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1 results

  • Knowledge, Modal Robustness, and Mathematical Platonism

  • Benoit Gaultier
  • Journal:
    Episteme , First View
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    21 March 2025, pp. 1-8
    • Article
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  • The intuition that knowledge requires the satisfaction of some sort of anti-luck condition is widely shared. I examine the claim that modal robustness is sufficient for satisfying this condition: for a true belief to be non-luckily true, it is sufficient that this belief is safe and sensitive. I argue that this claim is false by arguing that, at least when it comes to beliefs in necessary truths, satisfying the anti-luck condition requires satisfying a non-modal condition. I also advance a plausible candidate for this condition and argue for the implausibility of mathematical Platonism on this basis.