We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
One of the key challenges of regulating internet platforms is international cooperation. This chapter offers some insights into platform responsibility reforms by relying on forty years of experience in regulating cross-border financial institutions. Internet platforms and cross-border banks have much in common from a regulatory perspective. They both operate in an interconnected global market that lacks a supranational regulatory framework. And they also tend to generate cross-border spillovers that are difficult to control. Harmful content and systemic risks – the two key regulatory challenges for platforms and banks, respectively – can be conceptualized as negative externalities.
One of the main lessons learned in regulating cross-border banks is that, under certain conditions, international regulatory cooperation is possible. We have witnessed that in the successful design and implementation of the Basel Accord – the global banking standard that regulates banks’ solvency and liquidity risks. In this chapter, I will analyze the conditions under which cooperation can ensue and what the history of the Basel Accord can teach to platform responsibility reforms. In the last part, I will discuss what can be done when cooperation is more challenging.
The progressive globalization of finance over the last forty years has been a blessing and a curse for national financial systems. On the one hand, financial institutions, investors, and consumers benefitted from increased opportunities of credit and investment. On the other hand, financial interconnectedness and the reduction of barriers to capital flows have increased exponentially the risk of global financial crises. Regulatory cooperation among financial regulators through the various Transnational Regulatory Networks has decreased the risk of regulatory loopholes and avoided races to the bottom in financial policymaking. Yet, the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European Sovereign Debt crisis have shown that the current approach to global financial governance presents various flaws. The absence of a binding international legal framework for financial cooperation, coupled with the inherent pressure towards financial nationalism faced by national regulators often leads to failures of cooperation and, ultimately, to international crises. This chapter discusses how public international law and the doctrine of Common Concern can help in addressing the inefficiencies of the current system.
Using case studies ranging from cross-border bank resolution to sovereign debt, the author analyzes the role of international law in protecting financial sovereignty, and the risks for the global financial system posed by the lack of international cooperation. Despite the post-crisis reforms, the global financial system is still mainly based on a logic of financial nationalism. International financial law plays a major role in this regard as it still focuses more on the protection of national interests rather than the promotion of global objectives. This is an inefficient approach because it encourages bad domestic governance and reduces capital mobility. In this analysis, Lupo-Pasini discusses some of the alternatives (such as the European Banking Union, Regulatory Passports, and international financial courts), and offers a new vision for the role of international law in maintaining and fostering global financial stability. In doing so, he fills a void in the law and economics literature, and puts forward a solution to tackle the problems of international cooperation in finance based on the use of international law.