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This essay proposes to reframe the twentieth-century history of Islam by rethinking the relationship of that history to some dominant categories of twentieth-century sociology, especially the secularization thesis. The global history of Islam since the late nineteenth century has been shaped by an apparent paradox between its two most significant features. The first of these has consisted of persistent calls for Muslim revival, reform, and unity across the world, tending toward a unification or transcendence of the older forms of variation within the tradition. The second, countervailing tendency has been an increasing fragmentation of structures of authority within the tradition, a proliferation of the meanings attributed to it and of the forms of practice taken to embody it, and a renewed acuity of internal sectarian conflict. This is a paradox that only an understanding of Islam as social practice embedded in the forms of secularity characteristic of modern societies—and emphatically not one of Islam as “medievally” religious and uniquely “secularization-resistant”—can apprehend.
Since the 1990s, not only have China's universities become more in line with global standards but they now set them in some areas. This paper looks at how the production of space in Chinese higher education is employed in “new era” China to manage contested sites of globalization. From the spatial practice of scholarship to the representational spaces that map the educational bureaucracy, the production of space in Chinese higher education helps to organize social relations. This paper argues that the production of space in Chinese higher education is used to manage conflicts between global flows and localization as well as to serve national priorities. The paper contributes to ongoing discussions of the globalization of higher education and cultural studies of space and spatiality in contemporary China.
Cet article propose de donner un nouveau cadre à l’histoire de l’islam au xxe siècle en repensant sa relation avec certaines catégories dominantes de la sociologie, notamment avec la thèse de la sécularisation. L’histoire mondiale de l’islam depuis la fin du xixe siècle a été façonnée par un paradoxe apparent entre deux de ses caractéristiques les plus significatives. La première a consisté en des appels persistants au renouveau, à la réforme et à l’unité des musulmans à travers le monde, ce qui tendait vers une unification ou un dépassement des anciennes formes de variation dans la tradition. La seconde s’est manifestée, au contraire, par une fragmentation croissante des structures d’autorité au sein de la tradition, par une prolifération des significations qui lui étaient attribuées et des formes de pratique adoptées pour l’incarner, ainsi que par une acuité renouvelée des conflits sectaires en son sein. C’est un paradoxe que seule peut appréhender une compréhension de l’islam en tant que pratique sociale ancrée dans les rapports entre États et religions, caractéristiques des sociétés modernes – et non de l’islam en tant que religion « médiévale » et exclusivement « résistante à la sécularisation ».
On 13 September 2015, the man widely believed to be the real centre of power in Algeria officially left office. General Mohamed ‘Toufik’ Mediene, sometimes nicknamed rabb dzair [the lord of Algeria], the 76-year-old head of the country's intelligence and security apparatus – never seen in public, rarely glimpsed in unverified photographs, the incarnation of the opaque, unaccountable, faceless form of le pouvoir – had retired, ‘relieved of his functions’ in the terse formulation of a presidential communiqué as reported in the press. Whether he left the office he had occupied unchallenged for 25 years of his own choosing or under pressure from the coterie around the ailing 78-year-old President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was unclear – and relatively unimportant. The move could have been significant. ‘Toufik’ was the architect of the Département du Renseignement etdela Sécurité (DRS, Military Intelligence Services), the iron core of the ‘deep’ state that had waged its merciless war on, and of, terror through the 1990s and had become indispensable, untouchable, all but unnameable, known to every Algerian and answerable to no one. Observers of Algeria and human rights activists both in the country and abroad had long recognized that any meaningful move towards more democratic, accountable and law-bound government must necessarily pass through the removal of the DRS from the centre of the state and its subordination to legal oversight; doubtless for their own factional reasons, as well as or more than on principle, Algerian political party leaders regularly demanded the dismantling, or at least the thorough ‘restructuring’, of the political police. In 2015, and for several years before, the rumour mill of the Algerian media was regularly fed with accounts of the ongoing tussle between the presidency and the DRS, and in the course of the summer of 2015 the agency did indeed see its prerogatives reduced, transferred to elements of the army, in what some saw as a significant clipping of the sharpclawed secret services’ wings. In the context of a long-deferred ‘transition’ away from Algeria's apparently calcified authoritarianism, the retirement of Toufik might indeed have signalled a real departure, ‘la fin d'une époque’ [the end of an epoch] (Ouali, 2015), ‘un véritable séisme dans la vie politique nationale’ [an earthquake in the nation's political life] (Mesbah, 2015).
Covering a period of five hundred years, from the arrival of the Ottomans to the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, James McDougall presents an expansive new account of the modern history of Africa's largest country. Drawing on substantial new scholarship and over a decade of research, McDougall places Algerian society at the centre of the story, tracing the continuities and the resilience of Algeria's people and their cultures through the dramatic changes and crises that have marked the country. Whether examining the emergence of the Ottoman viceroyalty in the early modern Mediterranean, the 130 years of French colonial rule and the revolutionary war of independence, the Third World nation-building of the 1960s and 1970s, or the terrible violence of the 1990s, this book will appeal to a wide variety of readers in African and Middle Eastern history and politics, as well as those concerned with the wider affairs of the Mediterranean.