The study of European capitalism since 1945 has revealed three key findings. First, Europe’s governance of capitalism has been marked by four main periods: : 1) embedded liberalism (1945–73); 2) global attempts at mixed capitalism (1973–92); 3) high neoliberalism (1992–2016); and 4) the return of community capitalism since 2016. Second, Europeans have invented an original system to reach compromise between both states and the three types of capitalist governance, thereby offering choice, far from the image of a neoliberal technocratic dictatorship. The European Union is a mix between the influence of many countries, including Germany, France, and Britain, in addition to Italy and many others. Third, the trinity points to three alternatives that were – and still are – present: the neoliberal free-trade area, the socio-environmental alternative and the challenge of the return of community capitalism, between protectionist tensions, Fortress Europe and the possible hollowing out of the European Union from the pressure of growing nationalism.

This chapter examines the paradoxical success of the most demanding form of market integration, the Single Market established in 1992, which is based on the federalisation of numerous pieces of legislation. It is surprising that twelve European states, among the richest in the world, felt the need to link their markets so closely, even though they could have perfectly well continued alone. The creation of a unified market gradually became the central aspect of European cooperation between 1919 (when Keynes first aired his ideas on this topic) and 1957. The countermodel of the British-style free trade area (FTA) emerged as a major alternative but it failed. A genuine Single Market was established in the late 1980s. It had three striking features. First, it was put in place quickly between 1987 and 1992, enabling the unprecedented opening of the Union’s internal borders. Second, liberalisation was accompanied by enhanced regulation, in accordance with the oxymoron ‘freer market, more rules’, including a surprising rise of federal competition policy. Third, this move was opposed by several neoliberal figures, such as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the late 1980s.

Europeans promoted many alternatives to what became in the 1990s ‘neoliberal globalisation’. In the 1970s and 1980s, they promoted a vision of globalisation that was a compromise between liberty capitalism, solidarity capitalism, and community capitalism with its STABEX programme in 1975, which aimed to stabilise export revenue for some associated countries in the Global South. Thatcher’s policy with Nissan or shipyards shows that even a neoliberal leader such as she could practice neomercantilism, but in a much less systematic and showy manner than in Colbertist France. For all that, there was no common promotion of ‘European preference’, despite numerous talks. A minimal promotion of community capitalism emerged through the notion of ‘normative power’. The failure of the most ambitious projects should not obscure the weight of (often EC-level) protectionist regulations in numerous international markets during the 1970s and 1980s. This came in sectors such as agriculture, steel, textiles, and automobiles, before the advent of a more neoliberal form of globalisation after the completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986–1994).

In 1957 the Europeans created the European Economic Community, which is the basis for today’s European Union. Despite its name, this Community has not been able to promote communitarianism in the sense used in this book, namely a policy seeking to bolster the group. Creating a European organisation based on community capitalism has involved grappling with complex questions: who is a partner and who is a foe? Should Europeans companies be favoured or not? Should Europeans be capable of defending themselves independently, or through the US alliance? This chapter will show first that during the Cold War (1947–1991) defence and diplomacy were largely coordinated on a North Atlantic scale through NATO, despite numerous attempts to create a ‘European power’ (including with a nuclear arsenal). Second, some form of European protectionism nevertheless thrived in specific areas, such as agriculture and aeronautics, but surprisingly not in energy. Third, the ubiquity of national industrial policies led European institutions to counterbalance these policies through free-market rules rather than the creation of Europe-wide industrial policy.

The rise of community capitalism since the mid-2010s is reflected in the return of protectionism, authoritarianism, nativism, and violent conflict. European capitalism was forced to adapt by being more assertive. Europeans have embraced solutions that were previously refused as too protectionist, such as European preference, free trade contingent on adhering to social and environmental norms, subsidies to industry for strategic reasons, and competition policy decisions based on reciprocity. Some of these ideas were long defended by France. Germany previously criticised them, but has embraced some in trade since 2016, and others in foreign policy since 2022. The management of Brexit has reaffirmed the basis of European soft power, which depends on the unity of the Single Market. The Covid-19 pandemic (2020–21) forced the Union to adopt protectionist and interventionist measures. The Russo-Ukrainian War has led to very strong sanctions packages, as well as the Union’s foray into military matters. But the Europeans still remain heavily dependent on the US for defence. Donald Trump’s return to power in 2025 has forced Europe to think harder about organising community capitalism.

Chapter 4 first tackles the early reception of the concept of Weltliteratur in German criticism. I argue that these discussions, informed by the emergent economic and cultural nationalism of the 1830s-40s, offered a protectionist critique of free trade cosmopolitanism. Based on the conviction that untrammelled exchange assisted the exploitation of less developed trading partners, protectionists such as Friedrich List agitated for the temporary restriction of imports in support of domestic productive forces. Echoing these doctrines, world literature was associated with an overgrown translation industry that advanced the expansion of already hegemonic foreign literatures, wiping out demand for home-grown products in budding national markets. This combination of commercial self-protection and cultural self-defence was taken up in wider regions of East-Central Europe, especially in Hungary. The second part of the chapter discusses the shifting positions of world literature in Hungarian criticism between the 1840s and 1860s, as represented by the work of János Erdélyi and Hugó von Meltzl and their alternate strategies of self-assertion and self-expansion from a minor-marginal position.

This chapter examines the historical evolution of trade and globalization in Europe, focusing on the forces that have shaped trade patterns over time. It explores the impact of technological advancements, such as improvements in transportation and communication, as well as the influence of political decisions on trade policy, including cycles of protectionism and free trade. The chapter also discusses the economic benefits and challenges of globalization, analysing how trade has contributed to economic growth while also creating winners and losers within and between countries. The chapter argues that while globalization has generally increased economic efficiency, its effects have been unevenly distributed.

Focusing on the same period as Chapter 2, Chapter 3 treats economic history. It engages with recent historiographical debates regarding the late medieval economy, especially as those debates pertain to Catalonia. This chapter argues for a keenly felt decline, perceived by contemporaries and corroborated by the best available quantitative evidence, in the dominant sector of Perpignan’s economy, namely, cloth manufacturing. This chapter also argues for a surprising similarity in the Nou regiment’s and the Nova forma’s economic policies. Notwithstanding their different social profiles, both regimes sought to revive production and prosperity through traditional protectionism and anti-fraud regulation. This chapter argues that the surprising similarities in the regimes’ economic policies, and their inability to match the inventiveness displayed in matters of municipal government, reflect the power of cultural assumptions so deeply rooted that the desire for newness could not prevail against them: that production and prosperity were functions of honour; and that the greatest source of dishonour was fraud, which the town aspired to stamp out.

This chapter analyses Latin American trade policy trends from post-2008 to 2018 and offers in-depth case studies of Brazil and Mexico. At both aggregate and more detailed levels of analysis we document the significant rise in protectionism, and non-tariff measures (NTMs) in particular, in the decade following the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis. We focus on the preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that govern Mexico’s trade under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Brazil’s trade in the context of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). We report two main findings regarding Latin American trade and commercial policy trends in the 21st century. First, PTAs – long considered as key trade and investment-creating conduits – are now emerging as venues within which NTMs (e.g., non-transparent interventions, import bans, licensing requirements, controls on safety standards) are simultaneously increasing. That is, members within the same scheme are deploying NTMs against each other. The good news is that membership in these PTAs has mitigated some intra-bloc protectionism, albeit against a backdrop of rising NTMs within these PTAs, nonetheless. Second, the rapid trade and investment integration of China into Latin America markets since 2002 has directly shaped trade policy patterns and responses in this region. In the end, neither Brazil nor Mexico has risen to the occasion in terms of generating a pro-growth trade strategy that delivers compelling distributional and productive returns. Some of these shortcomings are due to path dependence within each PTA, as policymakers in both countries have failed to update approaches that have clearly failed to deliver over time. Outside of these PTAs, the stale macroeconomic response of each country to dynamic and competitive challenges emanating from the global economy risks an extenuation of long-term patterns of political and economic underperformance.

“Where are you really from?” This chapter takes a closer look at corporate nationality, the key element in geopolitical risk. Notwithstanding the challenges in defining a global company’s nationality, a firm’s country of origin will shape how it is treated in global markets. The chapter examines how corporate nationality shapes the manner in which companies compete, the resources they have access to, and whether it will be a source of advantage or disadvantage in global operations. For managers, an important question is whether they can shape others’ perceptions of their company’s nationality. Different approaches including masking, localization, transfer of control rights, and partnerships with foreign firms are discussed.

Accounts concerning the world trading system usually start the debate from the negotiation of the GATT. Trade integration before the First World War, though, had been quite remarkable, and the study of this era enriches our understanding of modern institutions in at least two ways. First, a number of GATT provisions had already been shaped during discussions following the advent of the League of Nations. Second, trade integration before the First World War did not manage to put a brake on belligerent behaviour, putting to rest the old Montesquieuan idea of doux commerce. Recent developments (like the invasion of Ukraine by Russia) can be analysed in this context, so that the world trading community can better grasp the limits of trade integration, and its impact on international relations.

Introduces the economic crisis that the US is currently experiencing and the reasons why industrial policy is the right solution to it.

Summarizes the industrial policies of the US from 1750 to 1865, especially the fact that the US was founded as a protectionist nation with active industrial policies.