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The revisionist school has asserted that pre-colonial indigenous polities were fluid shadow entities and that pre-British South Asian regimes had no law. This line of argument claims that unique conditions of India prevented the emergence of states with well-defined contiguous territories possessing centralised governments. Ironically this view is reminiscent of colonial British scholars’ argument about pre-colonial India. The argument that pre-British India had no laws and that the ruler’s will was the ultimate authority is incorrect. Rulers of pre-British indigenous polities did not operate in a vacuum, but had to take into account long-established practices, existing procedures and the presence of local powerbrokers. Arabic discourse for the Delhi Sultanate and Turko-Mongol conventions for the Mughals, along with local custom, shaped the legal history of medieval India’s militaries. Overall, the political theorists of the Delhi Sultanate, the Mughal Empire and the ‘Hindu’ dynasties accepted the pivotal role of the monarchy and the army in shaping the structure of interpolity relationships.
Medieval European travel writing reveals the particular ways that race-making and world-making are bound together. This literature combines ethnography and historiography, usually providing details about the culture and history of the peoples encountered by the traveler, as well as descriptions of the geography and landscapes traversed. Travelers consistently blurred the lines between fantasy and reality, but their writings nonetheless became common source material for encyclopedic texts and romance literature, thereby fueling European knowledge production and popular culture. As this literature developed a fantastical perspective about the world and its diverse inhabitants, it forged a crucible for making up people. It was a mode of writing particularly suited for race-making. This chapter examines race in medieval European travel literature that looked beyond the Levant and into Asia in order to demonstrate how histories of contact in the global Middle Ages shaped the development of racial ideologies in the period. It takes the ‘global’ not as an empirical concept, but as, to use Sanjay Krishnan’s argument, ‘a mode of thematization or a way of bringing the world into view’.
In this chapter, I will use the Great Khan’s dreams of the white knight as the starting point to examine the problematic figurations of idolatry, fetishism, orality and whiteness within late medieval travel writing, especially Mandeville’s Travels and Marco Polo’s Le Devisement dou monde. Seemingly unrelated among themselves or to whiteness, these material and performative manifestations of faith nonetheless intersect in important ways in medieval perceptions and representations of the Tartars. The kind of cultural and textual ‘whitening’ of Genghis Khan’s dreams that Hetoum and the Mandeville-author engage in points to the power of artistic manipulations. Geoffrey of Vinsauf, in his Poetria nova, argues that art ‘plays about almost like a magician, and brings it about that the last becomes first … black white, and vile precious’. Jacqueline de Weever argues that such a belief in art’s capacity to transform black into white (nigra candida) is also a belief in the possibility of erasing alterity through whitening. Whitening, in its attempt to mask anxieties and assimilate differences, ignores the origin of alterity. The act of whitening, in fact, posits a new origin.
In her book A Translucent Mirror, Pamela Crossley wrote that “The Ming empire (1368–1644) was perpetually engaged in a struggle against various peoples along its northern borders.” This bald statement contradicts conventional wisdom that the Ming dynasty, having endured Mongol rule for about a century, attempted to limit relations with foreign lands and developed a policy of isolation. In fact, the Ming empire became embroiled in numerous conflicts along its frontiers. Some of these clashes were defensive, but others were attempts to annex additional territory. The court resolved a few of these conflicts through diplomacy or withdrawal from alien lands, yet others festered throughout the dynasty. It scarcely enjoyed clear-cut victories. Nonetheless, such repeated battles necessitated improvements in military strategy and technology, and it is no accident that a spate of texts on the military appeared during this time. The first Ming emperor himself had to master principles of land and naval warfare in the course of defeating other rebel groups and in seeking to gain the throne.
The third edition of this ambitious book begins by asking: What is East Asia? Today, many of the features that made the region distinct have been submerged under revolution, politics, or globalization. Yet in ancient times, what we now think of as China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam had both historical and cultural coherence. Thoroughly revised and updated to include recent developments in East Asian politics, with new illustrations and suggestions for further reading, this book traces the story of East Asia from the dawn of history to the modern age. New discussion questions at the end of each chapter encourage readers to reflect, while a glossary, pronunciation guide, and parallel timeline enable a closer engagement with this complex subject. Charles Holcombe is an experienced and sure-footed guide who encapsulates, in a fast-moving and colorful narrative, the connections, commonalities, and differences of one of the most remarkable regions on earth.
Review of the inhumane practices of people in both New and Old Worlds prior to Columbian contact. Slave trading and cruelty were widespread, and slave trading was extensive. Most slaves were female, employed in domestic or agricultural environments (with little evidence of gang-labor), and came from a wide range of geographic areas and cultures. Most were born into slavery or were enslaved as a result of raids and wars in which many men on the losing side were killed. Slave markets existed across Eurasia, though in the pre-contact New World such markets were less common. After 1500, transatlantic trafficking came to draw exclusively on Africa or at least on Black people, probably because of the long isolation of the Americas from the rest of the world, and the inability of its Indigenous population to resist harmful pathogens from the Old World. Before 1820 migration to the New World was dominated by Africans rather than Europeans and by males (in contrast to the female-dominated slave populations of the Old World). White slaves were scarcely ever present in the New World.
The strategy of the Mongol Empire underwent four basic phases. The first centered on the rise and creation of the Yeke Monggol Ulus (Great Mongol State/Nation) by Chinggis Khan and the Mongols’ irruption from the steppes. The second phase was the formulation of a coherent strategy of conquest during the reign of Ögödei Qa’an. While this was derived from the campaigns of Chinggis Khan, it sought to maximise the deployment of the empire’s military on multiple fronts while simultaneously not overextending the resources of the empire. This further evolved into a third phase during the reign of Möngke Qa’an, who, through a series of reforms, allowed the Mongols to marshal more resources. In doing so, the Mongol strategy altered as they no longer had concerns of overextending themselves. During Möngke’s reign, the Mongols truly became a juggernaut. The final phase of strategy came into formulation with the dissolution of the Mongol Empire after Möngke’s death in late 1259. As the empire split into rival states often embroiled in internecine conflict, each new state had to develop its own coherent strategy, but without the massive resources of a united empire. The Mongols conceived of pragmatic grand strategy that was viable, if not always successful, rather than simply theoretical plans.
Chapter 10 begins by summarising the conclusions from the case studies in terms of the model of ruler conversion, but its main aim is to adopt a global perspective on ruler conversions and on conversion more generally at times. It first underscores how vanishingly rare ruler conversions between Islam and Christianity are in the historical record and yet how open to monotheism immanentist regions, such as the Pacific and, to a lesser extent, Africa have been. Some scholars have already noticed the resilience of Buddhist, Hindu and Confucian societies to the proselytising drives of Christianity and Islam. The chapter summarises why this makes sense in terms of the mechanism of transcendentalist intransigence. It then offers a brief overview of how this affected Eurasian history by reference to the Ottoman, Mughal, Manchu and Mongol empires. The second half of the chapter offers a more detailed appraisal of the fortunes of Christianity and Islam in attempting to secure ruler conversions in South Asia, East Asia and both maritime and mainland Southeast Asia. Even though missionaries developed some of their most sophisticated strategies in these regions, the result was largely a failure. The conclusion to the chapter, and the book, reflects on the role of culture and the question of scale in historical analysis.
This paper reexamines the sources used by N. Fancy and M.H. Green in “Plague and the Fall of Baghdad (1258)” (Medical History, 65/2 (2021), 157–177). Fancy and Green argued that the Arabic and Persian descriptions of the Mongol sieges in Iran and Iraq, and in particular, in the conquest of Baghdad in 1258, indicate that the besieged fortresses and cities were struck by Plague after the Mongol sieges were lifted. This, they suggested, is part of a recurrent pattern of the outbreak of Plague transmitted by the Mongol expansion across Eurasia. Fancy and Green concluded that the primary sources substantiate the theory driven by recent paleogenetic studies indicating that the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century set the stage for the massive pandemic of the mid-fourteenth century. The link between the Plague outbreak and the Mongol siege of Baghdad relies on three near-contemporaneous historical accounts. However, our re-examination of the sources shows that the main text (in Persian) has been significantly misunderstood, and that the two other texts (in Syriac and Arabic) have been mis-contextualized, and thus not understood properly. They do not support the authors’ claim regarding Plague epidemic in Baghdad in 1258, nor do other contemporary and later Arabic texts from Syria and Egypt adduced by them, which we re-examine in detail here. We conclude that there is no evidence for the appearance of Plague during or immediately after the Mongol conquests in the Middle East, certainly not for its transmission by the Mongols.
Chapter 4 deals with the encounter of Buddhism and the West during the period of the Mongol Empire. It locates any mention of the Buddha and his religion within a general view of the mediaeval East as a place of wonders – of unicorns, of dog-headed men, and of the mythical kingdom of Prester John. It demonstrates how the West came to see the Buddha as chief among idols. This chapter explores the encounter between Mongols and Franciscan missionaries sent by the West to explore the intentions of the Mongols: of John of Plano Carpini and William of Rubruck and of other travellers – Marco Polo, Andrew of Perugia, and King Hethum of Cilicia. It focuses not only on their often inchoate awareness of Buddhism, but also on Marco Polo’s first account in the West of the life of the Buddha, of the relics of the Buddha in Sri Lanka, and of various hints of Buddhist doctrines.
The Mongols embarked on an explorative incursion in the Caucasus in 1220 before fully invading the area in 1235–1236. Due to their organized and well-thought-out campaign, in a few years they managed to subdue the region from present-day Armenia to Ossetia. From the beginning of their rule, the Mongols relied upon an indirect administrative model, without replacing the pre-existing institutions of the area. The formation of the Ilkhanate in the 1250s moved the focal point of power southward and the political conduct of Caucasia became more indirect and relied on the local aristocracy. The decline of the Ilkhanate in the 1330s opened a process of political readaptation whose more immediate result was the fragmentation of power and the disappearance of a hegemonic center. This chapter discusses the phases of the Mongol conquest, as well as the huge consequences it had for Caucasia.
Prior to the Opium War China was central to Pacific Asia, but it was not in control of its neighborhood. The mobility of the various nomadic groups threatened China’s northern and western frontiers, and Vietnam’s successful resistance to Ming annexation set a southern boundary-stone. While China’s centrality was not hegemonic, its location, demographic preponderance, and artisanal production made China the center of regional attention. Conversely, because of China’s demographic and production centrality, China was more interested in defending what it had than in imperial adventures abroad. Its foreign policy was one of controlling exposure in relationships—thin connectivity. By the Ming Dynasty this evolved into the tribute system, whose core was a ritualized exchange of deference by the neighbor for acknowledgement of autonomy by China.
The twelfth–thirteenth centuries formed one of the richest periods in Armenian historiography. Armenian sources of that period can be classified as general histories, chronicles, hagiographic sources, colophons, epigraphic sources or inscriptions, and poetry. They are essential for understanding the patterns of thought of medieval Armenians as well as of the Mongols. The Armenian sources differ in their attitudes toward the Mongols, expressing both neutral and personal views, and depending on where they were written, in Greater Armenia or in Cilician Armenia. The information of these historians varies according to their views of certain historical events, which are based on their culture, locality, and time and style of writing, as well as the character of the sources, whether chronicles or historical compilations.
Attempts to re-write recent world history as a long series of struggles against European imperialism are inherently self-defeating, for the effect is exactly what it is purportedly trying to avoid. By making struggle against Europe the sine qua non of the past two hundred years of overall human experience, such an approach privileges Europe, and so is by definition Eurocentric. Furthermore, it would be wrong to assume that only European imperial pasts are present in the contemporary international system. Other imperial systems have also left their marks on historical polities that are kept up by today’s polities. In this chapter, we discuss ho what we have elsewhere baptised the steppe tradition is still alive in parts of Central Asia. It has also left a solid legacy in Turkey, as well as remnants in Russia. The difference between these polities and European ones are often observed. The debt they owe to the Eurasian imperial steppe tradition takes us one step closer to accounting for these differences.
Postclassical Muslim just war developments focused upon dealing with the twin challenges of the Crusades and the Mongols, both of which occupied substantial sections of the Muslim world as well as constituting religious challenges to Islam. These challenges were overcome by moving away from the earlier heroic manner of Muslim sacral warfare and adopting a more professional, technology-based military that at least attempted to assimilate standard Sunni Muslim norms (in terms of personal morality) into the military methodology. The expansion of Islam from the 13th to the 17th centuries demonstrated that this formula was a success.
This Companion offers a global, comparative history of the interplay between religion and war from ancient times to the present. Moving beyond sensationalist theories that seek to explain why 'religion causes war,' the volume takes a thoughtful look at the connection between religion and war through a variety of lenses - historical, literary, and sociological-as well as the particular features of religious war. The twenty-three carefully nuanced and historically grounded chapters comprehensively examine the religious foundations for war, classical just war doctrines, sociological accounts of religious nationalism, and featured conflicts that illustrate interdisciplinary expressions of the intertwining of religion and war. Written by a distinguished, international team of scholars, whose essays were specially commissioned for this volume, The Cambridge Companion to Religion and War will be an indispensable resource for students and scholars of the history and sociology of religion and war, as well as other disciplines.
Edited by
Ben Kiernan, Yale University, Connecticut,T. M. Lemos, Huron University College, University of Western Ontario,Tristan S. Taylor, University of New England, Australia
General editor
Ben Kiernan, Yale University, Connecticut
The term genocide has often been applied to the Mongol conquests in the thirteenth century, as well as many other pre-modern groups. Legally, the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide can only be applied anachronistically to the Mongols, but the Mongols have been accused of genocide of the Tatars (1202) as well as the Tangut (1227). Yet, these accusations often misunderstand the events themselves, not to mention the motives of not only the Mongols, but also the purpose of those actions. This is not to say that the Mongols did not employ massacres and other actions of mass destruction. Indeed, massacres were used widely, but often more judiciously that one might expect. Indeed, rape, pillage and plunder was standard not only for the Mongols but virtually all military organizations of the era.
While the legal application of the UN Convention definition may be impractical, nonetheless, investigating its attribution to the Mongols can be a useful exercise as it can help us understand not only the era and methods of violence employed, but also how the Mongols understood and rationalized their actions. Of greater significance is the employment of Leo Kuper’s concept of “genocidal massacres”. This concept cannot be considered anachronistic in any sense. Furthermore, it lends itself to a broader understanding of whether these “genocidal massacres” lead to a broader pattern of actions that might properly fall under the umbrella of genocide as defined by the UN Convention on the basic principle described by Douglas Adams, “If it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, we have at least to consider the possibility that we have a small aquatic bird of the family anatidae on our hands”.
Additionally, this study cannot be confined strictly to episodes of violence. In order to properly understand genocide in the context of the Mongol Empire, or any entity, one must understand other policies (both direct and indirect) that may be connected to the genocidal act. This is all the more important as the Mongol Empire emerged from the steppes which in the 12th century had numerous tribal entities into a single polity known as the Yeke Monggol Ulus. The use of the term ulus is particularly important. While it eventually acquired the meaning of “patrimony” and then later “nation or country” as it does today (Mongolia’s name in Mongolian is Mongol Uls), in the thirteenth century it was only used by the Mongols to refer to the various Mongol lineages. Other non-Mongol groups were considered irgen or people. There was a clear identification of the other. Thus, we must also consider whether the establishment of the Yeke Monggol Ulus was simply the melding of diverse groups, whether through voluntary or coercive actions, or perhaps something a bit different and did this Mongols apply massacres, deportations, and others aspects related to genocide and extermination as instruments of state creation in the creation of the Yeke Monggol Ulus.
Chapter 2 offers an introduction to the history of Islam and Muslims with a focus on events and processes that influenced and remained important for the origin and development of the Muslim firaq. It examines the period of late antiquity, what the Qurʾan has to say about sectarian splintering, the Prophetic era, and the period after the death of the Prophet. It focuses in particular on the events of the Saqīfa, the first Muslim fitna (civil war), and the establishment of the early Muslim dynasties. The shift from the Umayyad to the ʿAbbāsid eras offers an introduction to the idea of a Muslim school of thought, while the notion of caliphal power is examined using the examples of Umayyad persecution of “heretics,” as well as the miḥna. The Turkic invasions, including the Mongols, offers an opportunity to examine the nature of political and military power, and to see how such configurations change with the introduction of gunpowder and the establishment of the “gunpowder empires.”
This article introduces this special volume on the Mughal policy of sulh-i kull by situating the collection of articles in relation to broader developments across Eurasia.
The Catholic inquisitors of Europe who defended nonsense by cruelty,
might have been confounded by the example of a barbarian,
who anticipated the lessons of philosophy and established by his laws
a system of pure theism and perfect toleration…a singular conformity
may be found between the religious laws of Zingis Khan and Mr. Locke.
—Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire1
In a word, the question is no longer whether Jesus was first
crucified and then resurrected, but how it came to pass that so many humans
today believe in the Crucifixion and Resurrection.
How would the history of international relations in 'the East' be written if we did not always read the ending – the Rise of the West and the decline of the East – into the past? What if we did not assume that Asia was just a residual category, a variant of 'not-Europe', but saw it as a space of with its own particular history and sociopolitical dynamics, not defined only by encounters with European colonialism? How would our understanding of sovereignty, as well as our theories about the causes of the decline of Great Powers and international orders, change as a result? For the first time, Before the West offers a grand narrative of (Eur)Asia as a space connected by normatively and institutionally overlapping successive world orders originating from the Mongol Empire. It also uses that history to rethink the foundational concepts and debates of international relations, such as order and decline.