This study aims to analyze how two popular television series, Famagusta (produced in Greece) and Bir Zamanlar Kıbrıs (Once Upon a Time in Cyprus, produced in Turkey), reflect the political approaches of Greece and Turkey toward the Cyprus issue. Television series are often powerful media for national narrative building, and both Famagusta and Bir Zamanlar Kıbrıs series demonstrate the ways historical events are selectively portrayed to reinforce contemporary political perspectives regarding Cyprus. Beyond simply retelling historical events, both series are used to reflect the ongoing efforts of Greece and Turkey to assert rights over Cyprus, a geopolitically significant island with a complex colonial past. This study will analyze how these series engage in narrative framing to legitimize national claims over a distant territory, using television series as a medium for both national narratives and colonial continuity. The study will explore the underlying messages, rhetorical tools, and symbolic elements that each series uses to shape the public perception about the Cyprus issue, drawing on concepts from media studies and international relations.

In a time of polycrisis, internal contestation, and strained transatlantic relations, European identity is timelier and more relevant than ever. Do EU public policies operating in a multilevel governance system contribute to European identity-building, and what can jeopardise the process of identity formation at the level of policy elites? The article adopts a social constructivist and discursive approach and brings to the fore the lacking process of EU socialisation via discursive practices as a key reason leading to failed identity-building. Focusing on EU Cohesion Policy in Wales (UK), Crete (Greece), and Silesia (Poland), the analysis employs primary data and grey literature sources, along with 64 semistructured elite interviews, to show that, despite key differences among the three cases, Cohesion Policy has not contributed significantly to European identity-building among policy elites at different government levels and among the public. This is because the coordinative discourse about EU policies is dominated by ideas about economic goals and practical aspects of policy-making, while the respective communicative discourse is controlled by domestic political elites and the media and is ultimately determined by broader national/regional political cultures about the purpose and limitations of EU membership. Overall, the article contributes to the literature on European identity-building, EU socialisation, and discourse by arguing that the way EU public policies are designed, implemented, and communicated do not favour the achievement of political goals, such as the cultivation of a shared European identity.

Golden Dawn (GD), Greece’s most prominent far-right political organization, strategically utilized antisemitism as its core ideological principle rather than a marginal prejudice or rhetorical device. This article argues that antisemitism served primarily as an epistemological conspiratorial framework central to GD’s ideological worldview, providing a coherent interpretive lens through which all political, economic, and social phenomena were explained as elements of a singular Jewish-orchestrated plot. Drawing on qualitative discourse analysis of over 10,300 GD publications spanning 1993 to 2020, the study illustrates how this epistemological master frame enabled the party to unify diverse domestic and international issues, from foreign policy tensions and immigration debates to economic crises, under a consistent antisemitic narrative. Additionally, by explicitly employing Holocaust denial, endorsing Nazi symbolism, and openly propagating antisemitic conspiracies, GD deliberately violated post-Holocaust European norms. This normative transgression was integral to the party’s identity, positioning it in overt defiance of mainstream moral and political boundaries. The article thus demonstrates how GD’s antisemitism functioned not merely as a rhetorical provocation but as the foundation of a comprehensive ideological system that consciously challenged established European taboos. These findings also suggest broader implications for understanding the role and adaptability of conspiratorial antisemitism and normative transgression in other extremist ideologies beyond the Greek context.

Recent literature argues that with ever‐increasing levels of supranational constraints governments have less ‘room to manoeuvre’; therefore, voters will place less weight on policy outcomes in their voting decisions. The question that remains less explored is how voters fill this accountability gap. We argue that, in this context, voters may move away from outcome‐ to input‐oriented voting. Fulfilling their promises becomes less vital for incumbents as long as they exhibit effort to overturn an unpopular policy framework. We test this argument against a survey experiment conducted in the run‐up to the September 2015 election in Greece, where we find a positive impact of the incumbent's exerted effort to challenge the status quo of austerity on vote intention for SYRIZA – the senior coalition government partner at the time – despite the failed outcome of the government's bailout negotiations.

The paper analyzes the impact of economic crises on organized civil society. A number of empirical studies have shown that a financial crisis can inflict a serious damage on the nonprofit sector—mainly through a sharp decline in revenues. However, the Greek case shows that a crisis can also have some positive effects on NGOs: many nonprofits introduced reforms that increased efficiency, the number of volunteers reached record levels, and there was a spectacular rise in funding by private philanthropic foundations. However, Greek NGOs continue to be dependent on external funding, unable to raise large sums from their members and the wider public. Organized Greek civil society continues to be turned upside down: dependency on EU and state funds is being replaced by dependency on private foundations.

This article aims to address the social and political role of political scientists in Greece, which has been at the centre of the Eurozone crisis, resulting in the most troubled period in the country’s recent political history, namely the campaign week of the July 2015 bailout referendum. To that end, the article relies, on the one hand, on the PROSEPS survey data to identify the extent to which Greek political scientists engage in public debate in general and how they view the social role of their discipline. On the other hand, we used a content analysis of the leading national TV media during the aforementioned week to examine how much Greek political scientists participated in the public debate in comparison with other social scientists, and what were their stances on specific issues and dimensions, such as the framing of the European Union. In addition, we also delve into the stance of Greek political scientists who participated in the public debate regarding the referendum itself. The study results revealed a potential bias; political scientists who pronounce themselves in favour of the status quo seem to receive more invitations to participate in televised debates.

International organisations have considered national unity a necessary prerequisite to maintaining political stability and restoring economic growth in countries facing severe economic crisis. The European Union and the International Monetary Fund promoted such unity in Greece when making stabilisation packages available during the country's sovereign debt crisis in 2011–2012. Focused on the conditions under which diverse political groups can credibly coordinate their economic and political strategies, this article examines domestic and international factors that impact the prospect of political unity in Greece and small European economies. Anchored in the historical institutionalism tradition, it finds that political unity in small European economies has been consolidated during periods of economic growth and when complementary international institutions existed, but has regularly been undermined in countries experiencing the opposite conditions, including Greece. National unity in Greece over the long term requires domestic reforms, but such reforms will not be sustainable without external economic growth and a multilateral architecture that incentivises economic groups to share the benefits and costs of structural reform. Since the latter conditions are not ones that a small country itself can produce, sustained political unity rests as much with the actions of big economies as it does with Greece overcoming the historic legacies of its particular model of capitalism.

This article examines elite European discourses during the Greek financial crisis from its pre‐history in September 2008 up to the arrival of the SYRIZA government in January 2015. The article employs the conceptual literature on Discursive Institutionalism (DI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI). Having coded 1,153 unique quotes drawn from a dataset of 15,354 news wires from Reuters, the authors argue that the communicative discourse of 63 senior European (and IMF) officials on the Greek crisis during that period demonstrates significant volatility. Four distinct narrative frames are identified: ‘neglect’, ‘suspicious cooperation’, ‘blame’ and ‘reluctant redemption’, punctuated by three discursive junctures in 2010, 2011 and 2012, which reflect the content of the changing communicative discourse of the Greek crisis. The article's contribution is twofold: empirically, it is the first to provide a systematic analysis of the protagonists’ communication of the Greek crisis; and theoretically, it combines DI and HI in an effort to conceptualise an important part of our understanding of ‘bail‐out politics’ throughout the Eurozone crisis.

The 2015 crisis of refugee policies saw an upgrade in the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) as service providers for the migrant population in Greece. CSOs attempted to substitute for the government’s failure to provide a migration policy designed for the social integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (MRAs). As a result, they have been overseeing a majority of services related to the integration of MRAs in the labour market. This paper aims to enrich the underdeveloped so far discussion on the role of CSOs in the integration of refugees and asylum seekers (RAs) into the Greek labour market. This will be attempted by adopting a qualitative approach. The paper is based on 34 interviews done in 2019, involving refugees, asylum seekers and representatives of third-sector organizations, namely non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots solidarity initiatives (GSIs) provide various activities that seek to improve the employability of refugees and asylum seekers and help them navigate the employment policies. The article concludes that the lack of a follow-up to the various actions, the fragmented funding schemes and the absence of a clear integration policy from public actors and support from the public administration lie behind the relatively limited role played by CSOs for refugees and asylum seekers in labour market integration.

This article provides the contextual background to the symposium on Populist Discourses and Political Communication in Southern Europe. It explains the symposium’s objectives and introduces the rationale of its articles on Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Within this context, the editors also highlight the specific conditions for the emergence of typical forms of Southern European populism, as well as its distinctive features, focusing on the challenges populism poses to politics and media research. The implications of the phenomenon for the future of the European project are also addressed.