In his paper “The Meaning of a Word” J. L. Austin argues that a set of questions and (hence?) a set of answers to these questions is nonsensical. The philosophical claim that a question or answer is nonsense is an important part of the philosopher's stock and trade; for to ask and to propose answers to nonsensical questions is to reveal confusion and the tracking down and unraveling of confusion is one of the valuable contributions that philosophy has to make in the advancement of understanding.

At the same time one must not accept too easily the charge that a question or a form of answer to a question is nonsensical, for to do this is to block off a whole avenue of inquiry and therein direct one's efforts away from a route that might yield positive results.

In Chapter V of Res Cogitans, Zeno Vendler argues that any analysis of “x knows that p” that has “x believes that p” in the analysans is incorrect. The reason he gives is that the “that p” in “x knows that p” is not the same grammatical object as the “that p” in “x believes that p”. As Vendler puts it, there are thats and thats. The view that there are two kinds of “that” clause, one which follows “know” and another which follows “believe”, is attacked by O.R. Jones in his article “Can One Believe What One Knows?”.

Gold & Stoljar pose a dilemma for linguistics should neurobiology win out as the science of mind. The dilemma can be avoided by reestablishing linguistics as an autonomous discipline, rather than a branch of the science of mind. Independent considerations for doing this are presented.