This chapter highlights the parameters of modernity, because democracy today cannot rest on earlier practices created for small cities, like Athens, in the ancient world. Therefore, in 1917 and 1919, the German sociologist Max Weber described two new vocations, of “Science” and “Politics,” as characteristic of societies that grew out of the Enlightenment. “Scientists” used instruments and experiments to discover “knowledge” more reliable than “opinion.” The result is that their work overthrew many traditional beliefs and led to “disenchantment.” “Politicians” arose because, when “subjects” became “citizens” in many Western states, they needed leaders and spokespeople who would help them to organize their sentiments and express their preferences. In which case, politicians, elected on behalf of voluntary support from below, ruled on the basis of “tradition,” “legality,” or “charisma.” Weber’s terms overlooked at least two large problems. Charismatic politicians could break the “iron cage” of “bureaucracy,” but, as “demagogues,” they could also lead voters in undesirable directions. Voters, perhaps advised by scholars, would have to resist being led astray, but Weber said nothing about how they, in effect, should exercise a third new “vocation” in modern societies. Citizens were not present before the Enlightenment; they are everywhere now. What are they supposed to do? Weber did not say.

This chapter investigates the role of science and technology as a function of the history of the World War II effort to transform national security resource and acquisition under Vannevar Bush at MIT, its effects upon American society as President Eisenhower warned the nation in 1961, and the later forces of globalization, the knowledge economy and accelerating emerging and disruptive science and technology as applied to war and terror today. Important is our understanding of our application of a specific logic to war and terror after 9/11; forward deployment of American military power overseas and homeland security (defense of the homeland) for the purpose of understanding the rapid evolution of technological capability in achieving outcomes. Furthermore, we will look more specifically at emerging science and technology as a particular area of technological innovation that stems from research and development phenomena that is tasked to provide outsize national security, specifically counterterrorism deliverables for the United States.

This chapter discusses the Renaissance sensibility for order, symmetry and the elevation of the individual as an originating cause. Through Ruskin, then Heidegger, comes a discussion of how humans relate to things as equipment, as tools, how these relational and regional settings are those to which all craft work adheres, and how, nevertheless, we can be unhomed from such. There is a focus on the work of the potter Gillian Lowndes as an exemplar of this unhoming.

de Waal considers both Christian fundamentalism and pragmatism as competing responses to what Nietzsche called “the death of God”: the demise of the concept of God that was central to both science and philosophy in the modern era. de Waal provides an account of the relation among religion, science, and philosophy from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century that culminates in the demise of the idea of God as an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent creator and in science inheriting the social prestige that was once religion’s. The fundamentalists responded by maintaining that the only good science is that which is consistent with Scripture – unlike, e.g., the theory of evolution. Pragmatists responded by embracing the new science and responded to it with a passel of new philosophical ideas, e.g., Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, conceived as a test of meaningfulness for our concepts; his critical common-sensism, which allows us to take a critical position with regard to our common-sense beliefs; James’s denial of a ready-made world and his doctrine that it is sometimes permissible to believe in the absence of evidence; and fallibilism, which denies the possibility of certainty.

By the end of the nineteenth century, British-ruled India faced an ecological crisis due to the extension of cultivation, deforestation and desiccation. Famines since the 1870s had led to a decline in population in some regions. While colonial authorities attributed the famines to climatic factors, others held taxation, institutional reforms and economic policies responsible for these disasters. Colonial science emerged as a significant tool in managing and monitoring environments at the same time. The chapter examines the interlinked economic and ecological history of India in these times and the responses by the British imperial authorities and scientists to the perceived crisis.

This chapter argues that Scottish author Naomi Mitchison’s 1962 novel Memoirs of a Spacewoman is an exemplary critical feminist utopia. Touching on many of the literary utopian genre’s foundational tensions and ambiguities, Mitchison’s novel offers readers a world of freely accessible abortions, inter-racial and multi-gendered parenting, queer and alien sexual practices, and universal child-led education. Despite the obviously utopian contours of this speculative narrative world, however, Mitchison’s narrative uses the utopian society for its backdrop of spacefaring alien adventure. By creating a utopian society, only to leave it behind as her protagonists visits stranger alien worlds, the chapter argues that Mitchison manages to maintain a focus on the utopian missing ‘something’, even whilst depicting a feminist utopia. Rather than arriving at a static utopian locus, Mitchison’s eponymous spacewoman journeys in an ongoing process of utopian searching, in which many of the literary genre’s pleasures and dangers are laid bare. With its focus on a female scientist attempting to avoid the harm historically perpetuated on alien flora and fauna by British colonial scientific institutions, Mitchison’s text reveals the utopian prospect of an anti-colonial feminist science.

This chapter is concerned with the decline of Greek and Roman poetry and the rise of European culture in the Middle Ages. The decisive difference between the ancients and the moderns concerns poetry in the widest sense, that is, the culture of beauty. A number of fragments address this difference. The significance of Christian hymns and the Psalms for the European nations is discussed, with particular attention to national traditions in music, language, and the sciences. A distinction is made between the way the northern and southern European traditions use tone and alliteration. The culture of Arabic is seen as a strong influence on the culture of medieval Europe, passing through Spain by way of the troubadours. The difficulties in defining national character or national poetry are discussed, and the value of medieval poetic arts in Europe is described as an awakening of independent thinking and unencumbered judgement. This makes the medieval poetic arts of Europe a gay science, an expansion of the fields of science, and a general unification of the nations.

This chapter will examine the notion of theology as a science in some summae from the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth century, exploring the works written both by secular masters and members of the religious orders.

Only two complete works on the philosophy of mathematics survive from Antiquity, Iamblichus’ De communi mathematica scientia and Proclus’ commentary on Euclid’s Elements Book I. Chapter 21 lists works by Proclus concerning mathematics and the sources he used in these works. Concentrating on Proclus’ commentary on Euclid, I describe his conception of the ontological status of the objects with which mathematics is concerned: these objects are originally concepts innate in human soul, forming part of its very nature, concepts which the mathematician then seeks to articulate, project, construct through various methods so as to constitute an elaborated science. I present also the distinctions made between the mathematical sciences and their methods, the importance of mathematics for other sciences (both superior and inferior to it), and Proclus’ relations with other mathematicians of his time.

The substantive discussion begun in Chapter 2, particularly on interpretation, is continued in Chapter 3 through the prism of progress. Collective understandings of state violence, including torture, are understood to have changed over time, with what was historically conceived as permissible coming to be condemned as reprehensible. Changing understandings of pain and punishment, it is argued, are sociopolitically contingent, with legal assessments of torture too beholden to this broader context. On this register, the chapter charts the broader contours of the central shifts in prevailing social and scientific views, values and knowledge, as channelled or challenged through judges and taken to constitute torture’s sociality. This has culminated, it is argued, in a script of ‘progress’ driving the anti-torture field.

This concluding chapter elaborates on the main themes that have run through this book. It argues for the unity of knowledge in the natural sciences, the arts and humanities, and the hard and soft social sciences (section 1); discusses eclecticism and experimentalism as a compelling intellectual response to navigating the risk-uncertainty conundrum (section 2); illustrates different forms of coping with the risk-uncertainty conundrum with the help of punditry, scenarios, and forecasts (section 3); draws out the implications of the complementarity of risk and uncertainty for moral luck, policy, and pragmatism (section 4); and, returning to worldviews, points to the affinities that science and religion share in our coping with the risk-uncertainty conundrum (section 5).

This chapter describes the excitement surrounding scientific progress as a driver of medical progress in the Cold War and subsequent theoretical and practical challenges. Medicine, for skeptical theories, was a powerful example that there is no such thing as knowledge that continually approaches the truth, that even the body is historical, and that knowledge is always a tool of the powerful. From the medical side, some respondents were adamant that scientific knowledge about the body is “real” and that medicine is uniquely immune to uncertainties inherent in relativistic accounts of knowledge. The chapter concludes by analyzing two recent examples, evidence-based medicine and health artificial intelligence, which have been praised as objective examples of a particular kind of medical knowledge progress. Throughout, I show the implications for medical progress of larger debates about the progress of knowledge, as well as how an excessive focus on biomedical knowledge gains neglects other, important dimensions of progress.

This chapter examines the assumptions, concepts, and narratives historians use to study US relations with the natural world: with biological and chemical agents, environmental and physical phenomena, natural resources, and plants, animals, and microbes. Looking beyond the experiences and activities of human beings, it asks how non-human actors and forces can help explain the history of foreign relations. It surveys some of the key medical, scientific, and environmental issues that have shaped the history of foreign policy and international affairs, with an eye toward the methods scholars can employ to analyze these topics most profitably. Although studying these subjects can present methodological challenges, this chapter offers tools and strategies for overcoming those potential roadblocks. Becoming more attuned to medical, scientific, and environmental topics, as the chapter shows, challenges our assumptions about foreign relations in productive ways, offering fresh perspectives on conventional narratives and novel ways of studying the past.