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Mexico provides an interesting case study of a transition between the late industrializers such as Russia and China, on the one hand, and the recently developing nations such as India and Nigeria on the other. Whereas the former experienced decolonization in the middle of the twentieth century, Mexico’s independence from Spain was achieved more than a century earlier. Nonetheless, the process of industrialization for Mexico did not begin in earnest until about the 1930s, not much before when the countries discussed later in this text began their jump from predominantly agrarian economies into the industrial age.
The other interesting pattern to note is that Mexico experienced a major political and economic revolution at roughly the same time that Russia did. Indeed, the date in which Mexico’s revolution was enshrined in constitutional form was 1917, the same year the Bolsheviks took over Russia. Although not as extreme in terms of confiscating the factors of production as Russia, the Mexican system that was established following its revolution had a socialist flavor to it; communal farms were created and several industries were eventually nationalized or put under close regulatory management of the state. What is more surprising, at least to the comparative political scientists, is that the political and economic system that was created during the Mexican revolution also began unraveling at the same time the Soviet Union began its process of collapse. However, unlike the USSR, Mexico’s transition to a more democratic polity was more gradual, with the dominant party that emerged from the earlier revolution – the Institutional Revolutionary Party – remaining a significant political player in the new liberalized order.
In October 1990, the East German state (the German Democratic Republic – GDR) collapsed and its territory and people were absorbed by West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany – FRG), even though just months before almost no one had expected this to happen. Western troops did not fire a single shot; easterners were fleeing to the West. Yet, the strange fate of East Germany makes sense as part of Germany’s path through the modern world, which has been influenced strongly by external political and economic challenges. A precarious military-strategic position in Europe made it difficult for one German polity to rule over everyone who is in one way or another conceivably German. Even today, millions of German-speaking people and considerable territories that were formerly governed by German rulers remain outside of the unified state. Germany’s economic success as a middle-developer means that the country still has powerful influence beyond its own borders: in the wake of the recession of 2008–2010, other European governments called for more German assistance and cooperation even as they feared heavy-handed intervention and criticized Germany’s reluctance to provide more resources.
The challenges that Germans faced and their responses were characteristic of what happens when a major power takes a middle path through political and economic development. Germany was at a disadvantage with respect to the early developers. In politics, German rulers could not match France in establishing strong central authority over a vast territory. In economics, German industrial development lagged behind Britain’s. Along with these military and economic disadvantages, however, the rapid diffusion of new ideas into Germany offered certain opportunities. Germany’s newer bureaucracies skipped over incremental improvements to traditional practices and instead adopted only the latest and best organizational techniques. German industries, unimpeded by false starts, implemented advanced technology on a massive scale. In the struggle with the early developers, Germany developed powerful political institutions (a professional army and an authoritarian monarchy), mobilizing identities (ethnic conceptions of nation), and significant economic interests (heavy industry and labor-repressive agriculture), all of which imperiled liberalism and democracy.
At the turn of the twentieth century, Iran embarked on a path to development that was typical of many late developers. Iran’s experience, however, has proved to be unique. Development was accompanied by ideological conflicts that culminated in a religiously inspired revolution in 1979. In the process, a modernizing monarchy gave place to the theocratic and revolutionary politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran (the official name of Iran since the revolution). As populism changed the character of the economy and Islamic ideology (a political doctrine based on Islam) transformed Iranian society, its norms, institutions, and, for a time at least, pursuit of its interests were subsumed under preservation of identity. Since the revolution, the nature of development has been complex, revealing modernizing impulses tempered by the pressures of Islamic ideology. Beyond its ideological and institutional particularities, the Islamic Republic shares many of the characteristics and problems of populist authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the developing world: a bloated public sector, mismanagement, and corruption.
There are three distinct and yet interrelated periods in Iran’s modern development: the early and later Pahlavi (the dynasty that ruled Iran from 1925 to 1979); those of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925–1941) and Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941–1979); and the Islamic Republic (1979–present). There is greater continuity between the first two periods, under the Pahlavi monarchs, although there are notable differences as well. The Reza Shah period coincided with the rise of the modern Iranian state and started the process of development. The Muhammad Reza Shah period continued in the footsteps of the first period but accelerated the pursuit of modernization. Development under the second Pahlavi monarch was, moreover, conditioned by different global influences and domestic sociopolitical identities and interests. The Islamic Republic has been distinct from the earlier periods in its ideological orientation and in many aspects of its economic policies and political characteristics. Above and beyond their differences in ideological orientation or policy choices, the three periods are similar in the dominant role of the state in development. The basis of Iran’s path in the modern world is to be found in the historical circumstances in which Iran first embarked on development.
Imagine that you could design the political order for a country of your choosing. Where would you start? Who would get to rule? What rules for political life would you choose? Could you make rules that would be fair to everyone? If not, whom would these rules favor and whom would they disadvantage? Would they be rules that even those at the bottom of the social order, the poorest and least powerful people, would agree to? What would be the procedures for changing the rules? These are difficult questions because to answer them in a meaningful way requires an understanding of why and how different countries of the world are governed differently. With so many choices to make, it is easy to see why the job of designing a constitution would be such a difficult one.
It could, however, be made easier. One might start by evaluating the existing possibilities as exemplified by the various forms of government in the states of the world. The state is an organization that possesses sovereignty over a territory and its people. Yet, within our world of states, no two are ruled in exactly the same way. Why should this be the case? Why are societies run, and political orders designed, in so many different ways? What consequences do these differences hold for a people’s well-being?
In the previous chapter, we outlined our basic approach to comparative politics. In short, we see the world as made up of competing “regime types,” such as democracy, authoritarianism, fascism, and communism, which emerged in specific global and historical contexts and which shape domestic interests, identities, and institutions in particular ways. The success or failure of a given regime in one part of the world, in turn, can have dramatic effects on the global environment, influencing the domestic politics of other countries in powerful and sometimes surprising ways.
Any global order thus involves competition in world-historical space and time that affects the evolution of states. Here are the questions comparativists ask: What was the competitive international situation in which a state found itself when it attempted to modernize and industrialize? Who were its principal rivals and competitors among sovereign states? In other words, who developed first, had a head start, and could serve as a benchmark? And who developed later, had to play catch-up in order not to be left behind, and hence looked for negative and positive role models?
Students of comparative politics readily admit that the European Union is an implausible construct. As a rule, sovereign states guard their government authority and national independence zealously. So why would mature democracies agree to effectively reduce their policy independence and compromise their national sovereignty by transferring many areas of decision making to a supranational organization?
The answer goes back to the impact of international economic and security arrangements on European countries, many of which are small and trade-dependent. European heads of government agreed to an expansion of supranational European decision making in order to compete in the postwar world economy and cope with the post-1945 security dilemmas.
The story begins at the end of World War Two. In 1951, France and Germany – with the blessing of the United States – agreed to an economic, political, and trade partnership that also included Italy and three small export-dependent economies: Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands (Benelux). The first agreement sought to address the threat of communism and Soviet aggression while at the same time finding a politically palatable way to incorporate the new Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic alliance.
January 1, 2014 marked the centenary of the founding of Nigeria as a country. Competing interests, identities, and institutions have all played a central role in shaping the country’s developmental path from the precolonial through the colonial to the postcolonial era. In each of these historical periods, Nigeria’s material interests, identities, and institutions have in turn been shaped by the international environment in which its roughly 174 million people and over 250 ethno-linguistic groups have interacted among themselves and with the outside world in their quest for modernity. What makes Nigerian politics interesting is the constant changes in and interactions of these material interests, identities, and institutions – often arising from domestic, regional, and global pressures – and the myriad ways in which they have either been accommodated or rejected by the given political order.
The combination of these four mutually interacting variables – interests, identities, institutions, and the global context – provides a robust framework for analyzing the events that have shaped the political life of this fascinating country. We will situate Nigerian politics within the global context by answering the following set of questions: What are the global and domestic factors that have shaped Nigeria’s development path, from the precolonial through colonial and post-independence eras? How have these factors shaped the interests, identities, and institutions that, in turn, have shaped these development paths? We will also weave into the narrative the local and domestic political and economic threats Nigeria has faced as it navigates its way through the modern world. As the story moves along, we will evaluate the principles and values upheld by the Nigerian government in terms of whether they are considered legitimate by people in other countries, or are shunned as immoral or outmoded. The second set of questions that will be woven into the story concerns how Nigerian politicians and ordinary citizens have adopted domestic interests, identities, and institutions in response to the global challenges they face. The “interests” of Nigerian peoples can be assessed by asking the following questions: What are the major goals of politicians, businesses, civil associations, and ordinary citizens, and what strategies have they adopted to achieve them? The identities of Nigerians can be assessed by exploring the values, norms, ideological beliefs, and emotions that shape their worldviews most profoundly.
Russia has long puzzled and surprised observers of international politics. For seven decades, Russia was at the center of a communist regime – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR – that competed with the United States for global supremacy (see Table 7.1 at the end of the chapter). After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russia suffered a prolonged period of political, military, and economic decay. During the first two terms of President Vladimir Putin, the Russian economy rebounded strongly, but this growth was accompanied by a return to political authoritarianism. In 2008, Putin defied many analysts’ expectations by stepping down as president to make way for his protégé Dmitry Medvedev and becoming prime minister instead; Putin then turned the tables by returning as president for a third term in 2012. There is no consensus among specialists about how the former communist superpower became so weak so quickly; nor do scholars agree in their evaluations of Putin’s efforts to revive the country. Indeed, it seems that Russia simply does not fit conventional analytic categories.
The United States and France have a long-standing love-hate relationship of mutual respect, envy, and suspicion. The French came to the rescue of the American revolutionaries in their War of Independence from Britain, and twice in the twentieth century, American soldiers proclaiming “Lafayette, we are here” helped France repel German invaders. Despite – or perhaps because of – their ancient alliance, France and the United States have suspected and accused one another of disloyalty and imperial ambitions. Eager to assert its autonomy after having become a nuclear power, France in 1966, for example, withdrew from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s U.S.-led integrated command structure. The day after September 11, France’s left-liberal newspaper of reference Le Monde headlined “ We are all Americans,” but in early 2003, when France failed to back the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the United States retaliated not only by renaming some favorite foods “freedom fries” and “freedom toast” but by trying to drive a wedge between the “old” and “new” Europe.
Ambivalence and occasional animosity have been not only diplomatic but cultural and popular as well. In American minds, France represents elegance and sophistication, but also snobbery, frivolity, and cowardice (during the Iraq War, Google responded to the search request “French military victories” with “Do you mean ‘French military defeats’?”). In French minds, Americans are naïve “big children,” whom they nonetheless admire for their dynamism and entrepreneurial spirit. While France in trade talks has fought the United States in favor of l’exception culturelle in order to protect French and world culture from “hollywoodization,” the French have lionized lowbrow comedian Jerry Lewis and adored kitsch-television series such as Starsky and Hutch.
In this chapter the major alternative non-pharmacological, non-synthetic replacement methods to treat disease and injury are introduced. These are various methods of regenerative medicine, which incorporate cell therapies, gene therapies and tissue engineering. The first two of these are mentioned briefly since they involve biomaterials only minimally. Tissue engineering concerns the regeneration of tissues or organs through the stimulation of cells so that they recapitulate the power that they have during tissue development, but which they substantially lose once tissues become mature. This recapitulation may be achieved by either molecular and mechanical signaling, or usually by both. The conventional tissue engineering paradigm involves harvesting cells and stimulating them ex vivo, and implanting the resulting construct into the patient at the appropriate time. Other techniques attempt to use the environment of the patient’s own body as the location for regeneration. We discuss here the types of materials that are used in the so-called scaffolds and matrices that form the template of the regenerated tissue and the interactions between these materials and the target cells. Tissue engineering processes have not yet become used in routine clinical practice and cannot at this stage be defined and classified as clearly as with implantable medical devices, but we do discuss their scientific and clinical status in a wide variety of situations.
Introduction to regenerative medicine
There are two stark conclusions that arise from the discussion of implantable medical devices given in the last chapter. First, although they can give very good performance, they will always be limited to situations involving mechanical or physical functions and will not, by themselves, be able to deal with conditions that require biological solutions. Secondly, even in those situations where the performance is good, it will always be less than 100% effective because so many variables impose themselves on the process, especially in the context of biocompatibility and the influence of clinical skills and patient compliance. Outcomes are variable and often unpredictable.
In this chapter you will be introduced to the principles of the structure and characteristics of materials in general, and the specific features of the main classes of practical materials. These are metals and alloys, the different forms of polymer-based materials, ceramics and glasses, composite materials and natural materials. This is followed by discussions on how these structures give rise to the specific properties of these material classes, with an emphasis on the mechanical and physical properties and the chemical stability of materials in various environments, especially the physiological environment. Attention is given to many different specialized materials that are now used in health care, including nanocomposites, quantum dots, polymeric micelles, dendrimers, hydrogels and biopolymers. The objective is to allow you to understand why these different materials have their own properties and how biomaterials can be designed to meet the very critical performance specifications required in medical technology.
Introduction
It is important to start reading this chapter with no preconceived ideas of what a material should look like or how it should perform. In order to understand and appreciate the high-performance, esoteric materials that are used in advanced engineering applications of the twenty-first century, including medical engineering, it does not help to have fixed in our minds the idea that a material has to look and behave as if it were a macroscopic, solid object that is made by some conventional manufacturing process and which we can hold in our hand and examine visually. Most of today’s sophisticated materials do not behave in a similar manner to the more traditional steel, plastic, textile, glass, concrete or wooden structures that have been the mainstay of materials engineering for many decades. We should not be constrained by concepts of state (materials do not have to be solid), of size (they may be macroscopic, microscopic or of nanoscale dimensions), of activity (they do not have to be inert but may be intentionally active, or even living) or of permanence (they may be intentionally biodegradable). They do not have to be manufactured by conventional means but may be formed in situ by self-assembly. In other words, a collection of intensively active, macromolecular self-assembled nanoparticles is just as much a material as the piece of forged titanium that constitutes the bulk of a total hip replacement prosthesis.
Biomaterials are crucial components of many health care products. They are in the news daily as we hear of new devices that allow deaf people to hear, and of techniques to return patients to a near normal life after a heart attack. Headlines tell us of titanium dental implants, ceramic artificial hips, carbon heart valves, collagen cosmetic injections and clear plastic lenses in the eye. Science magazines talk of new drug–biomaterial combinations that are radically altering cancer chemotherapy and immunotherapy and of nanoscale contrast agents that give far more power to MRI and CT imaging systems for better and earlier disease diagnosis. Biomaterials save lives and improve the quality of life for millions of people.
The science that underpins these advances is, not surprisingly, called biomaterials science. It has grown and developed from tentative beginnings half a century ago into a major academic and clinical discipline today. This science is both multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary since it brings together many classical disciplines of science, engineering and medicine, but also adds new knowledge that fits within the gaps between the classical subjects.
This chapter provides a new way of classifying biomaterials and gives extensive information about the wide range of biomaterials that are either in current clinical use or showing considerable potential for clinical applications in the near future. There are six primary classes of biomaterials – metallic, polymeric and ceramics systems, carbons, composites and engineered tissues. In each of these classes you will see how real biomaterials are based on the principles of materials science, biology and biocompatibility given in the early chapters but also how they are adapted and modified to suit the specific requirements of the various clinical disciplines and medical technologies.
In this chapter, we bring together the details of all currently used biomaterials and those that appear to have considerable potential for the future. This is an extensive although not exhaustive list of the properties and the applications for each material and gives a generic classification of biomaterials, with an indication of their advantages and disadvantages.