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Modernization and Role-Expansion of the Military in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis*
- Moshe Lissak
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- Journal:
- Comparative Studies in Society and History / Volume 9 / Issue 3 / April 1967
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 03 June 2009, pp. 233-255
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Officers in active military service engaged in administrative tasks in the civil service, in the management of economic enterprises, in farming estates, teaching, bank management and other “civilian” tasks are not an unusual phenomenon in countries where the military is the exclusive ruler, or a direct and active partner in the government. The number of officers in this category is increasing also in those countries where the military is only a latent and unofficial partner in the regulation of the different sectors of political, economic and social power. However, even in countries where it is excluded from power, the military as an organization (as opposed to individual officers) takes charge of services which in Western countries are regarded as the domain of the civilian administration, or of other civilian bodies. This issue has received only partial and incidental treatment in the literature devoted to the subject of modernization. The “infiltration” of various military branches into different sectors of society is generally explained, if the issue arises at all, in terms of the conflict preceding the coup, or through other political events. Although this method of explanation is perfectly legitimate, it does narrow the discussion to the political sphere. This results in the neglect of highly significant material for the analysis of what may be termed “improvised” processes of modernization and nation-building. “Improvisation”, in this context, means the utilization of unorthodox means and routes to accelerate the modernization process. Infiltration and usurpation of non-military roles by officers is a case in point, although one should acknowledge that modernization is not always desired by the “infiltrators”.
Authority without Sovereignty: The Case of the National Centre of the Jewish Community in Palestine
- Dan Horowitz, Moshe Lissak
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- Journal:
- Government and Opposition / Volume 8 / Issue 1 / 01 January 1973
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 28 March 2014, pp. 48-71
- Print publication:
- 01 January 1973
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THE PROCESS WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE Jewish community in Palestine was a process of the formation of a non-sovereign political centre which progressively increased its authority through the exercise of control over the mobilization and distribution of resources. The bearer of this process was a power conscious elite – oriented on the formation of an institutionalized national centre. The mobilization of resources outside of the system enabled this centre to allocate more resources than it had to extract from its periphery. Thus, a dynamic equilibrium was created in which progressively increasing demands were balanced by an increased mobilization of resources. The operation of the system was dependent upon a division of functions between an evolving coalitionary national centre and various particularistic sub-centres. The lack of sovereignty paradoxically contributed to the development of ‘rules of the game’ which made the resolution of conflicts possible within a quasi-parliamentary framework.
The Class Structure of Burma: Continuity and Change
- Moshe Lissak
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- Journal:
- Journal of Southeast Asian Studies / Volume 1 / Issue 1 / March 1970
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 24 August 2009, pp. 60-73
- Print publication:
- March 1970
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The facts and evaluations presented here were designed to outline some of the characteristics of the Burmese class-structure. Of particular relevance seems to be the occupational structure and its modification during the last three or four decades. The income distribution among various occupational groups also helped in this characterization. The differentiation and cooperation between the different elites was described, together with the setting in which they function, the qualification for admission and the patterns of mobility comparing the standard of aspirations with the channels available. In this context roles and status image were discussed including the rough after status components, status symbols and the preferred occupational hierarchy in terms of social prestige. Finally the internal cohesiveness of the social strata in so far as distinct self-conscious entities are concerned was examined.
The material presented may be summed up as follows:
1. The population of Burma was split into two main parts: a small elite concentrated in government administration, party bureaucracy and the military on the one hand, and the peasants, small traders, business and hired labourers on the other hand. In between the two is a very small group of middle-class people and skilled workers.
2. Although the average income level was exceedingly low, at least until 1962, the span between the highest and lowest income categories was rather great.
3. The modern elite was small and though the internal differentiation is slight the antagonism is considerable. Before the coup the main adversary groups (excluding the underground) were administrators, politicians and students. The elite groups enjoyed little autonomy and freedom of action as there was no alternative outlet except the government bureaucracy, the military and an underdeveloped party bureaucracy. The weakness of the legal opposition parties and trade unions, the small number of independent economic organizations made it difficult for oppositional elite to develop and be institutionalized in relatively independent power positions. This had many repercussions on the already limited ability of the political and social centre to cope with economic and political problems.
4. Despite the generally universalistic criteria, for acceptance in the various elite groups, and the not insignificant de facto mobility, channels for such upward mobility were few and restricted to certain sectors of the political and government bureaucracy. This enabled the ruling elite to exert much influence on the chanelling of desirable recruits, but created permanent pressure from unemployed or underemployed high school and university graduates.
5. Leaving the ethnic minorities aside, crystallized class-oriented groups were very rare, and the main criteria for belonging to the few that existed were the type of education received and the amount of exposure to Western culture. This dividing line drawn by these criteria did not coincide entirely with that between town and countryside. There was little difference in this respect between the majority of the urban and the rural population.
Accordingly, Burma's class structure appears to be in a state of extensive flux. It would seem, therefore, that the primary problem is to achieve a more institutionalized differentiation of the sub-elite strata. This would particularly bridge the gap between the elites and the rest of the population and facilitate communication as there would be more “non congruent” status groups capable of serving as intermediaries between the elites and the more sophisticated, differentiated population.