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15945 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 712 of 798

  • Preface

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp ix-xii

  • Summary

    After the end of the Cold War, nationalism re-emerged as a challenge to world order. Many countries have disintegrated as a result of ethnic and religious conflicts, which have been interpreted as a clash of different types of nationalism. The former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are two examples. The situation in the Balkans is often cited as an example of national disintegration. Some have cited nationalism and religion as two important factors that have disrupted the Balkans, but others have attributed it to globalization as the major culprit. What have been the factors contributing to conflict and national disunity? Is the situation in the Balkans unique? Why do some countries remain intact? Is it only a matter of time before other multi-ethnic countries will disintegrate?

    It was the challenge of nationalism and globalization that led to the undertaking of this project. Apparently, the roles that these two forces play and the impact of globalization on the countries differ. A comparative study was initiated to find the answers to questions raised. This was not an easy task but we felt that the project was a worthwhile one.

    The first hurdle was the definition of the terms themselves. There is no general agreement on the definitions of both nationalism and globalization as they are interpreted in accordance with the concept and theory used by each individual scholar. However, if there is no basic agreement on the key terms and concepts, a comparative study or any generalizations will not be possible. For this project, it was suggested that the paper-writers adopt working definitions of the key words, or at least, to use some of the definitions in their study. The definitions have been taken from well-known writers but their selection reflects my understanding and perhaps bias on the subject matter. For instance, I view nationalism as a concept which is related to nation or nationhood, but I do not argue which one comes first. I also assume that nationalism is related to the concept of ethnie or ethnicity, but they are not identical. They are also different from the concepts of race, state, citizen or citizenship.

  • 13 - Conclusion

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 344-355

  • Summary

    In this concluding chapter, I would like to highlight some interesting points mentioned in the preceding chapters and occasionally offer my own interpretation. I will also draw some brief comparisons between the countries in order to show similarities and differences in the process of nationalism and globalization.

    As I see it, “nation/nation state” is the product of modern history. In the past, there was a concept of “dynasty” or kingdom rather than the “nation/nation state”. It is also true that “ethnic group” emerged long before “nation”, if one defines “ethnic group” in terms of common ancestry. Nevertheless, it seems that “ethnic group” can also develop into a nation, the so-called “ethno-nation” or “ethnic-nation”. Japan is one example. Nevertheless, the majority of nations in the world are multiethnic nations, also known as “social nations”.

    Whether it is an ethnic nation or a social nation, there are similarities in terms of their components. A common history, a common heritage (including a common language) and common values often constitute the basis of national belonging. The political élite promoted this sense of national belonging, which is often called nationalism. It was the élite who defined nation and nationalism. Some writers, for instance, Ernest Gellner, even maintain that nationalism is a creation of the élite in order to achieve certain political goals. It is a political construct. To a large degree, this is certainly true but one should not ignore the “foundations” (components) of a “nation” that other writers mention. Without these “foundations” it is hard to recognize that there is indeed a “creature” called “nation”.

    The twelve countries under study, with the possible exception of Japan, are “nations” at different stages of development. Some have just completed state building, while others have been “nations” for different lengths of time, but their components continue to develop. Even the United Kingdom, which is considered to be one of the first modern nations, is actually a “multinational state” rather than a “nation state”. Because of the difficulty in building a nation with a common culture, common language, and common heritage, many countries have abandoned nation-building efforts and concentrate instead on citizenship. They have abandoned the building of a national culture or a national identity but accept multiple cultures and multiple identities. Citizenship, it would seem, can be developed into nationhood, but citizenship is not identical with nationhood.

  • 2 - Nation-Building and Nation-Destroying: The Challenge of Globalization in Indonesia

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 38-70

  • Summary

    Introduction

    Nation-building in Indonesia started in the period of Dutch colonialism, especially during the Indonesian nationalist movement before World War II. But the systematic measures adopted by the state only took place after independence. Nevertheless, the nation-building process in Indonesia has not been smooth. Although, generally, many ethnic groups have identified themselves with the “Indonesian nation”, ethnic tension and conflict continue, particularly in the three provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Maluku as well as East Timor, which left Indonesia recently. The intensity of conflict has increased in the last decade, coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the globalization of the Indonesian economy. As a result, some observers have commented that Indonesia may now be at the nation-destroying stage. The departure of East Timor has been cited as proof of this. Amien Rais, a leading opposition leader, has compared the Indonesian situation to that of Yugoslavia, warning of the danger of national disintegration.

    This chapter analyses the rise of Indonesian nationalism, its nature, and its relations with Western colonialism. It discusses the development of a modern Indonesian nation, its relationship with the citizenry, and various measures adopted by the indigenous dominated government to foster nation-building. The position of the ethnic Chinese in this new nation is also examined. The impact of globalization, on the Indonesian state and nation, is also discussed: Is globalization destroying the concept of a modern Indonesian nation? Are the concepts of the Indonesian nation and nationalism still relevant in the face of globalization? Will Indonesia disintegrate?

    Indonesian Nation and Nationalism: Its Origins and Developments

    Indonesia is a multi-ethnic, multiracial and multireligious state. There are at least 250 ethnic groups, of which all but three are “indigenous” groups. They all have a homeland within Indonesia to identify with. Of these indigenous groups, the Javanese form about 47 per cent of the population. Five other indigenous groups each consist of more than 2 per cent of the Indonesian population: Sundanese (15 per cent) Madurese (7 per cent), Minangkabau (3.5 per cent), Buginese (3 per cent) and Balinese (2 per cent). There are foreign “racial” groups — the Chinese, Arabs, and Indians — of which the Chinese form the majority (3 per cent). Among these groups, there are at least six major religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholic, Hindu-Bali, Buddhism and Confucianism) but 87 per cent of the Indonesian population are Muslims.

  • 12 - Nationalism and Globalization in the Russian Federation at the Millennium

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 319-343

  • Summary

    Art thou not, my Russia, soaring along even like a spirited, never-to-be- outdistanced troika?....Whither art thou soaring away to, then, Russia? Give me thy answer! But Russia gives none. With a wondrous ring does the jingle-bell trill; the air rent to shreds, thunders and turns to wind; all things on earth fly past and, eyeing it askance, all the other peoples and nations stand aside and give it the right of way.

    — Nikolai Gogol, The Dead Souls

    Introduction

    Examining nationalism within the post-Soviet Russian Federation in the context of an increasingly globalized world is a complex task, given the propensity of the various historical forms of the Russian state to resist inclusion in the prevalent socio-economic, artistic, and political Pan-European trends. Thus, Russia never experienced the impact of Renaissance or Protestant Reformation, while its embrace of the Age of Reason had been ambivalent in its nature, and limited in scope. Both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, in spite of their universalistic and Messianic impulses, functioned within the context of a highly isolationist autarkic political culture. That globalization has indeed emerged as a factor in the post-communist Russian state is, nevertheless, beyond reasonable denial. Russia had first confronted aspects of modernity in the late seventeenth century through the reforms of Peter the Great and was fundamentally transformed by the Marxist mobilization model of socio-economic modernization thrust upon the Soviet empire by Joseph Stalin during the 1920s and 1930s. Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policy of glasnost exposed his country to the Information Age, while the set of policies collectively known as perestroika marked a decisive departure from traditional Russian autarky through seeking Western aid from such global institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Following the failure of Gorbachev's attempt to fuse socialism with reinvigorating elements of capitalism, a highly flawed and predatory form of capitalism emerged in Russia, fostering nevertheless its integration into the global economy. This chapter will examine the traditional sources and current manifestations of nationalism in contemporary Russian Federation, and then explore the degree and nature of interaction between globalization and various forms of ethnic nationalism flourishing on the Eurasian continent.

  • 7 - Nation, Nationalism and Globalization in France

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 200-215

  • Summary

    France is often regarded as one of the first modern Western nations in the world. This chapter attempts to address the origins and development of the French nation and the impact of European regionalism/globalization on it. It seems that there are two types of French nationalism: open nationalism and closed nationalism; the former is broader and closer to the concept of citizenship, and tends to be more inclusive, while the latter is narrower and closer to the concept of ethnic-nation. There have been conflicts between these two concepts in France. But what is more important is the challenge of European regionalism and globalization, which may dilute French nationalism.

    The Origin and Development of the Modern French Nation

    The French Revolution was a very important moment in French history. It was indeed during the Revolution that the motto of France — liberté, égalité, fraternité (liberty, equality, fraternity) — was coined. As a result of the Revolution, all people residing in France became citizens without any distinction, unlike in the past. People began to call one another citoyen (citizen) instead of the usual “Monsieur “or “Madame” (Mr or Mrs). Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century in France, the idea of equality was firmly established.

    In discussing the idea of nation in France, the first name that comes to mind is Ernest Renan, who delivered a lecture entitled “Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?” (What is a nation?) at the Sorbonne, Paris, in 1882. The lecture was important in the sense that the concept of nation addressed differed from the earlier concept of nation defined by the German philosopher Fitche, who had argued that the most important element in a nation is its common language. Fitche wrote earlier (1807–8) and addressed the issue of the German nation. The purpose was “to reawaken the spirit of the German people after the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon in 1806–07” (1956, p. xiii).

  • 6 - Nationalism and Globalization in Australia

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 175-199

  • Summary

    To trace the story of Australian nationalism is to trace the search for a national identity in the absence of a defining national moment or event. In 1977, Australia celebrated the bicentenary of Captain Cook's “discovery” of Australia; yet Dutch explorers had discovered Australia for the European world decades before Cook. In 1988, the bicentenary was of the first European settlement in Australia, despite the continent's 40,000-year prior habitation by Aborigines. The centenary of federation in 2001 — proposed as a celebration of national independence — will also be a highly ambiguous anniversary. Before 1901, several Australian colonies had exercised substantial democratic self-rule. Long after 1901, Australia was reluctant to exercise a sovereign voice independent of Britain: the 1931 Statute of Westminster, establishing foreign policy independence of the White colonies from Britain, was not ratified in Australia until 1943.

    One reason for this absence of a defining moment was the beneficence of the outside world. Australia's initial European settlement phase occurred during the nineteenth century “long peace”, at a time when Britain was at the peak of its power — the first industrial state, with a navy that was globally dominant. Until 1942, Australia had no realistic external foe to foster nationalism out of the desperate struggle for defence. Neither was a unifying independence struggle against the colonial centre necessary. Australia's colonization had occurred in the aftermath of the American War of Independence, from which the British Colonial Office learnt a great deal about leniency and large measures of self-rule for the White colonies: “Since the Colonial Office was itself an agent of reform, there was no need for the consolidation of an Australian nationality to carry issues which Britain would not concede.”

    The closeness of the relationship between Britain and the Australian colonies — defined in currents of people, manufactures and food, physical security, and pragmatic grants of self-government within the bounds of colonial deference — meant that neither could Australia initially be defined socio-geographically. The ebbs and flows of people between Britain and the colonies meant that at no time could all of those within Australia's shores be defined as nationals, nor could all of those in Britain or in transit be defined as foreigners.

  • 1 - “Yugoslav” Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 1-37

  • Summary

    Balkan Nationalism and the “Curse of History”

    The tragic events occurring in Kosovo in 1999 represent the culmination of a long process which may be considered as the emergence of full-blown “ethnochauvinism” in this part of the Balkans. As such, Kosovo represents perhaps the most advanced (or most degenerate) form of a problem which is common to much of the Balkan area. This widespread phenomenon is the result of historical developments, geographical peculiarities, demographic trends, and the existence and development of various myths in the entire region. In Kosovo, personality factors and the idiosyncratic characteristics of individual leaders add to the general aspects found elsewhere in the region. Finally, actions by outside forces influence the manifestations of regional and specific examples of ethnochauvinism in the area, as will be shown below.

    Scholars have discussed a number of concepts relevant for a systematic examination of nationalism in the Balkans. In so doing, they have examined phenomena which are variously called nationalism, “ethnonationalism”, and “ethnochauvinism”. In the process of this discussion, they have also launched concepts such as “ethnie”, ethnicity, and ethnic mobilization. Furthermore, some scholars have argued that nationalism as a practical manifestation is only possible if there are discoverers, myth-makers, and mobilizers who can find, conceptualize, and operationalize the various forms of nationalism present in a region. Let us now proceed to examine this plethora of concepts, attempting in the process to establish a set of conceptual tools which can be used to examine nationalism in present-day Yugoslavia.

    Let us start with the simplest of these concepts, and work towards the more complex. “Ethnie” is seen as a group of people who have some characteristics in common, such as a common ethnic background. Normally, no other characteristics are attached to this concept; it does not connote a particular kind of political preference, nor does it assume any special form of organization.

  • 4 - Globalization and Nationalism in the United States: A Historical Perspective

    • By Joel Hodson, American Studies Centre National University of Singapore
  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 102-131

  • Summary

    American jazz, Hollywood movies, American slang, American machines and patented products, are in fact the only things that every community in the world, from Zanzibar to Hamburg, recognize in common ... America is already the intellectual, scientific, and artistic capital of the world.

    — Henry Luce, “The American Century”, 1941

    At the annual Lower East Side Jewish Festival yesterday, a Chinese woman ate a pizza slice in front of Ty Thuan Duc's Vietnamese grocery store. Beside her a Spanish-speaking family patronized a cart with two signs: “Italian Ices” and “Kosher by Rabbi Alper”. And after the pastrami ran out, everybody ate knishes.

    — New York Times, June 1983

    Introduction

    “The United States,” political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset wrote in the early 1960s, “may properly claim the title of the first new nation. It was the first major colony to successfully break away from colonial rule through revolution.” Lipset's claim, made in the halcyon days of American post-war prosperity, echoes the exceptionalism that permeated American historiography and social science at that time. Nevertheless, the statement rightly positions the United States at the forefront of modern national experience and, by extension, to the process of globalization. The majority of countries in the world today are newly independent since World War II and, like their eighteenth-century American predecessor, are post-colonial nations. Most are “state-nations” constructed on the basis of social nationalism, rather than nation-states of single ethnic origin. Like the United States, they too are products of an accelerated process of globalization that characterizes modern times.

    Considerable differences of opinion exist about what constitutes globalization, when it began, and where it is leading us. World-systems analysts, for instance, put forth a metahistorical perspective that globalization is contemporaneous with the rise of capitalism and is an outcome of European expansion. In this view, globalization becomes the inevitable result of the free market at work.

  • 3 - Globalization and Singapore's Search for Nationhood

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 71-101

  • Summary

    Introduction

    When Singapore was founded by Stamford Raffles in January 1819, the population consisted of 120 Malays and 30 Chinese. As a result of immigration from China, India and Indonesia, the composition of the population was gradually transformed into the multiracial one today, with the Chinese becoming the majority (77 per cent) and the other minority groups being the Malays (14 per cent), the Indians (7.6 per cent), and other ethnic groups (1.4 per cent). The population is also multilingual (there are four official languages and many dialects) and multireligious, consisting of 53.8 per cent Buddhists and Taoists, 14.9 per cent Muslims, 14.5 per cent with no religion, 12.9 per cent Christians, and 3.3 per cent Hindus.

    Singapore became independent on 9 August 1965 but it was not a nation4 yet in spite of the nation-building efforts of the People's Action Party (PAP) government since its assumption of office in June 1959. Indeed, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew's recent answer to the question “Will we become one tribe [that is, nation]?” was:

    Not possible. If we try, we will bring misfortune to ourselves, because there are tribal elements in our society that say: I want to be myself. The Sikhs do not want to be absorbed. The various Muslim sects do not want to be absorbed by other sects, let alone by other religions. And I say, leave well alone, let's find common ground because those are the cards that we were dealt with. So much easier if we're all one race, one language, one religion. ... So when we, having gone through that stress, came to the conclusion that we have to be the opposite: tolerant of each other, accommodative, multi-racial, multi-lingual, multi-religious, multi-cultural; in other words, I'm not foisting myself on you.

    What is Singapore's approach to nation-building? What is the impact of globalization on Singapore's national identity? Why has the PAP government changed its approach to nation-building from its initial emphasis on the development of a Singaporean national identity in 1965 to the development of ethnic self-help groups since 1982 to improve the socio-economic status of the Chinese, Malays, Indians and Eurasians in Singapore? Has the influx of permanent residents and emphasis on foreign talent resulted in the erosion of the loyalty of Singaporeans? These questions will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

  • 9 - Globalization, Nationalism, and the Modernization of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 234-257

  • Summary

    Introduction

    In 1996, the New Labour government of Tony Blair embarked upon an ambitious programme of constitutional modernization for the United Kingdom (UK). In Northern Ireland, this involved a dramatic series of initiatives culminating in the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998, that sought to reconcile the warring communities in Northern Ireland and create a new power-sharing arrangement for that troubled province. At the same time, New Labour, in the course of 1997, organized referenda for Wales and Scotland which, it was contended, legitimated the creation of new directly elected assemblies for these regions of the United Kingdom. Moreover, the House of Lords was persuaded in the course of 1998 to cull radically its hereditary peers, and the government put proposals in place to elect a mayor for London. Apart from these new constitutional initiatives within the United Kingdom, the new government also launched the Jenkins Commission to examine the majoritarian or “first-past-the-post” (FPTP) voting system and propose more equitable, minority friendly alternatives. This attempt to remodel the United Kingdom as a planned rational arrangement eminently suitable for merging a weakening British identity into a prospective Euroland composed of functionally integrated regions constitutes a radical departure from British constitutional practice and raises a number of questions concerning the relationship between national identity and its democratic representation, the state and the region in an era economically shaped by globalized investment, Internet trading, and rapid capital flows.

    Retrospectively, it was one of the achievements of the British “nation” that evolved in the United Kingdom after the Act of Union (1707) that it contained a plurality of communities. From distinctively unpromising resources, a British union came initially to embrace North and South Britons, Scots, Welsh, Irish and, after 1945, included Chinese, Cypriot, Jamaican, Trinidadian, Guyanese, Gujerati, Nigerian, and Bangladeshi migrant communities. This essentially pluralist construct was even flexible enough to tolerate a variety of religious affiliations: Sikhs, Jews, Muslims and even Catholics, seemingly facilitating Prince Charles’ desire to reign as a multi-faith monarch.

  • 10 - Nationalities, Nationalism, and Globalization: The Case of China

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 258-293

  • Summary

    Nationalism and globalism are two mutually contradictory terms and incompatible goals. To emphasize one is to demean the other. Yet ironically enough, they also represent two phenomena coexisting in the contemporary world. Indeed, most countries have been consciously striving for the realization of both objectives and simultaneously. This is perhaps precisely the new dilemma or paradox confronting us at the turn of the century. Indeed, in an age of high technology and instant communication, which recognizes no national borders, nationalism loses much of its original appeal and value. In a world of ever-growing volume of international flow of both people and goods, and in view of the towering size of multinational corporations and the accelerating rate of privatization of world assets, national consciousness has also become practically irrelevant. But this is also a time when neither God nor Karl Marx inspires much awe or generates any appeal to the human world, when global competition for resources and markets become increasingly tense and ugly, and when uneven economic development has widened, rather than narrowed, the gap between the advanced and the backward nations, rendering many nations increasingly vulnerable and insecure. As a result, national identity, national awareness, and national dignity also appears to gain new currency, both for the power-hungry or security-conscious politicians and for the ideal-thirsty or economically deprived masses of the common people.

    The case of China is a unique one for a number of reasons. First, as a nation, China has been in existence perhaps longer than any other country in the world. Yet nationalism in its territorial and political sense is a new phenomenon emerging only in the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, owing to the absence of a common religion and a rigid class structure, the Chinese nation has always been a loose community bound more by a common way of life than by any Messianic appeal. In fact, both “China” and “Chinese” are vague terms, the former referring more to a geographical area and a cultural phenomenon than to a territorial state, and the latter also more to a cultural than to a political group. Moreover, Chinese perspectives on “nation” and “state” have always had global connotations.

  • 11 - Grasping the Nettle: Indian Nationalism and Globalization

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 294-318

  • Summary

    Introduction

    With the near completion of the decolonization process which resulted in the birth of a host of Afro-Asian states in the 1960s, it was generally assumed that nationalism had passed its heyday. Ever since the French Revolution, nationalism had exerted such a powerful influence on the thinking of mankind that it was hard to imagine that it would ever lose its appeal. But the end of colonialism and the gradual emergence of an interdependent world seemed to suggest that the age of nationalism was well and truly over. Economic, cultural, and communication links that have been operating regardless of national borders seemed to confirm the presence of a transnational world rather than a community of narrow, national entities. Sovereign states were thus seen to be fighting a rearguard action as boundaries became porous and penetrable by unconventional intruders. But the events associated with the end of the Cold War, particularly the break-up of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, have belied such claims. Several new states have emerged in the wake of the disintegration of these two former federations, fuelled by the spirit of nationalism. Consequently, the present day world is witnessing a resurgence of nationalism as manifested in the integration and fragmentation processes operating between and within states. Increasingly, nationalist demands are surfacing both in the developing and developed countries. Nationalism has once again begun to take centre stage in many places. In developing countries, its manifestation is evident in the people's aspiration for autonomy and greater political participation together with the urge to negotiate for these benefits on the terms and conditions set by them. The developed world too has not been spared the nationalist challenge as seen in the case of Canada, Spain, and Britain. Even in a clearly defined nation-state like France tensions are apparent as the country experiences a sharp cultural diversity between the migrants from the Maghreb and the French people. These developments warrant a fresh look at the process that leads to the emergence and propagation of a national identity.

    The cases of individual nation-states while being important must, however, be located within the broader context of the contemporary international order, the defining feature of which is globalization. It would appear that the world we live in at present is confronted by the contradictory pulls of nationalism and globalism.

  • 8 - National Identity and Adapting to Integration: Nationalism and Globalization in Japan

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 216-233

  • Summary

    Introduction

    In this chapter, nationalism and globalization are examined with specific reference to Japan. Here, nationalism is defined as a political principle holding that the political and national unit should be congruent, as a sentiment about that principle, and as a theory of political legitimacy requiring that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones (Gellner 1993). Globalization is defined as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa” (Giddens 1987, p. 64). Japan poses a challenge when examining this subject because it was one of the non-Western countries that made use of nationalism in building its modern, territorial sovereign state and constructing a modern, industrial national economy under the slogan of fukoku kyohei (a rich country and a strong army) (Samuels 1996). While nationalism cements integration within a state by differentiating the inside and the outside, globalization works in the opposite direction. Globalization tends to fracture the national body politic and the national economy by linking some components within with counterparts outside. If Japan was highly successful in mobilizing its populace with nationalist appeals, it should be interesting to consider how Japan may be able to adapt successfully to the forces of globalization with an equal amount of adeptness and adroitness. Before moving on to this subject, it is necessary to give a historical portrayal of Japanese nationalism and how the modern Japanese nation was created and has been maintained till today.

    Origins of the Ancient Japanese State

    The ancient Japanese state was born and shaped under Chinese influence (Okada, 1994). When the centre of continental East Asia experienced disorder and disintegration, local rulers could claim a modicum of freedom and independence (Yoshida 1998). It was around the seventh century (the time of the Sui and early Tang dynasties in China) when the first ancient Japanese state was recorded in an official Chinese historical document and thus legitimized. Subsequently, the ancient Japanese state, presumably unified with the help of such legitimization, continued to rely on international legitimization by the Chinese imperial state within the Sino-centric order based on the tributary system (Fairbank 1968; Inoguchi 1979; Basabi 1983).

  • 5 - Globalization and the Challenges to Malay Nationalism as the Essence of Malaysian Nationalism

  • Edited by Leo Suryadinata
  • Book:
    Nationalism and Globalization
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    16 November 2000, pp 132-174

  • Summary

    Introduction

    Globalization has reconstructed ethnicity and ethnic nationalism the world over. The exemplary case of Eastern Europe is too well-known to require elaboration. It suffered hitherto unknown mass ethnic violence to the point of ethnic annihilation. Closer to home, Indonesian ethnic nationalism has not only produced mass violence and hardships on a massive scale over an extended period of time but also threaten to break up the Indonesian state: the struggle for independence in East Timor, Aceh, and Kalimantan are probably just the beginning. Globalization in general seems to have re-ignited old ethnic fears and excited new ethnic demands in multi-ethnic societies. How does it affect Malaysia, a multi-ethnic state-nation which experienced serious ethnic clashes in the 1960s? Does it suffer a similar predicament? If not, why? What has happened to the fiery ethnic nationalism and ethnic struggles of post-colonial Malaysia?

    This chapter will discuss the rise of Malaysian nationalism and the challenges to it brought about by globalization. It will focus on how Malay nationalism emerged in the early part of the twentieth century and why it became strongly asserted in the 1980s under the New Economic Policy (NEP). Other types of ethnic nationalism in Malaysia, particularly Chinese ethnic nationalism, contested Malay dominance but internal splits and inter-ethnic élite alliance as well as rapid economic growth diluted non-Malay demands and diminished their position. This gave the opportunity for the Malays, through their major political party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), to exert their power and authority to define “Malaysian nationality” in terms of Malay interests, culture, and religion. But globalization brought about new challenges and opportunities, particularly to the Malay leadership. While they continue to safeguard Malay dominance, they at the same time turned Malay nationalism into an instrument for accumulation and concentration of corporate wealth in the hands of the few. In the process, they compromised the position of major symbols of Malay nationalism, such as Islam, the Malay-dominated education system, and the Malay language. Can the leaders defend themselves by creating new national myths and symbols and share it with other Malaysians in what may be called a new “Malaysian nationalism”? This chapter shows that ethnicity and ethnic nationalism are still pervasive and impair such a move. At the same time, the new nationalism is fragile and superficial because it is constructed mainly as a political defence.

  • 5 - Co-operation within a Narrower Framework: Growth Triangles in ASEAN

  • Edited in consultation with ASEAN Secretariat
  • Book:
    ASEAN Economic Co-operation
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    03 November 2017
    Print publication:
    07 September 2000, pp 137-156

  • Summary

    The Emergence of Growth Triangles

    The emergence of growth areas in Southeast Asia is best seen against the broader context of increasing economic integration in the region. As the rise of the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) shifted the location of industries from high-cost to low-cost countries, investments and technology became more interdependent, resulting in production linkages and increased intra-industry trade flows. As a result, East and Southeast Asian economies came closer together regardless of formal institutional ties.

    ASEAN economies are among the beneficiaries of the investmenttrade nexus driving economic integration in Southeast Asia. The fastpaced growth of ASEAN economies required that development processes go beyond national Limits to free the constraints posed by domestic Growth Triangles involve economic co-operation based on encouraging specific and limited linkages of complementary economic activities across borders. It is a pragmatic response to the practical problems of formal economic integration among nations that require fundamental changes in national institutional and administrative arrangements, as with NAFTA, the EC, or AFTA. Growth Triangles, as sub-regional economic co-operation modes, need not involve entire countries, but simply adjacent areas within countries that have complementary capabilities and resources.

    The concept is essentially a simple one: link adjacent areas with different factor endowments and different comparative advantages — such as differences in the levels of technology, labour (quantity and quality), natural resources, financial capital — to form a sub-region of economic growth that is driven by market dynamics. The intention is to have specific linkages across borders, rather than just complementarities in respective national economic structures. Sub-regional economic co-operation essentially involves initiatives in limited or localized economic integration that create transborder “economic neighbourhoods”. In its various forms, it has a number of characteristics:

  • Sub-regional economic co-operation tends to be consistent with the evolution of “natural economic linkages” among neighbouring countries, building on increasing formal and informal local trade and investment linkages. It “goes with the flow” in the very real sense, both responding to and facilitating emerging transborder economic activities.

  • Since Growth Triangles are limited in both substantive and geographic scope, the political and economic complexities (and related risks) are generally more manageable than those associated with more formal and extensive regional arrangements or “blocs”.

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