Since the 1980s, state capacity has been a major explanation for countries leaving the middle-income trap. However, this literature is unable to explain the failed experiences of countries with relatively high state capacity. This was the case of Chile after the unsuccessful enaction of a series of policies in the mid-2010s to upgrade the country’s position in the lithium value chain. To understand this failure, we combine the literature on developmental states and the literature on business power. We use the concept of institutional business power to understand how business actions erode state capacities leading to countries’ persistent inability to leave the middle-income trap. In the case of Chile, despite the relatively high levels of state capacity, previous processes of deregulation and privatization in the country configured a situation favorable to business’ monopolization of information and technical knowledge about lithium production and innovation processes that directly affected the capacity of the state to regulate the sector, let alone implement policies designed to upgrade the industry. The article highlights the need to investigate further the role of not just the state, but of the private sector in either facilitating or blocking value chain upgrading in countries caught in the middle-income trap.

Stark wealth inequality is consequential for politics, yet the underlying mechanisms are still understudied. We join recent research urging a deeper analysis of how oligarchic interests and material power operate in highly unequal societies by expanding the business power literature to understand new sources of influence based on wealth. We engage in a concept-building exercise for the concept of business power and clarify the similarities and differences between material power and other sources of business power. We then discuss different mechanisms underlying material power and develop the mechanism of opportunity hoarding from the literature on social closure. Opportunity hoarding helps understand how oligarchic interests appropriate well-functioning state institutions for their benefit. We illustrate these mechanisms by analyzing the case of Guatemala, a country with tremendous wealth inequality and pervasive political instability. We highlight the usefulness of our proposed concept structure for analyzing diverse instances of business power and the concept of material power for understanding business influence in highly unequal societies.

Research on the politics of skills formation in Latin America is severely underdeveloped. This article offers a novel characterisation of the supply of skills in the region or ‘skills supply profiles’, taking inspiration from the comparative capitalisms literature. We identify four configurations of skills supply profiles – universalising, dual academic-oriented, dual VET-oriented and exclusionary – and analyse their historical dynamics. By doing this, we challenge general assessments of Latin America's skills formation systems as pertaining to one overarching type. This sets the stage for a deeper understanding of the politics of skills in the region and their connection with different development alternatives.

By examining the Manifesto Project data for post-transition Chile, we show growing convergence in the electoral competition strategies between the centre-left and centre-right coalitions. While the former is characterised by inertia, the latter is marked by gradual yet relentless programmatic moderation. To interpret these results, we rely not only on theories of salience and party adaptation, but also on the cartel party thesis. This contribution reinforces the findings of increasing literature on post-transition Chile that reveals growing collusion between the mainstream left-wing and right-wing coalitions, which have increasing difficulties channelling demands emanating from below and therefore providing adequate political representation.