Content Listing

Summary

I. The Meaning of Collective Security

A. Definition

860. Collective security postulates the institutionalization of the lawful use of force in the international community. What is required is a multilateral treaty, whereby Contracting Parties create an international agency vested with the power to employ force against aggressors (and perhaps other law-breakers). Such an instrument is basically ‘introverted’ in character (designed against a potential future aggressor from among the Contracting Parties), unlike a collective self-defence treaty (see supra 802) which is ‘extroverted’ (envisaging aggression from outside the system). Collective security shares with collective self-defence the fundamental premise that recourse to force against aggression can (and perhaps must) be made by those who are not the immediate victims. But self-defence, either individual or collective, is exercised at the discretion of a single State acting unilaterally or a group of States. Collective security operates on the strength of an authoritative decision made by a central organ of the international community.

B. The Covenant of the League of Nations

861. The system of collective security has its roots in the League of Nations. Article 10 of the League's Covenant (cited supra 230) empowered the Council to advise Member States on the means to be taken in case of aggression or threat of aggression. Article 11 (cited supra 231) declared that any war or threat of war, whether or not immediately affecting any Member, was a matter of concern to the whole League, which had to take action as required to safeguard peace among nations. Article 16 stipulated that, if any Member resorted to war in violation of its obligations under Articles 12, 13 or 15 of the Covenant (see supra 231–3), it was ipso facto deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members. All trade or financial relations with the transgressor, including commerce between nationals, had to be severed. Article 16 went on to instruct the Council to recommend to the Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air contribution they should make to the armed forces which were to be used for the protection of the Covenant's obligations. Expulsion of a Member from the League for violation of any of the Covenant's obligations was also authorized. Accordingly, in December 1939, the Council decided to expel the Soviet Union from the League because of its attack on Finland.

Summary

995. The use of force in international relations is currently forbidden by both the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law (except within the prescribed circumference of collective security or self-defence): aggression even constitutes a crime. The legal ban on the use of inter-State force – particularly in the form of an outright war – forms the bedrock of the contemporary international legal system. Admittedly, to date, the prohibition has not had a spectacular impact on the actual conduct of States. As of now, its imprint has been more noticeable in the vocabulary of States. An international climate has been generated in which the term ‘war’ has an unsavoury connotation. Hence, while States continue to engage in international armed conflicts, they prefer taking the moral high ground and describe their activities in palatable euphemisms. One may say, in a combination of cynicism and realism, that so far the legal abolition of war has stamped out not wars but declarations of war. This lip-service to the cause of peace may be hypocritical. However, as pithily put by La Rochefoucauld, ‘l';hypocrisie est un hommage que le vice rend à la vertu’. The recognition of virtue is an indispensable first step without which no vice is likely to be eliminated.

996. All the same, a taboo on the use of the word ‘war’ in legal analysis makes no sense at all. The fact that war is banished linguistically will not make it vanish empirically. Whether we employ this or that semantic handle does not alter the incontrovertible truth that comprehensive armed conflicts still permeate international relations. If the phenomenon of war is to be eradicated, it must be faced and not ignored. Otherwise, all that we are left with is hypocrisy.

997. For aggressive war – as well as unlawful uses of inter-State force ‘short of war’ – to disappear, the international community must establish effective measures of collective security. The harnessing of force to international procedures of law and order is the real challenge of our day. Unfortunately, the lacklustre performance of the United Nations Security Council (which has been entrusted with this task by the Charter) has instigated widespread disappointment and dissatisfaction.

Summary

I. The Beginning of War

A. War in the Purely Technical Sense

84. War in the purely technical sense starts with a declaration of war (see supra 25). As the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission enunciated in its 2005 Partial Award on Jus ad Bellum: ‘In international law, the essence of a declaration of war is an explicit affirmation of the existence of a state of war between belligerents.’ A declaration of war is a unilateral and formal announcement, issued by the constitutionally competent authority of a State, setting the exact point at which war begins with a designated enemy (or enemies). Notwithstanding its unilateral character, a declaration of war ‘brings about a state of war irrespective of the attitude of the state to which it is addressed’.

85. According to Article 1 of Hague Convention (III) of 1907 Relative to the Opening of Hostilities:

The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between them must not commence without a previous and unequivocal warning, which shall take the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.

Article 1 explicitly mentions that reasons for a declaration of war must be given. But the causes of wars cannot be seriously established on the basis of a self-serving unilateral declaration. The main value of a declaration of war is derived from the fact that it pinpoints the precise time when a state of war enters into force. This may have far-reaching implications in the domestic law of the Belligerent Parties (see supra 8). It will also give an important notice to neutral countries.

86. An ultimatum may take one of two forms: (i) a threat that, if certain demands are not complied with, hostilities will be initiated; (ii) a warning that, unless specific conditions are fulfilled by a designated deadline, war will commence ipso facto. Article 1 requires an ultimatum of the second type, incorporating a conditional declaration of war. An ultimatum of the first category is not deemed sufficient by itself under Article 1, and it must be followed by a formal declaration of war. Only the subsequent declaration, rather than the preliminary threat, would be in conformity with Hague Convention (III).

Summary

The Meaning of Collective Self-Defence

The Four Categories of Collective Self-Defence

785. The phrase ‘individual or collective self-defence’, as used in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (quoted supra 521), is not easily comprehensible. A close examination of the text, in light of the practice of States, shows that more than a simple dichotomy is involved. It seems necessary to distinguish between no less than four categories of self-defence: (i) individual self-defence individually exercised; (ii) individual self-defence collectively exercised; (iii) collective self-defence individually exercised; and (iv) collective self-defence collectively exercised.

(a) Individual Self-Defence Individually Exercised

786. The first category represents the most straightforward implementation of the right of self-defence, and it has been dealt with in Chapter 8: Arcadia perpetrates an armed attack against Utopia, and in response Utopia invokes self-defence. This is a one-on-one forcible encounter, and the right of individual self-defence is exercised individually.

(b) Individual Self-Defence Collectively Exercised

787. The second category relates to the situation where an armed attack is launched by the same aggressor (Arcadia), either simultaneously or consecutively, against several States (Utopia, Ruritania, etc.). Both Utopia and Ruritania are entitled to resort to measures of individual self-defence against Arcadia. These measures may be taken individually, each victim State declining any suggestion of close cooperation with the other. Utopia and Ruritania, while resisting armed attacks by the same aggressor (Arcadia), are not obliged to consolidate a united front. When recent relations between Utopia and Ruritania have been characterized by a deeply felt animosity, let alone a longstanding antagonism with historical roots, either country is apt to be opposed to the idea of recasting the political landscape, and it may elect to act on its own.

788. However, particularly when a large-scale invasion is in progress, States trying to resist aggression are disposed towards overlooking past grievances and forging a coalition, proceeding on the basis of the principle that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. The essence of a coalition is that its members marshal their combined resources and act jointly in effecting their respective rights of self-defence. It is sometimes argued that such a situation was envisaged by the authors of the Charter when they referred to ‘collective’ selfdefence.

Summary

Introduction

This chapter discusses the theories of international relations that have as their principal goal the transformation of the global international order so that it better meets the objectives of global justice. It begins with a discussion of the nature of justice as it is understood in the political context, then addresses the cosmopolitan argument that principles of justice ought to apply to the world as a whole and not just within or between individual states. Next, it discusses the secondary argument that this requires significant reform of the relations between states and the democratising of the international realm. Finally, it examines the principal accounts of global justice, including Rawlsian liberalism (see Boxes 8.1 and 8.3) and cosmopolitan democracy.

Unlike other theories of international relations, theories of global justice are explicitly evaluative theories. They seek to discuss and identify the proper rules for ordering society and the relationships between its constituent parts. In particular, they assess the values that ought to guide social and political life and how they are embodied in institutions and practices. In the language of political theory, they discuss ‘the right and the good’. They do not merely explain or understand politics, but assess it normatively on the basis of ethical and moral grounds. The core concerns of these types of theories are the meaning of justice, equality, freedom and rights, and their relationship with power, violence and interests. Until relatively recently, theories of this type have been rare in the discipline. Normative or evaluative thought in international relations has been concerned mostly with the meaning of sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention rather than with justice. Cosmopolitan theorists, however, argue that the vocabularies of justice and democracy do apply to the relations between states and, furthermore, that there is a moral imperative to transform the international realm into one that better conforms to these values.

Justice and international relations

‘Justice’ is a term that has many meanings and can be used in many ways. Hedley Bull (1983), in his much-discussed Hagey lectures on justice in international relations, used it to refer to what is more commonly known as international ethics. Lawyers use the term to denote conformity with legal rulings and process, in the sense that justice has been done when the law has been followed and upheld.

Summary

Introduction

This chapter discusses a political theory that has come to the fore in the IR discipline since the end of the Cold War. Understanding IR liberalism nevertheless requires acquaintance with the historical context in which the broader political arguments for freedom and toleration were first enunciated. The chapter thus provides a brief historical outline of liberalism's development before surveying some key liberal tenets and their manifestation in IR. It concludes with a discussion of some of the challenges facing contemporary IR liberalism in the current era.

Liberalism

Liberalism is often seen as the characteristic political philosophy of the modern West. Its central principles – freedom, (human) rights, reason, progress, toleration – and the norms of constitutionalism and democracy are deeply embedded in Western political culture. Nonetheless, liberal theories of IR were until recently disdained as utopian by IR scholars no less than by diplomats. The two World Wars and the Cold War seemed to bear out the realist thesis that the international milieu was inevitably subject to the harsh imperatives of power politics.

For a while after the Cold War, however, the world suddenly looked quite different. There was no hostile power threatening the liberal democracies, major inter-state war seemed unthinkable and the international economy was organised in accordance with the norms of the liberal market (Friedman 1999; Fukuyama 1989). The predominant school of liberal IR theory, most strongly represented in the United States, concentrated almost exclusively on this moment of liberal triumph, invoking the insights of democratic peace theory (DPT), US-led institutionalism and the transformative power of the global marketplace as intrinsic to winning the Cold War (Doyle, 1983, 1986; Friedman 1999; Fukuyama, 1989; Kegley, 1993; Keohane, 1984).

In more recent times, this scenario and its dominant theoretical explanations have come under challenge from a variety of sources. In the face of terrorist threats, the crisis in the global capitalist order after 2008, the rise in global inequality and the many problems facing contemporary democratic societies, one sees widespread scepticism concerning the analytical capacity of mainstream IR liberalism to find even adequate explanations, let alone answers, for these contemporary issues from its base in a (mainly) positivist methodology (see Sterling-Folker 2015).

Summary

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the long history, nature and significance of terrorism for International Relations (IR). It first addresses the topic's recent prominence. Terrorism is by no means the most brutal type of violence, especially in comparison with wars in which states have killed millions of people. But it garners outsized attention through its symbolic nature. Only by educating ourselves can we rob terrorism of the source of its power. Second, it addresses key academic debates, which always go back to the definition. The chapter argues that there are core areas of international agreement about what a terrorist act is, and that it can and should be distinguished from other types of violence. Third, it lays out intellectual frameworks that help us understand and analyse terrorism, including types of terrorism, historical patterns and the strategies used by terrorist groups. The chapter concludes with reflections about what is at stake in countering this type of illegitimate act.

Terrorist violence is an enduring part of the human experience. Its ancient roots are traceable at least back to the first century CE, when the Jewish Sicarii publicly killed prominent men in Jerusalem with knives (sica) and terrorised the population of Judea. Yet the word ‘terrorism’, with its pejorative connotations, is contested. Some people think it is so contentious that we should not use it at all. Unfortunately, that would make it impossible to study, and no one denies that terrorism exists.

Another way to think about the concept of terrorism in international relations is to consider it as complicated as the words ‘war’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘revolution’. All of them reflect their political and historical contexts. They all have grey areas about which people argue, as well as core elements upon which there is consensus. At its heart, and regardless of whether we agree with the causes behind its use, terrorism is an act of illegitimate violence that hurts innocent people and violates long-standing legal and moral norms.

When and why did this issue become important to the study of International Relations?

The study of terrorism predates the establishment of international relations as an academic discipline, but it has never been as distinct and prominent it is now. Initially, terrorism was an interdisciplinary topic cutting across older disciplines such as history, economics, sociology, philosophy and political theory.

Summary

Introduction

This chapter examines what causes war between states. First, I briefly address some preliminary questions: When/why did the causes of war become important to the study of International Relations (IR)? What is at stake in this issue? Why does it matter? To whom? The next section outlines some of the major issues and debates in this subject-field of IR with reference to a few selected landmark contributions over the last several decades. The following section presents what I regard as the most useful set of concepts for analysing and understanding this topic.

Before I begin the discussion, I should clarify that, usually – and this is the practice I follow in this chapter – only those interstate armed conflicts with more than a certain number of total battle deaths are treated as ‘war’. IR scholars generally set this minimum at around 1000 in line with the ‘Correlates of War Project’ definition (Singer and Small 1972: 381). The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), with just one ‘battle’ death – of an American U2 pilot shot down over Cuba – was clearly not ‘war’ by this definition, whereas the Falklands War (1982), resulting in about 950 battle deaths, is usually treated as ‘war’; ‘not to count it [as war because the number fell below the 1000 mark] would be splitting hairs’ (Russett 1993: 12).

Interestingly, war has not always been regarded as a problem requiring serious scholarly attention to its causes. Strange though it may now seem, some thinkers and practitioners – especially of the nineteenth century – held a benign or even positive view of war. Especially through the experience of World War I, however, a contrary view that sees war in a negative way – as a criminal act or a pathological state requiring prevention and remedy – has become dominant. Our interest in the causes of war rather than, say, heroic deeds on the battlefield is a reflection of this broad shift in our attitude towards war. Since this shift was also a key factor in the formation of IR as an academic discipline, it is unsurprising that inquiry into the causes of war has been a traditional concern of that subject (see Introduction).

Summary

Introduction

This chapter introduces students to the post-conflict state-building agenda. Identifying the end of the Cold War, the rise of the discourse of humanitarian intervention and the events of 9/11, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as key to the development of this agenda, the chapter focuses on the main areas of contention and debate in this field. In particular, it seeks to highlight debates over the political content of post conflict statebuilding, and notes that more recent developments have slowed the impetus of this agenda. The chapter closes with a brief consideration of the impacts of the post-conflict state-building agenda, and asks where that agenda might head from here.

The rise of post-conflict state-building

State-building became the international community's default answer when presented with the need to respond to calls for help by severely weakened or beleaguered governments (as in the Solomon Islands), the dissolution of certain regimes (as in Afghanistan and Iraq) or the complete creation of new political authorities (as in Kosovo and East Timor). From 1999, such projects increasingly were seen as a potential panacea for solving conflict and cementing peace and security.

Although there were some historical precedents in the form of the post-World War II rebuilding of Japan and Germany, as noted in Box 30.1, the motivation for external actors to be involved in the building of states in post-conflict sites has predominantly been a post-Cold War and post-9/11 affair.

Summary

Introduction

The Cold War was the most important feature of the international system in the second half of the twentieth century. The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States shaped the contours of conflict and cooperation among states and peoples between 1945 and 1991. Although the conflict did not drive all aspects of international relations, its impact could be felt in every corner of the globe. Whether in Helsinki or Hanoi, Santiago or Sydney, the influence of geopolitical and ideological conflict was unmistakable. More importantly, the Cold War created rivalries and political faultlines that continue to shape international relations more than twenty-five years after the conflict ended.

The Cold War was a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States (see Box 10.1). The two powers that emerged from World War II as pre-eminent in world politics became engaged in a protracted global contest that, although actual combat between them never eventuated, involved the largest and most destructive military arsenals in history. The two camps could potentially destroy the entire planet thousands of times over with their nuclear weapons, and each side's military was on a hair-trigger for the conflict's duration. It was a dispute that was driven both by traditional concerns about security – each felt the other threatening to its survival and its interests – as well as by ideological antagonism. Both embodied universal ideologies that asserted the superiority of their social system over all others. In this respect, the Cold War was as much a contest about how to organise society as it was a competition for strategic influence and nuclear superiority.

BOX 10.1: TERMINOLOGY

Cold War: Meanings and temperature

The term ‘Cold War’ is generally used in two ways. First, it refers to the global contest for influence and power between the United States and Soviet Union and their respective allies, normally dated to between 1948 and 1991. Second, it is also used to label a broader period of international history in which the conflict was the pre-eminent feature of international politics. In spite of the many wars that were caused directly or indirectly by Soviet–American rivalry, such as in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, the conflict is referred to as ‘cold’ because, although there were near-misses, such as Cuba in 1962, direct military action between the two protagonists never eventuated.

Summary

Introduction

This chapter examines the rise and growth of human rights. First, it discusses the historical development of human rights. Second, it outlines how human rights are understood today. Third, it explains how the liberal universalism that lies behind human rights has come up against cultural resistance. Finally, the chapter touches on some challenges that lie ahead in the struggle for human rights.

The concept of Human rights has become one of the central political doctrines of international politics. This is a remarkable state of affairs, given that only seventy years ago the idea, while championed by some, had little or no traction on the behaviour of states with one another. The end of World War II was the key marker in the birth of the human rights movement as we know it today. Prior to that war, human rights – or ‘the rights of man’ as they were known then – had few political supporters in international relations. The doctrines of realism, or realpolitik, seemed an accurate description of international politics and stood opposed to the kinds of idealism and moralism that the idea of human rights was thought to embody. Importantly, too, the idea of universal rights had fallen on hard times in intellectual terms, being subject to various critiques which undermined its authority and persuasive power.

World War II was one of a series of tragedies that gripped the world in the twentieth century. The particularly horrific atrocities manifested by Germany through the Holocaust precipitated a radical change in the structures of international politics, and in the place that moral concerns were given within those structures. The international system underwent a crisis of legitimacy, and one component of the restoration of that legitimacy was the emergence of the modern human rights movement. Above all else, this movement sought to establish minimum standards for the behaviour of states in order for them to have legitimate standing in the international community.

These standards were expressed through, and were to be monitored and implemented by, a new organisation founded after World War II, the United Nations. Human rights were articulated in the UN Charter. In 1948, the key document of the human rights movement was promulgated by the United Nations: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Summary

Introduction

This chapter makes three main arguments. First, ideas and practices of diplomacy have a multi-millennial history – much longer than is generally thought. Second, this long history has been characterised by both continuity and change. As a result, diplomacy has been as much adaptive as resistant to change. Third, diplomacy is not diminishing in importance and both it and the diplomats who carry it out should be regarded as evolving and as important to the theory and practice of international relations. To assess these claims, the chapter first addresses the issue of defining diplomacy, before examining the evolution of diplomacy in terms that may be characterised broadly as pre-modern, modern and postmodern. The relationship between diplomacy and the study of international relations (IR) is then evaluated.

Summary

Introduction

This chapter reflects on the tradition of political thought known as realism. Its main purposes are to identify who realists are and to explain what realism is in the study of international relations. The first part of the chapter introduces students to some important thinkers – both ancient and modern – ascribed to the realist tradition of thought. It also identifies two broad strands of realist thought: ‘classical’ and ‘structural’, or ‘neorealist’. The chapter then investigates attempts to conceive realism as a unified theory and practice of international relations. It highlights realism's central concepts of the state and anarchy before reflecting on realism's normative dimension.

Historically, realism has been the dominant theory of International Relations (IR) and a point of reference for alternative theories –even if only critically. It aspires to be suprahistorical, explaining in all epochs the fundamental features of international politics, particularly conflict and war. Emerging in the 1930s, realism's polemical target was the progressive, reformist optimism connected with liberal internationalists such as American president Woodrow Wilson. Against this optimism, realism comported a more pessimistic outlook that was felt to be necessary in the tragic realm of international politics.

Realists lay claim to a long tradition of political thought, including such eminent thinkers as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, whose point of departure is the study of conflict and power politics. According to realists, conflict is inevitable – even necessary – in international politics. When disputes cannot be resolved peacefully or diplomatically, force – which ultimately leads to war – is viewed as a decisive means of settling matters. Insofar as order exists in international relations, it is the precarious product of the balance of power or hegemony (supremacy by a great power and its allies), according to realists (Dehio 1963; Levy 1983). The pragmatic acceptance of conflict and power politics is essential to realism's outlook. But who are the realists? And what is realism? This chapter provides answers these two questions.

Realism is best understood as both an eclectic and plural tradition of thought, rather than a theory as such, and a practical guide to the politics of international relations. Realists are political theorists and practitioners who, since the interwar years (1918–38), have self-consciously subscribed to this tradition of thought. They know the relationship between theory and practice is complex.

Summary

Introduction

This chapter introduces students to the range of theoretical perspectives and issues that have animated the study of international relations through the years. First, it explains why theoretical reflection is indispensable to explaining and understanding international relations. Second, it addresses unavoidable ontological and epistemological issues in the quest for theoretical understanding. Third, it traces the growth of mainstream international relations theory. Finally, it analyses the rise of diverse critical approaches to the study of international relations.

The necessity of theory

Attitudes toward ‘theory’ vary among students of International Relations (IR). Some are wary of it, some are frightened of it and some are hostile to it. Theory, it is often proclaimed, is too difficult, too abstract or irrelevant to the real world. Thankfully, these attitudes are changing as IR students in the twenty-first century embrace the theoretical challenges of IR and become aware of sophisticated debates concerning the role of theory in understanding and explaining the real world of which they speak of and in which they live. These debates illustrate that theorising is not something one can choose to avoid; rather, in the process of giving meaning to the things, people, events and controversies in the world, we are engaged in a theoretical process – explicitly or otherwise.

In particular, we cannot simply observe the everyday world of international relations without giving theoretical meaning to what we are seeing. And in this process of observation, we might well bestow different meanings on the same event, as we theorise these ‘real-world’ things in different ways. For example, when we see governments in the United States, the United Kingdom or Australia ramping up their political and strategic responses to Russian ‘expansionist’ inclinations in Eastern Europe and/or similarly perceived Chinese activities in the South China Sea, how are we to make meaningful judgements of these actions? Is this a prudent and justifiable strategy in the face of an otherwise growing threat to Western global interests, or a series of shallow and short-sighted responses to historical and geostrategic complexities likely to enhance anti-Western sentiments and accelerate the very attitudes and behaviours they seek to deter?

Summary

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the contemporary political debates surrounding globalisation. It illustrates the main features of protests against the social consequences of a globalised economy, and it identifies some of the key political issues that scholars and students of International Relations (IR) must face when addressing the promotion of justice and effective governance within a more densely connected world.

Introduced in the mid-1990s, the term ‘globalisation’ has entered common usage and become a central issue in public debates in most countries around the world. Globalisation has come to be associated with the controversial social outcomes that have stemmed from an increasingly integrated global economy, and the resulting public disquiet and controversy around the world, particularly as symbolised by the 1999 protests in Seattle against the World Trade Organization (WTO). This controversy has continued in the form of more recent protests in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008–09. Globalisation has also become an important – although essentially contested – concept within the field of IR and other social science disciplines. It is therefore essential to understand what globalisation means.

Understanding globalisation

Globalisation is a messy term that encompasses a wide variety of human activity. As you may be aware, there are trade statistics and other economic facts that suggest the world is becoming increasingly globally integrated (Held and McGrew 2007). Nevertheless, facts do not tell the whole story. Consequently, in an effort to systematise the examination of globalisation, a variety of scholars have advanced arguments about what globalisation means. The seminal globalisation work, Global Transformations, offers a systematic study of the history and nature of globalisation and suggests three explanations for contemporary global integration (Held et al. 1999) (see Box 28.1). The first is hyperglobalisation, a position held by liberals like Kenichi Ohmae (1995), who claims that globalisation represents a recent and near-complete triumph of liberal values and global markets that is tightly integrating states and people around the world. Such researchers argue that globalisation is a significant force for human progress.

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Frontmatter

Contents

Table of Cases

10 - Collective Security

Summary

Conclusion

Summary

2 - The Course of War

Summary

9 - Collective Self-Defence

Summary

List of contributors

Glossary of terms

8 - Theories of global justice

Summary

2 - Liberalism

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29 - Terrorism

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15 - The causes of war

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30 - Post-conflict state-building

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10 - The Cold War and after

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32 - Human rights

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20 - Diplomacy

Summary

3 - Realism

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1 - International relations theory in an era of critical diversity

Summary

28 - Globalisation and its critics

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