Mental health, like physical health, represents an important resource for participating in politics. We bring new insights from six surveys from five different countries (Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States) that combine diversified questions on mental health problems and political participation. Unlike previous research on depression, we find only limited evidence for the Resource Hypothesis that mental health problems reduce political participation, except in the case of voting and only in some samples. Instead, we find mixed evidence that mental health problems and their comorbidity (experiencing multiple problems) are associated with increased political participation. Our study leads us to more questions than answers: are the measures available in public opinion surveys appropriate for the task? Do general survey samples adequately capture people with mental disorders? And is the assumption that poor mental health reduces political participation wrong?

The transfer of American management ideas was a central part of the Cold War struggle over ideologies. A key mediator was the European Recovery Program, which conveyed American influences to European management specialists. However, a direct influence was not always possible, as in Finland, which officially blocked assistance because of foreign policy considerations. Still, it was among the first countries to follow Harvard University’s lead in launching advanced management training. We examine how and why the focal actors adopted the American model of executive education, and how they managed to translate foreign ideas persuasively to the local business elite. The translation of executive education to Finland was a lengthy process that involved modification and readjustment of the original idea according to emerging needs. The Advanced Management Program became the core of the curriculum of Finland’s leading executive education institution and thus has influenced the emergence of new business culture.

Why do parties change candidate lists between elections? Although candidate list volatility is an important indicator of the responsiveness of electoral representation, it has received little attention in research. We offer a critical case study of party list volatility in Finland, using a candidate-centred open-list proportional (PR) electoral system with ideal conditions for ‘ultra-strategic’ party behaviour. Our explorative two-stage research design begins with party elite interviews, to extract factors that can affect list volatility, which in the following step are tested in a regression analysis of 564 party lists in parliamentary elections 1983–2019. Our results show that list formation is a complex phenomenon, where demand and supply factors interact in a contingent fashion. Following trends of voter dealignment, personalization and ‘electoral-professionalization’ of parties, volatility has increased over time. Electoral defeats and declining party membership increase volatility, but a member-driven mass-party heritage that limits party elites’ strategic capacity has a stabilizing effect.

Recently, awareness of the importance of health in explaining political participation has grown considerably. Studies have focused on individual participation forms but not on broader participation modes. Furthermore, analyses of the mechanisms explaining the health effects have been lacking. Here, structural equation models are employed to study the relationship between health, political trust, and institutional and non-institutional participation using data from Finland. Poor health is related to increased non-institutional participation, while good health boosts traditional institutional participation, although the latter relationship is very weak. These observations are explained by differences in political trust. Those in good health have stronger trust in the political system, while poor health is connected with reduced trust. These differences manifest themselves in varying behaviour. Poor health decreases trust which leads to increased non-institutional participation, while good health leads to a high trust and institutional activities.

The study of government popularity functions has been popular among political scientists since the pioneering work of the early 1970s. Most of the studies have concentrated on data from the United States or from Great Britain. The reason for this has probably been the availability of data over long periods of time in these countries, and the fact that in two-party systems the effects of economic changes on government popularity seem to be stronger than in countries with multi-party government coalitions. However, some studies have also shown that in countries with multi-party governments the effects of economic conditions are similar, although possibly slightly less strong.

A method for rapid electrical sintering (RES) of nanoparticle structures on temperature-sensitive substrates is presented. For an inkjetted silver nanoparticle conductor, a conductance increase of five orders of magnitude is demonstrated to occur in a timescale that typically varies between a few and one hundred milliseconds depending on process parameters. Furthermore, most of the conductance change takes only a few microseconds. The achievable final conductivities are within a factor of two from the bulk silver conductivity, as calculated using the external geometric dimensions of the structure ignoring porosity. The method is also applicable to other inorganic conductors such as indium-tin-oxide (ITO). More generally, the method offers a versatile tool in nanotechnology for electrical functionalization of nanoparticle structures. The method is also potentially suited for mass production.

During the past two decades growing public sectors and simultaneous slow economic growth have highlighted the role of deficit management as a central part of economic policies in modern democracies. Both economists and political scientists have emphasized the role of political institutions in public financial policies. This study contributes to this growing body of research by showing that: (1) during election years public deficits increase because governments refrain from raising taxes; (2) multi-party governments are no more prone to deficit problems than one-party governments but they are more likely to raise both public expenditure and revenue; (3) in achieving deficit reductions, one-party governments with decentralized labour markets emphasize expenditure cuts while multi-party governments with centralized labour markets raise taxes; and (4) as a consequence, the highest tax rates can be found in countries with centralized labour markets, especially if labour market centralization is combined with multi-party government.