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Defamation is different from many of the other torts, not only because it contains concepts that do not arise elsewhere, but also because in no other tort do the defences play such a significant role in litigation. As a figure in the chapter illustrates, the elements of the tort set a wide circle of protection that shields a person’s private interest in their reputation –but this protection is cut down to a large extent by the defences, most of which reflect the importance of a countervailing public interest in free communication of information and opinion. To succeed in a defamation action, the plaintiff must be able to bring their case into the central zone (shown in the figure), but note that the balance between the two zones has varied over time.
Connecting with Australian Tort Law is a practical introduction to the principles and application of tort law. It guides students to expand their knowledge of tort law, improve their problem-solving and communication skills and advance their professional development. Now in its third edition, Connecting with Australian Tort Law maintains its clear two-part structure. Part 1 introduces students to the fundamentals of tort law, and provides practical tools needed to succeed academically. Students will learn how to structure a legal argument and answer complex questions before arriving at Part 2. This Part covers specific areas of tort law, including trespass to the person, trespass to land and personal property, nuisance, defamation and negligence. It examines the principles of tort law and uses case examples and legislation to demonstrate their application. Pedagogically rich, Connecting with Australian Tort Law includes problem-solving questions, tips and legislation alerts to keep students engaged and actively learning.
Defamation is a ubiquitous tort in modern society. Defamation protects a person’s reputation, rather than their bodily integrity, goods or land. With the rapid expansion of social media, it is frighteningly easy for false and disparaging comments to spread online like wildfire. This chapter introduces the tort of defamation and its purpose in society. Defamation has undergone substantial reform over the years, thus key amendments are explained, along with emerging issues. The chapter outlines and explains the elements of defamation and explores cases that clarify how courts interpret and apply defamation principles. Next, defences and remedies are explained, followed by the increasing focus on defamation and social media. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of privacy and breach of confidentiality, on which plaintiffs can rely when defamation does not assist.
Seema Elizabeth Isoy wrote in a condominium owner Whatsapp group that developer David Chiu had been arrested for fraud several years earlier. She knew but left out that he had later been acquitted. In holding her liable for defamation, the Malaysian Federal Court in Seema Elizabeth Isoy v Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong relied on the concept of a half-truth – a statement that is literally true but omits key information that would change the statement’s meaning – raised by Lord Shaw in Sutherland v Stopes. This note suggests that, while the Federal Court’s conclusion ultimately may have been justified, it should have more carefully considered whether a report of a preliminary act such as an arrest or charge necessarily implies guilt and whether an acquittal actually lessens the sting of an arrest and charge. Judgments cited by the Federal Court – from India, the US, Malaysia, Canada and South Africa – did not adequately address these issues, making this note of potential interest to readers across the common law world.
This chapter examines the relationship between English satire and libel law between roughly 1670 and 1730. It takes up the growth of verbal ambiguity and the use of irony, circumlocution, and allegory among satirists such as John Dryden, Alexander Pope, and Delarivier Manley, and demonstrates how the courts responded to verbal ambiguity by refining the supposedly “objective” interpretive standards to be used by jurors. Such standards created mechanisms for delimiting verbal ambiguity and restricting the interpretive latitude of jurors while permitting the crown to skirt technical linguistic issues. These revisions to the law were part of a more general refinement of libel laws, which furnished the government with its primary means of regulating the press during this period. The interaction between libel law and satire had consequences for both legal procedure and literature – consequences that extended well beyond the eighteenth century and that continue to shape legal and literary practice today.
Potential legal repercussions exist for cults and for the persons who lead, belong to, or otherwise interact with such organizations. Cults may be deemed criminal organizations, and may also incur civil liability when faulty attempts to maintain corporate status requirements are exposed. Despite this, attempts on the part of criminal prosecutors and civil plaintiffs’ attorneys to seek criminal penalties and civil damages have been met with mixed success. Cult members subjected to coercive control may attempt to assert defenses that involve duress and insanity, with uneven results. Of considerable concern for media representatives as well as cult members are defamation lawsuits that can lead to monetary damages and compelled public retractions. Lawyers whose efforts to provide zealous advocacy on behalf of cults are best advised to avoid overidentification with their clients. Treatment providers and forensic evaluators should weigh various risk factors carefully when engaging in service provision to cult members.
Communicating includes sending and receiving messages. Effective communicators take time to learn the values, attitudes, beliefs, and preferences of their intended audiences. By understanding who makes up the audience, a communicator can develop messages that resonate with the audience, motivating them to take action. For public health emergency risk communicators this means creating messages that educate and motivate people to protect their health during an emergency. This chapter explains how to identify audiences through audience segmentation by identifying risk variables such as age, health status, and geographic location. Stakeholder management theory provides critical insights into how to work and communicate with partners, stakeholders, and the public during a health emergency. Key information about public health laws including libel, slander, HIPPA and Right to Know is included, analyzing how public health laws impact emergency risk communication. Descriptions of public health powers for state and local health departments are included. A student case study analyzes the Jackson, Mississippi, Water Crisis using the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication framework. Reflection questions are included at the end of the chapter.
Researchers involved in research misconduct proceedings are increasingly threatening or bringing legal defamation claims against the institutions, complainants, and publications involved in the proceedings. Although defamation claims do not often succeed, they can nevertheless be costly and lengthy. This article analyzes certain defamation cases in the research misconduct space and provides advice for institutions and other involved parties seeking to minimize potential defamation liability associated with research misconduct proceedings.
It is widely presumed that privacy is ‘factive’, i.e. that it cannot be diminished by accessing or disseminating falsehoods. But if this is so, what wrongs are committed in cases where others access documents of ours (letters, medical records, etc.) which contain false information? In this article, I examine various ways of explaining the wrongfulness of accessing and dissemination falsehoods (defamation; that privacy can be violated without being diminished; ‘control’ accounts of privacy; downstream revelations of truths; that falsehoods diminish ‘propositional’ or ‘attentional’ privacy). I lay out what each of these accounts misses about accessing falsehoods, about privacy, and/or about the right to privacy. I then propose two alternative ways of accounting for the intuitive wrongfulness of accessing and disseminating falsehoods: viewing them as merely ‘attempted’ privacy violations and weakening the truth condition of privacy diminishments.
This chapter reviews the regulation of disinformation from an African human rights’ law perspective, focusing on the right to freedom of expression and the right to vote. It provides an overview of the African regional law framework, specifically the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of 1981 (the African Charter) and corresponding jurisprudence. The chapter also analyses the way in which freedom of expression and disinformation laws have been applied in African countries, the aim being to contextualize and illustrate how African regional law plays out at the domestic level, but with an emphasis on the position in South Africa.
The victim of a tort can generally claim compensatory damages for any loss suffered as a result of the tort. The assessment of such damages and the attribution of responsibility for such loss are generally governed by the rules discussed in Chs 2 to 4 for civil wrongs in general. Specific rules for tort are discussed in this chapter: the assessment of damages and the attribution of responsibility. The assessment of compensatory damages for personal injury, which are usually claimed in tort, is discussed.
The United States’ free speech regime, as codified in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, comes with obvious contrasts to Thailand’s ill-famed lèse–majesté law—Section 112 of the Thai Criminal Code—which prohibits defamation or even truthful degradation of the Thai King and Royal Family. Recent scholarship has focused on such differences and has largely depicted the two regimes as diametric opposites. When viewing the First Amendment and Thailand’s lèse–majesté law in temporal isolation, the recent scholarly consensus has significant merit. However, by analyzing the two regimes over time, similarities arise suggesting that both regimes represent each respective country’s attempt to accommodate competing and changing values present within the respective countries.
This article examines what the state of the law regarding the tortious protection of the privacy of corporations tells us about the concept of a legal person. Given that non-human persons are capable of having an interest in at least their informational privacy, logic would seem to dictate that they should be recognised such a right protecting their personality. In reality, the law is most hesitant to concede the right to privacy to non-natural persons (the same being true of reputation). This suggests that, for the dominant strand of the law at least, despite the rhetoric, legal persons do not really have rights of personality; in other words, that they are not really persons.
Dean John Wade, who replaced the great torts scholar William Prosser on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, put the finishing touches on the defamation sections in 1977.1 Apple Computer had been founded a year before, and Microsoft two, but relatively few people owned computers yet. The twenty-four-hour news cycle was not yet a thing, and most Americans still trusted the press.2
The laws of defamation and privacy are at once similar and dissimilar. Falsity is the hallmark of defamation – the sharing of untrue information that tends to harm the subject’s standing in their community. Truth is the hallmark of privacy – the disclosure of facts about an individual who would prefer those facts to be private. Publication of true information cannot be defamatory; spreading of false information cannot violate an individual’s privacy. Scholars of either field could surely add epicycles to that characterization – but it does useful work as a starting point of comparison.
Coordinated campaigns of falsehoods are poisoning public discourse.1 Amidst a torrent of social-media conspiracy theories and lies – on topics as central to the nation’s wellbeing as elections and public health – scholars and jurists are turning their attention to the causes of this disinformation crisis and the potential solutions to it.
It’s accually obsene what you can find out about a person on the internet.1
To some, this typo-ridden remark might sound banal. We know that our data drifts around online, with digital flotsam and jetsam washing up sporadically on different websites across the internet. Surveillance has been so normalized that, these days, many people aren’t distressed when their information appears in a Google search, even if they sometimes fret about their privacy in other settings.
Deep fakes are a special kind of counterfeit image that is difficult to distinguish from an authentic image. They may be used to represent a person doing any act and are generated using advanced machine learning techniques. Currently, such an appropriation of personality is only actionable if the circumstances disclose one of a number of largely unrelated causes of action. As these causes of action are inadequate to protect claimants from the appropriation of their personalities, there should be a new independent tort or statutory action for the appropriation of personalities which is grounded in the protection of a person’s dignitary interests.
The tort of defamation protects the reputation of individuals in society. A cause of action arises where one individual publishes a false matter about another that lowers the reputation of the latter in the eyes of ordinary and reasonable members of the society. While many of the torts covered in this book seek to protect the bodily integrity of individuals, the tort of defamation seeks to protect their reputation. Defamation laws are concerned with balancing freedom of speech with the protection of individuals’ reputation, character and standing in the community. The increased use of social media has a significant role to play in defamation, with the speed and ease of publication on the internet creating new sites for defamation action. Additionally, the emergence of novel technologies and methods of sharing defamatory posts online – such as hashtags, emojis and memes – have raised novel questions about application of traditional defamation principles to the modern technological landscape. This makes defamation a highly relevant tort in contemporary society.