Perceptual Modal Collapse is the view that no unperceived perceptibles exist. Aristotle takes Perceptual Modal Collapse to be central to Protagoreanism. But Aristotle’s Categories 7 commits Aristotle to Perceptual Modal Collapse: perception and perceptible correlate; each relative pair is constituted by its relation to its correlative; correlatives exist at all the same times; so, perception and perceptible exist at all the same times. Hence, there are no unperceived perceptibles. Moreover, correlatives are simultaneous by nature. Aristotle’s arguments that this does not apply to perception and perceptible are unconvincing. I argue that Aristotle’s second definition of relatives can save Aristotle’s theory from Perceptual Modal Collapse, since the definition distinguishes perceptible as a schematic relative from specific perceptible qualities. Once we disambiguate, we can see that specific perceptibles need not exist at the same time as perceptions. Thus, the specific heat of a fire in a forest can exist, even when unperceived. These ideas underlie Aristotle’s account of intentional relatives in Metaphysics 5.15, where specific perceptual qualities are the content of perceptions.

This chapter examines and clarifies Aristotle’s views concerning truth, truthaptness, truthbearers, truth-conditions, and temporal relativism and argues against two common readings of Aristotle. First, while Aristotle is often credited with the first correspondence theory of truth (wherein items such as beliefs and declarative sentences are true if and only if there is some item – such as a fact or obtaining state of affairs – to which the relevant belief or declarative sentence corresponds), I argue that there is little reason to attribute a substantive correspondence theory of truth to Aristotle. Secondly, although it is often thought that Aristotle is inclined towards a temporalist view according to which truthbearers vary in truth across times while undergoing mere Cambridge change, I argue that Aristotle instead held that truthbearers do not undergo any change at all. This, I suggest, has interesting implications for Aristotle’s views concerning temporalism and apparent changes in truth value.

The interlude explores Aristotle’s influential account of rhetorical redescription, showing its limits as a source for understanding paradiastole. It shows how ancient rhetorical treatments of the figure were quite varied, and at times critical of Aristotle’s approach. It concludes by analysing Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ treatment of language and stasis, showing how it critiques Aristotle’s account of redescription in the Rhetoric.

This chapter examines Amartya Sen’s ethical writings in relation to Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN). While Sen’s capability approach and later work on ethics are often read as alternatives to consequentialism and deontology, he never presents them as a systematic moral theory. His emphasis on freedom, capabilities and functionings reflects an implicit realist orientation which some, notably Martins and Lawson, interpret as ontological in character. Lawson further suggests that Sen’s framework might be viewed as a special case of CEN. It is argued, however, that the two projects diverge: Sen’s ethics rests on implicit ontological tensions, whereas CEN is explicitly grounded in ontological coherence. The chapter highlights these tensions, contrasts the orientations of the two projects toward Aristotle and mainstream ethics, explores the sources of Sen’s ontological reticence, and considers the form of embedded liberalism shaping his stance. It concludes by reflecting on whether limited synthesis between the two frameworks is possible.

The conclusion offers an overview of the book’s central arguments. It first reflects on the development of Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN) within a particular interpretation of Aristotle, showing how this alignment strengthens both its ethical content and its role within Cambridge Social Ontology (CSO). Situating CEN in this way provides a richer ontological grounding for understanding human flourishing and supports the broader project of reviving political economy on realist foundations. The discussion then revisits the comparison between CSO and Amartya Sen, highlighting that while both seek to integrate ethics and economics, they rest on contrasting ontological orientations. Sen’s reluctance to engage systematically with ontology produces conceptual ambiguities that limit the coherence of his framework. The conclusion also considers how Nussbaum’s and Robeyns’s liberal presuppositions reinforce these tensions. It closes by reaffirming the necessity of ontological inquiry for conceptual clarity, ethical critique, and the revival of political economy as a comprehensive social science.

This chapter examines the key features of Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN) through a sustained engagement with Aristotle’s ethics and politics. Four central dimensions of CEN are explored. First, its account of humans as community beings, mutually constituted and co-developing, is illuminated through Aristotle’s notions of character friendship and our intrinsically political nature. Second, the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia clarifies CEN’s understanding of human flourishing. Third, CEN’s claim that all humans are, in a sense, ethical naturalists, owing to their inherent dispositions to care, is reconsidered alongside Aristotle’s view that rational agents choose to endorse caring tendencies not merely because they are natural but because they are good. Finally, the chapter explores CEN’s recognition of human vulnerability and the social conditions that inhibit care, drawing parallels with Aristotle’s critique of defective political systems. Aristotle’s notion of organic social development also deepens the analysis of authenticity in CEN and its relation to human flourishing.

This chapter examines the interpretive consequences of Amartya Sen’s ontological reticence. While Sen recognises the social world as open and processual, his continued reliance on formal, taxonomic methods generates a deep tension that shapes how his work has been received and operationalised. It is argued that the plurality of interpretations surrounding the capability approach reflects not theoretical flexibility but ontological ambiguity. Drawing on developments in Social Choice Theory and mainstream empirical modelling, the chapter shows how Sen’s framework has been adapted within methodologies that presuppose closed systems, thereby diluting its relational orientation. It then contrasts these uses with heterodox applications that foreground an evolutionary outlook. Finally, by examining the contributions of Nussbaum and Robeyns, it is highlighted how liberal conceptions of personhood reinforce ontological inconsistencies and preliminary counters to their claims are offered. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the stakes of these tensions for the future development of the capability approach and its role in the revival of political economy.

This chapter motivates the central problem of the book from within the broadly Aristotelian tradition. Every Aristotelian science must have (1) a clearly delineated subject-matter about which its inquiry proceeds, (2) identifiable properties that can be demonstrated to belong to that subject-matter, and (3) principles to which the science’s practitioner can appeal in demonstrating that those properties belong to that subject. But even a cursory glance at the Peripatetic tradition shows that it is no easy task to state what metaphysics is about, what properties should count as metaphysical, or what principles metaphysicians should invoke when doing their work – let alone to make those answers harmonize.

This chapter continues the case for optimistic skepticism by examining whether meaningful forms of love and friendship require belief in free will. The chapter explores various kinds of love – romantic love, parental love, agape love, and the Buddhist virtue of loving-kindness – and argues that none of them depend on the kind of free will required for basic desert moral responsibility. In fact, adopting a skeptical perspective may enhance our ability to cultivate deeper and more compassionate forms of love. Drawing on psychological and philosophical sources, the author shows that many of the factors that lead us to love others – such as personality, shared values, and vulnerability – are not within our control, yet they remain central to authentic and fulfilling relationships. The chapter also explores the Buddhist notion of metta (loving-kindness), emphasizing its emphasis on universal goodwill without attachment or conditions. In the final section, the author turns to Aristotle’s account of friendship to argue that genuine friendship is essential to human flourishing (eudaimonia) and that free will skepticism preserves what matters most in these relationships: mutual support, character development, and shared purpose. Overall, the chapter defends a rich and affirming account of love and friendship that thrives without belief in free will.

This chapter addresses the common concern that free will skepticism undermines morality. The author argues that this fear is misplaced. While skepticism about free will and basic desert moral responsibility challenges some traditional moral practices – particularly backward-looking blame – it does not eliminate the meaningfulness of moral judgments or ethical life. The chapter explains how axiological judgments of good and bad, deontic “ought” judgments, and respect for persons can all be preserved within a framework that denies basic desert. Drawing on contemporary moral philosophy, the chapter defends the idea that moral life is still possible – and even enriched – when we shift away from blame and toward virtue. The second half of the chapter turns from deontic ethics to virtue ethics, especially Aristotelian and Buddhist traditions, arguing that the central question of morality is not “What ought I do?” but “What kind of person should I be?” From this standpoint, free will skepticism supports the cultivation of virtues like compassion, humility, and loving-kindness, which do not rely on desert-based assumptions. Rather than weakening our moral lives, the author contends, free will skepticism provides a more compassionate, realistic, and psychologically attuned ethical framework – one that better promotes human flourishing and moral development.

This chapter offers the first of two defenses of traditionalism. It argues that our enduring practices are often the way in which we achieve human excellence in any given activity, whether that is a sport or an art or a language or a craft. Relying on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, it contends that this understanding of a practice as constitutive of a tradition can help us make sense of and appreciate a similar phenomenon in constitutional law. It uses the examples of the law of the Second Amendment and personal jurisdiction in civil procedure to sketch what traditionalism looks like in our constitutional law.

Chapter 7 discusses anger in relation to gender. A character’s ability to display or suppress anger is tied to expectations of external judgment. In the Iliad, male characters frequently express anger; mortal women do not. Homer’s text highlights the gap between a female character’s words and her inner thoughts, creating an ambiguity that puzzles male audiences and characters attempting to read their minds. The chapter surveys theories of anger (from Aristotle to cognitive science) and analyses Homeric emotional expressions, including the emotional ‘script’ of anger. It focuses on ancient readings of Achilles’ anger. Aristotle’s influential definition of anger, presupposing Achilles as a model, shaped scholarly understanding but excluded anger from the emotions women could feel. Later, Seneca and Plutarch opposed this, linking anger to a lack of self-control, associating it particularly with women and barbarians. Ancient theories consistently stressed the connection between anger, rationality, and revenge.

Chapter 1 introduces some crucial themes of the book, discussing the contraposition between Achilles and Hector in the reception of the Iliad and in modern interpretations of the poem. Both heroes acknowledge causing the destruction of their philoi (’loved ones’) (Hector at 22.104, Achilles at 18.82). Zeus, a deeply emotional god (17.198–218), also causes suffering to humans he loves, a consequence he anticipates from the poem’s start when he grants Thetis’ request (1.511–19). The chapter treats these incidents as examples of a single narrative mechanism: the central characters achieve the opposite of their goals. These instances demonstrate tragic ‘reversal’ (Aristotle) and ‘moral bad luck’ (Williams), highlighting the gap between intention and outcome in the epic’s structure.

Chapter 4 shows that while one cannot deny Swift’s use of a Tory “conspiracy thesis” in foreign policy tracts like The Conduct of the Allies, Swift relied more heavily on legitimate arguments and sources of international politics and law that have been underrated: Aristotle, Hugo Grotius, and Samuel Pufendorf. Aristotle taught a concept of foreign policy centered on constitutionalism, geography, naval power, self-defense, and public reason. Grotius and Pufendorf provided a foundation of natural and international law, as well as just war theory, that was secular yet grounded on classical learning and Christian ethics. Grotius’s underappreciated influence undermines the idea that Swift’s politics were purely Hobbesian, realist, or authoritarian. Swift had a realist and an idealist strain but “Grotian rationalism” predominated in the controversy over the Utrecht Peace. Grotius also fed Swift’s growing skepticism about the Whig concept of the balance of power.

This chapter explores the intersection of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Husserl’s phenomenology within the context of dementia research, emphasising the concept of habits. By introducing curability as the counter-pole to vulnerability, the chapter highlights a shift towards integrating medical and philosophical perspectives. It argues that embodied practices, regarded as meaningful, are key in both preventing and treating dementia. Through Aristotle’s ethics, the chapter examines malign habitualisation in touch with the preventive turn. Here, the vice of intemperance is related to excessive alcohol consumption, alcohol dependence, and Korsakoff’s dementia. Through Husserl’s phenomenology, the chapter examines the power of benign habitualisation, connecting embodiment, narrativity, and affectivity. Drawing on a video of Marta Cinta, a former ballerina with Alzheimer’s, the chapter rethinks influential concepts, such as narrative identity and second nature, through the lens of embodiment. The chapter ultimately demonstrates that embodied habits, when perceived as meaningful, can aid in balancing health, well-being, and eudaimonia. Focusing on the affective sphere, the study contemplates whether we can still feel home in embodied habits despite dementia.