Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  1. Home
  2. Publications
  3. Textbooks
  4. Content Listing

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

38612 results in Cambridge Textbooks

Page 1278 of 1931

  • Part I - Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right

  • Immanuel Kant
  • Edited by Lara Denis, Agnes Scott College, Decatur
  • Translated by Mary Gregor
  • Book:
    Kant: <I>The Metaphysics of Morals</I>
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    04 October 2017, pp 1-38

  • Summary

    Preface

    The critique of practical reason was to be followed by a system, the metaphysics of morals, which falls into metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of righta and metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of virtue. (This is the counterpart of the metaphysical first principles of natural science, already published.) The Introduction that follows presents and, to some degree, makes intuitive the form which the system will take in both these parts.

    For the doctrine of right, the first part of the doctrine of morals, there is required a system derived from reason which could be called the metaphysics of right. But since the concept of right is a pure concept that still looks to practice (application to cases that come up in experience), a metaphysical system of right would also have to take account, in its divisions, of the empirical variety of such cases, in order to make its division complete (as is essential in constructing a system of reason). But what is empirical cannot be divided completely, and if this is attempted (at least to approximate to it), empirical concepts cannot be brought into the system as integral parts of it but can be used only as examples in remarks. So the only appropriate title for the first part of TheMetaphysics of Morals will be Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right; for in the application of these principles to cases the system itself cannot be expected, but only approximation to it. Accordingly, it will be dealt with as in the (earlier) Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science: namely, that right which belongs to the system outlined a priori will go into the text, while rights taken from particular cases of experience will be put into remarks, which will sometimes be extensive; for otherwise it would be hard to distinguish what is metaphysics here from what is empirical application of rights.

    Philosophic treatises are often charged with being obscure, indeed deliberately unclear, in order to affect an illusion of deep insight. I cannot better anticipate or forestall this charge than by readily complying with a duty that Mr. Garve, a philosopher in the true sense of the word, lays down for all writers, but especially for philosophic writers. My only reservation is imposed by the nature of the science that is to be corrected and extended.

  • Part I - On Duties to Oneself as Such

  • from I - Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics
  • Immanuel Kant
  • Edited by Lara Denis, Agnes Scott College, Decatur
  • Translated by Mary Gregor
  • Book:
    Kant: <I>The Metaphysics of Morals</I>
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    04 October 2017, pp 185-236

  • Summary

    The Concept of a Duty to Oneself Contains (at First Glance) a Contradiction

    If the I that imposes obligation is taken in the same sense as the I that is put under obligation,a a duty to oneself is a self-contradictory concept. For the concept of duty contains the concept of being passively constrained (I am bound). But if the duty is a duty to myself, I think of myself as binding and so as actively constraining (I, the same subject, am imposing obligation). And the proposition that asserts a duty to myself (I ought to bind myself) would involve being bound to bind myself (a passive obligation that was still, in the same sense of the relation, also an active obligation), and hence a contradiction. – One can also bring this contradiction to light by pointing out that the one imposing obligation (auctor obligationis) could always release the one put under obligation (subiectum Obligationis) from the obligation (terminus obligationis), so that (if both are one and the same subject) he would not be bound at all to a duty he lays upon himself. This involves a contradiction.

    Nevertheless, a Human Being Has Duties to Himself

    For suppose there were no such duties: then there would be no duties whatsoever, and so no external duties either. – For I can recognize that I am under obligation to others only insofar as I at the same time put myself under obligation, since the law by virtue of which I regard myself as being under obligation proceeds in every case from my own practical reason; and in being constrained by my own reason, I am also the one constraining myself.

    Solution of This Apparent Antinomy

    When a human being is conscious of a duty to himself, he views himself, as the subject of duty, under two attributes: first as a sensible being, that is, as a human being (a member of one of the animal species), and second as an intelligible being (not merely as a being that has reason, since reason as a theoretical facultyb could well be an attributec of a living corporeal being). The senses cannot attain this latter aspect of a human being; it can be cognized only in morally practical relations, where the incomprehensible property of freedom is revealed by the influence of reason on the inner lawgiving will.

  • Preface to the Second Edition

  • Immanuel Kant
  • Edited by Lara Denis, Agnes Scott College, Decatur
  • Translated by Mary Gregor
  • Book:
    Kant: <I>The Metaphysics of Morals</I>
    Published online:
    28 May 2018
    Print publication:
    04 October 2017, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    This second edition of Immanuel Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals within Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (CTHP) contains a new Introduction and a new Further Reading section. The index has been updated. There are only minimal changes, however, to Mary J. Gregor's translation from the first CTHP edition (Cambridge University Press, 1996). Consequently, that edition's Translator's Note on the Text has been retained, albeit with a few new editorial notes and small alterations.

    Footnotes to the text of The Metaphysics of Morals that are new to this edition or revised from the first edition are indicated by my initials, unless they are merely providing German words translated or making minor editorial changes. In this edition, the German words cited in translation notes are inflected and spelled as they are within the Academy Edition of the text edited by Paul Natorp (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1907), on which Gregor's translation is based.

    I flag revisions to Gregor's translation in footnotes, except where the changes seem too insignificant to warrant it. Where I am aware that Gregor's translation is controversial, I have usually retained it and alerted readers to the issue or offered an alternative translation in a footnote. When a problem with, or an alternative to, Gregor's translation came to my attention through (or is helpfully explained by) a particular article or book, I have cited the source. I hope that, in addition to giving credit where it is due, those citations will encourage inquisitive readers to seek out the sources cited and explore their discussions of the terms, text, and interpretive or philosophical stakes.

    I wish to thank several people for their help with various aspects of this project. Frederick Rauscher, Eric Entrican Wilson, and Allen W. Wood gave me valuable feedback on drafts of the Introduction and Further Reading section. Suggestions or consultation concerning the translation and notes were provided by Paul Guyer, Arthur Ripstein, Barbara Sattler, Jens Timmermann, Helga Varden, and Allen W. Wood. I thank Hilary Gaskin and Karl Ameriks for inviting me to undertake this project, and Agnes Scott College for a sabbatical leave during which I completed most of my work on it. Finally, I thank my husband, Roger Wertheimer, for his enduring support, encouragement, patience, and sense of humor.

  • 3 - Three-Phase Transformers

  • S. K. Sahdev
  • Book:
    Electrical Machines
    Published online:
    03 August 2019
    Print publication:
    04 October 2017, pp 224-300

  • Summary

    Introduction

    Three phase system is invariably adopted for generation, transmission and distribution of electrical power due to economical reasons. Usually, power is generated at the generating stations at 11 kV (or 33 kV), whereas, it is transmitted at 750 kV, 400 kV, 220 kV, 132 kV or 66 kV due to economical reasons. At the receiving stations, the voltage level is decreased and power is transmitted through shorter distances. While delivering power to the consumers, the voltage level is decreased to as low as 400V (line value) for safety reasons.

    Thus to increase the voltage level at the generating stations step-up transformers and to decrease the voltage level at the receiving stations, step down transformers are employed.

    Merits of Three-phase Transformer over Bank of Three Singlephase Transformers

    The voltage level in three-phase system at the generating stations and at the receiving stations can be changed either by employing a bank of three single-phase transformers (inter connecting them in star or delta) or by employing one three phase transformer. Generally, one three phase transformer is preferred over a bank of three single phase transformers because of the following reasons.

  • (i) It requires smaller quantity of iron and copper. Hence, its cost is nearly 15% lesser than a bank of three single phase transformers of equal rating.

  • (ii) It has smaller size and can be accommodated in smaller tank and hence needs smaller quantity of oil for cooling.

  • (iii) Because of smaller size, it occupies less space; moreover it has less weight.

  • (iv) It needs less number of bushings.

  • (v) It operates at slightly better efficiency and regulation.

    • These transformers suffer from the following disadvantage.

  • (i) It is more difficult and costly to repair three-phase transformers.

  • (ii) It is difficult to transport single large unit of three-phase transformer than to transport three single phase transformers individually.

    • The advantages of three-phase transformer (such as lower cost, lower weight, lower space requirement etc.) over weighs its disadvantages and hence are invariably employed in the power system to step-up or step-down the voltage level.

  • 2 - Consonants and vowels

  • Felicity Cox, Macquarie University, Sydney, Janet Fletcher, University of Melbourne
  • Book:
    Australian English Pronunciation and Transcription
    Published online:
    21 June 2018
    Print publication:
    04 October 2017, pp 22-74

  • Summary

    Introduction

    The physical production of speech is an exceptionally complex process involving carefully controlled movement of structures such as the lips, tongue, jaw, larynx and lungs, precisely coordinated to achieve the intricately balanced timing of gestures. For most speech production the first step in executing the plan of a message formulated in the brain is to initiate the speech production process by ensuring that the lungs are inflated so that compression of lung volume creates airflow. The outward-flowing air can then be modified in a number of ways on its journey from the lungs. The first major obstacle that the airflow encounters is the larynx, which has the important biological function of managing the flow of air in and out of the lungs and protecting the lower airway from foreign matter. The larynx can variably valve the airway – from totally obstructed to fully open – and under certain conditions of airflow impedance a buzzing sound can be generated. The buzz from the larynx can be transformed into speech by the supralaryngeal structures (articulators) and spaces (cavities), which further modify the sound to create speech through processes such as noise generation and resonance. With this sequence in mind, we can identify three major processes involved in the physical production of most speech sounds:

  • • The lungs provide the energy source – the airflow: RESPIRATION

  • • The larynx can convert the energy into audible sound: PHONATION

  • • The articulators transform the sound into speech: ARTICULATION

    • Some speech sounds don't require phonation and, for such sounds, modification to the pressurised airstream from the lungs occurs mainly through activity of the articulators. There are also sounds that don't require airflow from the lungs at all. The click sounds that occur in many languages of Southern Africa are made by drawing air into the mouth. The different processes used to create speech will be detailed in this chapter. The important anatomical structures for the production of speech are referred to collectively as the vocal tract. Anatomically, the vocal tract comprises the respiratory system from the lungs, through the larynx to the nose and mouth.

Page 1278 of 1931