15200 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
1 - Heritage as Aid and Diplomacy in Asia: An Introduction
- Edited by Philippe Peycam, Shu-Li Wang, Hui Yew-Foong, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao
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- Heritage as Aid and Diplomacy in Asia
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- 10 November 2020
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- 04 May 2020, pp 1-16
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In spite of a growing academic interest in the politics of heritage in Asia, few studies have directly questioned the role of international and transnational cooperation in heritage conservation. First, even though the literature has widely addressed the role of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a powerful disseminator of international standards of conservation (e.g., Askew 2010; Daly and Winter 2012; Labadi 2010, 2013a; Logan 2001), it has not yet tackled the impact of UNESCO's normative discourse on other cultural policy agents. Secondly, the social sciences have largely neglected other international structures such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Union, USAid, the Asian Development Bank and many others that have their own engagements in the conservation of heritage in Asia. These organizations often collaborate with UNESCO or participate in bilateral or multilateral initiatives by providing funding and “expertise” in the management of sites. The IMF, for instance, played an important role in the establishment of the International Coordinating Committee of the World Heritage Site (hereafter WHS) of Angkor under the aegis of UNESCO. Many of these initiatives are carried out by states’ cultural diplomacies in often well-thought-out strategies. Pioneer countries in cultural diplomacy include France, Italy and the Netherlands, but also India and Japan. Today, most Asian states are also engaging in cultural diplomacy. In the last two decades, China, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia have considerably strengthened their investments in regional “heritage cooperation”. Some of them, like India or Japan, have a long history of cultural international intervention (Ray 2012). Thirdly, private “philanthropic” programmes like the Ford Foundation, the Agha Khan Foundation, the World Monuments Fund and the Getty Trust have long had a major impact on the management of heritage in Asia. They are now joined by newly established Asia-based foundations such as Korea's Samsung Foundation. Finally, new connections have recently been drawn between market-driven “development” schemes explicitly linking “culture” and “economic opportunities” as part of the global capitaldriven developmentalist discourse, as when WHS become mass tourism destinations incorporated in national economic development schemes (Labadi and Logan 2016).
11 - Neoliberalizing Heritage: International Agencies and the Local Dynamics of Heritage Conservation in Bali, Indonesia
- Edited by Philippe Peycam, Shu-Li Wang, Hui Yew-Foong, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao
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- Heritage as Aid and Diplomacy in Asia
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- 10 November 2020
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- 04 May 2020, pp 278-304
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For Indonesia, culture as a means of economic development has recently become an important policy issue in development discourse and practice. Given the country's richness and diversity of cultural heritage, the deputy to the Indonesian minister of education and culture, Wiendu Nuryanti, claimed that Indonesia is a “cultural superpower state” (negara adidaya secara budaya). In order to show its leadership in cultural diplomacy, the government of Indonesia took the initiative of organizing the World Cultural Forum in November 2013, in Bali, as the first multilateral conference to build global partnership around culture-based development. Following the forum, in December 2013 the United Nations adopted Resolution No. 68/233 on Culture and Sustainable Development, which embraces an instrumentalist notion of culture by emphasizing its contribution “to inclusive economic development, since cultural heritage, cultural and creative industries, sustainable cultural tourism and cultural infrastructure are sources of income generation and job creation”. In the previous year, the deputy minister also led the Indonesian delegation to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, where nomination of the Cultural Landscape of Bali Province was finally approved as a World Heritage Site.
For both the World Cultural Forum and the approval of Indonesia's first World Heritage cultural landscape, Bali was the centre of gravity. Not only because Bali's cultural heritage is regarded as a national asset (UNDP, USAID and the World Bank 2003) but also because the island is the international gateway for Indonesia. Since the Dutch colonial era, Balinese culture has been an object of preservation in the service of the development of tourism. More recently, cultural heritage conservation projects for Bali have been promoted and supported by international agencies, including the World Bank and UNESCO. In these projects, the old discourse and practices of the conservation of Bali's cultural heritage, a concept Schulte Nordholt (2008) asserts was “invented” by Dutch Colonial authorities and scholars, has been brought into new structural settings. Not only has the global economic system been restructured, the Indonesian state has been transformed substantially from a colonial state to a developmental state, and more recently to a neoliberal regulatory state where the relations between the state, market and civil society in the heritage conservation sphere are redefined.
9 - Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Bamiyan
- Edited by Philippe Peycam, Shu-Li Wang, Hui Yew-Foong, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao
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- Heritage as Aid and Diplomacy in Asia
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- 10 November 2020
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- 04 May 2020, pp 226-253
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In 2001 the Taliban destroyed the Buddhas of Bamiyan, two of the world's tallest Buddha statues, which had stood at the crossroads of Asia for more than 1,400 years. The event was a poignant example of the dynamic relationship between archaeological heritage and politics. In the aftermath, the international community largely attributed the event to a growing trend of heritage destruction (i.e., Bahadur 2002; Bryant 2002) perpetrated by religious fundamentalists across South Asia (i.e., Chakrabarti 2003; Coningham and Lewer 1999; Ratnagar 2004). Others placed the event within a continuance of Islamic iconoclasm, extending back to the medieval period, across the broader Muslim world. From 2014, the Bamiyan Buddhas’ destruction was reinterpreted as a harbinger for Da’esh's iconoclastic destruction of archaeological sites across the Middle East (Williams 2015).
While the destruction of the Buddha statues linked the threats posed by religious fundamentalism to eastern and western neighbours, within Afghanistan it also underscored the relationship between the country's archaeology, nationalism and politics. Since Afghanistan's “independence” in the early twentieth century, successive political leaders have attempted to build a nation from a deeply divided society, and one of the most valuable resources available has been the ancient archaeological heritage. While numerous studies have revealed the politicization of archaeological heritage in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries across the Middle East and South Asia (i.e., Goode 2007; Meskell 1997; Silberman 1989), none have fully delved into the twentieth-century historical backdrop that shaped the events of 2001 in Afghanistan. Moving beyond the typically generalized treatment of the Taliban and their destruction of the Buddhas (for a discussion, see Bernbeck 2010, p. 30), this paper aims to place the events of 2001 in the context of the formation and development of nationalism and the archaeological discipline in Afghanistan since the country's “independence” in 1919. Using the iconic case of Bamiyan, this paper will reveal how key actors, including foreign archaeologists, conservative religious groups and Afghan political administrations, shaped the politicization of archaeology in the modern Afghan nation-state.
3 - Heritage Making – Aid For Whom? The Genealogy of Expert Reports in the Hands of Politics and Their Impact in the Case of Preah Vihear
- Edited by Philippe Peycam, Shu-Li Wang, Hui Yew-Foong, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao
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- Heritage as Aid and Diplomacy in Asia
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- 10 November 2020
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- 04 May 2020, pp 52-77
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Introduction: Expert Knowledge and Political Settings
As is well known, UNESCO is an international organization with an educational and cultural governance mandate to achieve a more equal and peaceful world through altering the minds of men (Nielsen 2011, p. 275). All UNESCO conventions dealing with “heritage” aim at contributing to these overarching idealistic goals. At the core of Operational Guidelines to the 1972 World Heritage Convention are the criteria that nominations must fulfil in order to reach approval by the Intergovernmental Committee (IGC). The first and foremost criterion a monument, a group of buildings or a site must fulfil is that of “Outstanding Universal Value” from the point of view of history, art or science. A number of circles of experts at both the national and international level are involved in the nomination and listing process. At the national level, such experts are charged with the task of describing and documenting the cultural property for the nomination file in such a way that the delegates of the member states constituting the Intergovernmental Committee to the Convention become ultimately convinced of its quality. UNESCO, on the other hand, cooperates with a number of international expert bodies such as the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Their experts, whose names are kept confidential, evaluate the nomination with regard to the fulfilment of the criteria and submit a recommendation to the IGC, where decisions are made. Though expert reports claim to focus exclusively on the quality of the cultural property (mostly monuments) and to stand above politics, the expertise expressed in them is often situated in a highly political context, which, as I am going to show, can lead to unforeseen consequences. These mostly implicit and invisible conditionings of expertise often divert UNESCO's noble goals and produce other socio-political results than those intended.
The politicization of the cultural property already begins when experts are called into action and they obediently seek to fulfil their task. This applies most strikingly to the ruins of the former Hindu Temple of Preah Vihear on the Thai-Cambodian border.
7 - Heritage Conservation as a Tool for Cultural Diplomacy: Implications for the Sino-Japanese Relationship
- Edited by Philippe Peycam, Shu-Li Wang, Hui Yew-Foong, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao
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- Book:
- Heritage as Aid and Diplomacy in Asia
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 10 November 2020
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- 04 May 2020, pp 167-189
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The Sino-Japanese relationship has experienced ups and downs since its diplomatic normalization in the 1970s. The increasing economic interdependence has broadened and deepened mutual understanding and interests among business sectors and the general public in both countries, while historical problems, security and territorial disputes, and economic competition remain the main obstacles for building trust and confidence between the two governments. The bilateral relationship since the changes in leadership in the two countries in 2012 has substantially deteriorated. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō were finally able to schedule their first bilateral summit in 2014, at the Beijing APEC Leaders’ Summit, after they had both been in office for two years. It is expected that the Sino-Japanese relationship will continue to face many challenges, particularly in relation to security issues.
With such a pessimistic background to Sino-Japanese relations over the past few years, this chapter aims to examine how heritage conservation could operate as a tool of cultural diplomacy in the context of Sino-Japanese confrontation. Heritage not only contains cultural or historical value but also enhances and channels a national image to a country's people, and to the rest of the world. So, in order to realize the nationalist agenda, it is essential for both governments to “push” heritage conservation at the international institutional level—in this case, through the framework of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The core concern of this chapter is to explore how China and Japan interact with different stakeholders through the negotiation and lobbying processes to realize their cultural and diplomatic, or nationalistic objectives.
The chapter consists of five sections. After this introduction, the second section reviews the process of heritage conservation at the domestic and international levels. I apply a constructivist approach to conceptualize heritage as a tool of cultural diplomacy. The third and fourth sections delineate two case studies related to heritage conservation and the Sino- Japanese relationship: (1) the inclusion of sites of Japan's Meiji Industrial Revolution: Iron and Steel, Shipbuilding and Coal Mining in the World Heritage List (WHL); and (2) the inclusion of Documents of the Nanjing Massacre in the Memory of the World Register (MWR) in July and October 2015, respectively.
8 - From Ideological Alliance to Identity Clash: The Historical Origin of the Sino-Korean Goguryeo Controversies
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- By Anran Wang
- Edited by Philippe Peycam, Shu-Li Wang, Hui Yew-Foong, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao
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- Heritage as Aid and Diplomacy in Asia
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 10 November 2020
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- 04 May 2020, pp 190-225
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Goguryeo (Koguryo in old romanization) is the name of an ancient kingdom that existed from 37 BCE to 668 CE in present-day North Korea and Northeast China (also known as Manchuria), as well as small portions of South Korea and the Russian Far East. In succession, its capitals were in the present-day Chinese county of Huanren (34 BCE – 3 CE), the Chinese city of Ji’an (3–427 CE) and North Korea's capital city of Pyongyang (427–668 CE). Historical relics, particularly tombs and city walls, abound in these places and their environs. During the seventh century, Goguryeo resisted numerous invasions from successive dynasties in the Chinese hinterland, particularly the Sui Dynasty (581–618 CE) and the Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE), and experienced continuous warfare with other regimes on the Korean Peninsula, such as Silla (57 BCE – 935 CE) and Baekje (18 BCE – 660 CE). The period during which Goguryeo existed is termed the era of the Three Kingdoms of Korea (57 BCE – 668 CE) because Goguryeo, Silla and Baekje were the three major powers on the Korean Peninsula. Goguryeo was eventually destroyed by a joint force of Silla and the Tang in 668, which led to the Unified Silla Era (668–935 CE) and to the Tang's rule in northern Korea.
Surprisingly, Goguryeo became an issue of severe contention among Northeast Asian countries in the early twenty-first century, more than thirteen centuries after the kingdom's collapse. A controversy among China and the two Koreas involving governments and academia over whether Goguryeo was a Korean dynasty or a local minority regime of ancient China broke out when North Korea and China nominated their respective Goguryeo relics for UNESCO World Heritage status. While nominations from both countries were eventually successful, the controversy persisted and had a significant impact on international relations in Northeast Asia.
This chapter probes the historical origin of this early twenty-first century controversy by placing it within the modern history of the three countries involved.
Contributors
- Edited by Philippe Peycam, Shu-Li Wang, Hui Yew-Foong, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao
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- Book:
- Heritage as Aid and Diplomacy in Asia
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- 10 November 2020
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- 04 May 2020, pp vii-viii
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10 - Disappearing Voices: The Politics and Practice of Safeguarding Kunqu Opera in the People’s Republic of China
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- By Min Yen Ong
- Edited by Philippe Peycam, Shu-Li Wang, Hui Yew-Foong, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao
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- Book:
- Heritage as Aid and Diplomacy in Asia
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- 10 November 2020
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- 04 May 2020, pp 254-277
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“Invaluable, Rare, Traditional Aesthetics: A Restoration of the Ming Dynasty Mode of Performance.” This was the caption used to market a kunqu opera performance in Beijing's Imperial Granary production of Ming dynasty playwright Tang Xianzu's (1550–1616) play Peony Pavilion. Such words exude authenticity and seek to attract those curious to experience a rare performance of an antiquarian art form. The exoticism and novelty of experiencing an “ancient” and “authentic” performance appeals to the modern (Ivy 1995, pp. 241–42). It prompts the modern to consider that kunqu performances and aesthetics have been irrevocably lost, and thus this performance of Peony Pavilion at the Imperial Granary was to be a rare opportunity not to be missed. Captions like these resonate within the individual—that, because of the rapidly evolving sense of time and changes in political history, environmental context and contemporary culture, much has been lost, and this alarming sense of distance2 appeals to the identity and nostalgia of the Chinese modern, who begins to question their roots and traditions
Performances like these are also marketed towards the international visitor. Printed in English, the production advertises its performance as the “Ultimate Landscape of Chinese Culture: A Must-see for Tourists in Beijing”, with the accompanying words: “Kunqu Opera: A Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity of UNESCO”. The endorsement by UNESCO places kunqu on the world stage: a source of pride for the nation. The lead performers are young, good-looking and professionally trained from state-sponsored, government-endorsed kunqu opera troupes. The performance has an air of exclusivity. The theatre is small, with intimate seating for an audience of about forty. The setting gives the appearance and allure of the historical home of a member of the literati holding a performance by a private family troupe (jiaban). The performance, without microphones, compels audience members to lean in and be entranced. Ticket prices are hefty, ranging from 380 to 1,980 renminbi. The promises of an authentic, professional, spectacular and exclusive performance are all made.
5 - Legacies of Cultural Philanthropy in Asia
- Edited by Philippe Peycam, Shu-Li Wang, Hui Yew-Foong, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao
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- Book:
- Heritage as Aid and Diplomacy in Asia
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 10 November 2020
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- 04 May 2020, pp 117-142
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I
There is little doubt that American philanthropy, including activities in developing countries, is experiencing fundamental shifts. Often defined as “using private wealth for public good”, philanthropy has been practised in the United States for more than a century within a particular framework shaped by American laws, which made it possible for philanthropists to minimize their tax burden by giving away wealth for what are defined as “charitable purposes”.
Primarily as a result of new technologies created by large and successful corporations, there is now a group of tremendously wealthy entrepreneurs and investors seeking to redefine the purposes and methods of philanthropic practice. Often called “philanthrocapitalists”, these entrepreneurs assert that being successful in business gives them the know-how to solve large-scale problems of poverty and deprivation. Their philanthropic organizations promote “business-like ways of working, business-like efficiency, and market-driven solutions to social problems” (Feinstein 2011). Instead of the “bottom line” of corporate profit, they promise a “bottom line” of social impact. Along with bottom-line thinking comes an emphasis on measuring outcomes and tangible results. The language of metrics, benchmarks, risk-reward ratios and scaling up now pervades the discourse of new philanthropies, making staff and their boards even more eager to see results quickly.
In a new book, David Callahan scrutinizes major living donors, who he argues are forming a “heterogeneous new power elite” (Callahan 2017). He describes activist megadonors who want to be celebrated for carrying out their philanthropic mission, and who maintain close personal control over their foundations, noting how in many cases donors are determined to give away all their wealth for specific purposes during their lifetimes, rather than leaving behind foundations that could evolve and chart new directions in perpetuity. The proponents of what is nowadays termed “venture philanthropy” do appear more activist than earlier generations of foundation executives. Venture philanthropists craft social media messages to explain their goals, and have created a celebrity culture of giving away wealth.
Malaysia in 2019: A Change of Government without Regime Change
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- By Ross Tapsell
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 24 November 2020
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- 22 April 2020, pp 191-208
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The year 2019 was potentially the most important one in Malaysia's political history since the creation of the Federation in 1963. While the historic change in government which ended the sixty-year reign of the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition government the previous year was indeed momentous, the transition of power would have far less meaning if the promises of broader national transformation are not fulfilled by the new Pakatan Harapan (PH) government led by former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad. PH's 194-page Buku Harapan (“book of hope”) manifesto included sixty pledges, from reforming the Anti-Corruption Commission to ensuring “transparency and robustness of our election system”, along with promises to “abolish oppressive laws” and “enhance the transparency and integrity of the budget and budgeting process”. Other bold promises included the “decentralisation of power to Sabah and Sarawak”, “making government schools the best choice for its people” and for Malaysia to “lead efforts to resolve the Rohingya and Palestine crises.”
It would be easy, then, to highlight the various unfulfilled promises of the manifesto in order to determine 2019 as an abject disappointment for the fledgling PH government. Indeed, it has become a well-worn path for many analysts to measure the new government against its manifesto pledges, especially after the first hundred days of the PH administration and the one-year anniversary of its electoral victory. The slow pace of reform is not only limited to the political sector. The economy remains buffeted by stock outflows and a weak ringgit as global funds signalled their concerns about the lack of reforms. Elina Noor has written that while Malaysia “faced myriad challenges” in terms of foreign and security policies, “not much is likely to change” under Mahathir's “new Malaysia”. There has also been no major reform of education at any level, no progress on promises of decentralization, and only limited attempts to address the issues relating to the Orang Asli (indigenous peoples). Many Malaysians have thus become despondent when discussing national politics in 2019, including those who were initially part of the reform process themselves. Opinion polls throughout the year from the Merdeka Centre (Figure 1) reflect the growing public disappointment with the PH government. In the face of these criticisms, senior PH politicians have spent much of the year defending their track record.
The 2020 Myanmar General Election: Another Turning Point?
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- By Ye Htut
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 24 November 2020
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- 22 April 2020, pp 255-272
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According to the Constitution of Myanmar, a general election is to be held every five years in order to elect parliamentarians to the two legislative chambers, the lower house (Pyithu Hluttaw, or house of representative) and the upper house (Amyotha Hluttaw, or house of nationalities). Twenty-five per cent of the seats in both houses are reserved for military-appointed representatives. After parliamentary elections, the lower and upper houses will sit together in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Assembly of the Union) to serve as an electoral college for the presidential election.
The coming general election in 2020 will be an important milestone for Myanmar. The elections in 2010 brought about the “Myanmar Spring” under President Thein Sein, while the 2015 elections witnessed Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) coming to power. The 2015 general election marked the very first peaceful transfer of power from one elected government to another since the country gained independence from the British in 1948. The year 2015 was also the first time Aung San Suu Kyi and her party were able to form the government since winning the election in 1990.
In the three years since assuming power, the NLD government has introduced reforms of the economy, banking and finance; implemented a crackdown on corruption; and initiated the 21st Century Panglong Conference, a new peace process aimed at settling the country's various ethnic insurgencies. However, these efforts have been overshadowed by an economic slowdown, the Rohingya crisis and a lack of progress in the peace process. In particular, the failure of the reforms to translate into tangible benefits at the grass-roots level has led many people to feel that the NLD government has under-delivered on expectations.
The upcoming general election in 2020 will be the first electoral test for the NLD government. It will also be a judgement of Aung San Suu Kyi's leadership and legacy. Meanwhile, the opposition parties in Myanmar have sought to capitalize on voter dissatisfaction with the NLD's performance in government. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which lost power in the 2015 elections, has been reorganizing itself and replacing its old generation of party leaders, including former President Thein Sein.
Cambodia in 2019: Entrenching One-Party Rule and Asserting National Sovereignty in the Era of Shifting Global Geopolitics
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 24 November 2020
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- 22 April 2020, pp 119-134
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On 29 December 2018, Prime Minister Hun Sen presided over the inauguration of the Win-Win Monument, constructed on the outskirts of Phnom Penh to commemorate the end of civil war in Cambodia some twenty years ago when the Khmer Rouge was finally defeated in 1998. Achieving total peace is a source of pride for Prime Minister Hun Sen, signalling his triumph over the neoliberal global order, especially since even the United Nations (UN) failed in this task, despite the mission's expensive price tag. The ceremony was also a testimony to the pre-eminence of the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) following the dissolution of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) and the party's comprehensive victory in the 2018 general elections that transformed Cambodia into a de facto one-party state. In many ways, Prime Minister Hun Sen and the CPP have reasons to be proud of Cambodia's achievements. The economy continued to expand sustainably at a rate of around seven per cent, elevating Cambodia to one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Its international geopolitical position has also been strengthened with the political and economic support of China. However, despite these successes, the CPP faces challenges to its legitimacy, both on the international and domestic fronts, as it embarks on further power consolidation. This chapter analyses the CPP's successes and challenges in 2019 in the domains of politics, economics and foreign affairs. The first section will discuss the domestic political developments surrounding Sam Rainsy's attempt to return from self-imposed exile and the reactions of the Cambodian government. The second section will address economic developments in 2019 as well as possible future trends. The third section will discuss Cambodia's external relations, particularly Western concerns over its recent democratic regression and its bilateral relations with China and Vietnam.
Politics
The CPP's electoral victories since the UN-organized elections in 1993 have occurred largely because of the divisions within the opposition camp. The merger between the Sam Rainsy Party and the Human Rights Party into the CNRP had initially posed an electoral challenge to the CPP, as evidenced by the former's strong performance in both rural and urban areas in the 2013 general election and the 2017 local elections.
Thailand in 2019: The Year of Living Unpredictably
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
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- 24 November 2020
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- 22 April 2020, pp 337-354
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What happened in Thailand throughout 2019 was different from anything that had gone before in contemporary Thai politics. Prior to the March general election there were many questions. Was the election going to happen, and, if it was, what were the results going to be? The process leading up to the election was also intriguing. On the one hand, there were many new political parties. On the other hand, politicians faced many challenges and constraints caused by the promilitary constitution introduced in 2017.
The result of the election was even more startling. It saw the decline of the urban middle-class Democrats, the oldest party in Thailand, as well as the rural mass-based Pheu Thai, the latest incarnation of Thaksin-inspired parties, which had won every election this century. The election also witnessed the emergence of the “new kids in town”: Future Forward and Palang Pracharat. The latter was a pro-military party that recruited from the ranks of existing politicians with existing patronage networks. Palang Pracharat nominated General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the leader of the 2014 coup and head of the junta, as its choice of prime minister. Even though Palang Pracharat was only the second-largest party in parliament, Prayut was still voted by a joint sitting of the House of Representatives and the military-appointed Senate to be the prime minister. Palang Pracharat also managed to form a coalition government of nineteen political parties to hold a slim parliamentary majority of 254 out of 500 seats, confronting an opposition bloc of seven political parties with 246 parliamentary seats. Given the economic downturn, strained relations with Western democracies, and the rise of a popular opposition in the form of Future Forward, the government was expected to be vulnerable and short-lived. But, after more than half a year, the pro-junta government has successfully maintained its upper hand, taming its medium- and small-sized coalition partners and suppressing the opposition. There have so far been no robust challenges to the pro-military government.
Peculiar Pre-election Conditions
In the decade following the 1992 democratic transition, Thailand was considered one of the most democratic countries in Southeast Asia. The subsequent campaign for reform led to the 1997 constitution, one of the most democratic in Thai political history. After this came two overwhelming electoral victories of Thai Rak Thai (“Thai Love Thai”), a new party led by Thaksin Shinawatra that was popular among the rural poor.
American Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia
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- By Daljit Singh
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 24 November 2020
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- 22 April 2020, pp 57-76
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The decline of America's relative strategic and economic power is reflected in adjustments to its global policy and strategy. This has in fact been apparent since the Obama administration's unwillingness to become involved in the Syrian conflict, and its calls for “burden sharing” and more partnerships. The tendency towards retrenchment has continued under the Trump administration, with officials seeking to review foreign involvement with the question “What is in it for us?” and seeking ways out of the conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan as the country tries to focus on the Indo-Pacific region.
American primacy after World War II was a historical anomaly brought about by very special circumstances of the post-war world. For many years before World War II the United States relied on a balance-of-power strategy to secure its interests in Asia, often in a multipolar geopolitical setting. This is the likely direction for the future. It is not clear yet what form a balance-of-power strategy will take in the Indo-Pacific. Alliances, partnerships and “burden sharing” will be important elements.
This chapter first addresses the big change in US foreign policy—in particular, policy towards China—during the Trump administration. It describes the mood in US policy circles as well as in the wider foreign policy community towards China and President Trump's role, which is not always in tandem with that of the relevant bureaucracies and Congress. It then goes on to examine the policy towards Southeast Asia, the region's importance to US interests, the current US “influence deficiency” in Southeast Asia and the prospects of the United States augmenting its influence and standing. Finally, there is a section making some concluding observations.
The New Turn in US Foreign Policy
A new phase in US foreign policy has begun, propelled mainly by three factors. First, the hubris and overreach during the immediate post–Cold War period, correctly seen in hindsight as a “unipolar moment”, led to wasteful and costly wars in the Middle East. Second, domestic policy failures to cope with the negative effects of globalization resulted in significant damage to US manufacturing industries and sections of the white working class. The global financial crisis of 2008–9 only accentuated the economic distress.
MALAYSIA
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
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- 24 November 2020
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- 22 April 2020, pp 189-190
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Myanmar in 2019: Rakhine Issue, Constitutional Reform and Election Fever
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- By Nyi Nyi Kyaw
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
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- 24 November 2020
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- 22 April 2020, pp 235-254
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Summary
Since it came to power in March 2016 after winning in a 2015 election landslide, 2019 has perhaps been the most problematic year thus far for Myanmar's National League for Democracy (NLD) government. The long-standing Rakhine issue, the initiation of a parliamentary constitutional reform process, and early election fever are some of the key developments to have dominated Myanmar's political attention in 2019. These high-level political events, mainly involving the executive and legislative branches, were accompanied by growing public distrust in the judiciary and the police. All these factors posed challenges for Myanmar in 2019, with considerable implications on the country's domestic and international fronts. Economically, Myanmar was working quite well, though some challenges remain.
The Rakhine Problem: Domestic and International Aspects
The Dual Rakhine Problem
Until early 2019, the “Rakhine problem”, both within and outside Myanmar, was almost exclusively Rohingya-centric. Before the eruption of inter-communal violence in Rakhine State in 2012, the problem had not been envisaged as a Rakhine problem. The issue was merely referred to as the “Rohingya problem”, “conundrum” or “crisis”. After the 1990s, the Rohingya problem was framed internationally as an insurmountable crisis of forced migration and statelessness. Following the first and second Rohingya mass exoduses in 1978 and 1991–92, the Rohingya problem was respectively constructed by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government (1974–88) and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government (1988–97) as a colossal problem of (illegal) colonial migration, armed insurgency, and secession.
The dominant issue among Rakhine affairs remained the Rohingya problem, even after the outbreak of inter-communal violent and non-violent conflicts between Rohingya/non-Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists from 2012 onwards, the emergence of a Rohingya “insurgency” led by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) from 2016 onwards, and the third Rohingya mass exodus from August 2017 onwards. These new problems have added two more layers to the Rohingya problem. First is the internal displacement of more than 100,000 Muslims in camps in Rakhine state. Second is a new protracted refugee situation that saw 909,000 Rohingyas being stranded in camps in Bangladesh as of March 2019, after about 745,000 Rohingyas fled following the Myanmar military's “clearance operation” in response to the ARSA attacks in August 2017.
Laos in 2019: Moving Heaven and Earth on the Mekong
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 24 November 2020
- Print publication:
- 22 April 2020, pp 175-188
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Summary
While the year saw some venting of concern at official corruption in the National Assembly, remarkable in itself, it is rent-seeking activities that define the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) party-state. A market economy operating under a Leninist system, events in 2019 did not detract from the general trajectory of a state hell-bent on prioritizing major projects such as hydro-electricity generating dams and the Chinese-built railroad, moving heaven and earth on the Mekong River, whatever the social and ecological consequences locally or downstream. But the practice of issuing licences and concessions for casinos and/ or agribusiness ventures also creates market distortions. Drought, disease and human dislocation stemming from mega projects or disasters (as with the 2018 dam collapse in Attapeu Province), land alienation and compensation issues all came to national and/or international attention during the year. Various serious human rights cases, including disappearances, suggest the longevity of the Lao PDR authoritarian developmental model, one that brooks no domestic challenge or even external scrutiny.
Governance
Typically, draft laws and amendments to laws are discussed at monthly sessions of the nation's National Assembly, which is invariably chaired by the prime minister. Notably, at the 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly's 8th legislature held in Vientiane on 23–24 July in the presence of National Assembly president Mrs Pany Yathortou, Lao PDR president Bounnhang Vorachit, and other party and government leaders, Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith called for the sectors responsible to shoulder more responsibility in finding solutions to six pressing issues that were seen as affecting socio-economic development. The first major issue was an outbreak of dengue fever, which had claimed 37 lives and saw at least 16,690 people falling sick. The second topic was an epidemic of African swine fever. Third on the list was the infestation of sweetcorn crops by a plague of caterpillars in Xayaboury Province, which had destroyed 30 per cent of 35,000 hectares of the crop. The fourth issue concerned persistent drought, which resulted in low river levels and affected rice and other crops. The fifth matter of concern was the fluctuating exchange rate, the falling value of the national currency, the kip, and the depletion of foreign-exchange reserves, seen as driving up commodity import prices and hindering economic growth. The sixth issue related to posts on social media by members of the public commenting negatively on state administration and management.
Brunei Darussalam in 2019: Issues Revisited
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 24 November 2020
- Print publication:
- 22 April 2020, pp 99-116
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Summary
It was generally a busy year for Brunei Darussalam in 2019 as it continued to focus on developmental issues while experiencing peace and political stability. Recurring concerns for the economy and administration surfaced periodically in line with fresh assessments towards the one major national goal—Wawasan 2035 (Brunei Vision 2035). Except for intense but short-lived global attention on its syariah system of jurisprudence, Brunei's domestic affairs were not of much concern for foreign observers. The effects of the preceding years’ reduced income from the country's hydrocarbon exports were still felt by the domestic economy, although global prices for oil had moderately improved in early 2019. Any increase in prices for the period under study was only speculative given the uncertainty of global economic trends. Increasing down-stream hydrocarbon activities provided diversification, while improved productive capacities in agriculture and agroindustry were sought. The recurring national concerns had familiar undertones—except that relevant policymakers appeared more committed to advancing the social and economic development of the state—with frequent admonishment from the Head of State and Government, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah.
Managing the State
As a small state, Brunei is politically and economically manageable in accordance with the stated priorities embodied in its philosophy of Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB; Malay Islamic Monarchy) and Vision 2035, which promotes socio-economic developmental goals. At an average growth rate of 3 per cent, the 2018 population was 442,400, a bane for large-scale economic activities. However, guided by the twin pillars of Vision 2035 and the UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030, the policymakers are mindful of the directions that uphold the national aspirations of growth amidst austerity in providing a satisfactory quality of life for Bruneians. The annual economic growth rate is of concern. In his speech on the occasion of the New Year 2019, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah expected better economic growth for the year. However, he reminded his subjects that they had to “march forward ⦠with full spirit and determination” and not be plagued with “lazy syndrome”. He urged them to be “a more proactive and productive society” in light of the economic challenges faced by Brunei.
Social Media and the 2019 Indonesian Elections: Hoax Takes the Centre Stage
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 24 November 2020
- Print publication:
- 22 April 2020, pp 155-172
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Summary
On 17 April 2019, elections were held across Indonesia, the third-largest democracy in the world. The 2019 elections were significant as the first-ever simultaneous presidential and legislative elections in the nation's history, all held within the same day. The complexity of the 2019 elections meant that effective communication strategies were more vital than ever in reaching out to electoral constituents. Social media, which has become an integral part of everyday social and economic life in the nation, is a natural channel to publicize political visions and missions and to galvanize support for parties and candidates.
As a digital commons, however, social media is inevitably weaponized as well. Concerns over the “dark side” of social media in the form of disinformation (popularly called “hoax”, referring to the general phenomenon of falsehoods) received outsized attention throughout the campaigning period of the 2019 elections. The low barrier to entry and ease of sharing user-generated content means that social media is more easily used for all kinds of purposes, including negative ones. Aksi Bela Islam 212 (the 2 December 2016 Defend Islam Action), combined with intense political mudslinging in past elections, resulted in “hoax” becoming a term that means division to many Indonesians, potentially tearing apart the young democracy.
This chapter examines how social media interplayed with electoral politics in Indonesia's 2019 elections. The first part of the paper outlines the role of social media in the nation's past elections. Social media has been weaponized for use in political smear campaigns since its introduction on to the nation's political landscape in 2012. Aksi Bela Islam 212 gave rise to fears that hoaxes could further split the nation and affect subsequent elections. Combined with worldwide events such as the 2016 US presidential election, it changed Indonesia's understanding of the so-called “fake news” phenomenon. The second part of the paper discusses how the notion of hoax was central to campaign discourses in the 2019 elections. Social media was the dominant means, although not the only one, by which hoaxes were disseminated.
Social Media and Political Contestation in Past Indonesian Elections
Indonesia is nicknamed the “Social Media Nation”. In terms of numbers, active social media users comprise 48 per cent of the country's total population. Indonesian netizens on average spend three hours and twenty-six minutes on social media.
LAOS
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
-
- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2020
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 24 November 2020
- Print publication:
- 22 April 2020, pp 173-174
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