Just as the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution defined the start of the ‘short’ twentieth century, so the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR marked its completion. The two stories should not be conflated. The demise of the Soviet Union was overwhelmingly the result of domestic factors: in the liberal climate of perestroika, ethnic nationalist movements flourished and provided effective vehicles for republican elites who were looking to gain power at the expense of a Kremlin weakened by mounting economic troubles and deepening political divisions. In this predominantly domestic process, international factors associated with the ending of the Cold War played a significant if secondary role. This chapter will consider how they helped to accentuate two outstanding features of the process of collapse: its speed and its remarkably peaceful course.

The domestic story

Before examining how external factors came into play, let us consider briefly the domestic course and dynamics of the story they affected. The Soviet collapse involved two intertwined processes: the transformation of the Communist regime and the disintegration of the highly centralised Union. Regime change came from the top: the Kremlin drove a project of radical liberalisation (perestroika, or restructuring) which by 1990 had transcended the Communist system of rule. The union was undermined from below: nationalist publics and elites pressed for greater autonomy from the centre.

The last decade has seen the worst and the best of times in post-war relations between the Soviet Union and Britain. In the first five years relations plumbed depths unequalled since the early Cold War period; in the last five they have reached new heights. Since late 1987 both sides have agreed that the bilateral relationship is better than at any time since the war.

This dramatic shift in relations is evident, in varying degree, in all the dimensions of the bilateral relationship covered in the preceding chapters. Drawing on these chapters we shall focus on the thrust of change in the second half of the decade. As the chapter title suggests, we are interested in Soviet-British relations ‘under perestroika’ in two senses: the nature of changes which have occurred in the period associated with perestroika, and the extent to which such changes amount to a restructuring of the bilateral relationship. This involves considering the scope and depth of change in each of the major dimensions of relations; the factors shaping such change; and shifts in the overall configuration of relations. Assessing such issues may help us to evaluate the significance of recent and current changes. Are relations becoming less thin and fragile, less vulnerable to disruptive developments? It is as well to recall that previous upturns in relations, as in the mid-1970s, were hailed as remarkable improvements, only to be followed by a downward cycle. Do the changes of the last five years signal a departure from the historical pattern of oscillation highlighted by Curtis Keeble? To address these questions the following sections look at changing popular perceptions; the development of non-governmental and economic contacts; the course of political dialogue; diplomatic relations; and finally, the shifts in national elite images and perspectives that shape relations over the long term.

The Soviet Union is central to British defence policy and Moscow considers London to be a pivotal member of the Western alliance. Yet relations between the Soviet Union and Britain have attracted little attention and less analysis. The Soviet literature is smaller than that on relations with France or West Germany and consists largely of descriptive historical surveys. What analysis exists is confined mostly to studies of Britain and British politics which pay scant attention to relations with the USSR. On the Western side there is remarkably little on contemporary relations between the two countries. We have a number of good historical studies, concentrating mostly on the pre- and immediate postwar periods. The sparseness of the literature on the last twenty years is

highlighted by the fact that two reports of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee provide perhaps the fullest information and comment on the recent period. Britain hardly figures in the relatively small body of literature on Soviet relations with Western Europe and what treatment it attracts is typically couched in security terms.

The thin coverage of Soviet-British relations in the academic literature is a product of both scholarly focus and the nature of the subject. British foreign policy questions, outside the defence and security areas, have until very recently attracted surprisingly little academic interest. Analysts working in the Soviet foreign policy field have long neglected relations with the states of Western Europe by comparison with their extensive concern towards relations with the US and the Third World. The relative neglect of British-Soviet relations in the literature reflects not just the vagaries of academic fashion but the nature of the relations themselves.