Chapter 2 explores an important premise which underlies this critique of the law: it examines the idea that disfigurement inequality is a problem which merits a legal response – namely the granting of protective rights under the Act. It concludes that, despite some uncomfortable distinctions, there is a compelling case for a legal response in this area. The nature of law’s current response is then laid out. Relevant parts of the international legal framework – including EU law, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’) and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) applying the European Convention on Human Rights – are explained by reference to the models of disability which implicitly inform them.

Chapter 4 examines how countries with different scientific institutional histories and income levels have dealt with scientific uncertainty and the ethics of ‘experimental’ interventions using so-called mesenchymal ‘stem’ cells, that is cells of uncertain therapeutic character. Observing regulatory practices for clinical research and commercial interventions in the context of global competition, the chapter describes the complex intertwinement of catering for patient needs and demands, the protection of high quality scientific research, the affordability of testing methods, and the prospect of economic growth through investment into regenerative medicine in China and in higher-income countries (HICs). HICs that traditionally have had the power to define standards and conditions set by regulation, even when that power is on the wane, still enjoy considerable ‘regulatory immunity’: their reputation allows HICs to tolerate regulatory violations. In HICs, a scientific boundary is commonly asserted between established stem cell scientists and clinical providers that violate official guidelines. Scapegoating, here, is used as means to defend the reputation of the regulated collective against unauthorized, but tolerated clinical cell-applications. Examples show that the USA and the EU have used regulatory immunization to protect the reputation of stem cell communities alongside violators.

This second chapter on transnational approaches to grand corruption looks at other ways to pressure corrupt governments when internal controls like the judiciary or auditors don’t work. It looks at individual or “smart” sanctions for human rights violations or grand corruption in the US, EU, UK, Canada and elsewhere. It then considers cases based on extraterritorial jurisdiction, private standards and certifications, and conditions placed by international development banks and agencies as sources of pressure and redress.

This chapter explores why the European Union (EU), which was not one of the original promoters of the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) agenda in the World Trade Organization (WTO), has become one of its most vocal supporters. We argue that embracing investment facilitation serves EU strategic goals of reviving multilateralism, bringing the fractious US–China relation back into the fold of multilateral disciplines, and assert itself as a leader in the field of sustainable development. After first tracing the emergence of the investment facilitation agenda at the international level, we then highlight the puzzling character of the EU’s embrace of the multilateral IFD agenda, before showing that changing institutional and (geo)political conditions provided the EU with a window of opportunity to act in 2017. In the last part, we briefly discuss the key elements shaping the EU’s preferences in the contemporary IFD negotiations and as well as the factors shaping its capacity to become a rule-maker.

This chapter evaluates anti-money laundering (AML) regulation of crypto-assets in the UK with a focus on the UK implementation of the EU’s 5th Money Laundering Directive. The UK implementation had a broader scope than that required under the Directive; however, there was a lack of specific requirements and guidance on certain potentially higher-risk areas including privacy coins, mixers, and decentralised finance (DeFi). This chapter suggests that specific AML requirements and guidance on these potentially higher risk areas may help ensure the associated risks are effectively mitigated.

Virtually all philosophical discussions of the rule of law’s meaning assume that the proper horizon of the concept is the national legal system, or what I call “the rule of law writ small.”  But governments are bound by a web of transnational legal obligations that should also be considered part of the rule of law’s scope. Analyzing whether the rule of law is honored against the backdrop of both national and transnational law gives us “the rule of law writ large.”  This concept has particular force in the context of backsliding (and democracy-restoring) governments when autocrats first pull their governments away from transnational norms before newly elected democrats seek to restore compliance with those norms. While both sorts of governments may change domestic law, and pack political institutions with those who share their values and fire those who get in their way, only the democracy restorers can be said to be honoring the rule of law writ large.

This chapter examines if the systems of evidence in annulment, failure to act proceedings, and actions for damages, are designed to support private parties’ access to and participation in actions brought directly before the EU courts. Against the backdrop of evidence theory and the so-called procedural abilities doctrine, this chapter argues that, in the context of direct actions, the principle of effective judicial protection receives a restrictive reading. As a result, the requirements that private parties must meet to launch those actions do not, in practice, give way to broad procedural abilities and an unhindered access to the Union courts. These requirements thus seem designed to uphold a (strong) presumption of lawfulness of the EU legislature’s normative action, seeking to preserve the stability and coherence of EU law, rather than to ensure an effective access to, and exercise of the legal remedies included in the EU Treaties’ system of procedures.

This chapter examines Sweden’s emissions trends and the evolution of climate policy in an international perspective by focusing on its role and interdependent relationship with climate action in the EU and with international climate coalitions. The chapter examines the assumption that Sweden is a front-runner and role model in setting and implementing ambitious climate policy. The emission trends across sectors suggest that Sweden has been able to swiftly reduce its emissions, in particular from industry and energy conversion, but that current reduction rates are insufficient to reach its decarbonization target. Reducing emissions in agriculture and transport poses perhaps the greatest challenges for the Swedish state. The chapter also discusses the limits and possibilities for the State to implement its decarbonization target while being dependent on the climate policies in the EU, notably the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). It also looks at Sweden’s role in international climate governance by zooming in on its role in international climate collaborations and clubs. Finally, the chapter provides three reasons for caution when it comes to Sweden’s reputation as a role model. First, that the rate of GHG reduction has declined significantly. Second, that consumption-based approaches to counting GHG emissions demonstrates that Sweden remains a high-emitting country. Third, that Sweden’s consumption-levels are far above the global average and its current consumption patterns should not be emulated by other countries.

From Brexit to the rise of China, the deterioration of the special relationship with the United States and the return of war to Europe in Ukraine, this chapter will explore how the UK’s position in the world has faced both challenges and opportunities over the last fourteen years. The analysis will focus on how different Conservative premierships used or wasted these global changes, and how it has affected UK foreign policy and Britain as a whole (particularly Brexit’s influence on domestic policy and politics).

The chapter examines how the radical Right’s counter-hegemonic struggle relates to other struggles for power in contemporary world politics and attacks on the so-called liberal international order (LIO). Drawing on recent literature on struggles for recognition, we show how the radical Right has built powerful transversal, global alliances based on a logic and discourse of difference and diversity rather than claims to Western superiority. We illustrate this through an analysis of an emerging global alliance in defence of the ‘natural family’. The radical Right’s civilisationalism and calls for multipolarity also enable complex, strategic convergences with illiberal states such as China and Russia, as well as states and people in the Global South. The multi-polar, civilisational world order envisioned by the radical Right is not anti-hierarchical and inclusive, but legitimises new differences and new forms of exclusion through its claims to cultural diversity. It is a more sovereigntist vision of the world in which exclusionary illiberal forces would be able to operate with fewer international constraints.

Within this chapter the book goes beyond the discussion on the region and EU and provides an examination of how specific positions of CEE countries towards energy and climate policy fit within global energy transitions. It highlights the ability of regional experience to provide insights into global energy transition challenges, and the lessons the region can offer for discussions about how to approach the pathways towards carbon-neutral economies; many challenges of CEE countries are shared internationally. As the region has to adapt to EU climate and energy policies, but is at the same time able to shape these, it provides insights into the process of developing and implementing decarbonisation policy. Our analysis of how EU enlargement has shaped mid- and long-term EU climate and energy policy is a contribution to understanding the EU’s role as an international actor.

This chapter focuses on the impact of CEE countries on the development of climate and energy policies at the EU level. It is argued that states in the region demonstrate some shared preferences and utilise regional groupings to promote these at the EU level. The chapter discusses the contribution of CEE countries to the development of EU policy – such as Polish efforts to create an ‘Energy NATO’, CEE countries’ efforts to improve energy security following the 2006 and 2009 gas crises, the 2014 Energy Union, and the reaction to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The chapter argues that the security dimension was given priority by CEE countries at the EU level. They contributed to placing energy security on the EU’s agenda during accession negotiations and the immediate post-accession period; however, their preferences were often not shared by older members. It was the 2006 and 2009 gas supply disruptions that shifted the focus towards energy security in the region, and at the EU level. In 2022 the EU’s dependency on and vulnerability to high levels of energy imports from Russia were brought into sharp focus.

Increasingly, illiberal and authoritarian governments are seizing upon the concept of constitutional identity in order to justify and vindicate their political projects in the face of external criticism. This contribution raises questions about what these invocations tell us about the normative value of constitutional identity. The authors argue that, in the European context of supranational legal integration, constitutional identity should not be seen as an unconditional source of value. Invocations of constitutional identity only deserve recognition to the extent that they serve the ideals of constitutionalism. Where constitutional identity is invoked as a normative argument, the normative expectation of constitutionalism is implied – claims from constitutional identity that stand at odds with the ideals of constitutionalism, in fact, invoke the former ironically and frivolously. Exemplary cases in which constitutional identity is invoked to justify forms of ‘illiberal’ constitutionalism – notably the Polish and Hungarian cases – should be considered abuses of the concept as they do not live up to the normative expectations which they evoke.