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This chapter examines the historical evolution of trade and globalization in Europe, focusing on the forces that have shaped trade patterns over time. It explores the impact of technological advancements, such as improvements in transportation and communication, as well as the influence of political decisions on trade policy, including cycles of protectionism and free trade. The chapter also discusses the economic benefits and challenges of globalization, analysing how trade has contributed to economic growth while also creating winners and losers within and between countries. The chapter argues that while globalization has generally increased economic efficiency, its effects have been unevenly distributed.
While political opposition to economic globalisation has increased, several governments have adopted stricter unilateral interventions in global supply chains in the name of sustainability, despite their potentially significant economic costs. We argue that these policy choices are partly driven by politicians’ incentives to align with domestic public opinion. In particular, new information disclosure rules enable governments to implement market access restrictions compliant with binding trade liberalisation commitments while (a priori) obscuring their costs to voters. We assess the latter argument with original survey data and experiments with representative samples from the twelve major OECD importing economies (N = 24,000). Indeed, citizens expect substantive benefits while discounting costs from these new regulations, resulting in majority support for rather stringent standards. We further observe that these relationships are muted in countries with high trade exposure. These findings suggest that governments may strategically implement unilateral policies with high-cost obfuscation to garner domestic voter support, driving regulatory proliferation in international economic relations.
One of the objectives of the Trump administration’s economic policy is to revitalize the American industrial fabric and create a large number of high-paying blue-collar jobs. However, the main instrument used to achieve this goal – tariff protection – is a point of contention. We discuss the relevance of the recently introduced policy for an emblematic sector: the automotive industry. The latter operates highly integrated production chains where intermediate products frequently cross borders to circulate within a ‘Big Factory’ encompassing production sites located mainly in Mexico, Canada, and the USA, but also in other countries. The imposition of a 25% tariff on finished cars and their parts could lead to significant disruptions for consumers and producers alike. The lessons learned from the automotive sector retain much of their relevance for other areas of the US economy.
In the absence of a nationwide adequate solution, the lot of displaced workers could be improved through place-based workforce transition programmes limited to disadvantaged areas. Industrial policy measures targeting disadvantaged communities and regions could also be envisaged. In this case, however, it would be necessary to deploy a variety of instruments adapted to the circumstances and to take into account, as far as possible, the interests of trading partners in order to avoid conflicts.
Focusing on the same period as Chapter 2, Chapter 3 treats economic history. It engages with recent historiographical debates regarding the late medieval economy, especially as those debates pertain to Catalonia. This chapter argues for a keenly felt decline, perceived by contemporaries and corroborated by the best available quantitative evidence, in the dominant sector of Perpignan’s economy, namely, cloth manufacturing. This chapter also argues for a surprising similarity in the Nou regiment’s and the Nova forma’s economic policies. Notwithstanding their different social profiles, both regimes sought to revive production and prosperity through traditional protectionism and anti-fraud regulation. This chapter argues that the surprising similarities in the regimes’ economic policies, and their inability to match the inventiveness displayed in matters of municipal government, reflect the power of cultural assumptions so deeply rooted that the desire for newness could not prevail against them: that production and prosperity were functions of honour; and that the greatest source of dishonour was fraud, which the town aspired to stamp out.
Following the French example, the Meloni government has introduced the phrase ‘sovranità alimentare’ (sovereignty in food) into the title of the ministry of agriculture, and makes clear that it is engaging in a very determined effort to defend and promote the cultural heritage of Italian cuisine on all fronts, at home and abroad. But the origins of this impulse go back to the 1980s and the arrival of the McDonald’s hamburger chain, which gave birth to the Slow Food movement, now a global phenomenon. All this conceals several paradoxes: Italian cuisine has always been open to hybridised versions invented elsewhere (especially in America); production in key sectors, including wine, depends on large numbers of immigrant workers at a time when the government is trying to discourage immigration; and the ‘sovereignty in food’ concept unwittingly unites the government and some of its most radical opponents. But the very basis of this concept is challenged by the hyper-protectionist trade policy of the Trump administration.
Economists have modelled the economic rationale for intra-industry trade, yet political scientists largely have neglected it until recently. Every Firm for Itself explores how dramatic shifts in the way countries trade have radically changed trade politics in the US and EU. It explores how electorally minded policymakers respond to heavy lobbying by powerful corporations and provide trade policies that further advantage these large firms. It explains puzzling empirical phenomena such as the rise of individual firm lobbying, the decline of broad trade coalitions, the decline of labor union activity in trade politics, and the rising public backlash to globalization due to trade politics becoming increasingly dominated by large firms. With an approach that connects economics and politics, this book shows how contemporary trading patterns among rich countries undermine longstanding coalitions and industry associations that once successfully represented large and small firms alike.
This chapter analyses Latin American trade policy trends from post-2008 to 2018 and offers in-depth case studies of Brazil and Mexico. At both aggregate and more detailed levels of analysis we document the significant rise in protectionism, and non-tariff measures (NTMs) in particular, in the decade following the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis. We focus on the preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that govern Mexico’s trade under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Brazil’s trade in the context of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). We report two main findings regarding Latin American trade and commercial policy trends in the 21st century. First, PTAs – long considered as key trade and investment-creating conduits – are now emerging as venues within which NTMs (e.g., non-transparent interventions, import bans, licensing requirements, controls on safety standards) are simultaneously increasing. That is, members within the same scheme are deploying NTMs against each other. The good news is that membership in these PTAs has mitigated some intra-bloc protectionism, albeit against a backdrop of rising NTMs within these PTAs, nonetheless. Second, the rapid trade and investment integration of China into Latin America markets since 2002 has directly shaped trade policy patterns and responses in this region. In the end, neither Brazil nor Mexico has risen to the occasion in terms of generating a pro-growth trade strategy that delivers compelling distributional and productive returns. Some of these shortcomings are due to path dependence within each PTA, as policymakers in both countries have failed to update approaches that have clearly failed to deliver over time. Outside of these PTAs, the stale macroeconomic response of each country to dynamic and competitive challenges emanating from the global economy risks an extenuation of long-term patterns of political and economic underperformance.
“Where are you really from?” This chapter takes a closer look at corporate nationality, the key element in geopolitical risk. Notwithstanding the challenges in defining a global company’s nationality, a firm’s country of origin will shape how it is treated in global markets. The chapter examines how corporate nationality shapes the manner in which companies compete, the resources they have access to, and whether it will be a source of advantage or disadvantage in global operations. For managers, an important question is whether they can shape others’ perceptions of their company’s nationality. Different approaches including masking, localization, transfer of control rights, and partnerships with foreign firms are discussed.
Accounts concerning the world trading system usually start the debate from the negotiation of the GATT. Trade integration before the First World War, though, had been quite remarkable, and the study of this era enriches our understanding of modern institutions in at least two ways. First, a number of GATT provisions had already been shaped during discussions following the advent of the League of Nations. Second, trade integration before the First World War did not manage to put a brake on belligerent behaviour, putting to rest the old Montesquieuan idea of doux commerce. Recent developments (like the invasion of Ukraine by Russia) can be analysed in this context, so that the world trading community can better grasp the limits of trade integration, and its impact on international relations.
This article explores how capital-labor relations were conceptualized in late nineteenth-century protectionist thought. Taking as an example the American Protective Tariff League (APTL), a national protectionist pressure group that was heavily influenced by industrial interests and attempted to popularize protectionist ideas by issuing newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets, and posters, it reconstructs the arguments protectionist industrialists used in their agitation targeted at industrial workers. Following the protectionist wage argument, the APTL made the supposed wage benefit to laborers in protected industries the center of their argument. This wage argument was strongly intertwined with nativist and Anglophobic stereotypes. Further, the APTL proposed a unity of interests between capital and labor in tariff matters that hinged on a nationalist interpretation of economic matters, in which the American national economy was conceptualized as being endangered by imports and competition from other national economies but simultaneously as a harmonious cooperation of capital and labor on the inside. Analyzing the organized labor movement’s response to such claims, the article argues that this sort of agitation, while important to industrialists’ arguments, probably had little influence on workers and their stance on the tariff issue.
Summarizes the industrial policies of the US from 1750 to 1865, especially the fact that the US was founded as a protectionist nation with active industrial policies.
The U.S. is losing the competition for good jobs and high-value industries because most of Washington believes trade should be free, the dollar should float, and that innovation comes exclusively from the private sector. In this book, the authors make the bold case that these laissez-faire ideas have failed and that a robust industrial policy is the only way for America to remain prosperous and secure. Trump and Biden have enacted some of its elements, but it needs to be made systematic and comprehensive, including tariffs to protect key industries, a competitive exchange rate, and federal support for commercialization—not just invention—of new technologies. Timely, meticulously researched, and bipartisan, this impressive analysis replaces misunderstandings about industrial policy with lucid explanations of its underlying economic theory, the tools that implement it, and its successes (and failures) in America and abroad. It examines key industries of the past and future – steel, automobiles, television, semiconductors, space, aviation, robotics, and nanotechnology. It concludes with a realistic, actionable policy roadmap. A work of rigor and ambition, Industrial Policy for the United States is essential reading.
Chapter 1 is the introduction to the book. The chapter provides the background to the problem. The anti-dumping investigations are conducted with complicated procedural rules so that exporters cannot cooperate with the investigating authorities. Investigating authorities tend to inflate anti-dumping duties and use anti-dumping for protectionist purposes taking advantage of the non-cooperation. In this context, research questions are listed in connection to the main problem. The scope of the research is also set in Chapter 1.
Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that measures equivalent to a quantitative restriction shall be prohibited. The case law of the European Court of Justice interpreting this has addressed product standards, selling arrangements and all other kinds of national measures that might tend to hinder trade or affect consumer behaviour and thereby restrict imports. Relying on judge-made ideas such as mutual recognition and mandatory requirements, the Court has put the informed consumer at the heart of the market, at the expense of the paternalistic state. On the other hand, it recognises the need to restrict free movement where legitimate public interests are at stake, with the proportionality of such restrictive measures being the main question in most cases.
Doctrine became increasingly less important, giving way to the second form of the conservative quest: the turn to culture as the defining feature of Christianity. The third chapter traces the development of postliberalism through the lens of mainline Protestantism’s interest in the authority and interpretation of scripture, beginning with biblical theology and concluding with the postliberal project of theological interpretation of scripture. This development explains how the norms of Christianity became understood as cultural norms, thus paving the way for orthodoxy becoming a form of culture war.
This paper explores American tariff politics and the embrace of protectionism within the Ohio Valley in the two decades following the War of 1812. During these years, residents of the western states navigated the emergence of steam transportation, a growing number of state-chartered banks, and intense population growth. This fueled an economic boom that went bust during the Panic of 1819. Western farmers, merchants, and manufacturers blamed harmful patterns of trade for this economic crisis, which bolstered a distinct regional identity that embraced a properly constructed restrictive tariff as a “western” measure. Consequently, the decade of the 1820s featured the most sustained period of conflict over the tariff issue in the antebellum era. This article examines western participation in conflicts over commerce and roots the political economy of trade policy in changing economic conditions that inspired distinct northern, southern, and western perspectives on trade and economic development. I conclude that both protectionist claims to economic nationalism and free trade embrace of international exchange overlook the individual assessments of local and regional markets that set the terms on which participants in the tariff debates of the early republic imagined future development.
This chapter analyses macroeconomic policy, with a focus on monetary policy, relating it to the performance of the economy in Turkey in the Great Depression. The Depression was transmitted to Turkey primarily through a sharp decline in agricultural commodity prices. In response, the government adopted strongly protectionist measures starting in 1929 and pursued import-substituting industrialization. In contrast, Turkey’s macroeconomic policy was cautious. Fiscal policy adhered to the principle of balanced budgets. The policies of the new central bank, established in 1930, were similarly restrained: as a result, the monetary base increased very little before 1938. While this restraint resulted in some appreciation of the currency, Turkey’s economy did better than most others around the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter argues this performance was primarily due to strong protectionism, which paid benefits in the short run, and recovery in the agricultural sector.
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Part III
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Intersections: National(ist) Synergies and Tensions with Other Social, Economic, Political, and Cultural Categories, Identities, and Practices
The relationship between capitalism and nationalism escapes easy generalization – hardly surprising given the many conceptions of nationalism, and the many stages and varieties of capitalism. Let us begin, then, with some ideal-typical definitions.
Nationalism is a form of politicized ethnicity in which a self-identified cultural group seeks to create or succeeds in creating a nation-state of its own. It also refers to ideological goals and tangible policies oriented to the preservation or strengthening of the nation-state.
There are as many ways of defining capitalism as there are of nationalism. For our purposes, this definition is most useful. Capitalism is a political-economic system in which property rights are legally protected by the state, in which prices are set primarily by supply and demand in a market composed of profit-seeking entrepreneurs or companies, usually (but not always) employing free wage labor.
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Part III
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Intersections: National(ist) Synergies and Tensions with Other Social, Economic, Political, and Cultural Categories, Identities, and Practices
When Britain unilaterally embraced free trade in 1846, proponents at home and abroad widely assumed that the rest of the industrializing world would soon follow suit. But Britain’s economic cosmopolitan trump card received an unanticipated countermove from its competitors; one rival after another instead turned to economic nationalism in order to foster their infant industries at home and to expand their closed colonial markets abroad. Even Britain’s own settler colonies abandoned free trade by the turn of the century. Economic nationalism, not free trade, became the driving political economic force underpinning the century of imperial expansion from the mid-nineteenth century to the Second World War.
British free traders sought to curb this economic nationalist turn, and the United States, Britain’s resource-rich former colony, seemingly contained the most fruitful soil for free trade’s mid-nineteenth-century transplantation. All the early omens appeared promising.