The article examines artificial intelligence (AI) narratives of the three most important powers in the emerging global AI order – the US, China, and the EU. It argues that these narratives are central to constructing the meanings ascribed to AI in international politics and therefore to understanding the global competition for AI leadership. Specifically, the article uses a method of narrative analysis to reconstruct the AI narratives of the three powers from government documents and strategy papers. These narratives speak to the worldviews and AI images of the powers, how they view each other’s aspirations and behaviours, and what their objectives and motivations are to engage in AI competition. The relationship between the narratives sheds light on the scope for international AI cooperation and conflict. The results reinforce expectations of an intensifying ‘AI race’ between the US and China for global AI leadership. The EU comes out more as a bystander to this geopolitical competition, but strives to lead the development of international AI norms and standards. The article points to different potentials for cooperation and conflict on different aspects of AI and identifies status-seeking as a possible driver of AI competition.

Denouncing the persistence of nationalist reflexes in order to explain the crisis of European integration is much too simple, as is the critique of a mercantile Europe deprived of solid social and moral foundations. Yet, these interpretations, oversimplified as they are, do point to some aspects of our liberal civilisation, which are under pressure in the current trajectory of developments shaping Europe. Seen as symptoms of a widespread malaise, these perspectives should be taken seriously.

Over the last three decades, European Union regulation of the internal market has become highly pervasive, affecting practically all domains of European citizens' lives. Many studies have focused on understanding the process and causes of regulatory change, but with limited attempts to analyse the more general sources of regulatory reform. This article focuses on the determinants of stability and change in EU regulation. An original dataset of 169 pieces of legislation (regulations, directives and decisions) across eight different sectors is developed and the dynamics of regulatory reform in the EU are analysed. Using time‐series analysis of count data, evidence is found that the number of winning coalitions in the Council and the size of EU membership have a significant impact on regulatory reform in the EU. By contrast, the ideological composition of the EU's legislative bodies is not systematically related to regulatory reform.

This short piece introduces four articles from a roundtable discussion on Small States and the Global Economic Crisis at the 2011 General Conference of the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) in Reykjavik Iceland. The discussants were each asked to consider the role of size and EU membership in determining the effect and response of small states to the current economic crisis. The lessons learned from the exchange are conditional: it is very difficult to generalise about the effects of either size or EU membership when considering small states and the global economic crisis.

New divisions have emerged within the European Union over the handling of the recent migration crisis. While both frontline and favoured destination countries are called upon to deal with the number of migrants looking for international protection and better living conditions, no consensus has been reached yet on the quota‐based mechanisms for the relocation of refugees and financial help to exposed countries proposed by the EU. Such mechanisms pose a trade‐off for member states: the EU's response to the crisis offers help to countries under pressure, but it inevitably requires burden‐sharing among all EU members and a limitation of their national sovereignty. Within this scenario, the article compares how public opinion and political elites in ten different EU countries view a common EU migration policy grounded on solidarity and burden‐sharing. By tracing both within‐ and cross‐national patterns of convergence (and divergence), the article shows that contextual factors influence policy preferences, with support for solidarity measures being stronger in countries with higher shares of illegal migrants and asylum seekers. While individuals’ predispositions, identity and ideological orientations account for both masses’ and elites’ attitudes towards burden‐sharing measures, subjective evaluations and beliefs concerning the severity of the crisis provide additional and alternative explanations when looking at the public's preferences. In particular, it is found that concern about the flow of migrants to Europe consolidates the impact of contextual factors, whereas the overestimation of the immigrant population fosters hostility against solidarity measures, with both effects more pronounced as the country's exposure to the crisis increases. In the light of these results, the main implication of this study is that EU institutions have to primarily address entrenched beliefs and misperceptions about immigrants to enhance public support for a joint approach to migration.

Scholars have used varying terminology for describing non-state entities seeking to influence public policy or work with the EU’s institutions. This paper argues that the use of this terminology is not and should not be random, as different ‘frames’ come with different normative visions about the role(s) of these entities in EU democracy. A novel bibliometric analysis of 780 academic publications between 1992 and 2020 reveals that three frames stand out: The interest group frame, the NGO frame, as well as the civil society organisation frame; a number of publications also use multiple frames. This article reveals the specific democratic visions contained in these frames, including a pluralist view for interest groups; a governance view for NGOs as ‘third sector’ organisations, and participatory and deliberative democracy contributions for civil society organisations. The use of these frames has dynamically changed over time, with ‘interest groups’ on the rise. The results demonstrate the shifting focus of studies on non-state actors in the EU and consolidation within the sub-field; the original visions of European policy-makers emerging from the 2001 White Paper on governance may only partially come true.

Promoting renewable energy sources (RES) has been addressed a key strategy for mitigating climate change, the governing in which has turned out a challenging and protracted task for the EU. There is often an implicit assumption that concern for climate change drives energy policy, but a closer look at the development of European RES policy indicates how EU governors have had to confront a range of governance dilemmas in trying to balance various objectives and conflicting interests. Therefore, while energy security and environmental concerns have provided a rationale for crafting renewable energy as a specific EU policy domain, the main driver for RES policy coordination has been internal market concerns, and not the concern about an impending climate catastrophe. More recently, rising concerns about energy insecurity and climate change have forced the EU to seek greater policy coordination in the context of more integrated energy markets. Although seemingly propitious for further harmonisation, it is doubtful whether the Member States and their citizens are yet prepared to accept new efforts towards deeper integration of European energy policy.

The financial crisis increased the importance of the member states at the expense of European Union (EU) rules on the single market and Economic and Monetary Union. The commission allowed exceptions that could become lasting if the economic downturn persists. At the same time, the EU has supported stronger financial market regulation, but not in corporate governance, where the member states retain reserved powers. The EU only gets and keeps institutions that the member states support.

In this article, I address the problem of party attitudes towards European integration and show its relevance for research on Europeanisation. I discuss the interaction between domestic parties and the European issue and propose a framework for the analysis of two alternative arguments: either Europe as an issue has been internalised by party systems and absorbed into the main patterns of party competition or, alternatively, Europe has had a disruptive impact on party systems and even resulted in forms of ‘de-partification’.

This article analyses how European studies were introduced in Australia, examining teaching, research and research training. It surveys policy and curriculum developments since the introduction of the study of the European Union (EU) in the Australian university curriculum in the early 1990s. It profiles Australian research on the EU. Australia's position – and that of New Zealand – in the Asia Pacific region has provided a useful context to understand the EU as an international actor and as a context for comparative regional integration.

This article provides a new perspective on EU exit as an exemplary form of disruptive dissensus or extreme Euroscepticism by examining how it is shaped by people’s attitudes towards the Union’s actions during the COVID-19 pandemic. We test how the dissatisfaction about how the EU handled the pandemic limited the trust in how it would manage it in the future, and influences a preference to exit the EU. We use a multi-level statistical model which combines individual-level data from a Eurobarometer survey and country-level characteristics from all 27 EU member states. The results indicate that disruptive dissensus is linked to both the retrospective and prospective attitudes towards the EU policy initiatives, even when controlling for the severity of the pandemic as well as the populists in government at the country level. We also find that the link between specific and diffuse support at the EU level holds during crises.

The article analyses the development of European Studies (ES) research and education in Russia and assesses various external influences in that process. Although ES were part of the cultural and academic agenda during the Soviet Union period, it was only with the end of the Cold War and the intensification of European Union–Russian bilateral relations that ES began to raise significant interest in the Russian academia, leading to the proliferation of research and teaching activities, and later to the institutionalization of ES as a separate subject area through specific educational programmes.

This commentary is in response to the European Union's (EU's) 7th framework programme (FP7). It sets out the major elements of FP7 and discusses the pros and cons of the EU's activity in the field of research funding. The main argument is that the EU's activities have grown in size. They can and should no longer be ignored by political scientists when looking for research money. The commentary enumerates some arguments regarding why the EU programmes may be better, or may become better in the future, than the usually critical accounts of the EU research system suggest.

What is the effect of external stimuli in curbing corruption at the national level? This article analyses the intervening impact of EU post-conditionality and GRECO monitoring on countries’ anti-corruption record. It finds that “soft governance” has a positive impact and stimulates national responses against corruption. This positive influence increases when is additionally conditioned by strong internal stimuli targeting corruption.

Which parameters affect coalition building in budgetary negotiations? In this article, three distinct levels of analysis are identified to account for coalition building patterns, associated with domestic politics, domestic socioeconomic structures and EU politics. At the level of domestic politics, ideology points to cross‐governmental affinity of a partisan nature; at the level of socioeconomic structures, similarity of policy interests, generated by cross‐national socioeconomic convergence with EU policy standards, informs coalition formation patterns; at the EU politics level, the intergovernmental power balance influences the political aspirations of each Member State in the integration process and coalition‐building decisions. Two sets of parameters affect the evolution of EU coalition patterns, corresponding to the integration impact on the EU (new cleavages) and on the Member States (the impact of Europeanisation). This analytical framework is used to examine the southern coalition (Spain, Greece, Portugal) in the four multi‐annual financial frameworks (1988, 1992, 1999 and 2005).

‘Multi-disciplinary’ field trips to Brussels to accompany undergraduate courses on European political and economic integration are of exceptional academic value. This article offers ideas on how to plan such trips – which people to meet, how to prepare for meetings, reflections on the instructor's role – and suggests how to measure study trip outcomes. The author argues that study trips are a resource that should be more commonly utilised as they are highly beneficial to student learning outcomes.

Interest group influence represents the Higgs boson of contemporary social research. Scholars have tried to define and measure influence for decades: tens of different definitions are used in the literature and as many methods to measure it can be found. The literature has recently converged towards an agreement on how to study interest group influence: preference attainment. The latter has monopolised the research in the literature in the last years. Yet, a discussion on what preference attainment is, what it does and what it does not is still missing in the literature. This works aims to fill this gap by providing a theoretical and methodological informed discussion on interest group influence and preference attainment. In so doing, I propose a novel method to apply preference attainment in an effective and efficient manner.