The concept of post-Kantian perfectionism clarifies the mutual polemics in the Hegelain School, contrasting Feuerbach’s naturalism, which combines pre- and post-Kantian motifs, with the more exigent Kantianism of Bruno Bauer; and it elucidates sharp disagreements with anti-perfectionists like Max Stirner. The concrete historical situation comes under scrutiny of post-Kantian perfectionist thinking. French Revolutionary factions and the contending parties in the German Vormärz express distinct views of freedom and follow different developmental trajectories. Civil society too reveals its inner dynamics. Rejecting Leibniz’s pre-established harmony and Wolffian mutuality, but also markedly differing from Kant and Schiller, the non-compossibility of interests in civil society is the theoretical innovation here. The irreconcilable opposition of interests, central to Marx, is not a view original with him. In Bauer, autonomy means divesting oneself of particular interests to the extent that they inhibit institutional transformation.

History for German idealism is the expression of practical reason, the process of gradually bringing about the accord of subject and object. In Hegel’s conception of the history of freedom, different configurations of ethical life embody changing assessments of the self and the world, and contain essential contradictions whose resolution is the key to progress towards new and more complex forms. The dialectic of the will in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is an exposition of the idea of spontaneity, endowing itself with concrete content as it moves through its dimensions of universality, particularity, and singularity. Hegel demonstrates that modern institutions are not mere limitations, but legitimate conditions for the exercise of freedom. The rationality of the real, however, does not preclude a critical engagement. Close examination of current relations and institutions as exemplifying ideas of freedom reveals nodal points where practical interventions are likely to be fruitful in effecting change. An implicit, historicised ‘ought’ in Hegel, arising from his reworking of the logical categories, marks his place within post-Kantian perfectionism.

Chapter 13 examines the evolution of regionally administered totalitarianism (RADT) in post-Mao China. The reforms were implemented to safeguard totalitarianism within the boundaries of its core principles. Economic reforms, particularly those implemented in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, inadvertently strengthened the private sector and civil society under RADT, which ultimately saved the regime. Yet this development also unintentionally created a new liberal type of institutional genes and steered China in the direction of regionally decentralized authoritarianism (RDA). The chapter explores the tug-of-war between the old institutional genes of the RADT/RDA system and the new institutional genes, with the authoritarian system exerting force to suppress the nascent traits, followed by a subsequent shift back to rigid totalitarian control. Finally, the chapter assesses the economic constraints imposed by the totalitarian structure, the changes in the party-state incentives, the precarious position of the private sector, and the overarching influence of communist totalitarianism on China’s economic progress.

The case of The Bahamas highlights the institutionally disruptive impacts of climate change. Despite pioneering efforts in national adaptation legislation in the mid 2000s, the chapter finds that The Bahamas has largely focused on relatively conservative programs concerned with climate change mitigation rather than adaptation or loss and damage. Yet drawing on semi-structured interviews and an analysis of relevant policy documents, the chapter also suggests that climate change has impacted the configuration of relevant institutional bodies in The Bahamas. As the analysis demonstrates, the loss and damage associated with several extreme weather events in the late 2010s led to the establishment of the Ministry of Disaster Preparedness, Management and Reconstruction; the strengthening of the legal framework for environmental protection; and the growing resonance among civil society organizations of the implications of climate change for their humanitarian and nature preservation work. The chapter argues that while much of The Bahamas’ loss and damage policy agenda is focused on developing the knowledge, resources, skills, and governance frameworks to grapple with the impacts of climate change, it is also worth paying attention to how climate change impacts are reshaping political institutions and defining the possible contours of knowledge generation.

This chapter focuses on how Bangladesh, a country with extensive experience of climate-related disasters, has dealt with loss and damage in its national policymaking. In response to its high vulnerability, Bangladesh is – among the countries studied in this book – a role model in disaster reduction and preparedness. However, the government’s efforts do not meet the scope of needs connected to climate impacts on the ground. Drawing on a review of relevant policy documents and semi-structured interviews with key public and civil society actors, the chapter analyzes national-level engagement with loss and damage from climate change in Bangladesh. It demonstrates that while fundamentally all ministries in Bangladesh are involved in averting, minimizing, or addressing loss and damage, the concept is yet to be fully integrated in national policy. The chapter also finds that existing policies tend to focus on addressing economic losses and overlook the significant noneconomic losses from climate change. It is argued that integrating loss and damage into national policies, establishing a fair national mechanism, and creating a comprehensive database of loss and damage data would strengthen Bangladesh’s role as both an advocate for loss and damage governance and a leader in climate response.

The durability of democracy among modern political systems is based on its ability to provide for its own self-enforcement without recourse to outside compulsion (North, Summerhill, and Weingast 2000; Przeworski 1991). Recourse to outside enforcement is always dangerous because loss of self-restraint by that authority raises the dilemma of “who guards the guardians” (Hurwicz 2008), and holds out the possibility of dictatorship.

Whether old or new, democracies are fragile. There are no guarantees that they will last. Why? Part of the answer is that democracy is an inherently unfinished project. There is always more political work to do. The institutions that define democratic life, such as a robust civil society, political parties that structure public opinion and voting behavior, and free, fair, and competitive elections, moreover, are just as available to authoritarians, as to democrats. Finally, democracies operate in an international system that supports the spread of dictatorship, as well as democracy.

This chapter explores the possibilities and dilemmas that civil society actors face in resisting and reversing democratic backsliding through examples from around the world. It examines the conditions that shape civil society activism under backsliding and the roles it has played in containing or reversing autocratization. As it shows, in a number of cases civil society resistance has been critical in restraining and reversing backsliding. But it has been better able to counter backsliding when popular support for the backsliding leader has eroded and the opposition is able to work through institutions rather than having to work against them. As backsliding proceeds, institutional channels for influence deteriorate. As a result, there is a critical window during which civil society resistance stands a better chance of containing backsliding: before electoral processes and institutional constraints on executives are fully captured. Once capture occurs, civil society resistance moves to the much more dangerous and difficult task of confronting rather than preventing dictatorship.

This chapter argues that advisory proceedings have the procedural flexibility to enable individuals’ participation, despite the Court’s reluctance to bring such participation to fruition. It first dispels the myth that witnesses are limited to the confines of contentious proceedings. It then discusses the Court’s sparse engagement with amici curiae. Finally, it explores the potential of the analogous extension of Article 66(2) of the Court’s Statute, authorising the furnishing of information by entities beyond states and international organisations.

This chapter discusses the political and diplomatic control of the implementation of international decisions by quasi-judicial bodies. It covers the follow-up procedures of the Human Rights Committee, the African Commission, and the Inter-American Commission, highlighting the challenges and effectiveness of these mechanisms. The chapter examines the role of states, international organizations, and civil society in ensuring compliance with international human rights decisions, the strategies for overcoming obstacles to implementation, and the impact of political and diplomatic efforts on the protection of human rights. It also discusses the need for enhanced cooperation and coordination among various actors to improve the effectiveness of these follow-up procedures.

Constitutional hardball consists of practices that are consistent with the formal requirements of constitutional democracy but that destabilize and potentially transform it. This Chapter examines why political actors engage in hardball, focusing first on their short-term political motivations and then turning to the function of constitutional hardball within reasonably well-functioning constitutional democracies. The Chapter ends with a discussion of what might be done to convert constitutional hardball into ordinary political maneuvering, conclude that such efforts are unlikely to succeed and might be inappropriate (though not illiberal) efforts to halt more or less ordinary transformations in political practices.

This chapter recounts some of the most important work that has been achieved or is ongoing: at global level (in the United Nations system); at regional level (especially in the African, American, and European human rights systems); by the International Committee of the Cross; and especially by pioneering civil society organizations (local and international human rights bodies). Thus, for instance, the seminal role of Amnesty International in promoting the adoption and implementation of a global treaty on the prohibition of torture—and drawing attention to the problem of torture more broadly—cannot be overstated.

This chapter examines Marx’s important but understudied text Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. It is shown that Marx, beginning from an enthusiasm he shares with Hegel for developing an organic theory of the state, shows Hegel’s execution of his project to be deeply flawed. Hegel’s defence of constitutional monarchy has the strange result of producing, when properly thought through, a defence of radical popular power. His attempt to use the ‘estates’ as an element in the state performing multiple many-way mediations further serves to reveal that something is amiss in the role that Hegel’s logic is being called upon to play.

This chapter considers access to courts for victims of grand corruption, especially in Latin America. It explains the origins and meaning of victim compensation in the UNCAC, how “victim” is defined in human rights law, and uses the Honduran Gualcarque River case to introduce how courts are beginning to apply concepts from human rights law to cases involving victims of grand corruption. It divides these cases into “direct harm” suffered by individual or group victims, and cases involving broad or diffuse harm where victims as a class are represented by civil society organizations. It looks briefly at which civil society organizations should be able to represent victims in proceedings.