We agree with aspects of Baumeister et al.'s view that shared identities are necessary during initial stages of group formation. In contrast to their analysis, however, we provide evidence that the value of self-differentiation depends more on the task itself than on the stage of group development and challenge the authors to focus on the functions of the group.

We agree that human economic structures can be informed by comparative analyses; however, we do not agree with several of Gowdy & Krall's specific assertions, which may hinder the generative potential of their model. We discuss these limitations from both biological and economic perspectives, and offer an alternative explanation for the expression of human economic behaviors based on individual optimization strategies.

Pain suffering has been naturally selected to be experienced and expressed within a wider social system. The communication of pain improves group coordination and decision-making about engaging in resource dependent and potentially risky endeavors. Recent findings warrant the development of a cohesive framework for understanding the reciprocal nature of pain expression and individual and group-level outcomes that can generate novel predictions on the heuristical expression of human suffering in naturalistic and clinical settings.

Self-reported opinions and judgments may be more rooted in expressive biases than in cognitive processing biases, and ultimately operate within a broader behavioral style for advertising the capacity – versus the trustworthiness – dimension of human reciprocity potential. Our analyses of facial expression judgments of likely voters are consistent with this thesis, and directly contradict one major prediction from the authors' “negativity-bias” model.

Social signaling models predict that subtle variation in climatic temperature induces systematic changes in expressed cognition. An experiment showed that perceived room temperature was associated with variability in self-descriptions, social reactions of others, and desiring differing types of social networks. The findings reflect the tendency to inflate capacity demonstrations in warmer climates as a result of the social networking opportunities they enable.

We disagree with Dixon et al. by maintaining that prejudice is primarily rooted in aversive reactions toward out-group members. However, these reactions are not indicative of negative attributes, such as trait bigotry, but rather normative homophily for peers with similar perceived attributes. Cognitive biases such as stereotype threat perpetuate perceptions of inequipotential and subsequent discrimination, irrespective of individuals' personality characteristics.

In their analyses of the neural correlates of discrete emotionality, Lindquist et al. do not consider the numerous drawbacks to inferring psychological processes based on currently available cognitive neurometric technology. The authors also disproportionately emphasize the relevance of neuronal activation over deactivation, which, in our opinion, limits the scope and utility of their conclusions.

Fincher & Thornhill's (F&T's) model is not entirely supported by common patterns of affect behaviors among people who live under varying climatic conditions and among people who endorse varying levels of (Western) religiosity and conservative political ideals. The authors' model is also unable to account for intra-regional heterogeneity in assortative sociality, which, we argue, can be better explained by a framework that emphasizes the differential expression of fundamental social cues for maintaining distinct social network structures.

Embodied simulation and the epistemic motivation to search for the “meaning” of other people's behaviors are not necessary for specific and functional responding to, and hence processing of, human facial expressions. Rather, facial expression processing can be achieved through lower-cognitive, heuristical perceptual processing and expression of prototypical morphological musculature movement patterns that communicate discrete trustworthiness and capacity cues to conspecifics.