Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation ofWeapons of Mass Destruction. By Derek D. Smith. NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 197p. $75.00 cloth, $24.99paper.

By the early 1990s, scholars and policymakers alike began voicingreservations about the ability of deterrence strategies to counternuclear, chemical and biological arsenals as these weaponsproliferated into the hands of state and nonstate actors. Someobservers doubted if it was technically feasible to create credibledeterrent commitments given the possibility that there might be nosignificant targets in the opposing camp to hold at risk, thatpotential opponents were irrational or suicidal, or that it might beimpossible to identify the culprits who launched the attack itself(e.g., the origins of an epidemic might never be identified). Othersdoubted the strategic wisdom of relying on deterrence, given thatthe costs of policy failure were potentially catastrophic. And, asthe September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrated, overwhelmingmilitary superiority cannot deter or defend against terrorist cellsthat are willing to sacrifice themselves to achieve theirobjectives. Because of the inherent limitations of deterrence, manysuggested that preventive war and preemption were the best way todeal with rogue states and terrorist organizations that wereacquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Most of the literature in the field of international security studies does not focus on the details of battlefield operations or the use of weapons in combat. The American military is usually left alone to devise effective tank tactics or solutions to the problems encountered as pilots attempt to place bombs on a target. Scholars increasingly realize, however, that theoretical work must reflect the reality of the battlefield and likely operational constraints. For example, recent explorations of the intricacies of nuclear operations have influenced the way analysts view the problem of deterrence. To be useful, theories and policy prescriptions must respond to the prevailing conditions on the battlefield.

When it becomes necessary to integrate operational considerations into theoretical work, scholars often turn to members of the military to determine if highly touted weapons perform “as advertised,” or to discover the potential limitations of tactics described in current manuals. Within the constraints created by issues of secrecy, officers and enlisted personnel usually are flattered by the interest taken in their profession and are forthcoming in supplying detailed answers to operational questions. Orgahized tours of military facilities also provide an opportunity to examine military hardware at close range and often lead to a fruitful exchange of ideas, especially after the conclusion of the formal presentations. Still, the information gathered from contacts with soldiers and sailors is largely anecdotal and limited to the general experiences of the individuals questioned.