In 2021, Russia and Belarus supplied 41% of EU imports, but following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent sanctions, trade with both countries collapsed. EU import demand is estimated by exporting country, and a choke‑price approach is used to recover the trade costs implied by sanctions. The results indicate high implied tariffs on Belarus (43.0%) and Russia (49.4%), while the United States and the rest of the world experienced large implied “subsidies” 70.0%, and 166.2%, respectively. Despite large and statistically significant cross‑price elasticities suggesting substitution toward Ukraine, trade gains accrued primarily to the United States and ROW.

The paper introduces the concept of ‘eco-digital constitutionalism’ to denote one of the latest offsprings of digital constitutionalism that, building on environmental constitutionalism, articulates rights and principles to face the ecological challenges of the digital revolution. We propose this concept as an analytical lens synthesising digital and environmental dimensions to study the response to the specific constitutional challenges of the twin transition: a convergence often overlooked by environmental or digital constitutionalism in isolation. In particular, the article leverages this new concept to investigate the emergence of digital sustainability principles within the EU, positioning the Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles as a catalytic normative blueprint. To contrast the Declaration’s fragmented structure, we develop a typology of three digital sustainability principles. We employ this categorisation as a parameter to conduct a socio-legal study of constitutionalisation of digital sustainability principles across EU member states. By examining a spectrum of sources, including constitutions, ordinary laws, policy documents and digital charters, our empirical findings reveal a process in its infancy, with no formal constitutional recognition and relegated to isolated pieces of legislation. On the contrary, policy documents remain the laboratory of digital sustainability principles, and digital charters display an effort to shift from principles to rights.

The European Union stands at a crossroads. Its founding promises of peace, convergence, and multilateralism are increasingly strained by debt, migration, sovereignty, and militarization. The introduction to this Special Issue begins with the question: who is the EU for? To stretch this question analytically we move beyond conventional debates on globalization and sovereignty foregrounding the colonial and racialized conditions that shape European integration. Colonialism, we argue, remains operative, structuring the production of race, racism, and anti-Blackness within and beyond Europe. Drawing on radical traditions of thought on colonialism and anti-Blackness, critical political economy, postcolonial theory, and institutional analysis, the introduction reframes the analytic of who the EU is for by showing how the Union’s commitment to universal values coexists with practices that reproduce hierarchies of life and death. We argue that the EU operates as a form of global power that mobilizes race and racism as constitutive mechanisms of legitimacy, authority, mobility, and value. Contemporary militarization, through defense integration, rearmament, and strategic autonomy, intensifies these dynamics by recoding racial hierarchies as security imperatives. Competing responses, from right-wing sovereign internationalism to left critiques of neoliberalism, rarely confront Europe’s colonial and racialized constitutive role in sustaining global inequalities. These unresolved contradictions and failures open up urgent questions about how Europe’s political and economic order continues to reproduce global hierarchies of power. It is precisely this tension that the special issue takes up, responding by engaging the intertwined colonial and racist projects in the EU. The contributors collectively frame crisis as a key site through which colonial violence is reconfigured, displaced, and normalized in contemporary EU governance. In so doing, they reposition the EU not as a neutral arbiter of order, but as an active geopolitical site where racialized and imperial forms of power are continuously produced, contested, and reimagined.

For many years, political scientists have debated over voter competence in direct democracy. At the core of the discussion is whether this central institution enlightens citizens about political facts. However, scholars have primarily examined if direct democracy fosters general political knowledge even though referendums and ballot initiatives are policy-specific in nature, as citizens vote on particular political proposals. By utilising a range of unique panel survey data collected around four Danish European Union referendums, I show that voters’ knowledge of policy-specific information markedly increased during the campaigns. I also combine the survey data with an original media content analysis and find that the learning of issue-specific facts is more related to the opportunities provided by the media information environment than to individual ability or motivation. These results suggest that a broad group of voters acquire policy-specific facts that help them make informed choices when they are granted full control of political decision-making.

The article examines artificial intelligence (AI) narratives of the three most important powers in the emerging global AI order – the US, China, and the EU. It argues that these narratives are central to constructing the meanings ascribed to AI in international politics and therefore to understanding the global competition for AI leadership. Specifically, the article uses a method of narrative analysis to reconstruct the AI narratives of the three powers from government documents and strategy papers. These narratives speak to the worldviews and AI images of the powers, how they view each other’s aspirations and behaviours, and what their objectives and motivations are to engage in AI competition. The relationship between the narratives sheds light on the scope for international AI cooperation and conflict. The results reinforce expectations of an intensifying ‘AI race’ between the US and China for global AI leadership. The EU comes out more as a bystander to this geopolitical competition, but strives to lead the development of international AI norms and standards. The article points to different potentials for cooperation and conflict on different aspects of AI and identifies status-seeking as a possible driver of AI competition.

Denouncing the persistence of nationalist reflexes in order to explain the crisis of European integration is much too simple, as is the critique of a mercantile Europe deprived of solid social and moral foundations. Yet, these interpretations, oversimplified as they are, do point to some aspects of our liberal civilisation, which are under pressure in the current trajectory of developments shaping Europe. Seen as symptoms of a widespread malaise, these perspectives should be taken seriously.

Over the last three decades, European Union regulation of the internal market has become highly pervasive, affecting practically all domains of European citizens' lives. Many studies have focused on understanding the process and causes of regulatory change, but with limited attempts to analyse the more general sources of regulatory reform. This article focuses on the determinants of stability and change in EU regulation. An original dataset of 169 pieces of legislation (regulations, directives and decisions) across eight different sectors is developed and the dynamics of regulatory reform in the EU are analysed. Using time‐series analysis of count data, evidence is found that the number of winning coalitions in the Council and the size of EU membership have a significant impact on regulatory reform in the EU. By contrast, the ideological composition of the EU's legislative bodies is not systematically related to regulatory reform.

This short piece introduces four articles from a roundtable discussion on Small States and the Global Economic Crisis at the 2011 General Conference of the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) in Reykjavik Iceland. The discussants were each asked to consider the role of size and EU membership in determining the effect and response of small states to the current economic crisis. The lessons learned from the exchange are conditional: it is very difficult to generalise about the effects of either size or EU membership when considering small states and the global economic crisis.

New divisions have emerged within the European Union over the handling of the recent migration crisis. While both frontline and favoured destination countries are called upon to deal with the number of migrants looking for international protection and better living conditions, no consensus has been reached yet on the quota‐based mechanisms for the relocation of refugees and financial help to exposed countries proposed by the EU. Such mechanisms pose a trade‐off for member states: the EU's response to the crisis offers help to countries under pressure, but it inevitably requires burden‐sharing among all EU members and a limitation of their national sovereignty. Within this scenario, the article compares how public opinion and political elites in ten different EU countries view a common EU migration policy grounded on solidarity and burden‐sharing. By tracing both within‐ and cross‐national patterns of convergence (and divergence), the article shows that contextual factors influence policy preferences, with support for solidarity measures being stronger in countries with higher shares of illegal migrants and asylum seekers. While individuals’ predispositions, identity and ideological orientations account for both masses’ and elites’ attitudes towards burden‐sharing measures, subjective evaluations and beliefs concerning the severity of the crisis provide additional and alternative explanations when looking at the public's preferences. In particular, it is found that concern about the flow of migrants to Europe consolidates the impact of contextual factors, whereas the overestimation of the immigrant population fosters hostility against solidarity measures, with both effects more pronounced as the country's exposure to the crisis increases. In the light of these results, the main implication of this study is that EU institutions have to primarily address entrenched beliefs and misperceptions about immigrants to enhance public support for a joint approach to migration.