In this paper, we examine the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the transmission of fiscal policy shocks in China, combining a structural VAR with macroeconomic data and a panel model with firm-level data. We first identify two types of structural fiscal shocks using a Bayesian SVAR with sign restrictions and informative priors on structural elasticities: (1) stimulus shocks, defined as deviations from a policy rule for the budget deficit, and (2) government size shocks, which reflect changes in taxes not necessarily affecting the deficit. These shocks are then incorporated into a local projections framework using firm-level data. Our analysis reveals that SOEs respond fundamentally differently from non-SOEs to fiscal shocks. The results suggest that SOEs are not in strict competition with non-SOEs for government resources: both types of firms benefit from fiscal stimulus, yet SOEs are the ones predominantly subject to crowding out when the size of the government sector expands. At the same time, SOEs in strategic industries consistently receive government support under both government size shocks and tax-cut-led stimulus shocks. Moreover, in nonstrategic sectors, SOE investment exhibits a leading effect over non-SOE investment under tax-cut-led stimulus—an effect that vanishes under spending-led stimulus.

We evaluate the impact of the 2017 Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (TCJA) pension tax break on sponsor contributions to defined-benefit retirement plans. We exploit cross-sectional variation in ex-ante exposure to the tax break. We find that the tax break induced an extra $2.8 billion of sponsor contributions to medium- and large-scale plans in 2017. However, we find strong evidence of reversal, both in terms of sponsor contributions and plan funding ratios by 2018. Our contributions model indicates that this reversal is consistent with more binding financial constraints in 2018 relative to 2019. Our results suggest that the TCJA did not have a long-lasting impact on corporate defined-benefit pension funds.

A growing strand of literature relates pro-market institutions to business and overall employment creation. However, the effects of pro-market institutions on industry-specific employment creation still need to be better understood. Employment creation in some industries may be more sensitive to pro-market institutions. Moreover, if these industries employ a large proportion of the population, the role of local-level institutions becomes more critical for boosting employment creation across industries. Therefore, we disentangle the effects of local-level pro-market institutions on employment creation across nine major industries by using 5-year balanced panel data of 374 US metropolitan areas from 1972 to 2017. Our fixed-effects results indicate that pro-market institutions boost employment creation only in the manufacturing, retail, and construction sectors. Furthermore, our findings reveal that local public policies can benefit or harm local employment creation, depending on the concentration of industries in the area.

This paper makes the most of the observed actions of bribe takers and givers from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and studies how a taker's action influences a giver's decision to pay bribes. To motivate our empirical study, we consider Kaufmann and Wei's (1999) Stackelberg game between a tax authority and a firm that undergoes tax inspection. The model predicts that, when the authority can use its action as a credible threat for the firm's profitability, the authority disturbs the firm by inspecting more, and the firm is more likely to pay bribes. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, we find correlational evidence that the propensity to pay bribes increases with the number of inspection visits, particularly for non-democratic countries.

Ce papier examine l'externalité verticale provenant de l'imposition d'une même base par des gouvernements aux territoires gigognes, phénomène récurrent observé dans la plupart des organiations étatiques et ayant fait l'objet d'un éclairage moins soutenu que celui de concurrence fiscale horizontale. Le modèle étudie un système comportant plusieurs niveaux de dèci-deurs et utilise la théorie des multiprincipaux pour analyser l'optimalité du degré de taxe lorsque plusieurs autorités exercent leur pouvoir fiscal sur une même assiette imposable. Cette théorie permet en effet d'appréhender et de décrire les mécanismes de concurrence entre différents décideurs poursuivant des objectifs propres. Il ressort que le comportement non coopératif de collectivités appartenant à différents niveaux administratifs et partageant une même base fiscale conduit à une hausse du taux de taxation auquel cette base est soumise. Chacun néglige en effet la perte de recettes fiscales qu'il inflige aux autres niveaux de gouvernement etdéfinit donc une taxe supérieure à celle qui correspondrait au coût marginal social. Le taux final d'imposition excède celui qui résulterait de l'exercice par un seul décideur public de la politique fiscale à mettre en oeuvre. Il apparaît en outre que la prise en compte d'une asymétrie d'information exerce un effet dépressif sur le niveau global d'imposition en conauisant chaque échelon à accorder une rente aux firmes, et donc à modérer sa pression fiscale, afin qu'elles révèlent leur information privéeet que puissent être mises en oeuvre les politiques les plus proches d'un optimum social.