The Cambridge University Press and the editors of the new series of Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought have kindly invited me to produce a second edition of Kant's Political Writings, of which the first edition first appeared in an earlier series almost twenty years ago. They also agreed that the volume might be enlarged by three additional texts. To decide on the most suitable texts presented me with anything but an easy choice. The three suitable pieces chosen, the reviews of Herder's Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind, Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History and What Is Orientation in Thinking?, are not ‘political’ writings in the narrow sense of the word. They do, however, supply a context for the strictly political writings published in the first edition; for all of them illustrate Kant's critical approach to reasoning and his attitude to the public use of reason without which political justice could not, in his view, be achieved. What Is Orientation in Thinking? does so particularly clearly. It also introduces the reader to the moral basis of Kant's politics, while the other two texts illustrate Kant's conception of history, another pillar of his political thought. I greatly regret that there was no space to include the other pieces relating to politics mentioned in the preface to the first edition. Perhaps one day the constraints on space will be less pressing and all writings by Kant which refer to politics, including the whole of the Theory of Right, can be printed in a later edition.

In order to keep down printing costs and make the volume affordable by students the text of the first edition could not be substantially altered. For this reason, it has unfortunately not been possible to revise and enlarge my introduction itself. I have, however, been able to add a postscript in which I take up issues raised during the discussion of Kant's political thought over the past two decades. I have also provided a more extensive bibliography and a new index.

My thanks are due to Barry Nisbet for translating the additional texts and for giving me invaluable help by commenting on and checking my manuscript.

Kant's essay was occasioned by a dispute between Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86), a Jewish philosopher of Berlin with whom Kant corresponded and whom he esteemed greatly, and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), a writer and friend of Goethe's who had attacked Mendelssohn's interpretation of Spinoza. It was a bitter dispute because Jacobi had, in Mendelssohn's view, maligned the reputation of their late common friend, the writer and dramatist Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729—81) when he claimed that Lessing had been a follower of Spinoza and hence a pantheist who did not believe in a personal God. Mendelssohn rebutted this charge and maintained that Jacobi had misunderstood Lessing. Their argument is of historical interest only.

Kant's essay, however, provides an introduction to his critical philosophy and shows how his discussion of the theoretical use of reason, as argued in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Can Claim the Status of a Science ﹛Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können) (1783), necessarily leads on to the practical use of reason as defined in his writings on ethics (for instance, in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten) (1785)), which in turn provide the foundation of his political writing. Kant did not openly attack either of the two writings in question, but thought it necessary to defend his late friend Mendelssohn while at the same time pointing out some shortcomings in Mendelssohn's argument (Mendelssohn had put forward proofs for the existence of God which Kant held to be illegitimate). He proceeds to show that the belief in reason is a ‘signpost or compass'1 which enables us to orientate our thinking. The use of reason is necessary in order to limit our enquiries to what can, in principle, be discovered and to prevent us from seeking to discover what is beyond the boundaries of knowledge. But the right use of reason also makes it possible for us to act morally. We have to avoid falling victim to zealotry or superstition—that would even be politically dangerous, for it would sooner or later lead to political repression by the authorities who would not be willing to tolerate the spreading of foolish and subversive opinions.

Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind by Johann Gottfried Herder. Quern te Deus esse iussit et humana qua parte locatus es in re disce. Part One. 318 pp. Quarto. Hartknoch: Riga and Leipzig. 1784.

In this work, our ingenious and eloquent author displays those distinctive qualities of mind for which he has already gained recognition. For this reason, the work is perhaps as little subject to ordinary standards of judgement as are some of the other products of his pen. It is as if his genius did not simply bring together ideas from the broad sphere of the arts and sciences in order to supplement them with other ideas which might be communicated to others, but as if he adapted them, by a certain law of assimilation (to borrow his own expression) and in a way peculiar to himself, to his own specific mode of thinking. They thus become markedly different from those by which other minds are furthered and sustained (p.292), and are accordingly less capable of being communicated to others. Consequently, what he understands by the philosophy of the history of mankind may well be something quite different from what is usually understood by that term. His approach does not entail, for example, a logical precision in the definition of concepts or careful distinctions and consistency in the use of principles, but rather a cursory and comprehensive vision and a ready facility for discovering analogies, together with a bold imagination in putting these analogies to use. This is combined with an aptitude for arousing sympathy for his subject—which is always kept at an obscure distance—by means of feelings and sentiments; and these in turn, as the product of weighty thoughts or as highly significant pointers, lead us to expect more of them than cool assessment would ever be likely to discover. Nevertheless, since freedom of thought (which is present here in ample measure), as exercised by a fertile mind, always affords food for thought, we shall attempt as far as possible to extract the most important and characteristic of the author's ideas and to present them in his own words, adding in conclusion a few remarks concerning the whole.

This work begins with a preface and a general introduction. Its main body falls into two parts—The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Right and The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Virtue. The extracts included in the present edition are taken only from The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Right. They include the most important paragraphs from the introduction to this part of the work, and its second main section, which deals with The Theory of Public Right. In order to place the relevant passages in their proper context, I have provided a brief summary of the other sections preceding The Theory of Public Right.

In the preface to The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant points out that a complete metaphysics of right is impossible because completeness in an account of empirical matters is impossible. He refers only to The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Right because the second part, The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Virtue, was published at a later date. Kant also states that, in his treatise, he has put into the body of the text those arguments relating to the system of right which were arrived at by a priori reasoning and has relegated those relating to specific empirical cases to the notes. Kant then defends the apparent obscurity of his style by saying that it is impossible to aim at popularity in a work involving a system of criticism of the faculty of reason.

In his general introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant discusses the fundamental terms and presuppositions of this work, pointing out that science can make progress without explicit reference to a priori laws, but that the case of morality is different. Moral laws are laws only in so far as they have an a priori basis and are necessary. He explains why he distinguishes between legal and moral laws: the former admit of no incentive except that of duty, the latter do not.

A full account of this introduction would be too long to justify inclusion here. Kant proceeds to provide definitions for many of the terms which he uses, thus supplying a brief account of the principles underlying his moral philosophy (cf. my introduction pp. 17-21 for a brief discussion of his moral philosophy).

Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, the will's manifestations in the world of phenomena, i.e. human actions, are determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event. History is concerned with giving an account of these phenomena, no matter how deeply concealed their causes may be, and it allows us to hope that, if it examines the free exercise of the human will on a large scale, it will be able to discover a regular progression among freely willed actions. In the same way, we may hope that what strikes us in the actions of individuals as confused and fortuitous may be recognised, in the history of the entire species, as a steadily advancing but slow development of man's original capacities. Thus marriages, births, and deaths do not seem to be subject to any rule by which their numbers could be calculated in advance, since the free human will has such a great influence upon them; and yet the annual statistics for them in large countries prove that they are just as subject to constant natural laws as are the changes in the weather, which in themselves are so inconsistent that their individual occurrence cannot be determined in advance, but which nevertheless do not fail as a whole to sustain the growth of plants, the flow of rivers, and other natural functions in a uniform and uninterrupted course. Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest.

Since men neither pursue their aims purely by instinct, as the animals do, nor act in accordance with any integral, prearranged plan like rational cosmopolitans, it would appear that no law-governed history of mankind is possible (as it would be, for example, with bees or beavers). We can scarcely help feeling a certain distaste on observing their activities as enacted in the great world-drama, for we find that, despite the apparent wisdom of individual actions here and there, everything as a whole is made up of folly and childish vanity, and often of childish malice and destructiveness.

Immanuel Kant was born on 22 April 1724 in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) in East Prussia which, except for occasional journeys into the immediate vicinity, he hardly ever left during the whole of his long life of almost eighty years. Königsberg in the eighteenth century was a lively city which, owing to its flourishing trade, was by no means isolated from the world at large. Kant, who was anything but a recluse, enjoyed social life and intelligent conversation. He was friendly with many Königsberg merchants, among whom there were also Englishmen, two of whom, Green and Motherby, were particularly close friends. Although he was meticulous and regular in his habits, punctual to a fault, he was also a man of urbanity and wit.

Kant's parents were not rich. His father was a harness-maker who lived in Königsberg. His family was steeped in Pietism, the Protestant religious movement which stressed emotional religiosity and the development of the inner life. The pietistic atmosphere of his parents’ household was a formative influence in his childhood, and he was particularly impressed by his mother's simple piety. After the early death of his parents (his mother died in 1738, his father in 1746), Kant's relations with his family were not very close.

Kant's outstanding intellectual gifts were recognised at school. It was made possible for him to enter the University of Königsberg, where he was a brilliant student. In 1755 he was granted the right to lecture as Magister legem or Privatdozenty i.e. as an unsalaried lecturer who depended on his lecture fees for his income. Since his lectures were popular and since he gave a large number of them—twenty a week at least—he was able to eke out a meagre living. He lectured on many subjects—logic, metaphysics, ethics, theory of law, geography, anthropology etc. He began to make his name as a scholar and scientist by his writings. In his General History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens (1755), he Put forward a highly original account of the origin of the universe similar to the one later elaborated by the French scientist Laplace.