The ethnic Chinese as an integral part of Indonesian society have also been affected by political development. This chapter examines Chinese political participation in the 1999 election. It compares their participation in the election of 1955 with that of 1999 to examine the continuity and change in their political behaviour. It also shows that there was a revival of ethnic politics but the majority of the Chinese continued to vote for multi-ethnic/national parties rather than “ethnic Chinese” parties. This approach is similar to that of the indigenous population, which focused on national rather than local/ethnic politics.

The Tempo Survey

The Chinese in Indonesia are a heterogeneous group. This heterogeneity was also reflected in the June 1999 general election. Prior to the election, Tempo, a leading Indonesian weekly news magazine, conducted a survey among the Chinese in five cities, namely Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Pontianak, and Medan to gauge their voting preferences. These five cities were selected because they have large Chinese communities. There were 753 respondents, selected from various social and economic levels which represent ethnic Chinese. The number of students represented 24 per cent. There were about 20 per cent respondents from each city and the majority (75 per cent) was below 40 years old. The Christian Chinese were over-represented (57 per cent) while the Buddhists (29 per cent) and Confucianists (5 per cent) were under-represented.

In post-Soeharto Indonesia, the President is still the most important figure in the political system. This chapter focuses on the election of the new President following the 1999 general election. Old and new leaders were competing for the highest position in the land and the contest was keenly observed by the political public. The process was full of intrigues and the situation was tense as Megawati's supporters expected her to be elected as President — her party, the PDI-P, had after all received the largest number of votes in the general election. The eventual election of Abdurrahman Wahid as President was a surprise but it illustrated the increasing importance of Islam. Although Islam is not the dominant force in Indonesian politics today, it has grown in significance over the years.

The Battle and the War

Casual Indonesian observers often wrongly regard the general election as the only battle fought by political parties in order to form the government. It might be assumed that the party with the largest number of votes (in this case Partai Demokrasi Indonesia– Perjuangan or PDI-P, albeit only 33.7 per cent to the total votes) should form the government, and the party leader should be the President. This would have happened if Indonesia was not under the 1945 Constitution. Under the first amended 1945 Constitution, a party which won the parliamentary election would not necessarily win the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People's Consultative Assembly) election. The President is elected by the MPR, not by the people directly. The leader of the party which obtained the largest votes in the MPR election, not the general election, would become the President.

The conflict between President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and the legislators resulted in his impeachment despite his attempts at various strategies to avoid such a fate. Both the President and the legislators claimed that they had acted according to the Indonesian Constitution. The Cabinet ministers and political parties had offered a last minute compromise, but it was rejected by Gus Dur. He was eventually ousted. The roles of the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or People's Representative Council) and MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or People's Consultative Assembly) give insight into the way Indonesia's system of government handled the unique and critical situation, including a parliamentary censure, a state of emergency, use of executive powers, different interpretations of the Constitution, and eventual impeachment proceedings.

The DPR Censure

Gus Dur's “crony Cabinet” had angered many political party leaders, especially those who did not have Cabinet positions. The DPR which was dominated by Gus Dur's opponents, continued to pursue the two scandals. This law-making body formed a Special Committee, known as the “Pansus Bulog dan Brunei”, which subpoenaed Gus Dur in January 2001 to explain his possible involvement in the Badan Urusan Logistik, or National Logistic Board (dubbed as Buloggate) and the Sultan of Brunei's donation (dubbed as Bruneigate) scandals. Some DPR members pressured Gus Dur to resign and thousands of students demonstrated against him. Initially Gus Dur refused to comply with the subpoena as he argued that it was unconstitutional, and only the MPR had the power to summon him. However, he eventually agreed to meet the Special Committee on 22 January 2001 at the Jakarta Convention Centre, not in the Parliament Building. He told the Committee that it was illegal, and accused it of being politically motivated to remove him. After making the statement, Gus Dur refused to answer questions concerning the two scandals and left the meeting abruptly.

On 21 May 1998 Soeharto announced that he was unable to continue leading the nation and had decided to step down: this dramatic three-minute announcement ended the Soeharto era. His deputy, B. J. Habibie, was immediately sworn in as the new President. This chapter gives an overview of the problems faced by Soeharto in the last six months prior to his stepping down, the crucial developments in the last weeks of his rule, and the “showdown” which eventually ended it all. This chapter also briefly evaluates Habibie's rule and the problems encountered.

Corruption and the Economic Crisis

The Indonesian economy deteriorated rapidly in the wake of the financial crisis that began first in Thailand in the middle of 1997, followed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Indonesia was the hardest hit. The value of the rupiah dropped from Rp2,350 per U.S. dollar in June 1997 to Rp16,500 in January 1998. By early April 1999 it had somewhat stabilized at Rp9,000 per U.S. dollar. However, the low value of the rupiah made it impossible for Indonesian companies to import goods and to pay debts. Prices of imported and domestic products rose dramatically and many companies faced bankruptcy. Unemployment rates jumped. These developments affected Indonesian politics. The presidential election, which took place after the general election, in March 1998 was thus conducted under the shadow of economic turmoil and increasing discontent, after Indonesia was compelled to ask for help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The 1999 general election in Indonesia and the presidential election following it are significant events in the history of the country. Being the first free and democratic general election for over thirty years, it has a profound impact on the whole region.

Similar to the approach adopted in my two earlier books on Golkar and Soeharto's foreign policy — Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar and Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership — this book has also employed the political culture approach. This approach has its weaknesses — it does not give sufficient attention to other important variables such as the economy. Nevertheless, I need a tool to interpret Indonesian elections and politics. This political culture approach helps me organize the information in a coherent manner to make it easy to understand. On the other hand, by doing this, I am running a risk of distortion and simplification.

Although this book focuses on the recent elections, there is the need to provide some framework and background. Major characteristics of Indonesian society and culture — ethnicity, regionalism, and religion — which affect electoral behaviour are highlighted. Also examined are the continuity and change in Islam as practised by Indonesians and their impact on the country's politics.

Indonesia saw the emergence of new political parties after the fall of Soeharto. However, the old as well as the new parties could only hastily prepare for the 1999 general election in a new political situation. The military grip was loosened while new freedom was won. The government succeeded in preparing various laws to conduct a free and relatively fair election — the first democratic election after Soeharto's thirty-two-year authoritarian rule.

New Political Parties: Old Wine in New Bottle?

During the Soeharto regime, political activities were restricted. The number of political parties had been confined to three and they had to be approved by the government. After the fall of Soeharto, the restrictions (except on the PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesian Communist Party) were removed and people began to enjoy political freedom which they had been deprived of for more than thirty years. Responding to this newly found freedom, people started to organize themselves and form political parties. It was reported that 145 parties (aside from the three New Order parties) were formed or revived soon after Soeharto's fall.

These parties ranged from major parties such as Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) to obscure parties such as the Women's Party (Partai Perempuan), Youth Progressive Party (Partai Remaja dan Pemuda Progressive), Drivers Party (Partai Reformasi Sopir Sejahtera Indonesia), Peasants and Fishermen Party (Partai Kemakmuran Tani dan Nelayan), and Poor People's Alliance Party (Partai Aliansi Rakyat Miskin Indonesia).

Pancasila, the five principles of Indonesia's state ideology, and political Islam are important aspects of politics in Indonesia. The two political cultures — the secular abangan (the Pancasila group) and the santri (the Islamic group) — have existed throughout Indonesian political history. This chapter examines Indonesian political parties and the general elections between 1955 (the year when Indonesia held its first general election) and 1997 (the year of the last general election held during the Soeharto regime). It explains the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system, from the purely proportional system during the “Liberal Democracy” period under Sukarno to a mixed proportional system during the Soeharto era. At the same time, it examines the socio-religious cleavages of Indonesian political parties from the start of Indonesian independence in 1945 up to the late 1990s.

The 1955 General Election: The Proportional System

Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 but became a sovereign state only in December 1949 after signing the Round Table Treaty with the Dutch. Indonesian history entered a period of parliamentary democracy — it was also called either “Constitutional Democracy” or “Liberal Democracy” — where political parties rather than an authoritarian leader or the military were in power. Sukarno was a figurehead president and the army was subordinate to civilian rule. It should be noted that political parties were established before World War II, but they were unable to form a government during the colonial period. Only after independence were the political parties — many of them an “extension” of pre-war parties — able to fulfil this role. In the early 1950s, the political parties decided to hold a general election to legitimize the government.

To understand Indonesian politics and the general election of 1999 in particular, one should be familiar with the basic characteristics of Indonesian society which account for Indonesian political behaviour. This chapter presents an introduction to Indonesian society, highlighting its salient features including multi-ethnicity, regionalism (Java versus the Outer Islands), and the existence of nominal (liberal) and pious (orthodox) Muslims.

A Multi-Ethnic Society

Indonesia is a multi-ethnic society consisting of about 300 ethnic groups (suku bangsa) and at least six major religions. However, the precise number of ethnic groups is debatable. One recent study put forward more than 600 ethnic groups (sometimes, including sub-ethnic groups) in Indonesia. There has been no census since 1930 which gives the percentage breakdown of each ethnic group. The Indonesian Government considered ethnicity a potentially divisive and an extremely sensitive issue. As Indonesia is supposedly a “nation-state”, the government appears thus not to have focused on the ethnic origins of its citizens. In reality, Indonesians have always been conscious of ethnicity. Because of the fear of “national disintegration”, the Indonesian Government in the last fifty years had never identified ethnic affiliation in its population census. Therefore, in order to examine Indonesian ethnic groups, the only “reliable” source is the 1930 census, gathered during the colonial era. To rely on the percentage derived seventy years ago may be misleading and even dangerous. However, I would argue that it is better than a wild guess without any data at all.

There was initial confrontation between the Abdurrahman Wahid administration and the legislators. This chapter analyses various challenges faced by his administration and its responses to them, with special reference to the relationship between the President and other institutions which emerged after the fall of Soeharto. It also examines the parliamentary session of July 2000, which questioned Gus Dur, and the annual meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat [MPR]) in August 2000 which ended with a Cabinet reshuffle.

Reduced Presidential Power

It should be pointed out that the presidential power of Gus Dur was different from that of Soeharto. During the Soeharto era, the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or People's Representative Council) could not subpoena the President. The DPR and MPR Law No. 4/1999 (Article 35) however, which was passed on 1 February 1999, empowers the DPR to subpoena the state and government officials (pejabat negara dan pejabat pemerintah) and citizens to supply information deemed crucial for the national interest. The term “state and government officials” is open to conflicting interpretations. The DPR insisted that this category included the President and immediately used this new power to summon President Habibie who was questioned on his sudden change in the East Timor policy and the Bank Bali scandal. However, Gus Dur maintained that only the MPR had the power to summon the President.