Ethnic and religious issues have, in the last few decades, confounded many social analysts by refusing to disappear. The “liberal expectancy” among social analysts used to be that modernisation would blur ethnic distinctions, achievement would replace ascription and particularistic criteria, and wide-ranging communication and education systems would homogenise populations. The “radical expectancy” was that differences in religions, languages, and culture would be swallowed up, perhaps even across national boundaries by emergent class consciousness. Instead, religion and ethnicity continue to cut across and envelop almost every facet of Southeast Asian life. Indeed, if anything, such divisions in many societies have become sharper, ethnic and religious interest groups more insistent, and opposition more politicised and strident. Much of this activity seems to be increasingly played on the urban stage – and this at a time when the pace of urbanisation in Southeast Asia is increasing rapidly, to the extent that by the turn of the century, cities such as Manila, Bangkok, and Jakarta could have populations of more than 10 million each. In these settings, Southeast Asian ethnic, religious, and linguistic complexities are likely to be even more challenging than in the past.

It was therefore only natural that among other aspects of the Southeast Asian social and cultural scene, the Institute should identify the study of contemporary religion as one of its key areas of interest. Southeast Asia is after all not only home to all the major religions of the world – Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism – but the geographical spread of these is such that the bonds that bind their adherents at one and the same time defy and accentuate political and territorial divides and boundaries. The case of Islam is especially striking in this respect, as its followers are present in significant numbers in almost every Southeast Asian country, and in several of these across constraining political borders. Acting on this, a group of Southeast Asian scholars met in 1980 and proposed a project to increase our understanding of Islam in its regional context.

As noted in Chapter 2, the Singapore petroleum sector encompasses a panoply of downstream industries and services besides refining. These include the trading of crude petroleum and refined products on the spot market, the loading of bunker fuels at port, independent storage facilities for crudes and petroleum products, and the production and trade of ethylene-based petrochemicals. These downstream activities are discussed in this chapter.

The Singapore Spot Market and Trading Enclave

The petroleum trade generally involves two types of transactions, term and spot transactions. A term or “forward” transaction implicates the buyer and seller in a long-term contract specifying the basic attributes of (“posted”) price, time and place of delivery, and quality and quantity of cargo. These contracts generally covered a period of three years or more, although since the late 1970s there has been greater flexibility in maturities and pricing formulas. Spot transactions refer to agreements for a change in ownership of cargoes on a prompt basis (that is, in the very near or immediate future). Often the cargo is ready for delivery in storage tanks or in tanker-at-sea.

Although the world petroleum industry comprised small producers, refiners, and traders in its origins, it began to display its characteristic oligopolistic industrial organization by the last decades of the nineteenth century (Penrose 1968). The domination exerted by the vertically integrated majors over all aspects of the industry, “from source rock to retail pump” (that is, from exploration and development to production, processing, transport, and sales), led to a tight control over the flow of oil, intra-firm balancing of supply and demand, and the predominance of long-term fixed price contracts. In this environment characterized by a relative stability of prices, there was no motivation for the development of an open spot market for either crude petroleum or its refined products. Despite the formation of OPEC in 1960, it was only with the up-heavals associated with the price shocks and the nationalization of the major concessions during the 1970s that the international oil market was structurally transformed from the tight web of large oligopolies into its present relatively diverse and decentralized market with a multiplicity of buyers, sellers, and brokers.

PATTERNS OF WORK AND RETIREMENT

It was noted earlier that most of the aged who work in ASEAN countries except Singapore are in agriculture, and that the decline in labour force participation rates as age increases is only very gradual. As shown in Tables 5.1 to 5.3, the rates are universally higher in rural than in urban areas. This probably reflects, not so much the need for the aged to work, but rather the integrated household economy in the rural areas, in which the elderly play a variety of roles. These include continued participation in the management of and actual physical work in the farm holding, in return for their support from the proceeds of the household's economic activities, support which normally continues after they have become too old to perform any economically productive activities.

Table 5.4, showing the reasons for stopping work among those who have stopped, supports this general thesis. Aside from the reason “reached retirement age”, which was particularly important for males in Singapore and the Philippines and probably reflects mainly formal sector government and private employment, the main reason given for stopping work was “ill health”. This would certainly not be the case in Western societies, where standard retirement ages apply and pension systems then take effect, and where the proportion of the workforce who are employees is much higher. But in ASEAN countries, some level of involvement in the work-force is normal until increased ill health related to ageing makes this no longer possible. This continued involvement in the work-force helps provide the justification for the aged to maintain their status as head of household.

Table 5.5 (for Thailand and the Philippines) confirms the tendency for old people in these societies to continue to work as long as they are physically capable of it. Even among the group aged 75+, around half of all respondents wanted to work.

SOURCES OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT

In Western countries, social security is the most prevalent source of income for aged individuals.

The proportion of old people is still very small in ASEAN countries, when compared with Western countries. In 1980, the proportion of the population aged over 60 was 7.2 per cent in Singapore, 5.7 per cent in Malaysia, and around 5 per cent in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. In Western countries, by contrast, this proportion ranges between about 12 and 30 per cent. The question might then be raised as to why it is necessary at this time to consider ageing a phenomenon deserving of serious attention in the ASEAN region. The answer is not that an ageing crisis is just around the corner; it is not. By the turn of the century, the proportion of aged in ASEAN countries will still be below 8 per cent, except in Singapore. But in all cases, the proportion will be rising. In other words, the number of old people will be increasing faster than those at all other ages. This trend will continue at an accelerating pace in the early twenty-first century. Therefore, what is faced is not an immediate crisis of ageing, but rather a steady trend which will lead to many changes in the way societies work, and raise many questions about appropriate approaches to problems raised by the steadily increasing share of old people in the population. The time to begin examining these issues is now, not later when the issues have assumed major importance and some of the options may have been foreclosed.

Population ageing over the next decade or two will be of a different order of magnitude in Singapore compared to the other ASEAN countries. Cowgill and Holmes (1970) have proposed that populations should be considered as “aged”, “mature”. “youthful”, and “young” on the basis of the proportion of total population aged 65 and over:

Translated into proportions aged 60+ (the measure used in the present study) the definitions would be roughly as follows:

As noted in Chapter One, Buddhism in Thailand is not only structured by the official state-imposed system of the sangha administration. Thai Buddhism is also patterned by a complex and fluid system of unofficial relations between the Buddhist laity and individual monks and monasteries. Occasionally, some monks with distinctive intepretations of doctrine or systems of religious practice develop such a large following of faithful lay supporters that it is appropriate to regard the monk and his lay audience as a distinct movement or sect within the body of Thai Buddhism. In the second half of the twentieth century a number of such Buddhist movements centred on the teachings of a particular monk have grown rapidly in size and influence. The largest movements, in terms of the numbers of lay adherents, tend to be those whose interpretations of Buddhist teaching and practice reflect the political aspirations and economic interests of a certain section of Thai society, and which consequently attract significant numbers of followers from that social stratum. Most of the larger urban Buddhist movements thus have a socially identifiable audience and it is possible to characterise such movements in terms of the socio-economic position of their audiences as being pro-establishment, anti-establishment, intellectual-professional, lower middle class, and so on.

The analysis of urban Buddhist movements and their lay audiences, as opposed to the study of formal stzte-sangha relations, is an important component of the study of the legitimatory function of contemporary Thai Buddhism. This is because of the growing influence of groups outside of and in opposition to the traditional political establishment. Controlling neither the sangha administration nor the official interpretation of Buddhist teaching and practice propagated by the state-controlled hierarchy of monks, many members of the professional and middle classes have instead turned to a number of sympathetic monks – such as Phutthathat, Panyanantha, and Phothirak – to provide a religio-political justification of their aspirations.

Question

The United States needs to borrow from abroad as long as its budget deficit persists. But then it doesn't like having current account deficits, particularly trade deficits which are the counterpart of the surpluses that Japan, the NICs, and Germany are enjoying because these are the real counterpart of the borrowing. So, at the same time the United States is pressurizing these countries which have surpluses with it to cut down their surpluses. At the same time it wants to borrow money from them. Can you tell us how to achieve this impossible trick?

Professor Kindleberger

No, I can't square the circle either. But I quite agree that the pressure of the United States to try to force countries to accept more U.S. exports should be based on microeconomics, not macroeconomics. I have always objected to mixing the two up. In the world of second best, you may have to use microeconomic devices to shape macroeconomics and I completely agree that in an absorption model of the balance of payments, it is the lack of savings in the United States which is producing the deficit. Some blame it exclusively on the federal budget but the decline in savings on the part of households is also to blame. We have had a spending mania for some years, personal savings have gone down from something like 7 per cent national income to 2.5 of disposal income. This is not just an odd happenstance but goes deeper. People in the United States want to get rid of the budget deficit and the trade deficit, but they are not willing to do it by willing the means. Look what happened to Mondale in the election of 1984 when he proposed a tax increase. And notice how every candidate this year is staying away from talking about taxes. My tax accountant tells me that there certainly is going to be a tax increase by July, one he thinks it is inevitable. But I would think that in an election year it is inevitable that you won't.

The establishment of Singapore as the petroleum centre for the Asia-Pacific is both a reflection and an outcome of the country's development as a “global city” (Lee Soo Ann 1984; Krause 1987a). The phrase is an apt one, given the city-state's extreme openness to the international economy, its modern infrastructure and amenities, and its cosmopolitan character. Classified by the World Bank as an upper middle income economy with a GNP per capita of US$7,410 in 1986 (World Development Report 1988), Singapore's standard of living (as measured by this basic indicator) is next only to Japan's in all of Asia. 1 Since the late 1960s, Singapore has on the average achieved one of the world's best overall economic performances. Singapore's outstanding achievements in economic development are well documented and, for present purposes, only the broader aspects need be delineated.

The Historical Experience

When Stamford Raffles founded Singapore in 1819, an island of 225 sq. miles, it was endowed with a vital natural resource — its location. Situated at the southern tip of the Malay peninsula astride the major gateway between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and possessing a superb natural deepwater harbour, Singapore underwent a logical development as port of call and entrepot for the surrounding region (Huff 1987). The development of entre- pot activities led to rapid urbanization and the establishment of a strong local banking sector. By the inter-war period, Singapore had developed into a fully fledged port and commercial city. It had also become the region's terminalling and distribution centre for petroleum.

When Singapore attained self-rule in 1959, it faced some of the classic problems of underdevelopment: rapid population growth, high unemployment, political instability, and unruly industrial relations. Entrepot trade and its traditional supporting services offered few opportunities for productively absorbing surplus labour. Given the constraints of size, import-substituting industrialization (ISI) based on a common market with Malaya was seen as the only solution to the development problems of Singapore (A Proposed Industrialization Programme for the State of Singapore).

In February 1988 the Energy Program of the East-West Center in Honolulu and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore agreed to undertake a joint research project. The goals of the Joint ISEAS and East-West Center Energy Project are to develop a data base and conduct analyses on key aspects of the energy economies of the Asia-Pacific region and its major constituent nations. A further purpose of the Project is to utilize the expertise of the Energy Program at the East-West Center for the development of a research capability within ISEAS with respect to major aspects of energy supply and demand of the region.

It is fitting that one of the first outcomes of the Joint Energy Project is the publication of Houston of Asia: The Singapore Petroleum Industry by Tilak Doshi. The “Houston of Asia” is an apt metaphor that captures Singapore's dominating regional role as provider of petroleum refining, blending, and storage services, exporter of petroleum products, port of call for bunker and jet fuels, and spot market for the Asia-Pacific petroleum trade. Singapore, in short, is at the very heart of the web of linkages that constitute the Pacific Basin's oil economy.

As the author points out in his introduction to the monograph, the industry has received scant academic attention despite the scale and importance of its activities. To be sure, the subject is both prominent within and well covered by trade and business journals catering to the “East of Suez” information needs of the world petroleum industry. Yet the Singapore petroleum industry has remained an almost mythical creature, the detailed understanding of which it seems is the special province of an elite of expatriate oilmen “who deal in the stuff” and some senior officials in government. The author, a Singapore national who is sponsored by ISEAS and currently pursuing his research interests with the Energy Program at the East-West Center, is appropriately a young economist associated with neither industry nor government.

The world refining industry grew rapidly prior to the 1970s when the end of the concessionary system and the two quantum leaps in oil prices radically altered the environment of downstream operations of the international oil industry (Mohnfeld 1984). World refining capacity expanded by 6.5 per cent in 1940-60 and 7.2 per cent in 1960-73 (Fesharaki and Isaak 1984, p. 7). It trailed behind the even more rapid increase in global consumption of petroleum products which grew by 7 and 7.6 per cent in the two consecutive periods (ibid.). This, in turn, led to high capacity utilization rates.

During the infancy of the international oil industry, most re-fineries were located in crude-producing areas. In the post-1945 era, however, new refineries were increasingly built in consuming as opposed to producing areas. While transportation differentials favouring the movement of bulk crude over smaller parcels of refined products may have played a role in the economics of refinery location, xthe decision by multinational oil companies to avoid placing major capital assets in the less developed countries in an era of rising nationalisms had a major impact. The fact that a refinery tied to a particular crude stream of a given oilfield is bound to be more constrained in its operations than a refinery located in a major consuming area and fed by a range of imported crudes provided another reason. Furthermore, developed country governments often encouraged the growth of domestic refining capacity for what were deemed to be “reasons of national security”.

The Development of Entrepot Refining in Singapore

Although the expansion of refining capacity in Singapore paralleled that of the world industry during the boom period of 1960-73, 3 the country's oil industry found its early beginnings in the colonial period when three bulk storage tanks for kerosene were built in Pulau Bukom in 1892. From 1892 to 1960, Singapore served as the storage, transshipment, and distribution centre for the Far East.

I. Introduction

1. Objectives of the Study

The textile and garment industry is one sector where developing countries have successfully competed with industrial countries. Over the past decade, the rapid increase in the production capacities of ASEAN countries has placed the region in the same league as the major producers and exporters of the industry. The industry plays an important role in the economies of the ASEAN members, except possibly for Singapore. Undeniably, textiles offer vast potentials for improving the capacity of each country to earn foreign exchange. However, the rapid expansion of trade has been held back by the growing protectionism of industrialized countries, such that textiles is now probably the most regulated item in international trade.

While the issue of protectionism has caused much concern, many foresee that the ASEAN textile industry will be affected by another development. This is China's recent emergence as a major exporter of textiles and clothing. Although the world's largest, the Chinese textile industry has remained inward-looking for many years. More active involvement by China in world trade, particularly in textiles, is viewed as a threat by many producers in the ASEAN region.

This paper attempts to analyze the impact of this recent development on the ASEAN textile industry and on ASEAN-China economic relations. The specific objectives of this paper are as follows:

1. To analyze the structure of the industry and the pattern of its development in the ASEAN region;

2. To identify the problems of the industry and to assess possibilities for the future; and

3. To evaluate the impact of China's emergence as a major exporter of textiles on the ASEAN textile industry and on ASEAN-China economic relations.

2. Scope and Limitations

The textile industry, as referred to in this study, comprises two separate industries: textiles (namely fibres, yarns, fabrics, and other products such as thread, twine, net, and cordage) and garments (namely wearing apparel and accessories).

The recent history of urban Buddhism can be divided into a number of periods which roughly coincide with major changes in the structure of the Thai political elite and in the patterns of conflict and alignment between its various factions. In this study the historical development of urban Thai Buddhism is analysed in terms of the changing influences upon the religion during the following six periods in Thailand's recent political history:

While the sociological structure of the Thai political and economic elite in the 1980s presents a complex pattern of alliances and conflicts between a number of factions, two broad groups or general alignments can be nevertheless be isolated.

I. Introduction

China's trade relations with the countries of ASEAN goes back a long time. These relations underwent a critical change in the 1970s and since then bilateral trade has expanded considerably. In 1970, trade values were only US$180 million; by 1980 they had grown to US$1.85 billion, and by 1986 to US$3.35 billion, a more than a seventeen-fold increase over 1970. The variety of commodities traded has grown considerably, with petroleum as one of the important commodities. The proportion of petroleum in this trade is not large, but with the recent growth of the petroleum industry in Brunei and Indonesia, the countries of ASEAN have been closely watching the expansion of China's petroleum industry and its exports. This paper is a study of the development of China's petroleum industry and its effect on economic relations between China and ASEAN.

II. Development of the Petroleum Industry in China

China was one of the earliest countries to discover and use petroleum and natural gas. More than 2,000 years ago, in the Qin and Han Dynasties, oil and gas were found in what are the modern provinces of Gansu, Shaanxi, and Sichuan. The Annals of the Han Dynasty record the existence of an “inflammable stream” near the present-day city of Yan'an, and note that the liquid was used for lamps, lubrication, as an anti-corrosive, and as fuel for boiling bitter to make salt. However, the use of petroleum as a source of industrial energy has a short history of less than a century.

China's modern petroleum industry dates from the end of the nineteenth century. However, the semi-feudal, semi-colonial nature of the society precluded the establishment of a national industry. A few fields were exploited but soon fell into disrepair and near bankruptcy. By 1949, there were only eight outdated oil rigs producing 120,000 tons. China was called an “oil-poor country”.

1. Petroleum Prospecting and Growth

With the founding of the People's Republic of China, (PRC), the petroleum industry began to develop rapidly.

One monk in particular, Phra Phimontham (Aat Asaphathera) Bhikkhu, has been at the centre of efforts to democratically reform the administration of the Thai sangha in the twentieth century. Because of his unconventional and progressive views, Phimontham became the victim of a concerted campaign against dissent in the sangha during the regime of Sarit Thanarat. The movement to obtain legal justice for Phimontham has been an important focus of agitation for change within the sangha and Phimontham's biography provides many insights into the relationships between the state and Buddhism in the past three decades.

Phra Aat Asaphathera (lay name: Aat Duangmala) was born in the northeastern province of Khon Kaen in 1901. He proved to be an able scholar and administrator and progressed rapidly within the ranks of the Mahanikay Order after his ordination. He obtained a degree in Pali studies at the grade of parian 8 in 1929 and in 1932 was appointed abbot of a royal monastery in Ayutthaya north of Bangkok, subsequently being appointed abbot, and then Sangha Provincial Governor of Ayutthaya province. In 1943 Phra Aat was appointed Sangha Regional Governor for the Central Region of the country and in 1945 he became Sangha Minister for Clerical Education. He was awarded a Phra Ratchakhana title of Theep grade in 1946 and of Rorng Somdet grade in 1947. Phra Aat is most widely known by the Phra Ratchakhana title of Phimontham that he held for over three decades. In 1947 Phimontham was appointed abbot of Wat Mahathat in Bangkok, the administrative centre of the Mahanikay Order, and in 1949 he became Sangkhamontri for Sangha Administration. Because of the speed with which he rose through the ranks of the sangha hierarchy and because of his recognised administrative skills, many monks, especially in the Mahanikay Order, regarded him as a likely future Sangharaja. Phimontham was innovative in his approach to Buddhism, travelling to Burma to study vipassana (insight meditation), visiting the West, and sending Thai monks to study Buddhism in India.

I. Introduction

There is a growing body of literature on the services sector in ASEAN. Koh (1985) studied the role of the services sector in ASEAN. Lee (1986) assessed trade in services between ASEAN and the United States. Tucker, Seow, and Sundberg (1983) looked at services in ASEAN-Australia trade. Pang (1985) provided an overview of ASEAN-EC trade in services. The present paper thus complements the existing studies on the services sector in ASEAN as it examines trade in services between ASEAN and China.

It is always difficult to define services as they constitute intangible output. There have been various attempts to define services and yet there is still no agreement among economists as to what constitutes a service (Riddle 1986; Bhagwati 1984; Kravis 1983; Hill 1977; and Smith 1973, among others).

Since the purpose of the present paper is to provide an understanding of the nature and importance of trade in services between ASEAN and China, a broad definition of services is adopted. Following the International Labour Organization (ILO) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the services sector comprises wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage and communications, finance, insurance, real estate and business services, public administration and defence, and community and personal services. Trade in services refers to trans-border transactions in services between residents and non-residents. It also includes both trade and investment in services or invisibles in the balance of payments, including factor services such as investment income and workers' remittances.

Specifically, we want to distinguish the following categories of trade in services.

(1) Factor services and non-factor services. Factor services are normally defined as the investment income component of services plus requited transfers. The latter consists largely of workers' remittances. Thus, factor services are investment income and workers' remittances. Non-factor services comprise all other invisibles in the balance of payments.