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Moving beyond the structural antagonism of criminal law, this chapter explores the subject positions of actors in scenarios of sexual harm. If the sex offender emerges as a felon bearing the head of a wolf, the victimized white child emerges as the exemplary figure of vulnerability. While tropes of vulnerability are mobilized to justify paternalistic state coercion, they are also a powerful reminder of humans’ interdependence and mutuality. Thinking with vulnerability as an analytical category focuses attention on the lingering traumatic effects of sexual assault, as well as the severe punitiveness toward sex offenders. Addressing sexual violence does not require draconian penalties; conversely, addressing carceral expansion does not necessitate minimizing sexual violence. Centering vulnerability may allow us to rethink the foundations of our social contract in ways that acknowledge both our precariousness and the sovereign violence that holds us in its thrall.
Donelson argues that pragmatism is a valuable tool in our thinking about three issues surrounding punishment. The first is how punishment should be defined; he argues in favor of understanding punishment in terms of practical criteria, e.g., ensuring that the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is interpreted in a just fashion. The second issue concerns debates about policing and prisons; Donelson argues that pragmatism, and in particular James’s pragmatic method, can help reframe those debates. He describes the respective positions of reformers and abolitionists and suggests, from a Jamesian deflationary perspective, that the reform-versus-abolitionist debate should be approached as a debate over how we should think and speak about policing and imprisonment. The third issue is how best to understand “mass” incarceration. Donelson’s view is that the concept of mass incarceration is normative and that natural facts alone cannot settle the question of what levels of incarceration count as mass and what levels count as unproblematic; on his view, we cannot understand whether a given level counts as mass incarceration without assuming some normative criterion.
The treatment of alleged “spiriting” victims in London courts versus colonial American courts further reveals presumptions of consent to work. The lower courts in London offered redress to people targeted by illicit transatlantic servant brokers when they escaped before transportation. Early modern notions about how people’s behavior flowed from their intentions meant that contemporaries sympathized with rescued or escaped spiriting victims in London precisely because they had avoided transportation. By contrast, spirited servants who arrived in the colonies struggled to shift the perception that the mere fact of their arrival indicated that they had wanted to come. The colonial magistrates presumed that newly arrived servants had been complicit in their own transportation and oversaw the belated creation of servants’ indentures. Far fewer servants found redress for spiriting in the colonies than in London, because of this presumption and further procedural obstacles.
This chapter explores, in a roundabout way, whether Kant’s legal philosophy relies on his mature ethics of autonomy and respect. The normativity of the law must be externally enforced by coercive measures. The proportionate and credible threat that transgressions will be punished acts as a deterrent and make the rights of individuals comparatively secure – the law is occasionally broken. Now, the Kantian state does not concern itself with why in particular citizens break or comply with the law. In that sense, Kant’s philosophy of law does not rely on his ethical theory or moral psychology. But agents must be in a position to comply with the law. They must face a meaningful choice, which can only be secured by the availability of the motive of ethics: respect for the law. Without respect, agents would be exposed to prudential considerations only. Those who break the law take their criminal act to be prudentially justified. Viewed from this limited perspective, their actions turn out to be imprudent if they are punished for them. But punishability and imprudence are different. So, making what the law prohibits properly illegal requires an ethical foundation after all.
If Kant’s Doctrine of Right is an integral part of his moral philosophy and thus the categorical imperative is the basis of his Universal Law of Right, then this Law of Right must be derived from the Universal Law of Morals due to the provisions of Kant’s concept of Right. This chapter shows how this works in the framework of the natural law tradition.
In 1651 Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan announced that the ‘question…by what door the Right, or Authority of Punishing…came in’ was one of ‘much importance’. In this he echoed Hugo Grotius who, while differing from Hobbes in the answer he provided, had written in 1625’s De Jure Belli ac Pacis [The Rights of War and Peace], that the ‘Origine and Nature’ of punishment had been ‘misunderstood…[giving] Occasion to Many Mistakes.’ This right to punish was seen by early modern political thinkers as needing justification. This was particularly true in the context of voluntarist models of legitimacy according to which individuals chose to become members of the political community and the right to enforce obedience wielded by the governors of these communities had its roots in the equal and natural rights of subjects themselves.
In this innovative history, Liang Cai examines newly excavated manuscripts alongside traditional sources to explore convict politics in the early Chinese empires, proposing a new framework for understanding Confucian discussions of law and legal practice. While a substantial number of convict laborers helped operate the local bureaucratic apparatus in early China, the central court re-employed numerous previously convicted men as high officials. She argues that convict politics emerged, because, while the system often criminalized individuals, including the innocent, it was simultaneously juxtaposed with redemption policies and frequent amnesties in pursuit of a crime-free utopia. This dual system paralyzed the justice system, provoking intense Confucian criticism and resulting in a deep-seated skepticism toward law in the Chinese tradition, with a long-lasting political legacy.
The concept of mercy is often proposed as an antidote to the punitive excesses of our current criminal justice system. But this concept is typically presented in generalized, abstract terms that seem unworkable as a pragmatic decision strategy. Its religious origins and associations only add to this impression. In fact, however, if the biblical accounts of mercy are interpreted using the narrative strategy that is featured in current scholarship, an eminently practical decision protocol emerges from these accounts. This protocol diverges from the common or popular view of mercy. It omits the demand for contrition or gratitude on the part of the wrongdoer, viewing this as an effort to exercise domination rather than extending mercy, and minimizes compassion on the part of the decision maker due to its tendency to merge into favoritism. Instead, the protocol recommends that the decision maker deal with the wrongdoer on a direct personal level, suppress any emotional responses such as anger or indignation, and consider the collateral consequences of the proposed punishment. The author describes the way the protocol can be derived from leading biblical narratives about mercy, including the expulsion from the garden, the mark of Cain, Christ and the adulteress, and the prodigal son. He expands on this derivation by analyzing the book of Jonah, rejecting the common view that this work is a satire and treating it instead as a profound inquiry into the nature of mercy. He concludes by applying the protocol he has derived to policy level decisions in the criminal justice system, specifically judicial sentencing, administrative parole and the use of restorative justice.
Voluntary sector and non-profit studies require theoretical frameworks facilitating better understandings of what occurs on the ground. Following Lipsky’s (Street-level bureaucracy: dilemmas of the individual in public service, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1980) formulation of street-level bureaucracies, scholars have emphasized workplace hierarchies, reproducing dichotomous ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ conceptualizations of practice which can obscure the full complexity of practitioners’ workplace relationships. In this paper, we offer a thematic model of (collective) action that centres the ‘division of labour’ across, and relations between, professional niches that are differentiated by their ‘helping’ orientations, workplace tasks, and responsibilities to service users rather than their organizational status or salaries. We mobilize qualitative research undertaken in the penal voluntary sectors of Canada and England to highlight the mutually constitutive efforts of frontline and management work with criminalized service users. Drawing on and extending Alinsky’s ‘river dilemma’, we conceptualize practice in the (penal) voluntary sector as organized according to the differing choices practitioners make about whom to ‘help’ and how to intervene, which have consequences for social policy, service delivery, and advocacy work.
Contemporary understandings of torture are ruled by a medico-legal duopoly: the language of law (regulating definition and prohibition) and that of medicine (controlling understandings of the body in pain). This duopoly has left little space for contextual conceptualisation – of ideological, emotional and imaginational impulses which function in readily recognising some forms of violence and dismissing others. This book challenges the rigour of this prevailing duopoly. In its place, it develops a new approach to critique the central scripts of 'law and torture' scholarship (around progress, violence, evidence and senses). Drawing on socio-legal and critical-theoretical scholarship, it aims to 'widen the apertures' of the dominant dogmas to their interconnected social, political, temporal and emotional dimensions. These dimensions, the book advances, hold the key to more fully understanding not only the production of torture's definition and prohibition; but also its normative contestation – to better grasp whose pain gets recognised and redressed and why.
Chapter 7 culminates in 1848 with a study of Mexican women’s varied strategies in dealing with the occupation. It argues that US officers and enlisted men misunderstood women’s actions in war to characterize Mexican women as affectionate friends, and surveys the harmful consequences of that misconception. The core cultural belief that the army protected women was powerful enough that soldiers were unable or unwilling to see what was in front of them: pervasive evidence of women’s combatancy. The chapter concludes by uncovering the violence of protection – how army depictions of Mexican women as nonthreatening and sexualized allies both generated violence against women and encouraged officers to exclude evidence of that violence from official records.
Legitimizing property rights over the resources that participants use in dictator and ultimatum games has been shown to significantly alter behavior. However, a similar impact has not been observed in public good experiments. We employ an interior public good design with thirty periods of peer punishment, which allows groups to choose between plausible contribution norms without conflicting with efficiency. Across our Unearned and Earned treatments, endowments are randomly allocated or earned through a real effort task. In Unearned, both High and Low types adhere to a norm of contributing an equal proportion of one’s endowment. In contrast, in Earned, only Low types adhere to the proportional contribution norm, while High types contribute less than an equal proportion. Notably, deviations from the proportional contribution by High types are punished significantly less in Earned, suggesting a greater tolerance to such deviations when property rights are earned.
This paper examines the consequences of post-release management programs, arguing that these initiatives extend penal power beyond formal sentencing through mechanisms such as surveillance, discretionary policing, and information sharing. While prolific offender programs are framed as risk-management strategies rather than punishment, they operate in ways that mirror carceral control, restricting autonomy and increasing individuals’ susceptibility to criminalization. Drawing on qualitative interviews with crime analysts and police officers, I analyze how the prolific label structures police interactions, justifies heightened scrutiny and reinforces recidivist assumptions that shape sentencing and enforcement decisions. The findings challenge clear-cut distinctions between carceral and non-carceral interventions, highlighting how penal control functions fluidly across legal and administrative domains. By linking empirical findings to broader theoretical discussions of punishment, surveillance, and risk governance, this study contributes to ongoing debates on the expansion of state power in contemporary criminal justice.
This chapter compares the impact of different regulatory tools (command and control, mandates, and incentives relative to reasoning, honesty oath, and nudge) on the crowding out of different types of intrinsic compliance motivations.
The pursuit of social justice in penal matters has regained momentum in Anglo-American criminal law debates. Among the various areas of discussion, a contentious issue is whether the social hardships that contribute to much criminal offending should be considered in the adjudication of criminal responsibility. Against this backdrop, this paper defends the position that chronic – ie long-lasting and ongoing – situations of social adversity can, in principle, warrant consideration in determinations of guilt. It therefore advances a proposal for a situational partial excuse (SPE) applicable to cases where criminal conduct is precipitated by conditions of chronic social adversity that unfairly diminish a person’s opportunity to do otherwise. Importantly, the proposed excuse also accounts for the compounding role of both state and societal neglect in diminishing an individual’s opportunities and resources to avoid wrongdoing. To this end, the paper integrates normative analysis with modern empirical insights into the relationship between adverse social contexts and crime, including through mechanisms of traumatic stress. It then elaborates the theoretical and doctrinal foundations of the SPE, articulates its statutory and evidentiary requirements, and discusses its coherence with core sentencing considerations.
This chapter describes the development towards more substantial legislative activity and governmental involvement in financial conflict resolution, with special attention to the Low Countries. While execution procedures once had a strong individual focus, over time creditors’ rights were increasingly balanced by collectivizing legal solutions. For a long time, legal solutions for insolvency strongly criminalized the insolvent (then called bankrupt, fallitus), seeking to stimulate honest and prudent conduct among citizens by deterrence. The failure to fulfil one’s obligations was indiscriminately punished by shaming rituals in many parts of Europe. While these defamatory practices proliferated well into the early modern period, they seem to have disappeared from the legal treatment of insolvencies in seventeenth-century Amsterdam. This signifies a crucial change in public mentalities, which allowed for the introduction of a more lenient and efficient insolvency regime.
In what ways, if any, do justice-involved Black women make political demands? How do they understand their role and rights as citizens? Previous work has focused on identifying forms of political behavior, both formal and deviant (i.e., resistance, subversive acts), and the degree to which different groups participate in these behaviors. Few studies have focused on the sensemaking and ideologies likely motivating the behavior of justice-involved Black women both within and outside the formal political realm (e.g., elections). Drawing on the responses of Black women residents of an urban prison reentry facility, this article illustrates how this group engages in what we describe as “political claimsmaking,” a type of deviant discourse in which participants negotiate the power dynamics informing their social reality to make political demands. Further, we argue that while this political claimsmaking acts as a form of resistance and assertion of citizenship, it is simultaneously a form of inequitable political labor. Understanding Black women’s political claims, and the labor involved in making them, has serious implications for imagining more liberatory futures in which the benefits associated with citizenship are more freely accessed.
Dubbed ‘the Impaler’ by his contemporaries, Vlad III Dracula (c. 1431–76), was accused of the slaughter of between 40,000 and 100,000 individuals, 20,000 of them allegedly impaled at the Wallachian capital Targovişte. Although historians have often considered these figures inflated, none of the numerous studies dedicated to the voivode of Wallachia have undertaken a methodical evaluation of the extent of this exaggeration. This article takes up this historiographical challenge by examining all available documentation. In so doing, it provides a full reassessment of the practice of impalement in fifteenth-century south-eastern Europe. Contrary to assumptions of previous scholarship, Vlad’s use of impalement was influenced simultaneously by pre-existing Hungarian and Ottoman practices. Quantitative analysis shows that only 7–10 per cent of the impalements claimed by sources can be considered plausible and proposes a new data-driven estimation of Vlad’s impaled victims. Finally, a comparison with other rulers shows that, while Vlad ordered collective impalements more frequently, the average number of victims per impalement was similar to that elsewhere in south-eastern Europe.
This chapter shows that the faculty of the will was presented as a ubiquitously dangerous facet of selfhood in Elizabethan and Jacobean plays, when used to gratify selfish or sinful desires. ‘Punishing the Transgressive Will’ explains how this convention helped define how the limitations of human ambition and the boundaries of moral transgression were depicted. I do so primarily through a comparative analysis of the notorious acts of wilfulness performed in Christopher Marlowe’s Tamburlaine the Great, Dr Faustus, and Elizabeth Cary’s The Tragedy of Mariam. Enticing as it was dangerous, the capacity for the will to incite violence or disorder was commonly shown to be the primary cause of its own ruin. This literary topos is, however, importantly refuted in Cary’s play through the character of Salome. Among all of the excessively wilful characters who feature in Renaissance drama, Salome proves to be an exceptional type of Neo-Senecan villain whose will functions without limit: her will is not self-defeating, nor is she punished for exercising it. I propose that Salome’s fate can help to redefine our understanding of transgressive acts in Renaissance tragedies.
Culture consists of practices – behaviour patterns – shared by members of a group. Some attempts to demonstrate evolution of cultural practices in the laboratory have shown evolution of material products, such as paper aeroplanes. Some attempts have shown evolution of actual group behaviour. The present experiments demonstrated evolution of group coordination across generations in punishing defection in a public-goods game. Cost of punishing defection varied across replicates that consisted of series of groups (generations) of 10 undergraduates each. Each generation played the game anonymously for 10 rounds and could write messages to the other participants and punish defection every round. The effectiveness of punishment depended on the number of participants choosing to punish. In Experiment 1, cultural transmission from generation to generation consisted of written advice from one generation read aloud to the next generation. In Experiment 2, transmission from generation to generation consisted of having some participants return from the previous group. The cost of punishing varied across replicates: zero, one, two or five cents. In both experiments, the evolution of altruistic punishing was strongly dependent on the cost of punishing. The results add to plausibility of studying evolution of complex behaviour patterns like cooperation in the laboratory.