This paper examines Thailand’s evolving policy toward Cambodia during the Cold War through the lens of strategic narrative. While conventional accounts emphasise geopolitical rivalry and threat perception, this study argues that Thailand’s foreign policy was equally shaped by the discursive construction of meaning. Drawing on archival documents, political memoirs, media analysis, and academic debates, the paper traces how successive administrations—Kriangsak (1977–1980), Prem (1980–1988), and Chatichai (1988–1991)—reframed the Cambodian conflict to legitimise controversial policies, including cooperation with the Khmer Rouge.

Kriangsak’s narrative of a neutral “situation in Cambodia” justified Thailand’s cautious diplomacy while concealing covert assistance to the Khmer Rouge. Under Prem, the conflict was redefined as an “international crisis,” enabling alignment with ASEAN, China, and the United States while framing Khmer Rouge participation in the CGDK coalition as patriotic resistance. Chatichai’s “marketplace” narrative marked a departure from ideological posturing, emphasizing economic engagement and regional integration.

By analyzing these shifting frames, the paper demonstrates how narratives functioned as instruments of realpolitik, shaping public opinion, forging alliances, and legitimizing policies that often subordinated humanitarian concerns. Thailand’s case underscores the constructivist insight that power in international relations operates not only through material capabilities but also through the politics of interpretation.