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International human rights law (IHRL) provides extensive protections for the living, but little in the way of direct protections for the dead. International humanitarian law (IHL) has more detailed protections for the dead, but is only triggered during armed conflicts. At first glance, this seems to create a protection gap for the dead during peacetime. This article explores how the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) creates a connection between IHL, IHRL and transitional justice to fill in this perceived gap in protections for the dead. While the CRPD does not explicitly address the dead, IHL contains several specific rules to guide how dead bodies are to be handled. When read together with the CRPD framework, these rules provide ample guidance on the treatment of individuals with disabilities after death. Some IHL protections of the dead extend temporally beyond the conflict, when transitional justice mechanisms should be in play, although neither the CRPD nor IHL address with any specificity how the five pillars of transitional justice – truth, justice, reparation, memorialization and guarantees of non-recurrence – might apply in relation to IHL rules regarding dead bodies. Nonetheless, Article 11 of the CRPD forges a bidirectional link to IHL protections and obligations supporting transitional justice. Accordingly, there is a legal framework for examining the interrelationships between rules in the CRPD, IHL and human rights law writ large, and for how we think about dead bodies under the various regimes of international law. Each ought to inform the others if the implications of CRPD Article 11 are to be fully realized and the siloing and fragmentation of international law avoided.
The application by states of economic principles in education has not produced good results in access to education in low-income and less-developed countries. This prompted UNESCO to designate countries with substantial problems of access to education and illiteracy as the E-9 countries, which include Nigeria. Nigeria’s status as an E-9 country indicates the existence of considerable problems in education, and where necessary, statistical evidence will be used to elucidate Nigeria’s E-9 status. This article argues that the nature of the laws and policy mechanisms that control education in Nigeria suggests that the country seems to be responding to the contemporaneous demands of global programmes of action in education that are predicated on economic principles and driven by the tides of globalization instead of to the requirements of international human rights law.
Each process to resolving intrastate conflicts requires different strategies and objectives. Yet, as conflicts continue to increase, researchers have asked if peacekeeping is truly possible. Furthermore, is peace from these approaches stable and durable? The role of third parties in ending intrastate wars or post-conflict instability is central to these processes, where organizations and states play a critical role in ushering in peace during and following civil wars. Over the last three decades a strong trend in third-party attempts to resolve intrastate conflict has emerged. Here, mediation and peacekeeping have played a pivotal role in addressing crises within various countries since the end of the Cold War. From mediation to peacekeeping, this chapter expands upon the different forms and interventions that prevent and resolve conflict, all of which incorporate various sociopolitical and international legal principles in the process. It highlights the benefits and consequences of each intervention, what institutions utilize these principles, and how international humanitarian law has changed since World War II.
The circulation of harrowing war images on traditional and social media – beheaded soldiers, mutilated bodies and civilians burned alive by flames – underscores a profound and enduring connection between war, death and photography. While this nexus is not novel, contemporary developments in the speed, scale and permanence of visual media have opened new questions worth examining. This article aims to dig deeper into whether and how the normative landscape for protecting the inherent dignity of the deceased is evolving and the role that new challenges posed by digital media and the pervasive nature of contemporary visual media play in this process. The relevance of this study rests on the premise that ongoing academic and public debates tend to focus on the issue of media censorship, overshadowing critical inquiries into the legitimacy and legality of the display of certain images. Thus, it is argued that, in the context of publishing and disseminating images of the war dead, it is essential to examine not only what is hidden but also what is shown and how. This is especially pertinent given the asymmetric representation of death and conflict in the Western media, which frequently reinforces distant, “othering” perspectives. Finally, by examining the issue through multiple lenses, namely those of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law, this study aims to provide a more comprehensive framework for addressing the ethical and legal dilemmas posed by war photography in the digital age.
The increasing use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based surveillance technologies such as facial recognition for national and public security purposes in the area of law enforcement raises serious concerns regarding the potential risks of abuse and arbitrariness it might entail, in the absence of adequate safeguards. At an international level, the impact of biometric identification systems on the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms has been consistently emphasised by international organisations, human rights monitoring mechanisms and the civil society, particularly with regards to the risk of mass surveillance possibly resulting in the infringement upon the right of privacy and freedom of assembly. This contribution will assess the international human rights and standards applicable to the use of these technologies for national security purposes especially in the context of peaceful protest by assessing the position of the European Court of Human Rights in Glukhin v Russia (11519/20) and recent regulatory attempts.
Data has become central in various activities during armed conflict, including the identification of deceased persons. While the use of data-based methods can significantly improve the efficiency of efforts to identify the dead and inform their families about their fate, data can equally enable harm. This article analyzes the obligations that arise for States regarding the processing of data related to the identification of deceased persons. Despite being drafted long before the “age of data”, several international humanitarian law (IHL) provisions can be considered to give rise to obligations which protect those whose data is used to identify the dead from certain data-based harms. However, some of these protections are based on a data protection-friendly interpretation of more general obligations, and many only apply in international armed conflict. Against this background, it is suggested that further analysis on how international human rights law and domestic or regional data protection law could help to strengthen the case for data protection where IHL does not contain specific duties to protect data would be desirable.
Communities and individuals globally continue to suffer the violent impacts of colonialism and racism, in a global system of governance that remains rooted in unequal and hierarchical power imbalances. The interpersonal, societal, and structural violence that persists around the world exists in violation of human rights, and is evidence of a persistent lack of political will to effectively invest in human rights, including the right to health, as a true priority.
The demand on States and non-State actors to fulfil the human right to health is imperative. Attacks on civilians during times of conflict and catastrophe, as seen in the latest escalation and display of imperial aggression by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, demonstrate the consistent uneven application of human rights and commitment to fulfilling them.
Protecting human rights, and specifically the realization of the right to health, is fundamental as it has significant consequences for the realisation of other human rights. Eliminating discrimination requires paying sufficient attention to groups of individuals that suffer historical or persistent prejudice. Fulfilling a commitment to health equity and justice demands creating opportunity and conducive conditions for the dignity for all people.
This article uses the theoretical framework of “performative sovereignty” to analyze the role of sovereignty in the Palestinian Authority’s interactions with human rights treaty bodies and to the judicial decisions of the Palestine Supreme Constitutional Court. We argue that, in contrast to dominant views of sovereignty as a threshold, sovereignty is performed through a series of discrete (yet related) interactions and practices that—when accepted by their designated audience—result in rights and privileges being granted, accompanied by sovereign status. Analyzing both Palestinian communications with human rights treaty bodies and cases brought before the Palestinian Supreme Constitutional Court, we argue that the drive to perform sovereignty helps explain states’ actions in joining and reporting to human rights treaty bodies and the responses those actions have elicited. We also find that sovereignty operates as an iron cage—an almost ubiquitous framework—that structures (both constrains and enables) the possible actions of different actors in the field of human rights. The inquiry deepens our understanding of the development and operation of human rights and the role of statehood in shaping the global legal order.
Data tax (DT) could re-establish states’ legitimacy by governing economic actors and promoting social solidarity and welfare through benefits. However, the overall impact of DT will depend on decisions about what social benefits DT funds (universal basic income or less expensive public goods) and whether benefits will entrench or challenge harmful business models and practices. Focusing on the right to science (RtS), the paper argues that DT could realise the RtS in the digital age through taxation that exacted not only data rent but also rent on the scientific heritage. Finally, the paper emphasises the need for international coordination to ensure that DT is equitably shared among developed and less developed countries.
In the quest for “identity dominance” over the enemy, armed forces are increasingly leveraging biometrics for a variety of purposes. This paper focuses on the combat employment of one of them – facial recognition, which, unlike other biometrics, does not appear to have been widely utilized for targeting purposes yet. With the purchasing patterns of advanced militaries suggesting that such a development is around the corner, this paper assesses the compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of the use of facial recognition technologies for targeting purposes. It peruses the applicable legal framework to demonstrate that IHL is neutral towards the use of new technologies and that the right to privacy under international human rights law does not preclude the use of biometrics in hostilities. The analysis zooms in on two specific use cases in which facial recognition is likely to be employed on the battlefield, namely (1) targeted killings against combatants and (2) targeted killings against civilians directly participating in hostilities. The paper closes with an acknowledgment that while facial recognition does have obvious operational benefits, it also has the potential to exacerbate targeting practices that stretch the limits of IHL.
Chapter 9 examines the relationship between IHL and international human rights law (IHRL). Both bodies of law are concerned with protection of the human person, but there are some stark differences between the two. First, many IHRL instruments permit parties to derogate from their IHRL obligations in times of public emergency such as armed conflict, while IHL applies precisely at such times and permits of no derogation. Second is the difference in scope. IHL applies to all territory where an armed conflict is taking place, whereas IHRL has only limited extraterritorial application. This can lead to a direct conflict for a State, such as in a situation of occupation: the local law might violate IHRL obligations, yet under IHL the Occupying Power is required to respect that local law. Third, where IHL applies to both States and non-State actors, IHLR is primarily addressed to the State. In cases of overlap, harmony is preferred – both bodies of law apply. Where that is not possible because the conflict is direct, there are different views on how such conflicts should be reconciled. One view is that IHL, as the lex specialis, should prevail; the other is that the lex specialis doctrine will not always be appropriate. The conclusion is that although IHL and IHRL are slowly converging over time, there will still be situations where the differences are irreconcilable.
Does targeting combatants really provide a military advantage during an armed conflict? The limitations on the use of force against civilians and means and methods of warfare are well developed under contemporary international humanitarian law (IHL), but the issue of targetability of adversary combatants remains underdeveloped. This paper builds on contemporary developments in international human rights law and moral just war theory to offer a revised lex ferenda look at the basic principles of IHL through the internalization of the value of the lives of combatants. It is argued that such a reading of IHL would allow for a rejection of the automatic necessity of targeting combatants, and hence give due consideration to the value of life of combatants (both adversary combatants and own combatants) in the evaluation of the use of force during armed conflicts, including through reduced military advantage, force protection, and adjusted proportionality analysis.
Persons with disabilities suffer disproportionately in every armed conflict, and Russia’s war in Ukraine is no exception. The atrocities committed against persons with disabilities in this conflict, however, are in part a consequence of the state’s longstanding policy of institutionalization, which heightens existing vulnerabilities and places persons with disabilities at an unacceptable risk of acute harm. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry for Ukraine must investigate the extensive and varied acts of violence that have been committed against persons with disabilities in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion, with a focus on persons with disabilities who are institutionalized. In recommending future action, the Commission must be driven by a victim-centred approach to accountability that contributes both to the criminal prosecutions of individual perpetrators, and to systemic reforms that contribute to the project of deinstitutionalization. This article can assist the Commission’s analysis by: (i) canvassing the reports of violence against persons with disabilities during the war in Ukraine, particularly those persons in institutions; (ii) reviewing the Commission for Ukraine’s mandate and explaining its primary purpose – that is, to ascertain the facts of the conflict, through an intersectional lens, with the aim of promoting accountability – with reference to the work done by United Nations commissions of inquiry in the past; and (iii) providing concrete examples on how the Commission’s investigations and report can further both legal accountability and systemic accountability for violence against persons with disabilities in Ukraine.
In this paper, I will examine the legal standards of gender persecution and the evolving descriptor gender apartheid as a way to describe the status of women in Afghanistan. The paper also examines other complementary forms of legal accountability procedures to vindicate Afghan women’s rights and hold perpetrators accountable under crimes against humanity. Although the current locus of the paper is focused on Afghan women, it has larger implications for all other crimes of gender persecution.
This chapter argues that enforceable decisions by treaty bodies are central to ensuring that international human rights laws are respected domestically. Taking the UK as an example, this chapter compares the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The chapter demonstrates that the ECHR has been used increasingly by the UK’s courts to protect individuals’ rights, and that the courts have often engaged directly with European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions. By contrast, although the courts sometimes make limited use of the ICCPR, their approach and its outcome are inconsistent. A similar pattern is observed when the UK’s compliance with both instruments is assessed. Although this may stem from a range of factors, the importance of binding judgments of the ECtHR should not be underestimated: they allow domestic courts to engage directly with a treaty body, and also create a pressure to act. Looking beyond the UK, the chapter concludes that enforceable decisions by treaty bodies have a vital role in ensuring that international human rights laws are respected, and individuals’ rights are protected.
In times of armed conflict, disasters and violence, people may become separated from their families, go missing or die, or become victims of ill-treatment and sexual violence. Under international humanitarian law, States have obligations to prevent harm and address humanitarian needs. At State level, the medicolegal system is conventionally mandated to address these needs and fulfil related legal obligations. In practice, State responses can sometimes be non-existent, limited by the endemic functionality of existing systems, or degraded by crises of violence, natural disasters and migration. These conditions can, in turn, impede the establishment of peace, reparations, restorative justice efforts and post-conflict reconstruction. This paper explains what a medicolegal system is and the entities that encompass it. The paper highlights the importance of developing clear policies, regulation and procedures that ensure proper functioning of the system. It reviews common gaps and challenges that limit State prevention and response to issues of humanitarian concern. Finally, recommendations when developing and implementing humanitarian programmes to strengthen medicolegal systems are provided, with a particular focus on the content of protection dialogue in diplomatic fora.
This Handbook aims to provide much-needed clarity in regard to China’s renewed proactive engagement with international law and international institutions and how China assimilates into, and how it may intend to put its stamp on, international law by offering an updated and fairly comprehensive perspective on the multifaceted contemporary engagement of China with different areas of the international legal order. In order to do this, it disaggregates China’s relationship with international law into different topical areas,each of which is covered by one of the eight thematic parts of the Handbook. These offer specialized treatments of China’s relationship with international human rights law, international trade law, the law of the sea, international criminal law, international investment law, climate change law and international dispute settlement, among many others.
In the past decade, the international community has generally felt China’s proactive role in the international human rights discourse. China has made substantive contributions in the creation of international human rights law and continues to promote a global moral consensus view of human rights. Additionally, China regularly and positively interacts with international human rights mechanisms such as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and special procedures and treaty bodies. It practises the principles of respect, dialogue and cooperation rather than confrontation, while resisting politicization, selectivity and double standards. Since China emphasizes economic, social and cultural rights, there is an impression that it ignores civil and political rights or selectively safeguards human rights. This conclusion is difficult to support when we review the recent movements within Chinese policy and judicature when it comes to human rights. Considering its positive commitment to civil and political rights during the third UPR and in its fourth National Human Rights Action Plan, China is expected to make substantive progress in the comprehensive, balanced protection of all human rights.
Chapter 8 seeks to untangle various issues in addressing when and how a state might be able to resort to the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors. It firstly raises some important general considerations in relation to self-defence against non-state actors, before moving on to examine the situation of self-defence measures which target both the non-state actors and the host state, as was the case with the United States’s response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. A distinction needs to be made between self-defence taken against both the non-state actor perpetrators of the attack or those posing a threat and the state within which they are located, and those actions that are more limited in only specifically targeting the non-state actors. The chapter finally addresses the particular phenomenon of so-called targeted killing, which engages not only the jus ad bellum, but also the legal framework of international human rights law and, potentially, international humanitarian law.
The discrimination faced every day by LGBTQIA+ individuals does not disappear during armed conflict. On the contrary, such persons have been, and continue to be, targeted for particularly heinous human rights violations due to their sexual orientation and/or gender identity. And while international human rights law has, in the last two decades, made significant leaps in prohibiting discrimination on these grounds, international criminal law lags behind. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court only criminalizes persecution, an extreme form of discrimination, on grounds of gender and other grounds universally recognized in international law rather than on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. In the absence of clear textual criminalization of queer persecution, this article argues international law can be queerly reinterpreted to fit sexual orientation and gender identity into the confines of ‘gender’. However, while acknowledging the normative and expressive gains that could come from using international criminal law to pursue queer persecution, this article also notes the costs, including the flattening of queer discrimination into the narrow rubric of gender and suppressing its more radical principles. Therefore, while concluding international criminal law can be queerly reinterpreted, this article expresses doubts as to whether, in fact, it should.