The European Union (EU) is facing an ongoing challenge to its institutional and political legitimacy. The 2014 European Parliament elections marked a decisive step towards bringing the EU closer to its citizens by increasing the personalization of EU politics. Under the slogan ‘this time it’s different’, the idea was that the ‘winning’ lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat) of the EP elections would become the new President of the European Commission (EC). However, the selection of von der Leyen as EC President after the 2019 EP elections neglected this process. Inspired by procedural fairness theory, we investigate the impact of the Spitzenkandidaten process on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in the EU. In a first study, we use observational survey data to examine whether Europeans reacted negatively when the Spitzenkandidaten process was ignored in 2019. In a second study, we investigate how the Spitzenkandidaten process could be salvaged to increase citizens’ satisfaction with EU democracy. We focus on the involvement of citizens through a primary system to select potential Spitzenkandidaten and the binding nature of the results of the EP elections to determine the EC President. Our two studies show the low impact of the Spitzenkandidaten process: Member state governments are able to override the results of the Spitzenkandidaten process without having to fear a (large) public backlash. Increasing citizen participation through a European primary does not affect this conclusion. In summary, we find very little evidence for the relevance of procedural fairness for citizens’ evaluation of the EU and the Spitzenkandidaten process.

Explaining to students what the European Union (EU) is and how it works can be challenging. Yet, the diffusion and success of ‘EU studies’ push instructors to develop innovative methods to make the complex EU decision-making accessible to students. Role-playing may be helpful and the EU provides ample opportunities of simulating various levels of policy-making. This article presents a format for a semester-long, role-playing simulation in which students act as EU Commission's staff employees.

The EU has been represented as a singular ‘Digital Empire’ speaking with one voice on matters of EU digital regulation. Closer examination of discrete areas of EU digital regulation reveals a more nuanced picture suggesting clear institutional divergence between the EU institutions regarding the substantive protection afforded by EU law. A detailed analysis of EU data protection adequacy decisions brings to the surface intra-EU tensions concerning the substance of core EU fundamental rights. This analysis reveals that the EU Commission has taken on a more prominent role in adequacy decision-making since the entry into force of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation at the expense of other relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, the Commission’s decisional practice does not align fully with the stance of the Court of Justice on the right to data protection. New sites of intra-EU human rights tensions are therefore uncovered with consequences for the legitimacy of the EU as a digital regulator and the role of the Commission as a guardian of the treaties.

When does the delegation of legislative powers to the executive endanger policy compliance? The European Union (EU) Lisbon Treaty introduced quasi-legislative tertiary legislation – delegated acts – which empowers the European Commission to amend secondary legislation. Formally, member states control delegated acts only ex post via a veto power in the Council, while they have both ex ante amendment powers and ex post veto over the alternative Commission legislation: implementing acts. However, as member states determine the choice of legislative instrument, we argue that they would consent to the Commission adopting delegated acts only on non-controversial issues. Such selection should result in their lower compliance with implementing than with delegated acts. Our analyses of member states’ transposition delays and infringement cases related to EU tertiary directives support this argument. The results suggest that the delegation of legislative powers to the executive does not increase non-compliance when the legislators have the means to moderate it ex ante.

This article uses a socio-legal perspective to analyze the use of ethics guidelines as a governance tool in the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI). This has become a central policy area in several large jurisdictions, including China and Japan, as well as the EU, focused on here. Particular emphasis in this article is placed on the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI published by the EU Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence in April 2019, as well as the White Paper on AI, published by the EU Commission in February 2020. The guidelines are reflected against partially overlapping and already-existing legislation as well as the ephemeral concept construct surrounding AI as such. The article concludes by pointing to (1) the challenges of a temporal discrepancy between technological and legal change, (2) the need for moving from principle to process in the governance of AI, and (3) the multidisciplinary needs in the study of contemporary applications of data-dependent AI.

According to the author, the answer to the question raised above is that neither a pure nor a semi-presidential system is to be recommended but rather a strong parliamentary system with an executive, the European Commission, whose democratic legitimacy is rooted in citizen involvement through parliamentary elections organized on the basis of political platforms presented by Euro-parties centred around well defined divisive issues. That would make the executive fully answerable towards the universally elected Parliament. In such a constellation, the accountability of the Council of Ministers should, as long as it remains the most prominent part of the Union legislature, be strengthened through devices such as transparency, mutual accountability between the Council and Parliament, and codes of ethics outlining the duties and responsibilities of individual Council members. As for the European Council, it should not be allowed to take over legislative or executive responsibilities but should continue to fulfil its role of driving the Union forward politically.