4 results
1 - The Evolution of Security Thinking: An Overview
- from Part One - Approaches to Asian Security
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- By Stephen Hoadley, University of Auckland
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- Book:
- Asian Security Reassessed
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 31 July 2006, pp 3-34
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Summary
INTRODUCTION
Few topics can be more important to more people than security, not least in Asia. Unfortunately for those who live there, Asia has been one of the world's most belligerent regions since the end of World War II. Of the approximately two hundred armed conflicts registered between 1945 and the present, nearly one-third took place in Asia. Two of the deadliest among them were fought in Asia. More than three million people died in the Korean War (1950–53) and over two million in the Vietnam War (1965–73). The Indochina death toll would reach three million if we add the victims of the first Indochina War (1946–54) and the Cambodian conflict (1979–91). Great power rivalry, arms races, communist insurgencies, ethnic rebellions, genocide, massive refugee flows, widespread human rights violations, terrorism, banditry and piracy have added to the apprehensions over Asia's security.
The end of the Cold War has not defused many of these conflicts in Asia as it has those in other parts of the world such as Europe. Even worse, new threats have emerged to frustrate the efforts of Asian governments and international organizations to create a peaceful security environment in the region. The nature of these threats has been aptly summarized by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Reviewof the United States Department of Defense. The report describes Asia as a region containing:
a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers. The governments of some of these states are vulnerable to overthrow by radical or extremist internal political forces. Many of these states field large militaries and possess the potential to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction.
In a globalized world the consequences of these conflicts may easily spill over into other world regions. Asia's security problems have thus become a prime focus for study by policymakers, scholars of international relations and the media, both inside and outside the region. This volume contributes to this policy-relevant study. It seeks to assess the changes in the Asian security environment since the end of the Cold War and the shifts in the perceptions and strategies of managing the threats in the region.
10 - Irregular Migration as a Security Issue
- from Part Three - Non-Traditional Challenges to Asian Security
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- By Stephen Hoadley, University of Auckland
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- Book:
- Asian Security Reassessed
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 31 July 2006, pp 251-269
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Summary
UNREGULATED MIGRATION AS A SECURITY THREAT
Migration has long been a security-policy concern to Asian governments. But during the Cold War it was discounted by realist theorists as a social or economic problem, and thus relegated to “low politics”, in contrast to the “high politics” of defence and diplomacy. The rise to prominence of concepts of comprehensive security and human security has brought migration into clearer view as a security threat in the post-Cold War period. This is most obvious in the cases of disorderly migrations forced by government oppression or expulsion, or precipitated by war, ethnic violence, or famine. Furthermore, illegal movement by economic migrants facilitated by document forgers, people-smuggling and people-trafficking gangs, and illicit employer networks, and other law-breaking activity such as labour exploitation, extortion, and forced prostitution, have made migration a central topic for security studies. Because realists and liberals differ on the cause and nature of migration problems and the proper policies to address them, political controversy is endemic.
Migration is an Asian security concern from the perspective of not only the migrants but also the source and host states. Migrants, particularly illegal migrants, are at physical risk during their perilous transit and at legal risk and vulnerable to economic exploitation until their status is regularized in their new abode and their rights protected by governments. Migrants’ unauthorized or sudden appearance in the host country can inflame social tensions, raise costs of public services, and unsettle traditional institutions of administration and law enforcement. However, under certain circumstances migration can increase individuals’ security, as in the case of escape from famine in North Korea or joblessness in Indonesia or ethnic war in Myanmar. High-skilled or wealthy migrants can be long-term economic assets to their new home countries. Moreover, migration can help a poor and overcrowded source country by relieving pressure and generating remittances. Conversely, it can threaten the source country by depleting its human capital or providing resources for insurrection. Herein lies the six-fold paradox of migration: It can enhance the security of both the migrant and the source and destination countries, or jeopardize the security of all three, or produce good outcomes for one and simultaneously negative ones for the others. This chapter is concerned with the negative outcomes, for they are associated with security risks and threats.
5 - Diplomacy, Peacekeeping, and Nation-Building: New Zealand and East Timor
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- By Stephen Hoadley, University of Auckland
- Edited by Anthony L. Smith
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- Book:
- Southeast Asia and New Zealand
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 13 June 2005, pp 124-144
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Summary
Introduction
New Zealand's formal diplomatic relations with East Timor began on 20 May 2000, when the former Portuguese colony became fully independent. In the prior 25 years East Timor had been invaded and annexed by Indonesia, suffered loss of life from guerrilla resistance and Indonesian reprisals, stabilized by an international peacekeeping force, and assisted and tutored by a UN mission.
New Zealand had been cultivating bilateral relations during the four years prior to independence. And for nearly three decades before that East Timor had been a security, diplomatic, and humanitarian concern to successive governments in Wellington. This chapter traces the evolution of New Zealand's involvement with East Timor from early awareness in the 1970s to deep involvement from 1999, touches on costs and gains, and speculates on future relations.
Early Awareness
Prior to 1974 East Timor (then Portuguese Timor) was known mainly as a battleground between Japanese and Australian forces during World War II, and later as a backward but tranquil colony in an otherwise turbulent region. New Zealand officials first took serious note of East Timor in the months following Portugal's change of government and acknowledgement of its overseas possessions’ right of self-determination and independence. East Timor seemed poised to make a leap from colonialism to self-government and independence, but this was a process fraught with uncertainty, particularly in the Cold War context.
New Zealand officials+ generally favoured self-government for East Timor but were anxious that the transition be done peacefully, and not disrupt the fragile Southeast Asian consensus. To this end New Zealand officials conferred with their counterparts in neighbouring Indonesia in November 1974, agreed that developments should contribute to stability, and hoped East Timor would not come under the influence of the Soviet Union or China.
In the early months of 1975, as the political climate heated up, New Zealand officials made informal contacts with some of the new East Timorese leaders. One of the first was José Ramos Horta, the foreign affairs spokesman of the popular FRETILIN party, who visited New Zealand in July 1975 to publicize his cause amongst NGOs and the media. That same month New Zealand diplomats contacted leaders of the rival UDT party in Díli. These were the two largest of the several parties that sprang up following the liberalization of colonial policy by Portugal in 1974.
Small states as aid donors
- J. Stephen Hoadley
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- Journal:
- International Organization / Volume 34 / Issue 1 / Winter 1980
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 22 May 2009, pp. 121-137
- Print publication:
- Winter 1980
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While debate continues on whether the foreign policies of small states are1 or are or not generically different from those of large states, little has been written explicitly about the association of size of donors with the quality of their foreign aid. This essay hypothesizes that the aid policies of small states will differ from those of large states in ways that may be measured empirically, just as Plischke, East, Sawyer, and Hermann have demonstrated with quantitative data that the general foreign policy behavior of small states varies significantly from that of large ones. More particularly, it is hypothesized that small states give higher quality aid, and give it relatively more generously, than large states. This hypothesis is grounded on general impressions—Sweden is widely acknowledged as a “good” donor and the United States an indifferent one—and on extrapolations from small state theory that will be sketched below.