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This essay argues that the ambiguities of the just war tradition, sifted through a feminist critique, provides the best framework currently available for translating the ethical entitlement to human dignity into concrete feminist political practices. It offers a gendered critique of war that pursues the just war distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets of wartime violence and provides a gendered analysis of the peace which the just war tradition obliges us to preserve and pursue.
Ofelia Schutte's relationship to Nietzsche is contentious. Sometimes she identifies him as an ally. Sometimes she calls him an enemy. Appealing to Nietzsche's abolition of the appearance reality distinction and to his discussions of women as skeptics, I turn to Ofelia's discussions of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo to suggest that their protests can be understood as a Nietzschean politics of transvaluation where the myth of the mother and the materialities of women's bodies become the ground of the demand for justice.
“One is not born, but rather becomes a woman.” These most quoted words of The Second Sex became the centerpiece of first-wave feminism and the signature of their author, Simone de Beauvoir. Their meaning, fleshed out in The Second Sex's descriptions of women's daily lives, once seemed obvious. They seemed to point to the difference between sex and gender. They seemed to indicate the ways in which human beings born with vaginas were habituated and initiated into the roles of adults called women. Today things seem less clear. Do these words mean that sex and gender are radically distinct – that any sexed body can become whatever gender it chooses? Could any body become a woman? Should Beauvoir's critique of the “biology is destiny” argument be taken as an argument for the complete malleability of the body? Or should her words alert us to the fact that the different materialities of human bodies constitute us as sexually distinct but that the sex/gender differences mandated by patriarchy are epistemologically untenable, ethically intolerable, and politically unjust (SS 267)?
“One is not born, but rather becomes a woman.” When originally
written, these words produced shocking effects. They soon became
central to the feminist critique of patriarchy. Eventually they became
familiar, obvious. Contemporary theorists and advanced technologies
have returned these words to their radical origin.
This paper may be read as a reclamation project. It argues, with Simone de Beauvoir, that patriarchal marriage is both a perversion of the meaning of the couple and an institution in transition. Parting from those who have given up on marriage, I identify marriage as existing at the intersection of the ethical and the political and argue that whether or not one chooses marriage, feminists ought not abandon marriage as an institution.
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