Singapore has come a long way from its early status as a storage and transshipment centre for kerosene in the colonial Far East. The country now encompasses a gamut of petroleum-related activities, from rigbuilding and rig-repair, the manufacture of oilfield equipment, and the provision of a collective of technical and logistics support services for the offshore hydrocarbons industry on the upstream side, to refining, crude and product trading, storage, marketing, and distribution downstream.

The heart of the industry lies with the country's refineries. Beginning with a small crude distillation unit constructed in 1961, the refining industry was well established in Singapore by the early 1970s. With the recent spate of large investments in sophisticated secondary processing facilities, the refining sector is in the process of substantial upgrading and rationalization. Defying the conventional wisdom of a few years ago which predicted the eventual demise of entrepot refining in Singapore in the face of severe external challenges, the refiners have successfully made the transition to a new era of optimism.

As argued in Chapter 4, several factors considered collectively suggest that the outlook for entrepot refining in Singapore is more positive today than it was just two to five years ago. More generally, the Asia-Pacific region offers prospects for rapid growth in the demand for refined products. Indeed, the recent expansion in the demand for light and middle distillates among the Asian NICs such as Taiwan and South Korea as well as the next-tier NICs such as Thailand has been spectacular. This veritable explosion in regional demand is expected to lead to a worsening balance between demand and supply of specific petroleum products as regional refinery yields fail to match the rapidly evolving product demand configurations. The changing structure of product demand in favour of lighter pro- ducts will place Singapore's upgraded refineries in a better position to continue to competitively fulfil the role of a swing refining centre, balancing out the disparities between supply and demand for specific products in the region.

The controversial reformist monk Phra Phothirak (Bodhiraks'a) Bhikkhu and his Santi Asok movement provide a clear demonstration of the fundamental practical and organisational incompatibility between middle-class reformist Buddhism and the establishment form of the religion controlled by the sangha hierarchy. The three reformist monks discussed in Chapter Six, Phutthathat, Panyanantha, and Thepwethi, deal with the contradictions between reformist and establishment Buddhism primarily at the theoretical level and all three have remained within the official sangha hierarchy, although firmly aligned with the Mahanikay Order rather than the Thammayut. Phothirak, on the other hand, has acted out Phutthathat's and Panyanantha's theoretical rejection of the teachings of establishment Buddhism at the practical and organisational level by rejecting the administrative authority of the Mahatherasamakhom and of both the Mahanikay and Thammayut Orders. Phothirak claims that if his religious practice is to be truly consistent with reformist critiques of establishment Buddhism he must separate himself from the traditional Thai sangha in deed as well as in word. As a consequence Phothirak's Santi Asok movement effectively represents the formation of a third, although as yet unofficial, nikaya or order within the Thai sangha.

Phra Phothirak (Rak Rakphong) was born in Srisaket province in northeast Thailand in 1934 of a Chinese father, Thorngsuk Sae Ngow, and a Thai mother, Bunhoom Rakphong. When he was ordained, Rak Rakphong took the Pali clerical name of Phothirakkhito (Bodhirakkhito) but he prefers to use the Sanskritised form of this name, Phothirak (Bodhiraks'a). Rak studied fine arts and majored in creative writing at a vocational college in Bangkok, graduating in 1958. Rak subsequently worked at a Bangkok television station in art, design, and directing, and comparing television programmes. After a successful career in television, he became interested in Buddhism and in September 1970 visited Phra Ratchaworakhun (Rajavaraguna), abbot of the Thammayut monastery of Wat Asokaram Paak-naam, south of Bangkok city, and soon after took ordination as a chiipakhaaw, an intermediate ascetic stage between laity and monkhood. One month later, on 7 November 1970, he was fully ordained as a monk by Phra Ratchaworakhun.

Excellencies, Ladies, and Gentlemen

Good afternoon and welcome to another of the lectures which the Institute organizes now and then in order to keep in contact with the world at large, and more importantly with the concerned segments of Singapore society. Today we have Professor Charles Kindleberger with us. Professor Kindleberger has had a long and distinguished career spanning so many different incarnations: research economist, soldier, planner, government official, and university professor, to name but a few. In the process he has produced numerous books and a generation of economists. I am sure that we are going to have a very interesting afternoon, particularly as the subject, ”The 1930s and the 1980s: Parallels and Differences” is going to be addressed by a person who has lived through all of the period he is going to be talking about. So, without further ado, I have the honour to present Professor Charles Poor Kindleberger.

Data availability and accuracy presented a central problem in the writing of this monograph. Unlike many countries, Singapore does not have a Ministry of Energy or other administrative body dealing specifically with energy affairs. Few aspects of Singapore's energy statistics are covered by official sources. Others are incomplete or completely absent. Published and unpublished unofficial sources use varying definitions, accounting conventions, and conversion factors, adding to the problem of accuracy.

Much of the data presented in this study has been estimated on the basis of industry sources. Besides the specialist trade journals, industry personnel who are based in Singapore and who maintain close contacts with the Energy Program of the East-West Center in Honolulu have constituted the most important sources of information for this study. As noted in the introduction, gaps and inconsistencies in the figures presented are unavoidable, and a margin of error is to be expected. Quantitative data and estimates thus require considerable caution.

Consumption Data

The domestic aggregate energy consumption data presented in Chapter 2 draw heavily from the studies done by Ang (1986, 1987, 1988). The data presented in that work are based on many sources including national and international publications, and unpublished data provided by the utilities and oil companies (see Ang 1986, appendix A). Data on domestic consumption of major petroleum products for 1980-87 (Table 2.2), which exclude bunkers and refinery fuel use and loss, were derived from a Singapore-based affiliate of a major oil company. Figures for gasoline consumption include naphtha.

The energy balance for 1986 (Table 2.3) is from the International Energy Agency's study of energy statistics of non-OECD countries, World Energy Statistics and Balances 1971-87. The energy balances given in this source were prepared in close collaboration with the Asian Development Bank, the Statistical Office of the United Nations and the World Energy Conference. Considerable use was made of the World Energy Survey data base of the United Nations. This was supplemented by materials obtained directly from the countries concerned and through wide contacts with industry sources.

I. Introduction

The last two decades have seen the relationship between the People's Republic of China (hereafter China) and ASEAN countries undergoing a dramatic evolution. The end of the Vietnam War, the U.S.-China detente, and the Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea are major events which moved many countries of ASEAN to normalize their relationship with Beijing. The changes which took place within China itself have also led to closer co-operation between ASEAN and China.

Many argue that the death of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and the purge of the Gang of Four escalated the new emerging trend in China and led to the rise of Deng Xiaoping to the supreme position in China. Under Deng, China which had been under the strict socialist path, began to reform her economic system based on the Four Modernization Principles. The modernization of China, which began in 1970, comprises new thinking on the economic system, institutions, and economic relationship with the rest of the world — the so-called ‘open-door policy’. These developments have caused some concern both within China and in the rest of the world. The introduction of the profit motive and the price system into China means that there can be incentives for Chinese to operate according to the market principle. At the same time, China has not solved the problems arising from the parallel operation of the price mechanism system and the planned economy. At present, the price mechanism is limited to certain commodities and localities and it is very difficult to envisage its extension to the whole vast economy.

The introduction of the market system, while generally lauded by outsiders, has also led to a price spiral resulting in a higher cost of living for the Chinese. The economic reforms which China undertook means also that she is more willing to integrate with the international economy. Since China has reached self- sufficiency in many commodities, her exports of surplus items have played a significant role in her economic relations with the rest of the world in general.

I. Introduction

Since its inception in 1978, China's economic reforms have attracted world-wide attention. Their successful implementation is not only crucial to the development of China's domestic economy, but also highly significant in promoting China's economic ties with foreign countries. The ASEAN countries are China's close neighbours, with whom China sincerely aspires to promote vigorous economic relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. This relationship hinges upon numerous factors, the most important of which are: firstly, the economic policies, structures, and development of China and the ASEAN states; and secondly, the pattern and development trends in the world economy. China's economic reform, a most assiduous, complex, and time-consuming undertaking, constitutes a long-term factor that will affect the economic relations between China and the ASEAN nations. What is the nature and trend of China's economic reform? And what impact will it have on prospects for China-ASEAN economic relations? These are matters of general concern to the ASEAN countries.

This paper is divided into three parts: first, an overview of China's economic reforms; second, China's economic structure and related policy reforms; and third, an analysis of the impact of China's economic reforms on China-ASEAN economic relations.

II. An Overview of China's Economic Reform

The economic reforms in China involve two interrelated aspects of structural and policy reforms, with focus on the former. The original economic structure characterized by centralized economic planning took shape in the late 1950s. The merit of such a structure lies in its centralized and unified planning which facilitates the mobilization of vast human, material, and financial resources for major projects vital to the national economy and the people's livelihood. It played a significant role in laying the foundation for China's socialist industrialization and in setting up an independent and comprehensive system for the national economy. Yet it also had serious flaws, manifested mainly in: excessive concentration of economic decision-making power; over-emphasis on mandatory planning; neglect of the development of the commodity economy and the regulatory role of the market; and lack of enterprise vitality and low economic returns.

ASEAN-China economic relations is an area of considerable significance. Indeed, if anything, this significance has been increasing in recent years. Yet this relationship remains poorly understood, particularly in terms of the overall issues involved and their implications for individual countries and the region as a whole. It was partly to correct this state of affairs and to put ASEAN-China economic relations in their proper perspective that a group of ASEAN and Chinese scholars came together in April 1985 to plan a three-year research project on “ASEAN- China Economic Relations”. Three themes were identified: Phase I — ASEAN- China Economic Relations: Trends and Patterns; Phase II — Developments in China and ASEAN and Their Implications for ASEAN-China Economic Relations; and Phase III — ASEAN-China Economic Relations in the Context of Pacific Economic Development and Co-operation. The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Beijing, are the co-ordinating institutions for ASEAN and China, respectively. Dr Chia Siow Yue is the Co-ordinator of the ASEAN aspects of the project and Mr Cheng Bifan, the Chinese aspects. Both Dr Chia Siow Yue and Mr Cheng Bifan are also the joint editors of the publications emanating from the project, with Dr Chia being responsible for the English edition and Mr Cheng Bifan, the Chinese edition.

The papers of the first phase of the project were presented at a workshop in Singapore in June 1986, and published under the title ASEAN-China Economic Relations: Trends and Patterns in October 1987. The research findings of the second phase were presented at a workshop in Beijing in October 1987. It is hoped that this second volume, ASEAN-China Economic Relations: Developments in ASEAN and China will also be useful to scholars and policy-makers concerned with ASEAN-China economic relations. The project on “ASEAN-China Economic Relations” has benefited immensely from the contributions of all participants, and from the financial support provided by the Ford Foundation and the International Development Research Centre, Canada. The Institutes would like to record their appreciation of all this assistance and support.

Professor Sandhu, Ladies, and Gentlemen

It is a great pleasure for me to be here in Singapore for the first time. I have two weeks to study your country, enough to make me an expert. It's only after you have been here four or five weeks that you get confused. Unhappily, I won't have enough time left in the rest of the stay that has been allotted to me to use this information fully.

It will come as no surprise to you, I hope, that I have thought about this subject before, and even talked on it, to the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the Icelandic Economic Association in Reykjavik, last month. The parallels and differences I have in mind are mostly those of the world economy as a whole and its fragility. For Singapore, the differences from the 1930s are enormous, except perhaps for the prices of tin and rubber. Singapore is no longer a colony. Its income has risen manifold. It is an industrial city-state, exporting manufactures and services rather than raw materials. My studies have been largely confined to Europe and the United States, with some slight exposure to Latin America, but one must be blind and deaf not to recognize the vast differences from the 1930s that has transpired in your remarkable city with its remarkable economy.

My economic studies started more than fifty years ago. For a long time I was interested in the theories of international trade and international finance. Bit by bit, as these became more technical and even possibly esoteric, I have wandered, perhaps drifted, but in any event moved, into economic history, first studying The World in Depression, 1929-1939, then going further back in time to about 1720, in a book entitled, Manias, Panics and Crashes, A Study in Financial Crises, a series of booms and busts, with emphasis on the latter, that may help me to understand the present if not perhaps to predict the future.

Although I will try not to forget the last point of the title, since the core of the topic tonight is Europe and the implications of the evolutions in Europe, I will start with some reflections about the future of Europe or to be more precise, about the Soviet Union and its policy towards Europe. Indeed, with regard to the future of Europe, for obvious geographical, physical, and historical reasons, the most important factor to consider is the Soviet Union. Then, I will turn to the INF Treaty which was signed last December between the United States and the Soviet Union and I will try to explain why, although it is a major achievement in the field of arms control, there may also be reasons to be worried about future developments. In my next point, I will underline the stakes for the next few months and years. The next few months of this year might be crucial in some important respects. To end with, I shall try to give you a few thoughts on the implications of these developments for the rest of the world.

IS THE SOVIET UNION REALLY CHANGING?

Glasnost, perestroïka — these two words have been ringing in our ears for some time. What does lie behind them? And more fundamentally, is the Soviet system really about to change? If so, in what direction? Is the hawk turning into a dove? Should we trust this dove and assume that the Soviet Union is now entirely concentrating on the prosperity of its people? And therefore, should we help them and, to show our goodwill, should we even agree to give up our nuclear arsenal? These questions raise some preliminary remarks.

First, the Soviet Union is a communist country and as such it continues to stick to the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Mr Gorbachev is himself a purest offspring of the system through his education first, later through his career: he climbed the ladder as a faithful communist and a member of the Party.

Thai Buddhism fulfils its political function of giving credence and authority to the administration of the country by symbolically reflecting the secular power structure. Historically the Thai sangha has reflected the secular political system by providing interpretations of religious doctrine which justified the patterns of social and political relations and the key policies of the government of the day. However, the sangha has also provided a direct mirror image of the state in its own internal system of administration. In the twentieth century each major shift in the Thai political system has been followed by a major state-initiated restructuring of the system of sangha administration, which has re-established a parallelism between the administrations of the secular and religious domains.

After his reforms of the state bureaucracy in the 1890s King Chulalongkorn restructured the sangha administration in 1902 to provide for a parallel centralisation of bureaucratic control over all Buddhist monks in the country. Nine years after the 1932 revolution, Chulalongkorn's centralised sangha administration was replaced by a system oisangha councils and ministries modelled on the democratic patterns of the revolutionary government. Five years after Sarit Thanarat assumed power in a military coup in 1957 and instituted his highly centralised form of military authoritarianism the democratic sangha structure established in 1941 was abolished and replaced with a recentralised administrative system which closely resembled the structure originally established by King Chulalongkorn in 1902. Since the overthrow of Sarit's successor, Thanom Kittikachorn, in October 1973, there has been a persistent and growing but as yet unsuccessful movement to re-establish the democratic system of sangha administration implemented under Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram in 1941. These major changes in the ways in which the sangha has been internally governed have been accompanied by political conflicts and agitation among monks which have indirectly reflected the political conflicts in secular Thai society.

The “Socio-Economic Consequences of the Ageing of the Population” project is one of the seven population projects of the Phase III ASEAN Population Programme. At the time of its inception, the then five member states of ASEAN — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand — agreed to participate in the study under the lead of Singapore. The Project is designed to provide information to policy-makers and planners on the extent of ageing, its implications, and the potential problems which might emerge as a consequence of ageing in each country. It also serves to review the conditions of the aged in different environmental settings and the existing policies and programmes for the elderly in the context of the overall development of the participating countries.

The decision to focus attention on this subject arose out of the realization that the region as a whole is making rapid strides towards completing the demographic transition into a mature society. Presently, the proportion of old persons is still small in ASEAN countries when compared with the West. Therefore, what is faced is not an immediate crisis of ageing but rather a steady trend which will lead to changes in the way societies work.

The political will which inspired the ASEAN Population Programme originated from the ASEAN Summit Meeting in 1976. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord called for the “intensification and expansion of existing co-operation in meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region”. Since then a total of nineteen projects under the umbrella of the ASEAN Population Programme have been implemented with the ultimate objective of improving the quality of life in the ASEAN region. The seven projects under the Phase III ASEAN Population Programme were funded by the Government of Australia.

The Project “Socio-Economic Consequences of the Ageing of the Population” was initiated in 1984. It has undertaken a series of activities under its aegis.