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Hegel has commonly been ridiculed for views expressed in his 1801 dissertation, On the Orbits of the Planets, in the final pages of which he had adopted a series of numbers from Plato’s Timaeus – a cosmological text earlier taken seriously by Kepler – to account for the ratios of the distances from the sun of the then known six planets of the solar system. While defenders of Hegel have usually toned down the extent of these claims, this chapter argues that Hegel’s reference to Plato’s Pythagorean cosmology must be taken seriously – not as cosmology, however, but as instantiating the logic appropriate for empirically based science. Hegel’s allusion to Plato’s mythologically expressed “syllogism” is consistent with his idea that logic as Plato conceived it allowed its application to the empirical world but that this applicability had been compromised by Aristotle adaptation of it. With the proper grasp of logic’s utilization of the category of “singularity” in its difference to “particularity” – available to Plato but not Aristotle – we can appreciate how, while Kepler’s Laws were empirically based, Newton’s were not as they relied on abstract entities that could not be justified empirically.
This commentary applauds Haveman, Joseph-Goteiner, and Li's (2023) efforts to build arguments around institutional logics to explain China’s remarkable economic progress since 1978. But it also calls for broadening the focus of this inquiry so it can more generally explain why and how some societies are able to build connections between cultures and institutions that enable widespread societal progress, while other countries fail to do so. In particular, I suggest that this line of inquiry would benefit from drawing more deeply on the extensive body of writings by economic historians who have compared the economic progress of different societies over a long period.
Systems of capitalism are conceived as formed under certain broad logics that apply to all, but which then interpret those logics in distinct ways society by society, seen as the society's own processes. Such processes cluster into three categories: an inspiring context; a transformative capacity; and empowered action. The political role is that of balancing the influences across the total. Each inspirational influence adds a key contribution, as with benevolent empowering authority, and critical thinking. Transformative capacity is built by: innovativeness and cooperativeness; and stable decentralized authority flows from communicative action, spontaneous emergent ordering; and competitive productivity. Societal progress may be explained in terms of the integrated workings of these processes to yield an ethically legitimate structure for the prosperity-driven creating and distributing of wealth. Two main stereotypes are examined to compare their workings and their outcomes: the Western free market democratic, and the Chinese party-state driven.
In December 1654 a large naval force departed from Portsmouth and sailed across the Atlantic. Its goal was to expand the English Commonwealth in the Caribbean at the expense of Spanish colonies. The Gloucester, a third-rate frigate recently constructed as part of Oliver Cromwell's ambitious shipbuilding programme, was one of the largest and most heavily armed warships of the expedition. Combining analysis of courts martial accounts, inventories, journals, letters, sailing instructions, and wills, this article argues for the Gloucester's importance as a case study and microcosm for understanding the economic, political, religious, and social problems that the navy and wider Protectorate faced. It revises traditional historiography about the topic that has underestimated the significance of the naval context to the Western Design. Crucial to this new history is that the extreme hardships and religious divisions created tensions that targeted the leadership of Admiral William Goodsonn. Of particular importance in this narrative is Benjamin Blake, captain of the Gloucester, who clashed with Goodsonn over key policies. By focusing on the Gloucester and exploring its crew's experiences, this article shows that the English navy was a restricted and internally conflicted force when operating at the peripheries of the state network.
Family law is a site of social conflict and the erasure of non-traditional families. This book explores how conservative religious and progressive queer groups can cooperatively work together to expand family law's recognition beyond the traditional state-sponsored family. Various religious groups have shown an interest in promoting alternative family structures. For example, certain Muslim and Mormon communities have advocated for polygamy, thereby aligning with queer groups' interest in overcoming the engrafting of monogamy into state law. Advocacy by North American religious conservatives for reforms in favor of non-conjugal families and against same-sex marriage overlaps with certain queer efforts to legitimize friendships and non-traditional families more generally.
This book explores these potential areas of queer and religious political cooperation-including limitations and principled reservations to such cooperation. It then looks at additional future arenas of queer and religious political cooperation going beyond family law.
Shortly after Black Lives Matter protests broke out around the United States in the spring of 2020, a curious protest took place in the state of Texas. Organized in response to the Texas governor's coronavirus-related order to close businesses devoted primarily to the serving of alcohol, some Texas bar owners staged a “Bar Lives Matter” protest outside of the Texas State Capitol building in the city of Austin and others coordinated a lawsuit challenging the governor's order in U.S. federal court. This lawsuit instigated by the Texas Bar and Nightclub Alliance followed in the footsteps of other lawsuits brought by Christian churches around the nation challenging pandemic-related limitations on in-person religious services. In July 2020, responding in apparent disgust to the activities of devoted drinkers in Texas and elsewhere, the wellknown economist and liberal columnist Paul Krugman lamented the potentially deadly reopening situation facing U.S. schools and students in the coming fall, opining in The New York Times that “the reason we’re in this position is that states, cheered on by the Trump administration, rushed to allow large parties and reopen bars. In a real sense America drank away its children's future.”
In this concluding chapter on future directions in queer and religious political alliances, I aim to explore the pandemic pitting of bars against babies, and then too churches against children. Moreover, I will demonstrate that the constellation of competing interests present in the coronavirus pandemic—one of the defining moments of the Trump presidency— cannot be broken down along neat political affiliations or dispersed across predictable camps on either the left or right. Rather, what we have witnessed again is the crisscrossing of political, religious, and sexual interests defying easy categorization. During these times, indeed, it seems almost as if queer theorist Gayle Rubin's 1980s-era “bar dykes” managed to commandeer Texan nightlife and that Paul Krugman was writing for Phyllis Schlafly's conservative Eagle Forum rather than for The New York Times.
In this topsy-turvy situation, the possibility of new alliances between queer and religious groups has emerged. Indeed, as this chapter discusses, recent viruses—notably, HIV and coronavirus—have raised existential issues for queer and religious folk alike and instigated converging debates about sustaining community in the midst of mass human death.
With same-sex couples having gained marital recognition in a number of prominent jurisdictions around the globe, it might appear that the struggle for the legal recognition of nontraditional families is over. But that is not the case. There continue to be families not recognized by a multitude of legal systems, including nonconjugal unions of friends or relatives, polyamorous relationships of more than two persons, and various religious families (including polygamous ones). These families embody a queer resistance to normalcy in family life as they challenge through their lived experience “sexual regimes of normalization” (Cossman 2019, 25) and find themselves at odds with “the normal, the legitimate, the dominant” (Halperin 1995, 62).
The misalignment between law and the reality of modern families continues with the effect that traditional (dyadic, heterosexual) marital families are prioritized when allocating benefits, rights, and obligations. This book explores counterintuitive ways of addressing this legal imbalance by staging an uncomfortable yet necessary conversation concerning a potentially conjoined queer–religious politics challenging “common-sense” (often majoritarian) norms and practices in family law. Such a politics requires looking beyond traditional allies, strategies, and discourses. We are especially intrigued by whether some religious groups might be allies in pluralizing family law in ways beneficial to queer politics. The intuition is that, when it comes to the legal regulation of intimate connections, certain religious subjectivities have more in common with those involved in queer politics than liberal politics.
A number of religious groups have shown an interest in promoting alternative family structures, which is a topos in queer activism as well. For example, with nondyadic unions, an oft-overlooked shared interest in overcoming the monogamous paradigm (commonly engrafted into state law) unites supporters of polyamory and polygamy. As a result, a common desire to overcome law's monogamous paradigm could unite queer polyamorists located in northern California, for example, with splinter “orthodox” Mormon communities living in Utah.
The potential for queer and religious groups to converge has occasionally been investigated before, especially in the U.S. context. For example, Andrew Koppelman's latest (2020) book on LGBT rights and religion has perceptively intervened into the ongoing debate over whether U.S.