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Much of what is commonly known about South Africa centers on a single reality: this is probably one of the most racialized societies on earth. South African society is notorious for how, over the course of a century and a half, its economic, social, and political system systematically structured identities, interests, and institutions in that country on an explicitly racialized basis. The country is also rightly famous however for the courageous, multifaceted, and long-standing attempts to oppose that system, for the struggle to build a more just and free society, and for its apparently miraculous transition to a multiracial democracy in the mid 1990s. This struggle in turn has constructed an alternate set of identities, interests, and institutions. More recently, South Africa has continued to capture headlines for the challenges and difficulties associated with the attempts to consolidate democracy in a society that remains, socially and economically speaking, radically unequal – albeit now increasingly in terms of class rather than, as it was previously, in terms of race.
For much of the country’s history, the dominant rules of the game that governed both political and economic life were built around the deliberate construction of race – or attempts to erode and challenge it. From at least the 1700s until 1994, those rules overwhelmingly favored white settlers and their descendants while other South Africans were systematically excluded from access to political and economic power. Throughout, this exclusion was most forcefully directed at Africans. Racialized identities shaped how most South Africans came to identify their interests, often overriding (if never quite eliminating) the importance of other identities such as class and gender; they structured also the society’s key institutions, both formal and informal, political and economic. In particular, the racialization of politics built a very particular kind of state – one of the strongest and richest on the continent, but one that explicitly sought to meet the needs only of a small fraction of the society. This was especially true under the National Party (NP) government.
Japan is a fascinating country for political scientists to study. Japan’s interests, identities, and institutions have both been shaped by and played a significant role in shaping the global order.
Within a little more than a century from its opening to the West in 1853, Japan went from being an isolated feudal society to one of the world’s richest economies and most stable democracies. In the transition, Japan experienced a wide range of political forms, including a shogunate, imperial rule with an emperor supported (or controlled) by oligarchs, a kind of imperial democracy, military (some argue fascist) rule, and empire.
From 1945 until 1952, Japan was occupied by the U.S.-led Allied forces. The postwar Japanese Constitution, which was heavily inl uenced by the occupying forces, renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and places sovereignty in the hands of the people. Japan’s subsequent political transition to democracy is among one of the most successful cases in the world of democratic consolidation. It is also a case of where democracy was largely imposed from outside. By the end of the Occupation, Japan was viewed as an important U.S. ally in the Pacii c . Japan’s security has been guaranteed by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty ever since. Because Japan does not function as a “normal” state in the realpolitik sense of the word (that is, as a state that wields power through military strength), Japan has had to rely on economic and “sot ” power in its foreign relations. Some in Japan are eager to rewrite the constitution while others wish to retain its pacifist core.
Britain is widely regarded as having a political system that is a model for the rest of the world. It is a vigorously competitive democracy in which the rule of law is firmly established and individual freedoms are well protected. The constitutional order has been functioning for centuries, undisturbed by wars or revolutions. The experience of countries in the “third wave” of democratization, during the 1970s and 1980s, seems to confirm that parliamentary systems are more successful than presidential systems in reconciling conflicting interests in society and, hence, promoting less violence and greater stability.
However, the British system entered into a profound crisis in the 1970s, from which it has not yet emerged. Social changes have eroded the class structure that was the foundation of the two-party system. No party won a clear majority in the 2010 general election, resulting in the first coalition government in sixty-five years. Parliamentary sovereignty has been weakened by the need to conform to the laws of the European Union (EU), which Britain joined in 1973. Other important constitutional developments since the 1990s include a stronger role for the judiciary as a check on executive power, and the introduction of parliaments for Scotland and Wales for the first time in three hundred years. However, successive governments have been unable to come up with a viable plan to reform the unelected upper chamber of Parliament, the House of Lords. Britain finds itself headed into the twenty-first century with a system whose basic features were laid down in the nineteenth century.
China has one of the world’s most ancient civilizations, dating back more than 3,000 years. It is easy for political scientists studying China to emphasize its uniqueness, as Chinese culture, language, political thought, and history appear quite different from those of any of the major Western countries. Modern Chinese history was obviously punctuated with decisive Western impacts, but the way China responded to those impacts is often considered to be uniquely Chinese. Furthermore, Chinese political leaders themselves frequently stress that they represent movements that carry uniquely Chinese characteristics. China, it seems, can only be understood in its own light.
When put in a global and comparative context, however, China loses many of its unique features. Imperial China, or the Qing dynasty, was an agricultural empire when it met the first serious wave of challenges from the West during the middle of the nineteenth century. The emperor and the mandarins (high-ranking Chinese officials) were forced to give up their treasured institutions grudgingly after a series of humiliating defeats at the hands of the Westerners. This pattern resembled what occurred in many traditional political systems when confronted with aggression from the West. From that time on, the momentum for political development in China was driven by global competition and the need for national survival. China differed from other cases in the developing world mainly in the immense dimensions of the country, not in the nature of its response.
For most of the period since its independence in 1947, India has been led by the Congress Party. This party, descended from the independence movement once led by Mahatma Gandhi, has been generally committed to a secular, democratic Indian nation in which members of ethnic or religious groups would equally enjoy the benefits of citizenship. Congress’s main competitor, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, or the Indian People’s Party), descended from political and social organizations committed to redefining Indian national identity in terms of Hinduttva (Hindu culture and civilization). Although these parties have been sharply critical of each other and have embraced quite different stances on identity politics, both have been committed to boosting India’s economic growth, facilitating India’s integration into global markets, and increasing India’s military capabilities and geopolitical influence. Although it was the BJP who was in power when India joined the “nuclear club” in 1998, the underground nuclear tests required years of preparation during the years when Congress had been in power. After 9/11, both BJP (until 2004) and Congress (from 2004 to 2014), despite some differences in rhetoric, supported cooperation with the United States in the “war on terror.” Although Congress was more attentive to the problems of rural poverty and food security, it was difficult to discern a major shift in economic policy or in the general commitment to liberalization when the Congress-led government took over in 2004. A decade later, mounting frustration over slower growth and persistent corruption helped the BJP and its allies trounce Congress on a platform of better governance and higher efficiency. There is little reason, however, to expect any dramatic changes in policy.
Mexico provides an interesting case study of a transition between the late industrializers such as Russia and China, on the one hand, and the recently developing nations such as India and Nigeria on the other. Whereas the former experienced decolonization in the middle of the twentieth century, Mexico’s independence from Spain was achieved more than a century earlier. Nonetheless, the process of industrialization for Mexico did not begin in earnest until about the 1930s, not much before when the countries discussed later in this text began their jump from predominantly agrarian economies into the industrial age.
The other interesting pattern to note is that Mexico experienced a major political and economic revolution at roughly the same time that Russia did. Indeed, the date in which Mexico’s revolution was enshrined in constitutional form was 1917, the same year the Bolsheviks took over Russia. Although not as extreme in terms of confiscating the factors of production as Russia, the Mexican system that was established following its revolution had a socialist flavor to it; communal farms were created and several industries were eventually nationalized or put under close regulatory management of the state. What is more surprising, at least to the comparative political scientists, is that the political and economic system that was created during the Mexican revolution also began unraveling at the same time the Soviet Union began its process of collapse. However, unlike the USSR, Mexico’s transition to a more democratic polity was more gradual, with the dominant party that emerged from the earlier revolution – the Institutional Revolutionary Party – remaining a significant political player in the new liberalized order.
In October 1990, the East German state (the German Democratic Republic – GDR) collapsed and its territory and people were absorbed by West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany – FRG), even though just months before almost no one had expected this to happen. Western troops did not fire a single shot; easterners were fleeing to the West. Yet, the strange fate of East Germany makes sense as part of Germany’s path through the modern world, which has been influenced strongly by external political and economic challenges. A precarious military-strategic position in Europe made it difficult for one German polity to rule over everyone who is in one way or another conceivably German. Even today, millions of German-speaking people and considerable territories that were formerly governed by German rulers remain outside of the unified state. Germany’s economic success as a middle-developer means that the country still has powerful influence beyond its own borders: in the wake of the recession of 2008–2010, other European governments called for more German assistance and cooperation even as they feared heavy-handed intervention and criticized Germany’s reluctance to provide more resources.
The challenges that Germans faced and their responses were characteristic of what happens when a major power takes a middle path through political and economic development. Germany was at a disadvantage with respect to the early developers. In politics, German rulers could not match France in establishing strong central authority over a vast territory. In economics, German industrial development lagged behind Britain’s. Along with these military and economic disadvantages, however, the rapid diffusion of new ideas into Germany offered certain opportunities. Germany’s newer bureaucracies skipped over incremental improvements to traditional practices and instead adopted only the latest and best organizational techniques. German industries, unimpeded by false starts, implemented advanced technology on a massive scale. In the struggle with the early developers, Germany developed powerful political institutions (a professional army and an authoritarian monarchy), mobilizing identities (ethnic conceptions of nation), and significant economic interests (heavy industry and labor-repressive agriculture), all of which imperiled liberalism and democracy.
At the turn of the twentieth century, Iran embarked on a path to development that was typical of many late developers. Iran’s experience, however, has proved to be unique. Development was accompanied by ideological conflicts that culminated in a religiously inspired revolution in 1979. In the process, a modernizing monarchy gave place to the theocratic and revolutionary politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran (the official name of Iran since the revolution). As populism changed the character of the economy and Islamic ideology (a political doctrine based on Islam) transformed Iranian society, its norms, institutions, and, for a time at least, pursuit of its interests were subsumed under preservation of identity. Since the revolution, the nature of development has been complex, revealing modernizing impulses tempered by the pressures of Islamic ideology. Beyond its ideological and institutional particularities, the Islamic Republic shares many of the characteristics and problems of populist authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the developing world: a bloated public sector, mismanagement, and corruption.
There are three distinct and yet interrelated periods in Iran’s modern development: the early and later Pahlavi (the dynasty that ruled Iran from 1925 to 1979); those of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925–1941) and Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941–1979); and the Islamic Republic (1979–present). There is greater continuity between the first two periods, under the Pahlavi monarchs, although there are notable differences as well. The Reza Shah period coincided with the rise of the modern Iranian state and started the process of development. The Muhammad Reza Shah period continued in the footsteps of the first period but accelerated the pursuit of modernization. Development under the second Pahlavi monarch was, moreover, conditioned by different global influences and domestic sociopolitical identities and interests. The Islamic Republic has been distinct from the earlier periods in its ideological orientation and in many aspects of its economic policies and political characteristics. Above and beyond their differences in ideological orientation or policy choices, the three periods are similar in the dominant role of the state in development. The basis of Iran’s path in the modern world is to be found in the historical circumstances in which Iran first embarked on development.
Imagine that you could design the political order for a country of your choosing. Where would you start? Who would get to rule? What rules for political life would you choose? Could you make rules that would be fair to everyone? If not, whom would these rules favor and whom would they disadvantage? Would they be rules that even those at the bottom of the social order, the poorest and least powerful people, would agree to? What would be the procedures for changing the rules? These are difficult questions because to answer them in a meaningful way requires an understanding of why and how different countries of the world are governed differently. With so many choices to make, it is easy to see why the job of designing a constitution would be such a difficult one.
It could, however, be made easier. One might start by evaluating the existing possibilities as exemplified by the various forms of government in the states of the world. The state is an organization that possesses sovereignty over a territory and its people. Yet, within our world of states, no two are ruled in exactly the same way. Why should this be the case? Why are societies run, and political orders designed, in so many different ways? What consequences do these differences hold for a people’s well-being?
In the previous chapter, we outlined our basic approach to comparative politics. In short, we see the world as made up of competing “regime types,” such as democracy, authoritarianism, fascism, and communism, which emerged in specific global and historical contexts and which shape domestic interests, identities, and institutions in particular ways. The success or failure of a given regime in one part of the world, in turn, can have dramatic effects on the global environment, influencing the domestic politics of other countries in powerful and sometimes surprising ways.
Any global order thus involves competition in world-historical space and time that affects the evolution of states. Here are the questions comparativists ask: What was the competitive international situation in which a state found itself when it attempted to modernize and industrialize? Who were its principal rivals and competitors among sovereign states? In other words, who developed first, had a head start, and could serve as a benchmark? And who developed later, had to play catch-up in order not to be left behind, and hence looked for negative and positive role models?
Students of comparative politics readily admit that the European Union is an implausible construct. As a rule, sovereign states guard their government authority and national independence zealously. So why would mature democracies agree to effectively reduce their policy independence and compromise their national sovereignty by transferring many areas of decision making to a supranational organization?
The answer goes back to the impact of international economic and security arrangements on European countries, many of which are small and trade-dependent. European heads of government agreed to an expansion of supranational European decision making in order to compete in the postwar world economy and cope with the post-1945 security dilemmas.
The story begins at the end of World War Two. In 1951, France and Germany – with the blessing of the United States – agreed to an economic, political, and trade partnership that also included Italy and three small export-dependent economies: Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands (Benelux). The first agreement sought to address the threat of communism and Soviet aggression while at the same time finding a politically palatable way to incorporate the new Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic alliance.
January 1, 2014 marked the centenary of the founding of Nigeria as a country. Competing interests, identities, and institutions have all played a central role in shaping the country’s developmental path from the precolonial through the colonial to the postcolonial era. In each of these historical periods, Nigeria’s material interests, identities, and institutions have in turn been shaped by the international environment in which its roughly 174 million people and over 250 ethno-linguistic groups have interacted among themselves and with the outside world in their quest for modernity. What makes Nigerian politics interesting is the constant changes in and interactions of these material interests, identities, and institutions – often arising from domestic, regional, and global pressures – and the myriad ways in which they have either been accommodated or rejected by the given political order.
The combination of these four mutually interacting variables – interests, identities, institutions, and the global context – provides a robust framework for analyzing the events that have shaped the political life of this fascinating country. We will situate Nigerian politics within the global context by answering the following set of questions: What are the global and domestic factors that have shaped Nigeria’s development path, from the precolonial through colonial and post-independence eras? How have these factors shaped the interests, identities, and institutions that, in turn, have shaped these development paths? We will also weave into the narrative the local and domestic political and economic threats Nigeria has faced as it navigates its way through the modern world. As the story moves along, we will evaluate the principles and values upheld by the Nigerian government in terms of whether they are considered legitimate by people in other countries, or are shunned as immoral or outmoded. The second set of questions that will be woven into the story concerns how Nigerian politicians and ordinary citizens have adopted domestic interests, identities, and institutions in response to the global challenges they face. The “interests” of Nigerian peoples can be assessed by asking the following questions: What are the major goals of politicians, businesses, civil associations, and ordinary citizens, and what strategies have they adopted to achieve them? The identities of Nigerians can be assessed by exploring the values, norms, ideological beliefs, and emotions that shape their worldviews most profoundly.