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In the conclusion I summarize my core findings, elaborate on the book’s contributions, and sketch out the limits of my analysis and identify new research agendas for rising scholars of African politics and comparative democratization. I outline how overlapping elite bargains involving the transitional government, the exiting military and the PDP facilitated the successful transfer to civilians in 1999. By showing how these bargains eventually undermined the PDP’s competitiveness as 2015 approached, I add to our understanding of how elite pacts end. I also reiterate the main findings from my three chapters on the APC’s electoral victory. By articulating promises of economic renewal, anti-corruption, and electoral integrity, the opposition APC capitalized on emerging electoral constituencies and correctly calculated that rational counter-terrorism could not flow from a shallow politics of fear. The PDP played to such prejudice and failed. These findings contribute to comparative research on elections in the context of terrorism by showing how polarization occurred, even without strong ideological differences between the parties. A secessionist revival in the southeast, ongoing violence from Boko Haram in the northeast, and geographically dispersed tensions between farmers and herders highlight the challenges ahead – both for Nigeria and for students of African politics.
In this chapter I statistically demonstrate that voters engaged in economic voting, responding to campaign appeals from the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC). Perceptions of national economic performance, average levels of citizens’ wealth, and expectations for whether Muhammadu Buhari or President Goodluck Jonathan was more likely to improve the economy all systematically correlate with electoral outcomes across states. Further, states with healthy economies were risk averse and overwhelmingly voted to keep the PDP. Proximity to violence in the years prior to the election had no systematic effect. This is surprising given the scale and scope of Boko Haram’s terrorism as well as numerous polls in which citizens ranked insecurity as the nation’s top priority. I also show that fear of an increase in insurgent violence under Buhari mobilized PDP voters, while counter-terrorism was less important for APC voters. This suggests that the APC built an electoral coalition on the promises of Buhari’s ability to improve the economy and run a clean election, while the PDP played to its base, missing important voter cues. The results contribute to a growing body of research that questions portraits of African elections as centered on ethnicity and devoid of issue-based campaigning.
In this chapter, I trace the successful handover to civilians to elite bargains within the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and between the party and the outgoing military. One elite “pact” within the PDP included power-sharing agreements to alternate the presidency between north and south, rotate various offices among different parts of the country, and an understanding that the party’s first presidential candidate in 1999 would be Yoruba. I show how the PDP’s founding principles were congruent with broader demands from the outgoing regime. Specifically, the military found itself with exit guarantees but no veto power – unlike other “pacted” transitions. Once in power, the PDP dismissed military officials who had been involved in politics. But it also embarked on a “coup proofing” strategy, reassuring the military with a wave of promotions, opening career paths for ex-generals, and increasing defense spending.
I trace the electoral defeat of the PDP in 2015 to the erosion of these elite bargains. Frustrated ambitions within the party inspired mass defections to the newly formed All Progressive Congress. The present historical moment highlights how the traits of successful a transition differ from the political features that make a successful democracy.
After explaining how elite agreements within the People’s Democratic Party contributed to the transition’s success, I ask: how did the PDP lose in 2015? I answer this question in three separate steps, culminating in a comprehensive account of Nigeria’s first electoral turnover. Chapter 3 provides the first step in my answer. I provide context for the election by describing President Goodluck Jonathan’s unusual route to power though the death of the president, and I summarize existing literature on the PDP’s loss. I then empirically demonstrate how the opposition APC opted for a campaign strategy centered more on the economy than on terrorism. I show this through a content analysis using NVivo software of 929 coded comments from party officials, drawn from a search of 2,390 news articles. I code party leaders’ comments and quotations into five thematic categories. APC politicians overwhelmingly focused on economic issues, with “electoral integrity” – exceeding even the references to terrorism and insecurity. Though social issues were less prominent in the campaign, I find that the APC discussed social issues twice as often as the PDP. The findings suggest that issues increasingly matter in presidential campaigns, and the opposition successfully highlighted its commitment to clean elections.
This chapter tests the influence of religious and ethnic identity on voting. I explain Nigeria’s electoral law that promotes ethno-regional coalition building. I then statistical test three hypotheses, using survey data. An “electoral integrity” hypothesis predicts that voters with positive perceptions of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) were more likely to vote for the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan. An “ethnic affinity” hypothesis predicts that Hausa and Fulani are more likely to vote for Buhari, a Muslim with Fulani heritage. A “religious referendum” hypothesis predicts that Muslim voters were more likely to vote for Buhari.
Statistical tests confirm each hypothesis, first at the bivariate level and then with probit models that control for potentially intervening conditions.
My findings are consistent with the research documenting that even where Africans vote based on issues or policy evaluations, ethnicity still has an appeal. The correlation between religion and voting, however, is worrisome, especially in light of the recent politicization of religious institutions. Therefore, unlike the hopeful message in the previous chapters about Nigerians expressing an interest in evaluating policy performance, this chapter offers a warning. Religion’s powerful allure means that new electoral reforms may be necessary to weaken the political salience of faith.
In this chapter, I briefly critique the concept of democratic consolidation as rooted in the transition literature’s assumptions about linear processes of political reform. Drawing on ideas from research on the Arab Spring, I introduce “stress points” as a tool for discussing whether democratic institutions can survive extra-institutional challenges. I then analyze Boko Haram in the northeast, threats of Igbo secession in the southeast, and farmer-pastoralist tensions. These stress points have roots in the elite pacts that facilitated the 1999 transition. I further argue that electoral accountability will be essential but insufficient for resolving the representational, distributional, and cultural components of these challenges. I draw on interviews that include meetings with pastoralists and also secessionist groups such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The links between state impunity and the saliency of sectarian identities emerge as one common thread across these cases, underscoring the critical role of rule of law in defeating terrorism, facilitating fair political competition, and improving the quality of democracy.
This book focuses on Nigerian politics from 1998 to the present, and this chapter introduce readers to Nigeria and situates the study within research on terrorism, comparative democratization and electoral politics in Africa. I summarize some of the violence and unfolding tensions related to the three stress points that I analyze in the book’s concluding chapter.
In particular, I note how billions of dollars spent on “countering violent extremism” has primarily focused on the causes of violent insurgency and how to defeat it – but not necessarily on its general political effects. This is surprising since electoral democracies are more likely to experience terrorism. The book thus seeks to explain how the presence of Boko Haram, one of the world’s deadliest terrorist organizations, impacts campaign strategies, the party system, and voting behavior in Nigeria. I find that the erosion of an elite bargain that facilitated Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule in 1999 made the ruling party vulnerable. But it was economic voting and new issues such as “electoral integrity” that made the opposition politically competitive.
In 2015, Nigeria's voters cast out the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP). Here, A. Carl LeVan traces the political vulnerability of Africa's largest party in the face of elite bargains that facilitated a democratic transition in 1999. These 'pacts' enabled electoral competition but ultimately undermined the party's coherence. LeVan also crucially examines the four critical barriers to Nigeria's democratic consolidation: the terrorism of Boko Haram in the northeast, threats of Igbo secession in the southeast, lingering ethnic resentments and rebellions in the Niger Delta, and farmer-pastoralist conflicts. While the PDP unsuccessfully stoked fears about the opposition's ability to stop Boko Haram's terrorism, the opposition built a winning electoral coalition on economic growth, anti-corruption, and electoral integrity. Drawing on extensive interviews with a number of politicians and generals and civilians and voters, he argues that electoral accountability is essential but insufficient for resolving the representational, distributional, and cultural components of these challenges.
Under what circumstances do new constitutions improve a nation's level of democracy? Between 1974 and 2014, democracy increased in seventy-seven countries following the adoption of a new constitution, but it decreased or stayed the same in forty-seven others. This book demonstrates that increased participation in the forming of constitutions positively impacts levels of democracy. It is discovered that the degree of citizen participation at the 'convening stage' of constitution-making has a strong effect on levels of democracy. This finding defies the common theory that levels of democracy result from the content of constitutions, and instead lends support to 'deliberative' theories of democracy. Patterns of constitutions are then compared, differentiating imposed and popular constitution-making processes, using case studies from Chile, Nigeria, Gambia, and Venezuela to illustrate the dynamics specific to imposed constitution-making, and case studies from Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, and Tunisia to illustrate the specific dynamics of popular constitution-making.