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This chapter looks at the governance of information in the last two decades of the twentieth century, when the ambition of the New World Information and Communication Order was superseded by the sweeping wave of liberalization. Free trade became a prominent frame with which to conceptualize information and build institution for its governance. This chapter discusses institutional and conceptual changes during this period. Institutionally, privatization of telecommunication – especially in dominant countries like the United States – affected the organizational structure of international telecommunication organizations. Particularly, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization underwent considerable reforms to ensure an international institutional environment for the privatization of telecommunication. Conceptually, telecommunication was no longer perceived as a public utility; it had become an issue of trade in services, eventually brought to the world trade regime. As a result, the World Trade Organization, with which the ITU formed a complementary relationship, became a primary forum for the regulation of telecommunication.
Drawing on archival sources from Paribas as well as published statements from bank chairmen Jean-Yves Haberer, Michel François-Poncet and André Lévy-Lang, this chapter examines Paribas in the European economy of the 1980s and 1990s, the evolution of the bank’s business strategy amid the macroeconomic changes of market integration and market openings, and the bank’s perspectives on the Single Market and banking regulation in European economic governance. If carmakers like Volkswagen and BMW expressed enthusiasm about the business opportunities of the Single Market Program for their supply chains, production, and distribution and even supported the EEC’s efforts to develop environmental regulations, merchant banks like Paribas seemed rather ambivalent and even directly opposed to the regulatory and social dimensions of market integration through their lobbying efforts and business interest associations. In the early 1990s, the opening of Central and Eastern Europe presented new investment and growth opportunities making Paribas much more interested in business opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe, the “CEE,” than in the business environment of the EEC and its Single Market.
This article analyzes the privatization of Telecom Italia as part of a broader historical evaluation of public ownership in a high-technology strategic sector. Drawing on archival material from Italian state-owned enterprises as well as national and European institutions, it traces the reorganization of the telecommunications conglomerate in the 1980s and 1990s, the European regulatory framework in which it unfolded, and the company’s post-divestment trajectory, thereby questioning the inevitability of privatization. The evidence shows that, before privatization, Telecom Italia had already become a profitable, technologically advanced, and internationally competitive firm under public ownership. The decision to divest reflected domestic political and fiscal priorities, as the European liberalization of the telecommunications market reshaped the rules while leaving member states a margin of maneuver. By comparing the public and privatized phases of the company’s development, the article contributes to the historical reassessment of state-owned enterprises and challenges the assumption that ownership change was functional to securing efficiency and competitiveness in the late twentieth-century telecommunications industry.
This chapter examines the mounting unease regarding the project of public education. By the mid-1960s, technocratic, Afrocentric, and Marxist critiques articulated a growing sense of worldwide educational crisis. These critiques presented differently in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, but in both countries popular frustrations were palpable. In response, both states attempted to reform public schooling: by introducing manual training in Ghanaian middle schools and television sets in Ivorian primary schools. Both reforms failed spectacularly, ultimately confirming the state’s abdication of its promise that education would lead to a better future for all. Public education systems crumbled along with public faith in the state, creating space for the privatization of education. The erosion of the anticolonial development ideology helped pave the way for neoliberalism to take root.
The Conclusion first reiterates the three main arguments of the book. It then surveys changes and continuities in global education and development policies since the 1960s, while also touching on the present state of public education in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. It closes by reflecting on education’s double-edged nature as it relates to the problem of freedom: Does education emancipate, or oppress?
In the aftermath of the assassination of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson in December 2024, everyday Americans took to social media to share stories of the challenges they'd faced trying to navigate the American health insurance system. Why did this event strike such a nerve with the American public? For a topic as central to the lives of Americans as health care, there is no book that examines the impact of coverage denial, whereby health insurers decide whether to cover health services that appear to be within the scope of a plan's benefits – not until now. In Coverage Denied, health policy professor Miranda Yaver offers a sobering account of the ways in which coverage denials damage patient health and exacerbate inequalities along income, education, and racial lines. Combining rich interview material with original survey data, Yaver draws critical attention to the tens of millions of medical claims denied by health insurers every year, shining a necessary light on our inequitable health care system.
Though coverage denials and delays impose on physicians and patients (especially marginalized patients) substantial administrative burden, the persistence of this practice is inevitable. Drawing on interviews with patients and former health insurance executives, this chapter reflects on harms caused by prior authorization and offers a menu of state and federal solutions to expand access to care, while also reflecting on how the 2024 election results impact their likelihood. A growing complication is major insurers’ increasing reliance on AI tools to process prior authorizations and claims in seconds. Though many states have sought to lessen prior authorization burden in targeted ways, this reach is limited because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act preempts state policies that “relate to” much of employer-sponsored health insurance. Despite some appetite for reform in Congress, legislative efforts have stalled. The 2024 election results signal a likely acceleration of America’s reliance on privatization (especially Medicare Advantage), so it is especially important to understand the impact of these managed care practices and ways to mitigate their burdens.
Health insurance barriers are a uniquely American experience arising from decades of political choices pushing the United States toward increased privatization of health insurance. Despite notably high health care spending, many Americans face coverage denials and delays, which are a little-discussed dimension of underinsurance. These coverage barriers arise out of managed care practices such as prior authorization, or required health insurer pre-approval for prescribed care. This practice proliferated as American health reform efforts accelerated reliance on privatization, in which health insurers seek to not only contain costs but maximize profits. Tracing the history of health reform and successive choices favoring managed care, this chapter shows that Americans’ everyday struggles with their health insurers are actually the product of intentional political choices that keep care out of reach. Assessment of medical necessity is likewise political and allows for insurer discretion that impedes patients’ access to care. However, rather than containing costs, prior authorization can ultimately shift costs from insurers to patients (especially marginalized patients) and their physicians.
The privatization of rights and obligations of states under the influence of international organizations (IOs) is a challenge for international law. The difficulty resides in the lack of a clear public status of those organizations. This article purports to identify an ‘international public law’ of both states and IOs. Only such a law could indeed institute international organizations as ‘public’ institutions of their member states’ peoples and thereby ‘reinstitute’ those peoples. The article’s first section presents an institutional-normative account of publicness. A second section presents how, even though an international law ‘of the public’ gradually developed after the nineteenth century, that public dimension was never very strong, not the least because of the role played by IOs. The third section explains indeed how, due to IOs’ construction as functional and apolitical organizations and the private law analogies that have dominated their organization, the international law of IOs quickly turned into a vector of public/private hybridization of both states and IOs. To address this challenge, the fourth section argues not only for a general and minimal common public status of IOs under international law, but also against quick analogies with states’ sovereign rights and obligations. To help consolidate the proposed distinct albeit continuous public status of IOs, the fifth section spells out what could be the common but differentiated public rights of states and IOs which may not be conferred to private persons, and their common but differentiated public obligations that could set limits on the private exercise of these rights.
Chile’s pension privatization represents one of the most radical neoliberal experiments in social security reform, reshaping welfare from a collective right into a market-driven, property-based entitlement. This Article examines how the constitutionalization of pension privatization entrenched inequalities, shielding the system from democratic contestation and embedding a logic of over-propertization, where private property rights supersede social rights. Drawing on a Law and Political Economy (LPE) approach, explicitly concerned with the distributional consequences of legal design, this study traces how, during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–90), Chile’s 1980 Constitution, and Decree Law 3500 institutionalized financialization and individual responsibility, transforming social security into an asset class managed by private pension fund administrators (AFPs). By legally structuring private capitalization accounts as financial assets with attributes such as ownership, transferability, and enforceability, these frameworks granted private actors control over investment management and risk distribution. The analysis highlights challenges to reversing this model, as judicial claims, pension fund withdrawals during COVID-19, and two failed constitution-making processes reveal legal and political constraints on reform. It examines legislative efforts, judicial interpretations, and collective mobilizations—such as the No+AFP campaign—seeking to restore solidarity. It also explores legitimation strategies, including the discourse of “popular capitalism” and the institutional entrenchment of AFPs within Chile’s political economy. By framing pension privatization as a constitutional and legal project rather than mere economic policy, this Article underscores the global consequences of over-propertization and the urgency of reimagining social rights. In doing so, it contributes to a growing body of LPE scholarship that treats constitutions as terrains of economic power, exposing how legal frameworks both encode and contest neoliberal orders.
The legal theory of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) posits that SOEs persist due to legal failures rather than market failures. It views privatization fundamentally as a process of legalization rather than liberalization. Privatization does not always suggest the state’s withdrawal from private sectors; in many cases, it is accompanied by expanded or stricter regulatory oversight. This perspective generates two implications. First, the successful reform of SOEs depends on the state’s ability to clearly define its control and establish institutions that deter opportunistic actions. A judiciary capable of effectively distinguishing between government opportunism and the legitimate exercise of power – thereby restraining abuse of power while upholding lawful decisions – is crucial. Second, if the government can develop effective regulation of private firms without ownership, the need for maintaining SOEs diminishes. Given the advantages of private firms in terms of ownership costs, further investment in developing robust legal and regulatory institutions could promote social efficiency by reducing the role of SOEs.
Despite sustained efforts to privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across various sectors in China, they continue to play a significant role in certain industries. Existing scholarship has yet to provide a fully satisfactory explanation for the historical development and sectoral distribution of SOEs. Economists frequently argue that SOEs serve as tools for addressing market failures, while others interpret them as outcomes of political decisions shaped by ideology and interest group dynamics.
This book advances a legal theory of SOEs, asserting that prevailing accounts are incomplete. Market failures, after all, can also be addressed through regulatory measures. The more pertinent comparison, therefore, is between the use of SOEs and the use of regulation. When regulatory costs are high, SOEs are more likely to arise, endure, and resist privatization.
Social reproduction scholars have made headway in integrating the analysis of capitalism, class, gender, and care. We offer two contributions to this literature. First, we provide a novel framework with insights into companies as sites of decommodification, shaping childcare cost distribution and affecting childbearing rates. Second, we extend social reproduction research geographically to the oft-overlooked region of Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe is home to 15 of the world’s 20 fastest-declining populations, with low fertility as a prime cause. We argue that privatization catalyzes commodification, raising work intensity and financial-temporal uncertainty and eroding collective resources for social reproduction, thereby impacting childbearing. We explore this mechanism quantitatively by employing four distinct definitions of privatization across two datasets: one covering 52 Hungarian towns (1989–2006) and another spanning 29 postsocialist countries (1989–2012). We shed light on the details of the mechanism through a qualitative analysis of 82 life-history interviews in four Hungarian towns, surveying the lived experience of privatization.
Rural income growth substantially slowed down in the 1990s, both relative to the growth rate in the 1980s and relative to contemporaneous GDP growth. This was the start of the phase of Chinese reform era in which the majority of the Chinese population gained a decreasing share of the GDP improvement. The pivotal moment was 1993–94, when China’s central bank recentralized finance and banned private finance. The Chinese state prioritized urban development at the expense of rural China. Rural enterprises began to falter owing to rising credit constraints. Capital constraints increased and labor adjusted in response and rural labor migration rose dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s, a development, while partially offsetting a broad rural plight, that was to leave a detrimental impact on rural human capital in the long run.
China’s gradual transition has avoided the economic collapse and stagnation caused by the shock therapy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but many problems arising during the rapid development are closely related to the incomplete SOE reform. The root cause of SOEs’ problems is the policy burdens. Privatizing SOEs without first addressing the policy burden would only exacerbate the problems. Therefore, the removal of policy burdens is the prerequisite for a smooth transition to a market economy.
Iceland's boom and bust replicate in miniature the causes, development and trajectory of the absolutely larger but proportionately smaller American boom and bust, except for Iceland's costly lack of a reserve currency and its banks’ preference not just for speculating in but also overpaying for shaky assets. In the aggregate, both the US and Icelandic economies sold short-term, passive, and liquid assets to the world, consumed part of that borrowing, and reinvested outward in fixed, long-term and active investments. The key differences between Icelandic and US banks are that Iceland's banks made their titanic gambles without the benefit of an international reserve currency. The United States survived its catastrophe and continues to have access to global credit markets without much penalty because the dollar is the international reserve currency. By contrast, Iceland has mortgaged its economy and economic independence for decades to bail out banks that had overpaid for dodgy assets.
Present day welfare societies rely on a complex mix of different providers ranging from the state, markets, family, and non-profit organizations to unions, grassroots organizations, and informal networks. At the same time changing welfare discourses have opened up space for new partnerships, divisions of labor, and responsibilities between these actors. For nonprofit organizations this means that they operate in complex institutional environments where different institutions and logics compete with each other. In this special issue we have collected a number of articles that analyze how organizations and organizational fields adjust to a new environment that is increasingly dominated by the logic of the market, and how in particular nonprofit organizations, as hybrids by definition, are able to cope with new demands, funding structures, and control mechanism.
Religion is now politically active in ways that until recently were unthinkable. Both in Europe and elsewhere in the world, there are numerous examples of how religion has left its previously assigned place in the private sphere, becoming in some cases an important contributor to various political issues, conflicts and competitions. To understand what has happened in this regard necessarily involves a remodelling and re-assumption of our understanding of the public roles of religious actors. Until the 1960s or 1970s, theories of secularization had long condemned religious actors in both Western and non-Western countries to social and political marginalization. Secularization theory maintained that as countries modernized, religion would lose its public centrality. But, as this did not happen, there is now a need to rethink the public role of religion. This article is concerned with this issue, with a focus on Europe, using democratization, democracy and civil liberties as key examples.
Social service contracting to nongovernmental organizations is popular form of privatization across the world. Although nonprofits are preferable social service providers for legal and normative reasons, governments in the United States increasingly rely on for-profit organizations to deliver social services. This trend warrants further exploration about whether nonprofits or for-profits perform according to theoretical expectations when they exist in the same market. This study employs qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine how sector-public, nonprofit, and for-profit-combines with structural variables to produce acceptable contract performance in juvenile justice programs. QCA is a discovery-oriented research tool that determines whether combinations of variables within cases produce a specific outcome and whether those combinations are consistent across cases. I find sector is not a necessary or sufficient predictor of acceptable performance on its own. Rather it combines with market factors to lead to acceptable contract performance. Combinations vary by sector, indicating that sectors behave differently in similar circumstances. The primary theoretical contribution of this paper is to provide a nuanced account of contract performance in mixed sector markets.
In Japan, a nonprofit organization system enacted in the late 1990s and the later introduction of privatization policies in human services were expected to overturn government dominance of nonprofit organization activities. By focusing on the long-term care insurance (LTCI) system, which privatized public human services for the first time in the country, this study empirically examines whether, and to what extent, nonprofit–government relationships in Japan have actually changed as a result of this new system. In addition, because LTCI newly allows for-profit organizations to provide services, the influence of such organizations were incorporated into the analysis. The outcomes of this study demonstrate that the government continues to extend its sphere of influence over nonprofit and for-profit organizations through LTCI. In addition, for-profit organizations appear to be more successful than nonprofit organizations, in that the former organizations have overcome their lack of experience as public service providers by taking over the roles that nonprofit organizations have traditionally occupied.