In a time of polycrisis, internal contestation, and strained transatlantic relations, European identity is timelier and more relevant than ever. Do EU public policies operating in a multilevel governance system contribute to European identity-building, and what can jeopardise the process of identity formation at the level of policy elites? The article adopts a social constructivist and discursive approach and brings to the fore the lacking process of EU socialisation via discursive practices as a key reason leading to failed identity-building. Focusing on EU Cohesion Policy in Wales (UK), Crete (Greece), and Silesia (Poland), the analysis employs primary data and grey literature sources, along with 64 semistructured elite interviews, to show that, despite key differences among the three cases, Cohesion Policy has not contributed significantly to European identity-building among policy elites at different government levels and among the public. This is because the coordinative discourse about EU policies is dominated by ideas about economic goals and practical aspects of policy-making, while the respective communicative discourse is controlled by domestic political elites and the media and is ultimately determined by broader national/regional political cultures about the purpose and limitations of EU membership. Overall, the article contributes to the literature on European identity-building, EU socialisation, and discourse by arguing that the way EU public policies are designed, implemented, and communicated do not favour the achievement of political goals, such as the cultivation of a shared European identity.

Golden Dawn (GD), Greece’s most prominent far-right political organization, strategically utilized antisemitism as its core ideological principle rather than a marginal prejudice or rhetorical device. This article argues that antisemitism served primarily as an epistemological conspiratorial framework central to GD’s ideological worldview, providing a coherent interpretive lens through which all political, economic, and social phenomena were explained as elements of a singular Jewish-orchestrated plot. Drawing on qualitative discourse analysis of over 10,300 GD publications spanning 1993 to 2020, the study illustrates how this epistemological master frame enabled the party to unify diverse domestic and international issues, from foreign policy tensions and immigration debates to economic crises, under a consistent antisemitic narrative. Additionally, by explicitly employing Holocaust denial, endorsing Nazi symbolism, and openly propagating antisemitic conspiracies, GD deliberately violated post-Holocaust European norms. This normative transgression was integral to the party’s identity, positioning it in overt defiance of mainstream moral and political boundaries. The article thus demonstrates how GD’s antisemitism functioned not merely as a rhetorical provocation but as the foundation of a comprehensive ideological system that consciously challenged established European taboos. These findings also suggest broader implications for understanding the role and adaptability of conspiratorial antisemitism and normative transgression in other extremist ideologies beyond the Greek context.

Recent literature argues that with ever‐increasing levels of supranational constraints governments have less ‘room to manoeuvre’; therefore, voters will place less weight on policy outcomes in their voting decisions. The question that remains less explored is how voters fill this accountability gap. We argue that, in this context, voters may move away from outcome‐ to input‐oriented voting. Fulfilling their promises becomes less vital for incumbents as long as they exhibit effort to overturn an unpopular policy framework. We test this argument against a survey experiment conducted in the run‐up to the September 2015 election in Greece, where we find a positive impact of the incumbent's exerted effort to challenge the status quo of austerity on vote intention for SYRIZA – the senior coalition government partner at the time – despite the failed outcome of the government's bailout negotiations.

The paper analyzes the impact of economic crises on organized civil society. A number of empirical studies have shown that a financial crisis can inflict a serious damage on the nonprofit sector—mainly through a sharp decline in revenues. However, the Greek case shows that a crisis can also have some positive effects on NGOs: many nonprofits introduced reforms that increased efficiency, the number of volunteers reached record levels, and there was a spectacular rise in funding by private philanthropic foundations. However, Greek NGOs continue to be dependent on external funding, unable to raise large sums from their members and the wider public. Organized Greek civil society continues to be turned upside down: dependency on EU and state funds is being replaced by dependency on private foundations.

This article aims to address the social and political role of political scientists in Greece, which has been at the centre of the Eurozone crisis, resulting in the most troubled period in the country’s recent political history, namely the campaign week of the July 2015 bailout referendum. To that end, the article relies, on the one hand, on the PROSEPS survey data to identify the extent to which Greek political scientists engage in public debate in general and how they view the social role of their discipline. On the other hand, we used a content analysis of the leading national TV media during the aforementioned week to examine how much Greek political scientists participated in the public debate in comparison with other social scientists, and what were their stances on specific issues and dimensions, such as the framing of the European Union. In addition, we also delve into the stance of Greek political scientists who participated in the public debate regarding the referendum itself. The study results revealed a potential bias; political scientists who pronounce themselves in favour of the status quo seem to receive more invitations to participate in televised debates.

International organisations have considered national unity a necessary prerequisite to maintaining political stability and restoring economic growth in countries facing severe economic crisis. The European Union and the International Monetary Fund promoted such unity in Greece when making stabilisation packages available during the country's sovereign debt crisis in 2011–2012. Focused on the conditions under which diverse political groups can credibly coordinate their economic and political strategies, this article examines domestic and international factors that impact the prospect of political unity in Greece and small European economies. Anchored in the historical institutionalism tradition, it finds that political unity in small European economies has been consolidated during periods of economic growth and when complementary international institutions existed, but has regularly been undermined in countries experiencing the opposite conditions, including Greece. National unity in Greece over the long term requires domestic reforms, but such reforms will not be sustainable without external economic growth and a multilateral architecture that incentivises economic groups to share the benefits and costs of structural reform. Since the latter conditions are not ones that a small country itself can produce, sustained political unity rests as much with the actions of big economies as it does with Greece overcoming the historic legacies of its particular model of capitalism.

This article examines elite European discourses during the Greek financial crisis from its pre‐history in September 2008 up to the arrival of the SYRIZA government in January 2015. The article employs the conceptual literature on Discursive Institutionalism (DI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI). Having coded 1,153 unique quotes drawn from a dataset of 15,354 news wires from Reuters, the authors argue that the communicative discourse of 63 senior European (and IMF) officials on the Greek crisis during that period demonstrates significant volatility. Four distinct narrative frames are identified: ‘neglect’, ‘suspicious cooperation’, ‘blame’ and ‘reluctant redemption’, punctuated by three discursive junctures in 2010, 2011 and 2012, which reflect the content of the changing communicative discourse of the Greek crisis. The article's contribution is twofold: empirically, it is the first to provide a systematic analysis of the protagonists’ communication of the Greek crisis; and theoretically, it combines DI and HI in an effort to conceptualise an important part of our understanding of ‘bail‐out politics’ throughout the Eurozone crisis.

The 2015 crisis of refugee policies saw an upgrade in the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) as service providers for the migrant population in Greece. CSOs attempted to substitute for the government’s failure to provide a migration policy designed for the social integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (MRAs). As a result, they have been overseeing a majority of services related to the integration of MRAs in the labour market. This paper aims to enrich the underdeveloped so far discussion on the role of CSOs in the integration of refugees and asylum seekers (RAs) into the Greek labour market. This will be attempted by adopting a qualitative approach. The paper is based on 34 interviews done in 2019, involving refugees, asylum seekers and representatives of third-sector organizations, namely non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots solidarity initiatives (GSIs) provide various activities that seek to improve the employability of refugees and asylum seekers and help them navigate the employment policies. The article concludes that the lack of a follow-up to the various actions, the fragmented funding schemes and the absence of a clear integration policy from public actors and support from the public administration lie behind the relatively limited role played by CSOs for refugees and asylum seekers in labour market integration.

This article provides the contextual background to the symposium on Populist Discourses and Political Communication in Southern Europe. It explains the symposium’s objectives and introduces the rationale of its articles on Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Within this context, the editors also highlight the specific conditions for the emergence of typical forms of Southern European populism, as well as its distinctive features, focusing on the challenges populism poses to politics and media research. The implications of the phenomenon for the future of the European project are also addressed.

The majority of Greek nonprofit organizations active in the field of human services belong in two categories: the first is homes for the elderly that provide assisted living to seniors and the second is philanthropic societies, which primarily fight against poverty. This paper argues that this sector is small in terms of membership, voluntary performance, beneficiaries, and budget. Nonprofit organizations have succeeded in developing close relationships with local communities, as well as in providing essential alleviation quickly and flexibly. On the other hand, organizations are very dependent on the state and they keep beneficiaries away from decision making; moreover, their contribution to building social capital is trivial and participation in policy-making minimal. The lack of collective representation prevents an open society and hinders communication with government.

This article argues that after the initial expansion of departments and postgraduate courses during and after the mid-1990s in Greece, we are now witnessing the first signs that the academic environment is unable to absorb young academics entering the field. A long ‘waiting list’ of young PhDs, combined with a lack of public funding for new posts, creates a rather negative picture for the future of young Greek political scientists.

Which parameters affect coalition building in budgetary negotiations? In this article, three distinct levels of analysis are identified to account for coalition building patterns, associated with domestic politics, domestic socioeconomic structures and EU politics. At the level of domestic politics, ideology points to cross‐governmental affinity of a partisan nature; at the level of socioeconomic structures, similarity of policy interests, generated by cross‐national socioeconomic convergence with EU policy standards, informs coalition formation patterns; at the EU politics level, the intergovernmental power balance influences the political aspirations of each Member State in the integration process and coalition‐building decisions. Two sets of parameters affect the evolution of EU coalition patterns, corresponding to the integration impact on the EU (new cleavages) and on the Member States (the impact of Europeanisation). This analytical framework is used to examine the southern coalition (Spain, Greece, Portugal) in the four multi‐annual financial frameworks (1988, 1992, 1999 and 2005).

What factors explain the persistence of emotion in public policy? Applying the multiple streams framework, it is hypothesised in this article that the more intense the fear and the longer it persists under high salience, task unfamiliarity and complexity, and inconsistent preferences, the less likely it is for policy to change. The study examines the Greek attempt to block international recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1990–1993) and finds the power to build coalitions through emotional arousal that in the short run helps reframe losses and paradoxically undermines political support in the long run. Illuminating the emotional endowment effect within the logic of appropriateness, the article concludes that policy is made under certain conditions on the basis of validating emotions.

Political economists usually study small states to understand the secrets behind their success. This article examines the reasons for their failure. Greece is the most obvious example of a small state that has not managed to navigate the global economic and financial crisis successfully. But Greece is hardly alone. Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, and Portugal have also struggled in the crisis although they have little in common with Greece. Meanwhile, countries that share many Greek characteristics, such as Italy, managed to hold out much longer. This suggests that the explanation for small country failure is structural rather than country-specific. The implication is that all countries are potentially at risk.

Along with other South-European countries, since 2008, Greece has experienced deep economic and social dislocation, leading to a crisis of representation and triggering populist mobilisations and anti-populist reactions. This article focuses on the antagonistic language games developed around populist representations, something that has not attracted much attention in the relevant literature. Highlighting the need to study anti-populism together with populism, focusing on their mutual constitution from a discursive perspective, it articulates a brief yet comprehensive genealogy of populist and anti-populist actors (parties and media) in Greece, exploring their discursive strategies. Moving on, it identifies the main characteristics this antagonistic divide took on within the newly contested, crisis-ridden sociopolitical field, highlighting the implications for a contemporary understanding of cleavages, with potentially broader implications.

The Greek model of mental healthcare delivery in rural and remote low-resourced areas is based on Mobile Mental Health Units (MMHUs). MMHUs are low-cost, interdisciplinary, generic community psychiatric services that collaborate closely with the primary healthcare system and local social services. MMHUs may be effective in the treatment of patients with severe and persistent mental illness and cost-effective in the treatment of patients with common mental disorders. The Council of Europe categorised this model as an effective community-based initiative. Major challenges derive from the difficulties MMHUs run by public general hospitals face in recruiting and retaining personnel.