. On the other hand, proponents of an Islamic basis for the state can and do point to parts of Islamic law (for example, family law) where rather more specific provisions are available.

The forms and expressions of the nation-state, such as constitutions, legal codes, and the distribution and separation of powers have developed from European political history over the past two centuries.

Introduction

On 20 October 1999, the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) — comprising the 500 members of the People's Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and 200 representatives from interest groups and regional factions — elected Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur), the leader of the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), as the fourth President of Indonesia and the first democratically elected. Contrary to what was predicted by many, he defeated Megawati Sukarnoputri, the leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party–Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan, PDI-P). On 7 June 1999, the PKB gained the third highest number of votes (12.6 per cent) in the DPR election, but it came in fourth in allocated seats with fifty-one members. Although the PDI-P emerged as the largest party with 153 seats and 33.7 per cent of the votes, it could not translate this into capturing the presidency of Indonesia. After several weeks of intense political bargaining, Wahid's victory was seen as the result of Megawati's mistakes. First, she allowed him to be progressively alienated. Then, Megawati's inflexibility was an obstacle to a power-sharing alliance with the PKB and Amien Rais' National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN). Finally, the vote against President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie's accountability speech by the PDI-P members in the MPR for all intents and purposes eliminated the candidate against whom she had a guaranteed victory. Megawati would say to an aide in tears that “I can't believe this has happened — my own brother stabbed me in the back”. Still, not everything was lost for her. Fearing a wave of violence across the country, many MPR members were willing to cast a vote for Megawati as a way to appease her supporters and maintain political stability. Initially, she refused to seek the nomination for Vice-President of Indonesia, but she later accepted and won with PKB's political support. Despite her initial feelings of sadness, disappointment, and humiliation, her advisors believed that she could assume, as Vice-President, a pivotal role in the near future. Less than two years later, the chain of events would show how correct they were.

Introduction

There have been concerns among many people that the growing anti-U.S. sentiments expressed in widespread, sometimes rowdy, street demonstrations in several cities in Indonesia could spell the end of the Megawati-led coalition government. Radical Muslim groups or hard-liners have been asserting themselves in a much more visible manner in the aftermath of terrorists’ attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States, and the subsequent U.S. military retaliation against Afghanistan. These groups have accused President Megawati of being too sympathetic towards the United States. Her silence or her refusal to condemn the U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan has been regarded by the Muslim hard-liners as a reflection of her unfriendly attitude towards Islam and Muslims.

Certain individuals and Muslim groups have become increasingly critical of the Indonesian Government's attitude and responses to the U.S.–Afghanistan crisis. The most visible among these Muslim hard-line groups are the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front), Forum Komunikasi Ahlus-Sunnah wal- Jamaah (FKAWJ, Communication Forum of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah) or more popularly known as Laskar Jihad (Jihad Force), and the Hizb al-Tahrir (Party of Liberation). Lately, other Muslim groups and institutions, such as the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Council of the Ulama), have also become increasingly critical of the Megawati administration. Similarly, groups of Muslim students who are members or affiliates of the Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice Party) have also become more vocal; they staged the largest peaceful demonstrations against the U.S. military retaliation in Afghanistan.

The anti-American outbursts have undoubtedly put a lot of pressure on President Megawati. Some observers even believe that the Muslim hard-liners’ expressions of anti-Americanism would pose serious political threats to the political future of President Megawati. How serious are these threats?

This chapter discusses recent developments regarding radical political Islam and the challenge it poses to the Megawati government.