The scope of EU law is not to be underestimated: in 2010, the acquis consisted of around 8,400 regulations and nearly 2,000 directives in addition to the primary law in the Treaties. These measures are no longer limited to economic issues but now also include instruments regulating health and safety, discrimination, criminal justice, as well as migration and asylum. Since 1992, Justice and Home Affairs matters have been coordinated in the EU and the Lisbon Treaty fully incorporated all issues related to these themes. Policing is thus now an EU competence, although these matters for now remain beyond the scope of the CJEU. This chapter will explore the methods to oversee the application and enforcement of EU law. In 1957, enforcement was predominantly the responsibility of the Commission as ‘guardian’ of the Treaties, supported by the threat of litigation before the CJEU.

The European Union introduced ‘European Union citizenship’ in 1992. European Union citizens hold a citizenship that is linked to national citizenship. It is the only form of citizenship in the world that is acquired automatically by those who are nationals of a member state. Citizenship is complex and varied – some countries allow dual citizenship while others do not; individuals can change their citizenship or renounce it but states may not arbitrarily deprive a citizen of this status. As the EU is not a nation state, EU citizenship does not give Union citizens dual nationality. This chapter will explore the character of EU citizenship and the substance of the rights associated with it. EU citizenship may have been the idea that drove a wedge between the UK and the EU resulting in Brexit. A key question is whether it can be given enough substance to act as a ‘glue’ and bind the nationals in the twenty-seven EU member states. Furthermore, what is its value – is it an ‘inviolable’ status, giving rise to rights that exist regardless of any economic activity?

The essence of a human right is that it is afforded immediate protection, even if this protection is not absolute. Rights are ‘fundamental’ because their existence is not open to dispute, negotiation or compromise, although their substance is subject to interpretation. Rights are anchored in law and they underwrite legal as well as political action. Despite their interaction, human rights should not be equated with human rights law. This chapter will explore the appearance and evolution of human rights in EU law, paying particular attention to five themes: the history and systematisation of human rights in EU law; their initial appearance in EU law via adjudication rather than political deliberation; the relationship between general principles, fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights in EU law; the use of fundamental rights in EU law, in particular the scope of judicial review by the CJEU; and accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.

This chapter will explore and provide a background to European integration, from the creation of the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC or the ‘Community’) to its evolution into the present-day European Union (EU) and EEA. Klaus Patel describes the EEC as ‘a fragile latecomer in an already densely populated field of international organisations’. It covers, first, patterns of post-war regional cooperation, of which the EEC/EU is just one example; second, the enlargement of the EEC, which saw it grow from six members in 1957 to an EU of twenty-eight member states in 2013; third, the process of Treaty reform and development from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the Rome Declaration in 2017 and the Future of Europe conference in 2021; and fourth, Brexit or the British exit from the European Union, taking it to twenty-seven member states.

Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, there was nothing in EU law setting out how a member state could leave the Union. In Costa, the CJEU had indeed implied that membership was forever, describing the EEC as a ‘community of unlimited duration’ based on a Treaty concluded for an unlimited period. Article 50 TEU changed this. It had been included in the Convention to deflect criticism that member states could join but never leave. The inability to leave became another manifestation of the EU’s democratic deficit. Inclusion of Article 50 was approved by all Member States but it was envisaged that Article 50 would not be used. The four paragraphs of Article 50 set out a general framework of how to exit the Union but provide very little detail. The first part of this chapter goes through the structure of Article 50 and comments on the process of leaving the EU. The remining sections focus on the resulting agreement. Overall, it is unclear how far Article 50 succeeded in improving democratic procedures and legitimacy in the EU, but clear that this provision needs to be amended if a repeat of the lengthy and chaotic Brexit process is to be avoided.

Although the new growth strategy for the EU, ‘Europe 2020’, includes the goal to remove 20 million people from poverty, the Treaty of Rome was not an anti-poverty manifesto. Part One of the Treaty of Rome laid out the principles of the Community. It was designed to deliver ‘a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living, and closer relations between the States belonging to it’. The goal was to create a common market, a single trading area, not a European welfare state. It is no longer assumed that a common market requires common rules. The legislative goal has moved from the creation of harmonised rules to minimum standards and best practice. The judicial approach has also evolved, especially in relation to non-fiscal rules. Brexit and COVID 19 have been 'stress-tests' for the free movement rules.

The regulation of services pursues both economic (market failure, protection and promotion of competition) and non-economic objectives. The regulation has to accommodate different ‘modes’ – the World Trade Organization identifies four ‘modes’ of trade in commercial services. The modes will be used as themes to explore the concepts used by the Court to create a single internal market in services. Cases arising from broadcasting rules and gambling will demonstrate the deference to national autonomy in issues of ‘cross-border supply’. However, cases concerning ‘consumption abroad’, in particular of healthcare services, demonstrate a less deferential approach. The strongest defence of free movement of services and establishment appears in cases dealing with ‘commercial presence’ and ‘presence of natural persons’. It will be seen that the CJ tries to defend the rights of natural and legal persons under these provisions. Before plunging into the case law, the primary and secondary rules will be laid out.

A court is said to be the last branch of government because it is the first defence of the individual – individuals rely on the judiciary to protect their rights and freedoms from intrusion by the exercise of public power. Does this apply to the CJEU? Does it protect individuals and Union citizens? To what extent does it act as the ‘third branch’ of government, ensuring that public powers are exercised in the interests of the ‘peoples’ of Europe, or even those people beyond affected by EU law such as the Inuits of Canada? These questions highlight the main themes in this chapter. They can only be partly answered by examining the organisation of the CJEU – its tasks and composition. A fuller answer requires further exploration of the extent to which individuals can access the Court to challenge Union legal acts. This chapter will therefore focus on the two main procedures to bring actions before the CJEU: direct actions via Article 263 TFEU and indirect actions under Article 267 TFEU.

The task of the provisions in EU law providing free movement to workers is to tackle national rules that hinder movement. Rules obstructing entry and settlement of migrant workers and their families have to be removed or disapplied. As seen from the opening extract, the European Commission study found no evidence of benefit tourism. This chapter explores three specific themes in relation to the full exercise of free movement of EU workers. First, it will explore the definition of a worker – who gets to enjoy the privilege of an international career in the EU? Is the movement from one state to another an EU norm as it is in the United States? Second, what is the level of transnational solidarity for the economically active, and how does national action help or hinder this? Finally, what situations do not attract the protection of Article 45 TFEU – when can member states undermine the creation of an internal labour market? However, before looking at these themes in detail, the Treaty provision and related secondary law providing rights to the employed will be fully set out.

Law-making is perhaps the most important function in a democracy. Laws regulate the content of products as well as behaviour and relationships of both the state and individuals. However, as important as the rules themselves is that they are followed. It is not just the rules themselves that are important but how they are made, for this secures their credibility. Laws need to be fair, clear and comprehensible and in addition made according to procedures that are seen to be legitimate. Legitimate procedures must underpin rule-making if laws are to be considered credible by the populace who must follow them. This chapter will explore the typology of laws made in the EU and the procedures by which they are made. The chapter begins with an exploration of the law-making procedures themselves, looking at the different procedures for legislative and non-legislative measures. It then sets these within the regulatory environment of the EU to discuss the democratic deficit and a potential alternative. Finally, it analyses the EU law-making environment from the perspective of Lani Guinier’s concept of an ‘electocracy’ – when viewed through this lens, does the EU look more legitimate?

This book is concerned with what a human rights perspective means for social workers, noting that social work has a tradition of human rights that exceeds 100 years (Staub-Bernasconi 2016). Framing social work as a human rights profession has certain consequences for the way in which social work is conceptualised and practised. In many instances, such a perspective reinforces and validates the traditional understandings and practices of social work, while in other cases it challenges some of the assumptions of the social work profession. The position of this book is that a human rights perspective can enhance social work and that it provides a basis for social workers to achieve their social justice goals, regardless of the setting. In this chapter some of the issues and problems associated with human rights will be discussed, and the implications of these discussions for social work will be highlighted.