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15736 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 87 of 787

Infiltrating Society

Praetorians, Profiteers or Professionals?

30 Years On
  • A Reflection on Southeast Asia's Fight Against Communism During the Cold War Years
  • Daljit Singh, Lye Liang Fook
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    14 July 2021
  • The year 2021 marks the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Cambodian Peace Agreements which ended the Cambodian conflict and the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Communism was a perennial concern in Singapore and Malaya (later Malaysia) from 1948 into the 1980s -- a concern which younger generations may not appreciate. The threat came largely from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) supported by China, and from Vietnam. The CPM waged a guerrilla war in Malaya. They were defeated by 1960 but tried to revive the insurgency in the 1970s. In Singapore they attempted to attain political power through a united front with the People's Action Party during the 1950s. The victory of the communists in the Vietnam War in 1975 alarmed non-communist Southeast Asia. The concern was aggravated by Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978. ASEAN states strongly opposed Vietnam's action on the grounds that the invasion and occupation of a sovereign country violated a fundamental principle of international law. Successive UN General Assembly resolutions supported the ASEAN position with significant majorities. Thailand was pivotal to the security of the rest of non-communist Southeast Asia. Had it succumbed to Vietnam's pressures and reached an accommodation with Hanoi, the security of the rest of Southeast Asia would have been endangered. Thailand stood firm. Had it not done so, the people of Southeast Asia would be living in a different world today.

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
  • Implications for Southeast Asia
  • Edited by Cassey Lee, Pritish Bhattacharya
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    15 January 2021
  • The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a free trade agreement involving major countries across the Asia Pacific region. The trade pact, which entered into force on 30 December 2018, is considered by many to be the 'gold standard', given its ambitious scope and depth. This volume offers multi-dimensional insights into the CPTPP and its impact on Southeast Asia. It begins with broad analyses covering the historical, economic and geopolitical aspects of the CPTPP. Subsequent chapters focus on the nature and implications of three key path-breaking provisions in the trade agreement, namely investor-state dispute settlement, intellectual property rights and state-owned enterprises. The effect of the CPTPP on Southeast Asia in terms of regional production networks is also examined from the perspective of Japanese multinational enterprises. The potential economic impact of the agreement is analysed for member countries (Vietnam and Malaysia) as well as countries that aspire to join the CPTPP in the future (Indonesia and Thailand). The world trading system is in disarray: the World Trade Organization has been weakened, perhaps terminally; the world's two economic superpowers are locked in deep, politicized disputes; the forces of populism and nationalism are everywhere complicating the return to a more liberal, rules-based order. These trends are challenging one of the building blocks of ASEAN economic development, namely these countries' outward-looking trade and investment policies. With impeccable timing this important volume by a group of eminent authors assesses these issues with reference to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The CPTPP excludes the three largest traders—China, the EU and the US—but it is a welcome second-best initiative that may have broader, positive ripple effects.

Environmental Movements and Politics of the Asian Anthropocene
  • Edited by Paul Jobin, Ming-sho Ho, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    24 May 2021
  • How have authoritarianism, democratization and political change affected environmentalism in East and Southeast Asia? How have environmental mobilization and demands for environmental justice at the grassroots influenced politics there? These are among the vital questions answered by this insightful and well-crafted volume.—Paul G. Harris, Chair Professor of Global and Environmental Studies, Education University of Hong Kong

From Grassroots Activism to Disinformation
  • A Selection
  • Edited by Aim Sinpeng, Ross Tapsell
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    21 October 2020
  • This book reflects on the role of social media in the past two decades in Southeast Asia. It traces the emergence of social media discourse in Southeast Asia, and its potential as a 'liberation technology' in both democratizing and authoritarian states. It explains the growing decline in internet freedom and increasingly repressive and manipulative use of social media tools by governments, and argues that social media is now an essential platform for control. The contributors detail the increasing role of 'disinformation' and 'fake news' production in Southeast Asia, and how national governments are creating laws which attempt to address this trend, but which often exacerbate the situation of state control. From Grassroots Activism to Disinformation explores three main questions: How did social media begin as a vibrant space for grassroots activism to becoming a tool for disinformation? Who were the main actors in this transition: governments, citizens or the platforms themselves? Can reformists 'reclaim' the digital public sphere? And if so, how?

The Hand that Rocks the Cradle
  • Nurturing Exclusivist Interpretations of Islam in the Malaysian Home
  • Serina Rahman
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    01 August 2021
  • As an increasingly conservative wave of Islam engulfs the globe, literalist Salafi interpretations of the faith have become prevalent in Malaysia. While there are several Islamic schools of thought in the country, including those deemed 'deviant', the loudest voices are always the more extreme. Over the past year, there has been increasing recognition of women's roles as recruiters, financiers and influencers for radical Islamic groups. More women have been arrested for their support for and involvement in the Islamic State (IS), but much of the focus has been on their desire to marry a jihadi soldier or channel funds to the cause. In Malaysia, these women (including returnees from IS) are seen to be followers, not decision-makers or active agents in extremist action. While Malay-Muslim women were both economically and socially active prior to colonization, patriarchal norms are now commonplace because of Islamic and Western conventions, as well as increasing conservatism in society. Women do have agency in the home, however, and exercise this power and centrality within the private sphere by wielding religion as a tool to exert influence over their spouse and children. More attention needs to be paid to mothers as potential nurturers of extremist interpretations of Islam. Their actions in active support of non-violent extremism and intolerant exclusivity could have far-reaching effects given their unrivalled influence in the home. Their need to achieve social recognition through religion, coupled with increasing Salafi infiltration into mainstream Malaysian society and Islam, could be highly detrimental in multi-faith Malaysia. At the very least, these women may not report family members who intend to participate in terror; at the worst, they may encourage it and sanction jihadi theology and action.

The Forests for the Palms
  • Essays on the Politics of Haze and the Environment in Southeast Asia
  • Helena Varkkey
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    01 August 2021
  • Transboundary haze has been a recurring problem in the Southeast Asian region since at least 1982. Why does this toxic form of air pollution still persist? Helena Varkkey, a Malaysian political scientist, has been studying this multifaceted problem for more than fifteen years. This book provides an ideal collection for those who want a clear but concise introduction to this complex issue. Its commentaries explore how often sensitive matters of ASEAN diplomacy, national interest or political patronage continue to stand in the way of clear skies in the region.

Flying Blind
  • Vietnam's Decision to Join ASEAN
  • Nguyen Vu Tung
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    10 February 2021
  • This book discusses Vietnam's relations with ASEAN in the period from the early 1970s to mid-1990s. It focuses on the evolution of Hanoi's view on ASEAN, from denial to integration in the organization. Further, it reveals the reasons behind Hanoi's decision to join ASEAN in 1995 in the context of the transformation of the overall Vietnam's foreign policy when the Cold War ended. Relaxation of the Cold War conditions allowed Hanoi to improve understanding of ASEAN that resulted in better Vietnam-ASEAN relations and subsequent Vietnam's membership in ASEAN. The author has had access to documents and interviewees that few other researchers can rival. And the richness of the empirical evidence of this book makes a significant contribution to the studies of Vietnam foreign relations in specific and Southeast Asian international relations in general.

Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS)
  • Unifier of the Ummah?
  • Wan Saiful Wan Jan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    04 December 2020
  • The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) is no stranger to coalition politics. It has a long history of working with others, both in government and in opposition. Up until 2018, it used the framework of tahaluf siyasi as the guide to forming coalitions. Under the pretext of tahaluf siyasi or political coalition, PAS joined the Barisan Nasional (BN) government in 1974. It was also a key player in the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU), Barisan Alternatif (BA) and Pakatan Rakyat (PR) opposition coalitions. But in the lead up to GE14, PAS decided to form the Gagasan Sejahtera coalition with much smaller parties—Berjasa and Ikatan. It dominated this coalition and the two partners were largely insignificant. After GE14, PAS decided to partner with UMNO in Muafakat Nasional, under the pretext of a new strategy called ta'awun siyasi or political cooperation. This is a looser partnership arrangement, in which the partners are not strictly bound to each other. The formation of Muafakat Nasional is a historic development, as it brings together the two biggest and oldest Malay political parties for the time in an exclusive manner. Bersatu joined the pact in 2020, making Muafakat Nasional the biggest Malay political force in Malaysia today. PAS sees its role as a unifier of the Muslim ummah, holding and keeping the peace between UMNO and Bersatu. For PAS, creating Malay Muslim unity is not just an effective political strategy but also a religious obligation.

Federal-State Relations under the Pakatan Harapan Government
  • Tricia Yeoh
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    16 October 2020
  • On 9 May 2018, Malaysia's Barisan Nasional (BN) government lost the country's 14th general election (GE14). Replacing it was the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition, made up of four parties, three of which had had experience cooperating with each other for a decade, namely Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah). The fourth was the new Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) led by Dr Mahathir Mohamad. The election also saw equally significant changes at the state government level. PH now controlled seven states in total, up from two, while BN went from controlling ten states to retaining but two. PAS regained Terengganu and with its control over Kelantan now held the two East Coast states. The Sabah state government, held by Parti Warisan Sabah (Warisan) aligned itself with PH, while the Sarawak state government chose to stick with BN. As many as ten of the sixty promises listed in the PH 2018 election manifesto related to federalism and Sabah and Sarawak, an indication of the growing importance of these two states (and of state issues more generally). The PH administration's two significant set-ups were the Special Select Committee on States and Federal Relations and the Special Cabinet Committee on the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63). Serious attempts were made to address concerns by both committees, with achievements being more visible in the Special Cabinet Committee on MA63, possibly due to the greater attention given on Sabah and Sarawak. Issues brought up within the Parliamentary Special Select Committee were not substantively addressed. PH's time in power saw how states aligned to it maintained a smooth working relationship with the federal government. What was more interesting to note was that even non-PH aligned states such as Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis also received favourable attention from the federal government. Federal-state relations were much more aggressively tackled under the PH government than under any other preceding administration.

Terrorism in Indonesia after 'Islamic State'
  • Quinton Temby
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    01 August 2021
  • The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) movement in Indonesia in 2014 re-energized violent extremism in Indonesia. As a result of effective counterterrorism policing, however, IS networks have been decimated and the structure of jihadism in Indonesia has shifted from organizations to autonomous networks and cells, increasingly organized via the Internet. Although support for violent extremism in Indonesia remains marginal, cells of IS followers maintain a low-level capacity to conduct lethal attacks against civilian and government targets. Most IS operations in Indonesia are sporadic and low-level attacks against the Indonesian police. Religious minorities have also been high-profile targets, as in the Surabaya church suicide bombings of 13 May 2018. There are some indications, however, of militants' renewed interest in attacking foreign targets, such as tourists on the resort island of Bali. IS returnees from the Middle East have begun to play a role in recent attacks. The presence of this population in Indonesia raises the risk of militant capabilities being enhanced above their current relatively low level. Most returnees are women and children, and the increasing involvement of this cohort in IS attacks promises to complicate counterterrorism operations. The rise of pro-IS charities in Indonesia, poised to service returnees and reintegrate them into Indonesia's jihadist community, further exacerbates this problem. The overall threat of terrorism to the Indonesian state and to the stability of the Joko Widodo administration remains low. Surprise attacks by unknown cells, however, have the potential to shock the Indonesian political system, provoking government repression of Islamists and exacerbating political polarization and community tensions.

'Old' and 'New' Chinese Business in Cambodia's Capital
  • Michiel Verver
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    01 August 2021
  • China's influence over economic and political affairs in Cambodia is undisputed. It is the biggest investor in Cambodia, adding nearly US$5.3 billion between 2013 and 2017, especially into real estate development, the garment industry and the tourism sector. For Phnom Penh's SMEs, 'new' Chinese migrants are an increasingly important clientele, and raw materials, machinery, consumer goods and capital from Greater China have been vital resources. At the same time, they face competition from entrepreneurs from China entering the Cambodian market. For Cambodia's elite entrepreneurs, known as oknha, China is an export destination for Cambodian timber and cash crops, and 'new' Chinese investments provide business opportunities in the form of construction contracts and joint ventures in real estate and tourism development, industrial parks or the energy sector. Recent Chinese investments and migrants have reinforced Cambodia's established politico-economic order, which is characterized by ethnic Chinese economic dominance as well as a divide between the business-state elite and the general population.

Widodo's Employment Creation Law, 2020
  • What Its Journey Tells Us about Indonesian Politics
  • Max Lane
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    23 June 2021
  • During 2020, the Widodo government introduced a new Bill for parliamentary consideration. This was the Employment Creation Law. It was also known as the Omnibus Law as it introduced amendments to seventy-four other existing laws on a wide range of matters. The Bill provoked considerable controversy, especially provisions reducing protection of labour rights and weakening environmental protection laws. Several provisions introducing further deregulation of a range of activities also attracted criticism. The labour and environmental issues were the basis for a series of street protest mobilizations during the year. These also involved mobilizations where university students participated. The Law was justified by the government in its supplementary material to the legislation as a strategy to attain a specific growth rate in the gross domestic product and arguing that the revisions in the Law were necessary to substantially improve what was described as Ease of Doing Business. Despite the protests and criticism, the law was passed by a big majority in Parliament on 5 October 2020. All member parties of the governing coalition voted for the Bill, and it was signed into law by President Joko Widodo on 2 November 2020. The political journey of this Bill into Law revealed very clearly the homogeneity of the Indonesian political elite, represented by the parliamentary parties, all of whom either supported or acquiesced to the Law. It was also revealed that sustained and mobilized opposition to the Law was basically confined to a section of civil society, with some sections, including important large trade unions, campaigning in only a moderate and constrained way.

Minding the Grassroots
  • Celebrating 70 Years of Sino-Indonesia Relations amid the Coronavirus Pandemic
  • Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Klaus Heinrich Raditio
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    09 December 2020
  • The 70th anniversary of Sino-Indonesia bilateral relations is marked by issues alongside the coronavirus pandemic, such as medical cooperation, the import of Chinese workers, and confrontation in the Natuna waters. Since the first case of coronavirus was identified in Wuhan in late December 2019, Indonesia has been generously assisting China in coping with the pandemic. In return, when the outbreak occurred in Indonesia, China also rendered support to its strategic partner. The collaboration occurred at government-to-government (G-to-G) level (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence), business-to-business (B-to-B) level (state-owned companies and private companies), and people-to-people (P-to-P) level (ethnic Chinese associations, philanthropic institution). However, both Indonesia and China have not optimized on the P-to-P or grassroots interaction. China's 'vaccine diplomacy' is not unconditional, and Beijing may use its vaccine donations to advance its regional agenda, particularly on sensitive issues such as its claims in the South China Sea. The import of Chinese workers into certain Indonesian regions has met with local opposition. This has been resolved with the central and the regional governments reaching an understanding that the Chinese projects will eventually benefit the local economy. In the Natuna waters, Jakarta shows a shift in tone from confrontation (during Jokowi's first term) to moderation. Although Chinese fishing vessels are likely to continue fishing there, the Jokowi administration is likely to deliver business-as-usual responses in order to maintain cordial relations with China while not compromising on its own territorial claims. Overall, bilateral relations on the G-to-G level are amicable and even facilitate B-to-B contacts. However, on the P-to-P level, Indonesians remain suspicious of China. Both governments need to make the common Indonesians key beneficiaries of bilateral cooperation, for example, by providing reliable vaccines to them.

Digital Mediatization and the Sharpening of Malaysian Political Contests
  • Pauline Pooi Yin Leong
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    24 July 2021
  • The introduction of the Multimedia Super Corridor in 1996 was due to the Malaysian government's initiative to tap into the ICT sector. While this move spearheaded Malaysia into the knowledge economy, digital media enabled the opposition and civil society to compete and break the government's monopoly over information flows. Digital mediatization of politics in Malaysia encouraged cyberattacks such as DDoS attacks, hacking and spamming. Cyberbullying on social media is also on the rise. Information warfare is being perpetuated by organized teams of cybertroopers who disseminate propaganda, fake news, and disinformation in order to influence public opinion. Digital mediatization of politics has opened up the public sphere and given ordinary citizens, especially youths, the opportunity to voice their opinions on the issues of the day. Social media campaigns, especially on Twitter, discuss the trending issues through the use of hashtags. PN component parties have the incumbency advantage going into the next election. Its narrative is likely to be ethno-religious. The challenge for the opposition PH, therefore, is to provide an alternative message of inclusivity, unity and acceptance of diversity.

The Vietnam-US Security Partnership and the Rules-Based International Order in the Age of Trump
  • Le Hong Hiep
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    01 August 2021
  • Vietnam-US relations have kept strengthening since bilateral normalization in 1995, including in the defence and strategic domains. This has turned the two countries into increasingly important security partners for each other. The shared perception of the China threat, especially in the South China Sea, provided the strongest momentum towards bilateral strategic rapprochement in recent years despite the strategic uncertainties generated by the Trump administration. Such strategic dynamics also shaped Vietnam's supportive view of the US-led regional and global orders. In the short to medium term, challenges for bilateral relations include the further improvement of mutual trust and the building up of Vietnam's capacity to participate in more substantive defence cooperation initiatives with the United States. In the long run, how to balance its strengthening ties with Washington and the troubling yet important relationship with Beijing remains a challenge for Hanoi. Vietnam's support for the US-led rules-based international order should remain persistent, but will vary depending on the shifting dynamics in Vietnam's relations with China as well as Sino-US strategic competition.

Naquib Al-Attas' Islamization of Knowledge
  • Its Impact on Malay Religious Life, Literature, Language and Culture
  • Mohd Faizal Musa
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    23 July 2021
  • The concept of the Islamization of knowledge was introduced by Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas in the late 1970s. It aimed to detach knowledge from Western culture and civilization in order to replace it with Islamic concepts, frameworks and values. The Islamization of knowledge was to occur in the fields of education and culture, manifesting in changes to the syllabus in institutions of higher learning and niche areas of interest in selected research institutes. In the field of culture, however, it resulted in an unintended consequence of Malay literature being heavily characterized by Islamic elements. Over the years, proponents of the Islamization of knowledge in Malaysia have moved beyond the fields of education and culture. They have entered the mainstream and become part of the state machinery, thus possibly impacting national policies. The concept has also evolved and arguably led to the strengthening of Islamic conservatism among Malaysian intellectual and cultural elites. More specifically, its exclusivist thinking does not augur well for intra- and intercommunal relations in the country.

The Growing Salience of Online Vietnamese Nationalism
  • Dien Nguyen An Luong
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    23 July 2021
  • Vietnamese nationalism has a strong undercurrent of anti-China sentiments, and Vietnam's leaders have regularly tapped into such sentiments to shore up their legitimacy and boost Vietnamese nationalism. Over the last decade, the helter-skelter growth of social media has bred new popular actors in Vietnamese cybersphere, who are deeply nationalistic but who pursue entirely different political and social agendas. In sum, they give rise to a new nationalistic narrative, one that paints the Vietnam Communist Party as being often too meek and subservient to China, and calls for drastic reforms to the political system—regime change not excluded—to deal with Chinese threats. An examination of prominent cases of online Vietnamese nationalism shows that anti-China sentiments have been a recurrent theme and a consistent trigger. The online nationalistic movements have been mostly instigated by popular figures, with state actors playing a facilitating role in stoking and harnessing them for their own ends. Manifestations of online nationalism, especially those centred on anti-China and sovereignty issues, may hold serious consequences, including violence and deadly riots. In some instances, online nationalistic campaigns both galvanize and dissipate relatively quickly once state and popular actors have somehow managed to achieve their aims. The growing salience of online Vietnamese nationalism has posed serious challenges and dilemmas for the regime. The authorities have had to encourage nationalistic patriotism without letting Sinophobia spiral out of control or turn against the regime.

The Unrealized Mahathir-Anwar Transitions
  • Social Divides and Political Consequences
  • Khoo Boo Teik
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 October 2021
    Print publication:
    16 July 2021
  • The failure of two expected transitions of leadership from Dr Mahathir Mohamad to Anwar Ibrahim (in 1998 and 2020) are traceable beyond their personal entanglements to the social divides and political currents of their time. The unrealized transitions are symptomatic of UMNO's dynamic of 'dysfunctional succession'. Under Mahathir, the party split. Under Najib, it was defeated. The condition persists as the current prime minister, Muhyiddin Yassin, has not even appointed a deputy prime minister after being in power for fifteen months. The unrealized transitions were a setback for a 'reform agenda', which Anwar Ibrahim articulated, but which emerged from dissident movements for diverse reforms. These movements helped the multiethnic, socially inclusive, opposition to win the 14th General Election. They are only seemingly dormant because of the pandemic. The Pakatan Harapan regime had the best chance to supply a fresh vision, deeper social understanding, and commitment to reform. The present Perikatan Nasional regime's fixation on 'Malayness' overlooks twenty years of intense intra-Malay conflicts that began with the failure of the first transition. As the '7th Prime Minister', Mahathir had a rare chance to redeem himself from major errors of his first twenty-two-year tenure. He squandered his chance by not honouring the Pakatan Harapan transition plan. Anwar Ibrahim's opponents mock him for being obsessed with wanting to be prime minister. Yet they obsessively fear his becoming prime minister. Anwar may be twice loser in political succession but 'the spectre of Anwar' still haunts Malaysian political consciousness.

Page 87 of 787